VZCZCXRO3278
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0478 1331330
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131330Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2470
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0091
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0133
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0016
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS ABU DHABI 000478 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/NESS, ISN/CPI, ISN/RA, EEB/CBA 
UNVIE FOR HILLIARD AND KESSLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG KNNP PNUC ECON AE
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP BRIEFS UAE NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS 
TEAM 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: UAE officials working on developing nuclear power 
met May 12 in Abu Dhabi with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, discussing 
mechanisms of collaboration to prevent proliferation and ensure 
program integrity.  With members of the UAE's export control team 
also present, they reviewed UAE preparations for an oversight 
organization to help manage export licensing and control lists.  The 
meetings were productive, noted in the UAE press, and constitute a 
useful step forward in UAEG engagement on export control generally. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) In a full day session on May 12, an 11-member team 
representing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was received at the 
UAE Foreign Ministry by a similar sized Emirati team chaired by the 
UAE's Special Representative for International Nuclear Cooperation 
(and UAE PermRep to the IAEA) Ambassador Hamad Ali al-Kaabi.  UAE 
participants hailed from Foreign Affairs, Federal Customs, Dubai 
Police, State Security, Ministry of Interior, GHQ (Armed Forces), 
Ministry of Energy, and the Central Bank.  The NSG presenters 
included experts from the U.S. (key presentations by Richard 
Goorevich, Chair of the NSG Consultative Group and Director of the 
Office of International Regimes and Agreements at the National 
Nuclear Security Administration), Germany (current NSG chair), and 
Hungary (incoming NSG chair). 
 
¶3.  (U) The UAE began with a short briefing on the status of its 
nuclear power program, expressing interest in international 
coordination and acknowledging that key regulatory issues and 
legislation were still under development.  The NSG team gave a 
thorough review of the history of the NSG with emphasis on the 
philosophy, intent, mechanisms, and significance of cohesive NSG 
action.  Ambassador al-Kaabi's focused questions punctuated an open 
and engaging discussion.  The UAE clearly appreciated the timely 
outreach and looked forward to ongoing coordination. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Of significance to the larger UAEG export control efforts 
(to include but not limited to nuclear aspects), Ambassador al-Kaabi 
cited the May 10 meeting of a new Executive Committee mandated under 
the Export Control Law and the planned formation within a month of a 
federal level "Executive Office" (to include a technical support 
wing) to coordinate day-to-day work.  The Committee itself plans to 
meet monthly. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Licensing and control list issues would fall within the 
Executive Office's mandate.  The office will issue licenses to 
exporters, for example, referring sensitive cases to the Committee 
for review.  Disputes may be elevated to the Cabinet for decision 
(in the apparent absence of a more precise dispute-resolution 
mechanism).  UAE participants also said the control list would be 
dynamic (not part of the law itself) and could therefore be 
frequently updated, much as the Singapore or German models. 
 
¶6.  (U) The day closed with a discussion of the importance of 
industry outreach as "a first line of defense" and all parties were 
appreciative of the useful exchange.  The meetings were noted in the 
local press, based on an official UAE news release highlighting the 
common interests of the UAE and NSG. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: This is the first time UAE officials working on 
the nuclear power program have been so directly involved in broader 
export controls issues.  The meeting is a positive indication that 
the nuclear program may help drive export controls progress, as key 
nuclear officials have been suggesting.  End comment. 
OLSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
06Cable-WomenFNCelections           UNCLASSIFIED