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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0634
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: G/C OPPOSITION LEADER FRUSTRATED WITH 
CHRISTOFIAS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  "Demetris Christofias is focusing on the 
(anti-solution) minority, not the (pro-solution) majority," 
DISY Chairman Nikos Anastassiades bitterly complained to the 
Ambassador on May 11.  Anastassiades said that President 
Christofias was overly solicitous of his two hard-line 
coalition partners, Socialist EDEK and centrist DIKO, and 
failed to embrace or appreciate DISY's strong support for the 
ongoing UN-brokered peace process.  He criticized Christofias 
for the slow pace of negotiations and for the latter's 
penchant of seeking petty tactical (vice strategic) victories 
over the Turkish Cypriots.  The DISY leader also said that he 
was trying to meet with Turkish PM Erdogan (they met in 2005) 
to set up a channel of communication with AKP.  Anastassiades 
claimed he still hoped to form a common pro-solution front 
with Christofias and his Communist AKEL party, but hinted 
that his patience and ability to do so was limited by AKEL's 
hostility -- which in turn fueled his own internal party 
opposition within DISY.  End Summary. 
 
"We are building psychological walls" 
 
¶2. (C) Anastassiades expressed dismay over the tactics of 
both President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot (T/C) Leader 
Mehmet Ali Talat, especially their habit of launching verbal 
brickbats at each other via the press.  "We are building 
psychological walls," he complained, pointing out that 
Christofias's repeated public rejection of any continuation 
of Turkish guarantor powers in a reunified Cyprus, combined 
with Talat's insistence on them, made it nearly impossible to 
sell a compromise deal to the public.  Anastassiades said 
that he had, to no avail, implored each leader to reserve 
such battles for the negotiating table, not the press. 
However, he criticized Christofias particularly strongly for 
the slow pace of the process.  Christofias seemed to be 
slowing down the process on account of Turkey's EU accession 
review at the end of 2009, when he ought to be speeding the 
process up. 
 
¶3. (C) The DISY leader was especially vexed over 
Christofias's inability to hammer out a deal with Talat to 
open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point in western 
Cyprus, a long-time G/C demand and key confidence-building 
measure.  Anastassiades, who had spoken recently with UN 
Special Adviser Alexander Downer on the matter, said that he 
fully supported the UN plan to run electricity to the T/C 
enclave/military base of Kokkina (instead of allowing the 
T/Cs to transport fuel for generators) in exchange for 
opening the new crossing.  "We supplied free electricity to 
all of the north for twenty years, even to the army," he 
added.  Christofias had told Anastassiades that he still 
needed more time to sell the compromise to his 
solution-skeptical coalition partners EDEK and DIKO, however. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to Anastassiades's question, the 
Ambassador said that he believed Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots were ready to do a deal on Limnitis/Yesilirmak along 
the lines of the electricity proposal, although the sides 
still had to hammer out the details.  Turkish Cypriots were 
waiting for a detailed G/C offer, he added.  Anastassiades 
replied that opening this crossing point, as well as 
conducting a technical infrastructure survey of the abandoned 
G/C city of Varosha, were key to "breathing new life into the 
process." (Comment: The survey, a pet project of 
DISY-affiliated "exile" G/C Mayor of Famagusta Alexis 
Galanos, is a red flag for the Turkish military, which 
controls the abandoned city.  Galanos and other G/C mayors of 
the "occupied areas" will be in the Department shortly for 
CyProb-related meetings and likely will raise the matter.) 
The Ambassador told Anastassiades that we believed opening 
the crossing should now be only a question of finding the 
political will to do it.  The international community had 
weighed in with the Turks and gotten the answer from them 
that we wanted.  Varosha would be much more difficult, 
however. 
 
"Let's find a way to join forces" 
 
¶5. (C) Anastassiades said that his party still wanted to make 
common cause with the pro-solution AKEL in order to build the 
 
public momentum necessary to achieve a "yes" vote in a future 
referendum.  He said that he had even suggested to AKEL to 
"join forces" in explaining to the Greek Cypriots the 
benefits of a solution and the steps, often painful, they 
would need to take to reunify the island.  Unfortunately, he 
griped, AKEL was not reaching out to DISY; rather, the 
hard-left party was gripped by an "anti-DISY" complex. 
Anastassiades warned that he could not continue to pretend 
that AKEL was not staffing the bureaucracy with party hacks 
and conducting domestic policy anathema to DISY's free market 
principles.  He hinted that his own internal party opposition 
made his unrequited support of Christofias and AKEL's 
moderate Cyprus Problem approach increasingly untenable. 
 
Wants to Meet PM Erdogan 
 
¶6. (C) Anastassiades, who had met the Russian Ambassador 
earlier that morning, said he was trying, with the help of 
the Swedish Embassy, to meet Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in 
Turkey in the near future, a follow-up to their 2005 
encounter.  He noted that he used to meet with Erdogan and 
other AKP officials at gatherings of the European Peoples 
Party (EPP) political grouping, and he hoped to reestablish 
this contact after Erdogan stopped attending EPP events in 
¶2007.  AKP and DISY had agreed to exchange delegations, 
Anastassiades added, but were still working to "set up a 
channel."  The Ambassador said he would pass on this 
information to Embassy Ankara. 
 
Comment 
 
¶7.  (C) Anastassiades' frustration with President Christofias 
over the latter's inability (or refusal) to toe a bolder line 
in reunification talks for fear of alienating his 
anti-solution coalition partners is clearly growing.  The 
opposition leader's agitation during the meeting was 
noticeable; perhaps for dramatic effect, he even stopped 
mid-way to pour himself a large scotch (at noon, no less). 
Anastassiades's ability to encourage AKEL and Christofias to 
adopt a bolder approach appears extremely limited, however, 
absent a change of heart on the part of the President's 
erstwhile, nationalist "allies" EDEK and DIKO -- or major 
stiffening of Christofias's own political backbone. 
Urbancic