Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09PARIS637, SCENESETTER FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY TALKS IN PARIS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PARIS637.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PARIS637 2009-05-11 11:59 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0637/01 1311159
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111159Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6207
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0001
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0921
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0784
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0220
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1709
S E C R E T PARIS 000637 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019 
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR FR AF PA KN MN SR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY TALKS IN PARIS 
MAY 14, 2009 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark Pekala, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  French officials view the upcoming 
continuation of the 2 plus 2 political-military talks, 
initially launched in November of last year, as an important 
affirmation of the new administration's desire for increased 
bilateral cooperation and coordination with France on major 
global challenges.  This cable provides an overview of French 
positions on key issues on the proposed agenda.  The planned 
May 14 discussions give us an opportunity to press France for 
increased engagement in Afghanistan, including in civil 
reconstruction, and caution against a too precipitous 
drawdown in KFOR and EUFOR in the Balkans.  Further, we 
should push for French support in the Macedonia name dispute 
with Greece and be prepared for another French push for an 
OSCE summit to discuss European security issues with Russia. 
French officials may again request improving our bilateral 
intelligence cooperation in operational areas and support as 
French reintegration into the military command of NATO is 
implemented over the course of the next few months. Both of 
your interlocutors are well-established in their current 
positions and anxious for regular contact with new 
administration officials, both having already traveled to 
Washington in recent weeks.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AFGHANISTAN 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C/NF) French officials openly acknowledge that they must 
do more to explain to publics the importance of our mission 
in Afghanistan.  In recent months, GOF officials downplayed 
the possibility of additional French deployments in 
Afghanistan in an effort to de-link that conflict (which the 
public continues to view as an "American war") with the 
controversial return to NATO's integrated military command. 
In opinion polls, French citizens consistently disapprove of 
military deployments to Afghanistan while conversely 
expressing overwhelmingly support for civil initiatives aimed 
at institution-building and reconstruction.  Rhetorically, 
French officials, particularly FM Kouchner, fervently support 
the view that there is "no purely military solution to 
Afghanistan" and place a great emphasis on a comprehensive 
approach.  However, due to the current economic crisis, the 
fact is that France is more able to deploy military assets 
than financial or other assistance this year.  Elysee and 
military sources have confirmed to us that current French 
planning is to turn over RC-Capital to Afghan and other other 
allied forces this year, and then to rotate their RC-Capital 
troops to RC-East to join their maneuver battalion in Kapisa 
(which would further be quietly supplemented with the 
necessary enablers).  The goal is to make more French forces 
available for combat operations, without violating high-level 
public declarations by both the French Foreign and Defense 
Ministers that no "new" troops would be deployed to 
Afghanistan this year. 
 
3.  (C/NF) On the civil side, the GOF expects to provide 
approximately USD 40 million this year (an amount which was 
increased from the previously allotted USD 10 million for 
2009). In addition, current plans call for 150 French 
gendarmes to be deployed to Afghanistan by June as part of a 
300-man European Gendarmerie Force, to be placed under the 
authority of the recently approved NATO Training Mission for 
Afghanistan (NTM-A). The French plan is to initially deploy 
these civil forces in the Kabul region to ensure stability 
and then backfill when French troops rotate from the capital 
to deploy to RC-East.  The Elysee is also starting to look at 
the possibility of deploying additional OMLTs in response to 
President Sarkozy's unexpected offer to President Obama on 
the margins of the NATO summit.  Your meeting could be a good 
opportunity to push for a progress report and reiterate the 
standing need for additional OMLTs to mentor Afghan National 
Army units. 
 
