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Viewing cable 09USEUBRUSSELS597, THE FUTURE OF EU DECISION MAKING ON POLICE AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09USEUBRUSSELS597 2009-04-24 18:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN USEU Brussels
P 241821Z APR 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 000597 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR INL, EUR, INL/PC, INL/AAE, EUR/ERA, L/LEI; 
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS; 
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OFFICES OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KCRM PTER EON
SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF EU DECISION MAKING ON POLICE AND 
JUDICIAL COOPERATION -- WITH OR WITHOUT THE TREATY OF LISBON 
 
REF: 08 BRUSSELS 1590 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C/NF) With or without the Lisbon Treaty, we anticipate 
that major Treaty provisions affecting police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters will ultimately find their 
way into the EU decision-making and institutional frameworks. 
 The Treaty's fate will determine how fast these changes make 
their way into the EU "acquis"  The Lisbon Treaty would have 
far-ranging effects on decision-making on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.  The Treaty envisions 
instituting qualified majority voting (QMV) as the norm for 
decision-making in this area to speed decision-making within 
the Council of Ministers; however, the Treaty also accords 
"co-decision" authority to the European Parliament (EP), 
which could offset gains in efficiency or speed.  The Treaty 
would also give national parliaments the ability to slow down 
approval of legislation through a system of "emergency 
brakes."  The United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, and to a 
lesser extent Denmark and Poland, will enjoy significant 
"opt-out" and "opt-in" powers, which could produce an 
ever-changing patchwork of EU legislation on criminal justice 
and police cooperation. 
 
2. (C/NF) Given the far-ranging impact of Treaty provisions 
on decision-making for legislation and policies on judicial 
and police cooperation in criminal matters, U.S. policy 
makers will want to continue pursuing various initiatives 
with the EU to timely conclusion.  Prompt ratification of the 
U.S.-EU mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties and 
establishment of a negotiating mandate for a binding 
international agreement on data privacy principles will be 
critical to locking in innovative measures favorable to U.S. 
and transatlantic national security, counter-terrorism, and 
law enforcement interests.  A greater EP role in JHA 
decision-making will place a premium on more frequent 
diplomatic outreach with political groupings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
MAJOR IMPACT ON POLICE AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3. (C/NF) Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty in June 
2008.  A new referendum to be held later this year will 
likely decide the Treaty's fate, although a few other Member 
States must still complete their ratification procedures 
(Reftel).  The Treaty would retain many institutional and 
decision-making changes that the Constitutional Treaty for 
the EU -- defeated by referendum in France and Holland in 
2005 -- provided on justice and police cooperation in 
criminal matters.  These provisions on Justice, Freedom, and 
Security (JLS) arguably represent the most important 
procedural and substantive changes of any area under the 
Treaty and merit close attention for their impact on 
transatlantic cooperation on criminal matters. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
MERGING OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PILLARS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Currently, the legal framework established by the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam separates issues in the Justice, Freedom, 
and Security (JLS) area (also known as Justice and Home 
Affairs -- JHA), among two different institutional and 
procedural "pillars."  Immigration, asylum, visa, and civil 
justice issues fall under the first pillar as do other 
community-wide issues, including trade and commerce, while 
justice and police cooperation on criminal matters falls 
under the third pillar.  The second pillar, encompassing 
Common Foreign and Security Policy issues, will retain unique 
decision-making procedures.  Under the current system, 
adoption of community-wide decisions affecting the third 
pillar requires inter-governmental consensus, or unanimity, 
among all 27 Member States within the Council of Ministers -- 
a threshold often difficult to achieve.  Originally, the 
requirement for unanimity preserved individual Member State 
prerogatives in areas considered matters of national 
sovereignty, particularly enforcement of criminal laws. 
Member States gradually ceded aspects of their sovereignty to 
the EU by adopting common policies, procedures, and 
beneficial practices related to mutual recognition of court 
decisions (i.e., introduction of the European Arrest Warrant 
in place of extradition) and sharing of law enforcement 
information. 
 
5. (U) With some exceptions, the Lisbon Treaty merges the 
existing first and third pillars by adopting qualified 
majority voting (QMV) as the "ordinary procedure" or norm for 
making decisions in the Council of Ministers.  Thus, the 
Council of Ministers, meeting in one of its nine 
configurations of Cabinet Ministers from specific sectors -- 
in this case, Interior and Justice Ministers -- will decide 
on police and criminal justice cooperation by QMV in place of 
unanimity.  QMV, also known as "double majority voting," will 
ultimately require approval by 55-percent of the Member 
States (i.e., 15 of 27 the current Member States) 
representing at least 65-percent of the EU's population.  To 
ensure that the most populous Member States acting alone 
cannot block proposals, at least four Member States must vote 
against a measure for it to be defeated. 
 
