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Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI310, MUATASSIM'S WASHINGTON DEBUT: BURNISHING HIS IMAGE AND TESTING U.S. WATERS TRIPOLI 00000310 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TRIPOLI310 2009-04-17 12:23 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO2555
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0310/01 1071223
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 171223Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4721
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5250
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000310 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/17/2019 
TAGS: OVIP MQADHAFI PREL PGOV MARR MASS PARM PHUM
PINR, PTER, KNNP, ENRG, LY 
SUBJECT: MUATASSIM'S WASHINGTON DEBUT: BURNISHING HIS IMAGE AND TESTING U.S. WATERS TRIPOLI 00000310 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(S//NF) Summary: Muatassim al-Qadhafi's trip to Washington on April 20-24 will serve as a key metric for skeptical regime members to judge the success of Libya's ten-year re-engagement project with the West and as a personal "test" for him to establish his bona fides as his brother did in Washington. After reported turbid relations with his father, Muammar al-Qadhafi, in the late 1990s, Muatassim returned from several years in Egypt in 2006 to serve as Libya's National Security Advisor - a position created especially for him. His focus on enhancing regime security through military acquisitions and broader mandates for state security services makes him a more palatable successor to his father's leadership for old guard Revolutionary Committee members than his older brother, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the apparent lead contender to succeed his father. Muatassim seeks demonstrative rewards from the U.S. for Libya's decisions to give up WMD programs and support for terrorism, and is keen to garner "respect" from having met with high-level U.S. officials. His visit represents an opportunity to convey our vision for continued development in the bilateral relationship to a key insider and the potential future leader of Libya. End Summary.

MUATASSIM'S DOMESTIC PARAMETERS AND PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP

2.(S//NF) After several years of negotiation, Libya fulfilled its obligations under the Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement - providing funds for the victims of Pam Am 103 and LaBelle bombings, among others - on October 31, 2008. The implementation of the agreement increased the level of interaction between the USG and GOL - including former Secretary Rice's visit to Tripoli in September 2008 during which she met with Muatassim and his father. Muatassim's current visit comes five months after his older brother - Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's - three-week trip to the U.S. during the final days of the Bush administration. Despite the high-level interest in deepening the relationship, old-guard regime figures remain skeptical about the benefits of re-engagement and the more critical facets of our interaction remain at the mercy of the often mercurial inner circle. September 1 will be the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power, and the two brothers are widely thought to be jostling to take on their father's mantle. For his part, the Leader has made recent personnel changes that signal he may be positioning one of the sons for the succession mantle without indicating which is the clear preference. Western-educated Saif al-Islam has been the public face of Libya's rapprochement with the West and nascent reform movement, while Muatassim enjoys support from more conservative elements drawn to his efforts to bolster Libya's military and security posture. Both, however, appear to be supportive of normalization with the U.S.

SYMBOLS OF A STRONG AND LASTING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S.

3.(S//NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi seeks symbolic gains as much as he does substantive ones, and 2009 is full of symbolic milestones. In September, he will celebrate both 40 years as Libya's leader and 10 years since the Sirte Proclamation - a foundational document of the African Union signed in al-Qadhafi's hometown. His February election to the African Union chairmanship provides al-Qadhafi with a high-profile platform from which he can trumpet his vision of Africa and rail against Western interference on the continent and serves as confirmation of his regional importance. In March, Libya presided over the Security Council and al-Qadhafi expects to send his top Africa diplomat to preside over the 64th session of the UN General Assembly in the fall. Al-Qadhafi has played host to Tony Blair, Vladimir Putin, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Juan Carlos of Spain; but the "Holy Grail" for al-Qadhafi, a meeting with the U.S. President, has eluded him thus far. We expect Muatassim to forcefully promote a meeting between POTUS and al-Qadhafi at this summer's G-8 meeting in Italy. Similarly, Muatassim may seek other symbolic "gains" to show Libyan insiders that he is laying the groundwork for the future, including by advocating agreements on security and civilian nuclear cooperation in particular, as evidence that he can deliver diplomatically. The Libyan leadership places high priority on such deliverables during their trips; follow-up, however, is often lacking. European and Russian colleagues here have bemoaned last-minute attempts to ready agreements for signature, with one diplomat saying, "the Libyans always want to sign everything but only implement what they want. An agreement is only valid if both sides read it the same way." The bottom line for the Qadhafi clan is respect which they believe comes from high-level interaction and formal TRIPOLI 00000310 002.2 OF 004 agreements.

