VZCZCXRO3514
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHLN #0043/01 0991036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091036Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2745
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1660
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 0613
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0604
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0405
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0004
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0013
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3108

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ST PETERSBURG 000043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CA/VO/KCC; RSO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC RS
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - ST. PETERSBURG 
 
REF: 08 State 102952 
 
¶A.  Country Conditions: Economic growth in St. Petersburg has 
slowed markedly over the past year, with St. Petersburg's 2008 
GDP at roughly RUR 1.1 trillion (USD 32 billion).  The average 
salary for St. Petersburg's 4.5 million is still about double 
the nationwide average of about $5000 a year.  Salaries 
nevertheless lag behind those in Moscow, and have fallen by 
about 5% since summer 2008 in the local currency, and by over a 
third in dollars with the substantial ruble devaluation. 
Economic indices -- including income, cost of living, and 
jobless rates -- vary from region to region in Northwest Russia, 
though members of ethnic minorities in particular tend to be 
underemployed while the elderly are most vulnerable to broad 
inflationary pressures.   As evidenced from this and previous 
reports, fraud is encountered at a medium frequency in St. 
Petersburg. 
 
¶B.  NIV FRAUD:   The worldwide economic crisis and ruble 
devaluation have not spared Northwest Russia, and though the 
majority of the NIV applicant pool remains a good bet, post 
expects an increase in the number of mala fide applicants 
seeking admission to and employment in the US.  Even among 
otherwise legitimate vacation travelers, many Russians still 
consider it necessary to bolster their NIV applications with 
fabricated documents, trumped-up employment letters, and 
inflated salary claims.  In addition, post has encountered an 
increasing number of petition-based applications for work at 
non-existent companies in the U.S. 
 
B1/B2 
 
Post encountered several applicants who provided fake job 
letters and employment information in order to improve their 
chances of qualifying for an NIV.   Phone numbers listed for 
their place of employment often turn out to belong to friends' 
private apartments or are completely fictitious.  Such 
applicants cannot tell us the names or numbers of employees at 
their company.  Applicants also go to the trouble of falsifying 
their Russian labor books to make their current and past 
employment look more official.   One particularly unprepared 
applicant listed his employer's number as his own cell phone 
number, and though he claimed to work for an advertising agency, 
he listed the website of a home-appliance company on his 
home-made letterhead.  Another, who claimed to work for an auto 
dealership in Murmansk, eventually revealed that his shop no 
longer had any business, but he wanted to leave for a long 
vacation in the U.S. anyway, leaving behind a six-month old 
child and his wife. 
 
C1/D 
 
While the majority of Post's C1/D applicants are legitimate 
crewmembers of the large number of ships sailing from the port 
of St. Petersburg, we do occasionally come across attempts at 
fraud. 
 
One applicant, after receiving a C1/D on the strength of her 
employment letter with Disney Cruise Lines, entered the U.S. in 
April 2008 but failed to join her cruise ship, opting instead to 
stay with her boyfriend in Florida, until she returned in 
October 2008 for another C1/D to work for a different cruise 
company.  She was denied under Section 214(b). 
 
Another crewmember abandoned his ship in the U.S. and was caught 
and returned to Russia by DHS.  Upon applying for a new C1/D 
visa, he changed his last name and claimed he had never been to 
the U.S. before.  IAFIS checks revealed his true identity, 
although he never admitted his fault in the interview, insisting 
he is and always was his new identity.  Subject was found 
ineligible under 6C.  This case raises particular concerns about 
the veracity of Russian documents, particularly in the ease of 
obtaining genuine documents from the proper legal authorities 
with false biographic information. 
 
F1 
 
We continue to see cases of fake ESL packages prepared by local 
visa facilitating agencies.  One applicant who received an F1 
for six weeks of ESL study at Temple University in 2007 ended up 
staying until late 2008.  When she appeared in early 2009 for 
another F1, we launched an investigation, revealing that her 
case was completely prepared by a local visa agency.  The fixers 
provided her with a fictitious husband and child, in an effort 
to show strong ties to Russia to compel her timely return. 
During her interview this year, she "forgot" she was "married," 
and she eventually confessed to paying money for the supporting 
 
ST PETERSB 00000043  002 OF 003 
 
 
materials, saying she had in fact studied at Temple only for one 
of the 11 months she was in the U.S., and that she had actually 
used her visa to reside with her LPR or Amcit boyfriend. 
 
J1 
 
A local agency coached another applicant prior to her interview 
for a J1 visa (au pair).  The applicant successfully made 
arrangements with a family in the States and received J1.  But 
after she received the visa, the U.S. au pair agency contacted 
post to inform us that they had canceled her SEVIS registration. 
 The applicant had told the agency that she missed the visa 
interview and chose to withdraw from the program, although in 
fact she had attended the interview and received a visa.  Post 
called the applicant back to cancel the visa, and she admitted 
that her true intentions were to move to the States and live 
with her sister's boyfriend.  Post physically canceled her visa. 
 