------------------------- 
QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C/NF) Treaty supporters predict that use of QMV will 
produce higher quality legislation.  Supporters of 
legislative proposals will be able to prepare such 
legislation without having to water down the proposals to 
gain the support of individual Member States threatening to 
veto such proposals.   In theory, proposals will not suffer 
from the least-common-denominator approach that often now 
results from decision-making on JLS issues.  Moreover, the 
merging of the two pillars could reduce some artificial 
distinctions currently erected by Member States among border 
protection, asylum, migration, counter-terrorism, and 
transnational crime issues.  This process of reducing 
cross-jurisdictional barriers will take some time, as 
existing distinctions codified in community law will remain 
until modified. 
 
7. (U) Complicating even further the decision-making process, 
the Treaty contains a transitional provision for QMV as a 
concession to Poland for its assent to the draft Treaty.  The 
transitional provision preserves current QMV requirements for 
most community-wide issues from the 2001 Nice Treaty, which 
requires approval beyond a simple majority (i.e., 50 percent 
of the votes plus one) -- taking into account demographic 
weights assigned to Member States.  Such weights range from a 
maximum of 29 votes for the largest Member States to a 
minimum of three votes for the smallest ones..  This 
transitional provision will remain in force until at least 
2014 and possibly as late as 2017.  Under it, the Council 
must re-examine legislative proposals to try to overcome 
minority objections, if either one-third of the Member 
States, or Member States representing 25 percent of the EU 
population, oppose them.  During this transition, Member 
States will not be able to make rapid, dramatic changes in EU 
legislation on police and judicial cooperation, thereby 
allowing for gradual adjustment by Member States to the new 
distribution of powers within the EU and its institutions. 
 
 
-------------------- 
ENHANCED COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
8. (C/NF) The Lisbon Treaty also provides for possible 
"enhanced cooperation" among Member States for implementation 
of measures on specific types of police cooperation, 
including operational cooperation among law enforcement 
entities, and establishment of a European Public Prosecutor 
(EPP).  To date, Member States demonstrated considerable 
reluctance to use this procedure under the current legal 
framework and occasionally worked outside EU institutions to 
achieve desired results.  Initial establishment of the 
Schengen System and negotiation of the Pruem Treaty 
constitute prime examples of such maneuvers.  In the case of 
Pruem, Germany and several Member States agreed to shre DNA, 
fingerprints, and vehicle registration data from their 
national databases on a "hit / no hit" basis, as well as 
underlying information from such matches via later mutual 
legal assistance requests.  Under the German Presidency in 
2007, the Council agreed in principle to incorporate Pruem 
Treaty provisions within the EU legal framework, except for 
more controversial, forward-leaning provisions on 
cross-border responses by police forces in emergencies and 
use of air marshals. 
 
9. (U) Lisbon Treaty drafters revised provisions on enhanced 
cooperation to encourage use of such decision-making measures 
in place of going outside the EU's institutional and legal 
framework.  While the Treaty will continue to emphasize 
inter-governmental consensus (unanimity) as the desired basis 
for making decisions, it will allow for use of enhanced 
cooperation on certain JLS initiatives as a decision-making 
procedure of last resort.  Under the new Treaty, if unanimity 
does not exist on proposals for establishing an EPP or on 
certain types of police cooperation, including operational 
cooperation among law enforcement entities, the Council of 
Ministers may refer the measure to the Council of the 
European Union (composed of heads of state from all 27 Member 
States) to try to reach consensus within four months.  If 
consensus results, the heads of state will refer the proposal 
back to the Council of Ministers for adoption via the 
ordinary legislative process (i.e., QMV and co-decision with 
the EP.)  If no consensus emerges among heads of state, and 
if at least one-third of the Member States (i.e., nine or 
more of the current 27) supports the proposal, they may 
obtain authorization from the Council of Ministers via QMV to 
adopt and implement such legislation among themselves. 
 