AFRICOM, SECURITY ASSURANCES, MILITARY SALES, AND TRAINING

4.(S//NF) Muatassim's March 10 meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward seems to have quieted Libya's harsh rhetoric against AFRICOM. Muatassim, apparently influenced by Ward's presentation, encouraged the General to meet his father at the earliest opportunity. During this meeting Muatassim appeared eager to obtain security guarantees in light of Libya's decision to abandon WMD. He told Ward that Libya, an oil-rich country of approximately 5 million, faces the threat of "tens of millions" from Algeria and Egypt. He specifically mentioned upgrading the Mil-Mil MOU signed in January to a full, binding security agreement because Libya - betting on US support - had left itself defenseless. The GOL is not likely to join the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in the near-term, but is beginning to understand that AFRICOM's mission can be congruent with Libya's national interests. Red lines remain, however. According to MFA Secretary for the Americas Ahmed Fituri, who will accompany Muatassim on this trip, Muammar al-Qadhafi expressed reservations to Muatassim in November 2008 that expanded military and law enforcement cooperation would lead to having large numbers of U.S. advisers and trainers in Libya - which would be untenable given that the "evacuation" of U.S. forces in 1970 is trumpeted as a key accomplishment of the revolution.

5.(S//NF) Libyan officials have been keen to purchase US military equipment - both lethal and non-lethal - and to secure training for Libyan military personnel. At Muatassim's behest, Libyan officials presented a "wish list" in January which included requests ranging from F-16 fighters to mobile field hospitals. Although we have yet to present the Libyans with a response, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is developing Letters of Offer and Acceptance for some of the non-lethal items. During General Ward's visit, Muatassim requested Libyan participation in joint-training activities such as Bright Star in Egypt. In response, Ward encouraged Muatassim to accept the standing invitation to send observers to the Phoenix Express naval exercise which Libya did less than one month later. Military contacts have expressed keen interest in obtaining training for their officers, but to date Libya has not formally stated its requirements. Muatassim may have the influence to push the military bureaucracy to produce such a request.

6.(S//NF) Muatassim is likely to repeat two familiar refrains: that the U.S. "owes" Libya security cooperation (read: sales and security guarantees) in return for al-Qadhafi's decision to give up his WMD aspirations; and that the U.S. should return or reimburse Libya for the C-130 transport aircraft it purchased in the 1970s. Ownership of the eight planes was transferred in the United States, but the USG did not grant an export license. Lockheed Martin ceased maintenance of the aircraft and they have since become unserviceable. In effect, the Libyans have made military sales and resolution of the C-130 issue key tests of U.S. trust of and future intentions toward Libya.

LIBYA'S OUTSTANDING OBLIGATIONS ON WMD DISARMAMENT

7.(S//NF) Libyan officials have argued since 2006 that the Libyan example of WMD disarmament was a poor model for the rest of the world because Libya did not receive sufficient tangible "rewards" from the U.S. for its 2003 decision to abandon its WMD programs. Muatassim has told us that Libya has been "embarrassed" when asked by North Korea, Iran and others what Libya received for having taken such a major step.

8.(S//NF) Libya is still in the process of effecting the dismantlement of its WMD capacity. The logistics to ship 4.6kg of highly enriched uranium to Russia in September 2009 have yet to be set and the conversion of the Rabta chemical weapons facilities to peaceful use has suffered periodic delays. U.S. and UK members of the Tri-lateral Steering Committee charged with monitoring the disarmament report that Libyan progress is sporadic and that periodic unresponsiveness is often blamed on high-ranking regime members' perception that Libya was not getting enough in return for its actions. The GOL has repeatedly called for specific, large projects that, in their view, will demonstrate to the public (and conservative regime members) that the decision to disarm and re-engage was the right one. For example, Muatassim has recently pressed for a civilian nuclear project, mirroring earlier calls for a power-generating TRIPOLI 00000310 003.2 OF 004 or a desalination facility built by a U.S. firm. More conservative regime elements see the WMD decision as a crucial bargaining chip too easily given away and this drives the Qadhafi efforts to show that the policy change toward the U.S. was a beneficial one. If he is successful in Washington, Muatassim can be a key messenger to them that Libya will see further rewards and that further cooperation is possible.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