4.  (C/NF) Given the French support for a more comprehensive 
approach to Afghanistan, your visit is a good opportunity to 
urge the French to think more creatively about how to bolster 
their civilian commitment, perhaps using military resources 
if that is where they have greater flexibility and capacity. 
France has consistently declined to stand up a PRT with their 
other troops because of ideological resistance to having 
civilians subordinate to military command.  However, post 
 
understands that this policy has lately been under review 
within the MFA.  France has a long history of incorporating 
development and reconstruction into its military missions in 
Africa, and these resources could be equally useful in 
Afghanistan.  A description of the U.S. Agri-business 
Development Team (ADT) model might help the French find 
creative ways to ramp up civilian assistance in Afghanistan. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BALKANS 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C/NF) In a January speech to parliament, PM Fillon 
identified deployments in the Balkans as areas for potential 
drawdowns in military forces as part of an overall French 
defense re-structuring mandated by the 2008 White Paper on 
Defense and National Security.  GOF officials are targeting 
KFOR on the grounds that Kosovo is now more stable and the 
situation no longer justifies maintaining such a large 
presence on the ground. Given French concerns about 
overstretched forces, officials are eager to shift KFOR 
troops to other greater needs -- in one recent meeting 
implying that resistance to downsizing efforts was coming 
more from some bureaucrats at NATO who do not want to reduce 
the KFOR presence for institutional reasons.  At the same 
time, GOF officials are sensitive to our arguments against 
"unilateral" recall of troops and your visit can help 
reinforce the message that France should engage in extensive 
consultations with NATO before any decision is taken.  France 
shares our concerns about recent violence against EULEX in 
Kosovo, but French officials have emphasized the difficulty 
of pressuring Belgrade further on Kosovo-related matters 
given the need for balance with reinforcing Serbia's EU 
orientation.  France is deeply unhappy with the Netherlands, 
insistent, "shortsighted" position of blocking Serbia,s 
Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) absent the arrest 
of Radko Mladic. 
 
6.  (C/NF) On Bosnia, France is eager to close down the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and 
transform it into an EU mission headed by the EU Special 
Representative (EUSR), based on the BiH government progress. 
Although the GOF continues to acknowledge the importance of 
Bosnia fulfilling the requirements laid out in the 5 plus 2 
agenda, France may seek to avoid a negative Peace and 
Implementation Council assessment of Bosnia,s stability and 
implementation of Dayton in order to support a quicker 
transition to a EUSR.  Although receptive to U.S. arguments 
against unilateral drawdowns of EUFOR to a training mission, 
GOF officials have recently warned us that current deployment 
levels are unsustainable and that delays in moving to the 
smaller training mission threaten European unity.  French 
officials view Bosnia as the best model of a transition from 
peacekeeping to nation-building, so are anxious to 
demonstrate visible progress. 
 
7.  (C/NF) On Macedonia, France has been unwilling to 
pressure its fellow EU member Greece to show greater 
flexibility on the name issue.  France is also interested in 
sales of military aircraft (Rafale fighters) to Greece, which 
makes them even less likely to intervene in this dispute.  FM 
Kouchner said publicly in 2008 that the burden lies on 
Macedonia, as the NATO aspirant, to display more flexibility 
than in the past to find a solution.  Our concern is that 
recent nationalist trends in Macedonia underscore the 
importance of reinforcing Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic 
orientation and the need for both states to show genuine will 
to resolve the issue and bring Macedonia into the NATO family. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (S/NF) A constant refrain in our high-level meetings with 
French officials is their request for increased intelligence 
cooperation, particularly in operational areas such as 
Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden.  While their requests for 
access to "four-eyes" information have been problematic, we 
may want to consider addressing French concerns with a more 
targeted approach.  Our understanding is that the French 
objective is twofold: to increase their situational awareness 
of opposing forces in the numerous operations that we 
undertake together; and to enhance the integration of French 
 