10. (C/NF) Treaty supporters argue that such provisions on 
enhanced cooperation will make it more likely that Member 
States will resort to such cooperation rather than going 
outside the Treaty's institutional framework.  Nonetheless, 
such provisions retain much of their earlier complexity, 
which may make Member States reluctant to use them.  In any 
case, use of enhanced cooperation carries the risk of 
producing an even greater patchwork than currently exists of 
differing legal measures on justice and police cooperation on 
criminal matters.  Development of more complicated and uneven 
legal systems would require Member States and non-EU states 
alike to make even greater efforts to track differences among 
legal frameworks applicable to different Member States.  This 
development would also exacerbate U.S. preference to deal 
bilaterally with individual Member States on certain types of 
police and judicial cooperation and further undermine ability 
of fledgling EU institutions, such as the European Judicial 
Coordination Unit (EUROJUST) and European Police Office 
(EUROPOL), to generate and sustain cross-border cooperation. 
 
----------------- 
OPT-IN PROVISIONS 
----------------- 
 
11. (C/NF) The current legal framework has permitted a few 
Member States, specifically the UK, Ireland, and Denmark, to 
"opt out" of individual provisions involving police and 
judicial cooperation.  Under the Lisbon Treaty, as a 
trade-off for agreeing to provisions permitting QMV and 
co-decision with the EP, the UK and Ireland may choose to 
"opt-in" selectively to provisions they favor.  This 
concession, in part, reflects the differing legal systems and 
traditions of these two Member States, with common law legal 
systems in contrast to the civil law legal systems of much of 
continental Europe.  The UK and Ireland may decide that they 
do not wish to participate in particular measures proposed 
for adoption via enhanced cooperation.  Later, if they deem 
the final result unobjectionable, they may decide to opt in. 
By that point, however, they may have lost their ability to 
influence the content of such measures.  In any case, under 
the new Treaty, JLS measures will not automatically apply to 
all Member States. 
 
12. (C/NF) The new Treaty requires that all Member States 
abide by measures to which they had agreed before the 
Treaty's entering into force.  However, amending existing 
legislation could produce interesting scenarios.  For 
example, the UK or Ireland may decide to opt out of such 
amendments, even though they had previously adopted the 
measures under revision.  Nevertheless, in such instances, if 
other Member States decide by QMV that their withdrawal would 
"affect the effectiveness of the measure and make it 
inoperable," they could force the UK or Ireland to withdraw 
from the entire measure and not just the amended portion. 
Again, provisions for opting in or opting out of individual 
measures or withdrawing from amendments to existing 
legislation have the potential to exacerbate the already 
uneven patchwork of differing legal frameworks within the EU. 
 Again, such actions could complicate not only internal EU 
law enforcement relationships but also dealings with third 
countries. 
 
--------------------------- 
PULLING THE EMERGENCY BRAKE 
--------------------------- 
 
13. (C/NF) Under the new Treaty, a Member State may object to 
a specific JLS measure, if it deems such a measure would 
affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system. 
Such objections would occur through a process that 
complements the enhanced cooperation procedure.  In case of 
objection, the Member State may refer the matter to the heads 
of state within the Council of the EU, suspending the 
measure's consideration for four months.  If the heads of 
state reach consensus within four months, they may refer the 
measure back to the Council of Ministers for resumption of 
the ordinary approval process (i.e. approval by QMV and 
co-decision with the EP).  If, on the other hand, heads of 
state fail to reach consensus within this period, then the 
proposal fails to win approval via the ordinary 
decision-making process.  Nevertheless, in such a case, if at 
least one-third of the Member States still favors the 
proposal, then this group of nine or more may adopt the 
measure under enhanced cooperation.  Proponents of the 
"emergency brake" provision predict Member States will use 
this measure judiciously and only as a last resort, because 
of the political capital they would expend in employing it. 
In most cases, the threat of using this emergency brake would 
likely allow Member States to gain concessions regarding 
their concerns.  Views differ on whether the UK and Ireland 
would choose to pull this emergency brake, as they already 
have the right to opt in to legislation they favor.  Indeed, 
pulling the emergency break after their employing this opt in 
procedure would occur in only rare cases, if at all. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
INCREASED POWERS FOR MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
14. (C/NF)  Under the current treaty framework, the European 
Commission and individual Member States have the power to 
initiate legislation, and the Council need only consult with 
the EP regarding such proposals.  Currently, the EP provides 
non-binding observations on legislation to the Commission as 
part of such consultations.  While Commission officials 
sometimes modified proposed legislation to address EP 
concerns, for years they more often ignored or paid lip 
service to these concerns when amending and approving draft 
Framework Decisions. 
 