9.(S//NF) Libya is a vital partner in combating transnational terrorism. The regime is genuinely concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara and worries that the instability and weak governments to their south could lead to a "belt of terrorism" stretching from Mauritania to Somalia. Libya sees transnational Islamist terrorist networks as dangerous threats to regime security and continuity. Security services actively and aggressively combat threats in their sphere and cooperate with the USG and our allies through liaison channels. Muatassim is keen to receive training and, more importantly, equipment from the U.S. to help Libya detect and disable terrorist threats.

10.(S//NF) The USG has provided training under the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and Export and Border Control (EXBS) rubric, and an IMET-funded English-language program for Libyan military members is a key entry point for further training assistance. After accepting ATA in early 2008, Libyan security officials received the first tranche of trainers in early March, with two additional trainings scheduled for May. While the program is still in its infancy, thanking Muatassim for helping begin the program and encouraging his continued support will do much to ensure future success.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FATHI AL-JAHMI

11.(S//NF) Muatassim views U.S. interest in the human rights situation in Libya as an obstacle to further engagement on other issues. He complained to the Ambassador that the annual Human Rights Report did not reflect the real situation in Libya saying the embassy "should get rid of it". He told the Ambassador he was against NGOs operating in Libya as they could be a destabilizing force for the regime (Note: NGOs are outlawed. Saif al-Islam, who has no official government role, chairs the largest "civil society organization" operating in Libya. End Note.) and that the GOL would not countenance the "~same situation as had been the case with Egyptian NGOs." While he has recently told us that regime critic Fathi al-Jahmi will be released "this year", his father's direct and intimate involvement in the case will leave him little latitude to depart from his talking points: "Fathi al-Jahmi is a Libyan citizen subject to Libyan laws. His case is an internal matter and foreign intervention is inappropriate and unwelcome." The Ambassador has repeatedly informed Muatassim and other senior Libyan officials that his case would continue to figure large in the bilateral relationship and that it needed to be resolved quickly to prevent any damage to the furtherance of bilateral relations. In turn, Muatassim and others have argued that according the issue high-profile media coverage could set back efforts to free al-Jahmi.

DEALING WITH MUATASSIM

12.(S//NF) Considered little more than a playboy just two years ago, Muatassim has surprised many observers by the seriousness with which he has taken his new responsibilities as the National Security Adviser. He has, at times, overreached - notably attempting to install security chiefs without clearance from other regime elements and requesting $1.2 billion from the National Oil Corporation to form his own special forces brigade. His mentors include members of Muammar al-Qadhafi's inner circle, notably Foreign Minister Musa Kusa. Ambitious and competitive, Muatassim realizes that he is being groomed as a potential successor to his father and that Saif al-Islam is his primary competitor. He has met with several senior U.S. officials - including former Secretary of State Rice, former NEA A/S Welch, and AFRICOM Commander Gen. Ward. He does not appear to have the depth of knowledge and analytical ability commensurate with his position but at the same time, seems to be slowly growing into the job. Libyan officials have described him as not intellectually curious, reporting that it is a struggle to get him to read custom-made abstracts on current TRIPOLI 00000310 004.2 OF 004 events, national security, and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, he is considered a serious contender to succeed his father and has proven he has the power to influence military and security decisions.

13.(S//NF) Muatassim last traveled to the U.S. shortly after being named National Security Advisor for the fall 2007 session of the UN General Assembly. At that time, he was closely advised by Musa Kusa who accompanied him to New York. Notably, his current delegation seems to lack a similar minder - perhaps a sign of his growing independence and stature. He speaks enough English to conduct basic meetings, but lacks the fluency to discuss complex issues.

14.(S//NF) Comment: The visit offers an opportunity to meet a power player and potential future leader of Libya. We should also view the visit as an opportunity to draw out Muatassim on how the Libyans view "normalized relations" with the U.S. and, in turn, to convey how we view the future of the relationship as well. Given his role overseeing Libya's national security apparatus, we also want his support on key security and military engagement that serves our interests. End comment. CRETZ