forces and individual staff officers within U.S. commands to 
a level that permits greater sharing of "friendly" 
operational information.  Access to U.S. intelligence, 
otherwise reserved for a small group of English-speaking 
countries, is only part of their aim.  They also seek the 
ability to integrate French officers into the staffs of U.S. 
commands (i.e. CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM, NAVCENT, CJTF-101) in 
a manner similar to the integration of Australian, Canadian, 
and British officers.  A top-down effort to review our 
bilateral intelligence cooperation, starting at the policy 
level with elaboration of their objectives and working 
downward toward the details of implementation, could help us 
better leverage French cooperation and intelligence capacity 
into a closer partnership with the U.S. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
CFE AND NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C/NF)  French officials at the highest levels are 
interested in the Obama administration's proposals to breathe 
new life into disarmament and security efforts.  Last year, 
President Sarkozy launched a proposal for an OSCE summit 
meeting to discuss a new European security architecture, and 
he remains very committed to the idea.  French officials 
argue that the summit proposal, which was developed on the 
margins of the EU-Russia summit last year without input from 
allies, was a necessary response to the original proposal by 
Russian President Medvedev for a meeting among Europeans to 
discuss security cooperation.  By anchoring the discussion 
within the OSCE, the French intent was to safeguard existing 
institutions and the importance of the transatlantic 
relationship in European security, while still acknowledging 
room for progress in other security instruments, such as CFE. 
 Paris strongly supported the Parallel Actions Package 
pursued since July 2007 to help overcome the impasse on the 
A/CFE treaty.  However, Russia's failure to implement the 
"Istanbul Commitments" of 1999 remains the key stumbling 
block, compounded now by its suspension of its treaty 
obligations for 16 months and its occupation of Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian parts of Georgia.  French officials are 
interested whether recent overtures to Russia, such as 
President Obama's announcement in Prague of plans to complete 
a new START treaty, are expected to positively impact 
security cooperation in other areas. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND TRANSFORMATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10.  (S/NF) Now that the formal debate over French 
reintegration into NATO has been concluded, French officials 
are focusing on the next steps in NATO -- including filling 
the command posts in the Allied Command Transformation in 
Norfolk and the regional Lisbon command.  The French military 
is expecting to increase its participation in NATO structures 
tenfold, including contributing an extra 20 million euros per 
year to the NATO budget and augmenting their presence by some 
1000 additional staff.  Rumors have floated (most appear to 
originate from internet sources) of possible French interest 
in transferring the Norfolk command to French territory.  To 
date, no French official has raised this possibility with 
post.  French support for NATO SYG-designate Rasmussen is 
high and they hope he will lead the continued reform of NATO 
into a more stream-lined, less bureaucratic, and more 
flexible alliance. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
11. (C/NF) GOF officials are looking forward to hearing the 
Obama administration's plans for missile defense.  In the 
past, Paris supported bilateral U.S. efforts to conclude 
missile defense agreements with Poland and the Czech 
Republic, but was reluctant to extend the system to all NATO 
members, largely on cost concerns.  France remains 
concentrated on its internal military restructuring reforms, 
laid out in the White Paper published last year and now 
incorporated into a draft budgetary law for 2009-2015.  That 
plan did not envisage a large cost outlay for missile defense 
and the frequent refrain that there is "not one euro" 
allocated to pay for missile defense is not expected to 
 
change in the current French budgetary environment.  That 
said, Paris remains interested in our plans and technology 
development and continues to evaluate the need for missile 
defense as we do, through the lens of concerns over Iranian 
proliferation. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
DPRK 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12.  (S/NF) In general, GOF officials strongly support U.S. 
non-proliferation initiatives, including using the Six-Party 
framework to hold North Korea to its commitment to verifiably 
eliminate all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs.  The April 5 DPRK missile test and expulsion of 
IAEA inspectors and the U.S. disablement team were equally 
worrisome to Paris, which supported the UN Security 
Council,s Presidential Statement condemning the launch and 
subsequent agreement by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee to 
designate additional banned weapons-related goods and to 
designate entities for an asset freeze. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
COMMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C/NF)  The fact that the new administration is willing 
to continue the bilateral political-military discussions 
launched last year is an important signal to Paris that 
France is a valued partner with a global reach.  Although the 
current budgetary environment and military constraints may 
limit France's willingness to commit to resource-heavy 
initiatives in the short-term, GOF officials are able to take 
the hard political decisions when necessary.  We saw this 
last year when President Sarkozy chose to deploy a French 
OMLT with Dutch troops in Uruzgan, despite the dire warnings 
against such a move based on military and force protection 
concerns.  This year, the Elysee is working quietly to try to 
move French troops based in Kabul doing security operations 
to a more critical combat role in RC-East, while still 
balancing previous political commitments.  The French want to 
be major players and your interlocutors on Thursday are 
pragmatic and results-oriented.  We look forward to seeing 
you later this week. 
PEKALA