15. C/NF) Accordingly, the EP co-decision authority on JLS 
legislation constitutes one of the Lisbon Treaty's most 
significant provisions.  A UK expert at a think-tank event in 
Brussels described this change as creating essentially a 
bicameral legislature involving both the Council and the EP, 
with both bodies deciding on JLS legislation.  As a result, 
the EP will experience an overall increase in power, with EP 
Members (MEPs) having the ability to offer amendments to 
proposed JLS legislation, rather than serving merely as a 
consultative or advisory body.  Proponents of EP co-decision 
authority claim this change will increase transparency and 
accountability for legislation affecting judicial and police 
cooperation in criminal matters.  As MEPs often assert, their 
institution is the only EU body whose members are directly 
elected by EU citizens. 
 
16. (C/NF) Some critics worry that MEPs will place too much 
emphasis on protection of civil liberties and privacy rights 
of individuals at the expense of promoting law enforcement 
cooperation to enhance common security.  Several high-profile 
MEPs, particularly those from the influential Human Rights, 
Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee, have strongly 
criticized measures to promote transatlantic sharing of law 
enforcement information as violating individual privacy 
rights and civil liberties.  A close Council Secretariat 
contact has assured us repeatedly that MEPs will express more 
balanced positions after they obtain genuine powers over JLS 
legislation.  He said moderate views of the larger political 
groupings and parties will prevail in votes on JLS 
legislation and generally mirror those of Member State 
governments.  Nonetheless, given extreme positions sometimes 
expressed publicly by current MEPs, such predictions may stem 
more from wishful thinking than objective analysis. 
 
17. (C/NF) In recent months, in anticipation of Lisbon Treaty 
ratification, Commission officials have consulted more 
closely with MEPs, particularly on sensitive measures 
involving data privacy and sharing of law enforcement 
information.  Indeed, Commission counterparts have argued 
repeatedly that, because of the anticipated greater EP role, 
they must wait for Treaty entry into force before setting a 
formal mandate for negotiating a binding international 
agreement with the U.S. on data privacy.  With or without 
Lisbon, we do not see EU officials back-tracking on closer 
consultations, amounting to de facto co-decision with the EP. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
GREATER POWERS FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AS WELL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
18. (C/NF) The Treaty also provides for systematic 
consultations with national parliaments of Member States on 
adhering to the "subsidiarity" principle, which provides that 
the EU may only legislate where such action can be done 
better at the community level than at national or local 
levels.  National parliaments may voice objections to 
proposed legislation, if they view such measures as violating 
this principle.  If at least one-third of national 
legislatures (i.e., nine or more of the national legislatures 
in the 27 Member States) object, then the proposal must go 
back to the Commission for additional review to try to 
address objections.  If a majority of the legislatures 
object, then the Commission must consult with Member States 
and the EP for their views on the subsidiarity principle. 
Although not exercising a formal veto, national parliaments 
will have the power to seek additional review or slow down 
approval of proposed legislation.  Reviews could occur within 
the inter-parliamentary body (known as COSAC) that currently 
meets twice yearly, but would probably have to meet more 
frequently under the Treaty.  An EP professional staff member 
opined at a think-tank event that such consultations will 
enhance transparency and democratic legitimacy for JLS 
legislation.  She compared such safeguards to use of yellow 
and red cards in professional soccer matches, which referees 
use to indicate less or more serious rule infractions.  Under 
this system of parliamentary scrutiny, elected 
representatives at the national level can influence the 
content of proposed legislation.  Additionally, each house of 
each national parliament may refer a measure to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) for any perceived violations of the 
subsidiarity principle, thereby providing additional 
safeguards. 
 
----------------------------------- 
INITIATORS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
----------------------------------- 
 
19. (C/NF) Under current rules, either the European 
Commission or individual Member States may initiate JLS 
legislative proposals.  In practice, the Commission produces 
most proposals, known as Framework Decisions, often at the 
Council's direction, but some Member States also initiate 
proposals.  The new Treaty will change these rules slightly 
by allowing either the Commission or one-quarter of the 
Member States (i.e., seven or more of the current 27) to 
propose legislation.  This change will encourage Member 
States wishing to table proposals to seek support of 
like-minded states before presenting it to the Council. 
Nonetheless, this situation will not be much different from 
the current one, which already places a high premium on 
consensus-building. 
 