 
H/L fraud 
 
The most disturbing trend Post has encountered is the growing 
number of sham petition-based visa applications.  We continue to 
scrutinize these cases carefully, including renewals, since we 
have uncovered cases that might not have been approved in the 
past had we known all the pertinent facts.  One example of such 
is a third time, L-1 renewal case which raised eyebrows because 
its claimed place of business and telephone number in the U.S. 
matched those of the applicant's attorney.  Further 
investigation revealed that the company was not an operating 
business and therefore did not qualify as an L1A petitioner, 
resulting in a revocation request sent to DHS.  While no 
material false statements were located, information gathered 
during his interview raised suspicions of money laundering, tax 
fraud in Russia, and possibly embezzlement. 
 
Another disturbing case involved an L1A applicant whose 
companies FPU investigated and discovered that they were 
operational neither in the U.S. nor in Russia.  She insisted the 
companies were real, but her own description of their dates of 
operation - for about three months in the past three years - 
along with her ignorance about any detail of the companies' 
operations, though she claimed to be the CEO and president, 
undermined her story.  Additionally, her husband, the L2 
applicant, is a well-known, high-level public official, and, 
according to press articles, is under investigation for the 
misuse of around USD 11 million from the public purse. 
 
One H1B applicant misrepresented her qualifications for a 
position as credit specialist at a bank.  She would have been 
the U.S. company's first employee after the petitioner, himself 
a St. Petersburg native.  During her interview, the applicant 
stated that the petitioner, who lives in Russia, was a longtime 
friend of her mother.  Further investigation revealed fake lease 
agreements provided by the petitioner, raising the suspicion 
that the company is a shell company created for immigration 
purposes. 
 
¶C.  IV FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶E.  ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD:  Among post's CRBA 
applications, there have been multiple applications in the 
reporting period for children born out of wedlock to American 
citizen fathers.  While this itself is not remarkable, post has 
noticed that one or both parents in such cases has not disclosed 
a prior (or continuing) marriage to a third party; other 
discrepancies were then discovered when looking further into the 
parents' claims.  Out of concerns that the American citizen may 
not be the biological father of the child in each case, post 
conducted in-depth interviews and, in at least one case, the 
parents agreed to do voluntary DNA testing.  As these cases are 
not yet resolved, post will report further if fraud is confirmed 
in these cases. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING: N/A 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST 
TRAVEL:   Per reftel, we regularly receive applicants with P3A2 
lookouts for suspected ties to organized crime.  If VO/L/A were 
to request further information in response to an advisory 
 
ST PETERSB 00000043  003 OF 003 
 
 
opinion request, Post would have limited resources to 
investigate P3A2 claims: FPU and ARSO-I in St. Petersburg have 
no opportunity to actively investigate outside the confines of 
the Consulate and are totally reliant on information provided by 
the Russian police. 
 
¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  FPU cooperates closely 
with ARSO-I on issues related to local law enforcement, 
organized crime, financial crime and terrorism, and during 
investigations of US-based companies and financial transactions. 
 
 
One example of such cases under investigation by the ARSO-I is 
the company Main Bridge LLC, which petitioned for L1 visas for 
its workers.  Initial investigations revealed a false business 
address in Russia and a false U.S. lease.  Additional checks 
identified at least three shell companies in Russia, British 
Virgin Islands, and Germany, and false invoices involving one of 
the companies.  Due to bank records submitted with the petition 
that show financial transactions in excess of $1 million, Main 
Bridge is suspected of being involved in a financial scheme and 
laundering money. 
 
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY:  Though rare, post occasionally uncovers applicants 
who have altered their documents and identity in order to obtain 
U.S.  immigration benefits.   A Senegalese applicant submitted 
an altered passport.  He had changed the date of expiration for 
his passport along with the date of expiration of his Russian 
visa, revealing that he was no longer legally permitted to stay 
in Russia.  The NIV unit also encountered an applicant with a 
P2A1 lookout placed in the NIV system by Embassy Riga.  The 
applicant, applying for an NIV with his Russian passport, 
purchased a Latvian passport for 100,000 euros in the late 
1990s, allegedly for purposes of starting a business in Latvia, 
though the applicant claimed this business never got off the 
ground.  The passport, which permitted him to travel through the 
EU without a visa, was seized by German authorities in 2004. 
FPU shared information on his application with the Latvian 
consulate in St. Petersburg; the applicant has not yet been 
convicted for his crime. 
 
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  Rossiya 
Airline officials at Pulkovo Airport, using information we 
forwarded them in a 2006 DHS alert on altered passports, called 
us to thank us for that information, since it led to the 
discovery of three Afghan nationals toting fake Portuguese and 
Norwegian documents this quarter.  The Afghans spoke neither 
Russian nor English and were transiting St. Petersburg from 
Dushanbe en route to Helsinki. It was Rossiya Airlines visa 
control staff that suspected each passport book was fake, even 
though they were of sufficiently good quality to escape 
detection in Dushanbe.  All three were detained and deported to 
Tajikistan and apprehended by Afghan security officials. 
 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: N/A 
 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING:  The Fraud Prevention Unit has one 
Consular Officer, one Fraud Prevention FSN, and one ARSO/I.  The 
FP FSN took the Fraud Prevention training course in November 
¶2006.  The Consular Officer attended the Fraud Prevention for 
Managers training course at FSI in April 2008. 
GWALTNEY