----------------------------- 
LAWS WITH DIRECT LEGAL EFFECT 
----------------------------- 
 
20. (C/NF) Under the existing legal framework, legislation on 
criminal police and justice cooperation does not have direct 
legal effect.  Instead, Member States must enact national 
legislation to implement the provisions of a Framework 
Decision either after Council approval or, in some cases, 
beforehand.  Moreover, Commission officials cannot initiate 
infringement proceedings against Member States that fail to 
implement approved Framework Decisions, although they can 
undertake evaluations of Member State performance.  Critics 
insist such limitations have hindered effective 
implementation of JLS legislation.  Currently, implementation 
is uneven at best among Member States, with wide variations 
in the quality of enforcement.  In some instances, 
enforcement of laws against corruption and violations of data 
privacy leave much to be desired.  Moreover, the ECJ now has 
limited jurisdiction over third pillar issues, and 
individuals generally do not have legal standing to enforce 
their rights in this area. 
 
21. (U) The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that JLS legislation 
will have direct legal effect and that the Commission will 
have the power to enforce implementation of JLS laws through 
infringement proceedings against individual Member States. 
Such infringement proceedings could result in assessment of 
substantial fines, as has occurred within the private sector 
under enforcement of Community-wide provisions on competition 
and trade.  Treaty supporters insist this power will 
substantially strengthen the Commission's ability to promote 
efficient enactment of JLS provisions.  Even terminology for 
legal instruments will change, as Decisions become 
Regulations and Framework Decisions become Directives. 
Designations of already adopted instruments, however, will 
remain the same, unless such instruments undergo amendment or 
repeal. 
 
------------------------- 
EXPANDED ECJ JURISDICTION 
------------------------- 
 
22. (C/NF)  Under the Treaty, the ECJ will enjoy greater 
jurisdiction over JLS legislation.  EU citizens will have the 
right to appeal administrative and judicial decisions in JLS 
matters before the courts.  Preliminary references will be 
available from any national tribunal or court, except that 
the ECJ will not have jurisdiction over operations conducted 
by police and law enforcement services or the exercise of 
Member State responsibilities for maintaining law and order 
and safeguarding internal security.  We anticipate that 
expanded ECJ authority will have a major impact on U.S.-EU 
law enforcement cooperation, especially on implementation of 
procedures and safeguards. 
 
---------------------------- 
LEGAL PERSONALITY FOR THE EU 
---------------------------- 
 
23. (C/NF) The EU will also confirm and assert its legal 
personality under the new Treaty, as the EU will formally be 
able to enter directly into agreements with third nations in 
areas under its competence, as the EU has already done with 
the U.S. on matters such as mutual legal assistance and 
extradition.  In some cases, the EU will have exclusive 
competence, while, in other areas, the Member States will 
continue to wield exclusive jurisdiction.  In other cases, 
mixed competence will result.  Interestingly, the EU may 
decide under the Treaty of Lisbon to negotiate certain 
agreements with non-EU countries under Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), which involves a separate set of 
decision-making rules.  The EU recently negotiated a 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement with Australia under 
the second pillar, rather than under the first or third 
pillars as with earlier agreements of this type.  The EP will 
not enjoy co-decision powers under CFSP. 
 
------------------ 
WHAT ABOUT PLAN C? 
------------------ 
 
24. (C/NF) The Lisbon Treaty already represents the 
fall-back, or Plan B, to the failed Constitutional Treaty of 
2005.  Should ratification fail, EU counterparts will enter 
into another period of reflection likely to last years, given 
that EU officials have no real Plan C.  Should this happen, 
then EU officials may find themselves packaging certain JLS 
provisions from the Treaty into smaller, more acceptable 
parts that promote piecemeal, de-facto implementation over 
time.  With or without Lisbon, we will need to confront the 
impact of its provisions, particularly on QMV and co-decision 
for the EP. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
25. (C/NF) If ratified, and before the Lisbon Treaty enters 
into force, U.S. policy makers should continue pressing for 
final ratification -- by Belgium and Greece -- of the U.S.-EU 
mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements as well as 
establishment by the EU of a negotiating mandate for a 
binding international agreement on data protection principles 
identified and defined by the U.S.-EU High Level Contact 
Group.  After entry into force, approval of agreements may 
become more problematic because of the EP co-decision role. 
U.S. officials may wish to explore flexibility that may exist 
for negotiating agreements under the CFSP process, instead of 
under the Treaty's ordinary procedure for JLS issues. 
Finally, the Mission and U.S. Embassies in Member States will 
also want to chart strategies for expanded outreach with 
moderate political groupings and parties of the new EP (to be 
elected in June) and national parliaments to exchange views 
on issues, policies, and proposed legislation on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
 
MURRAY