VZCZCXRO9277
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0266/01 1041237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141237Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9789
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5437
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0002
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1404
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1426

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 15 
MEETING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER MEHMET ALI TALAT 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 186 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 199 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1 
.4(b) and 1.4(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Your April 15 meeting with the leader of the 
Turkish Cypriot (T/C) community, Mehmet Ali Talat, is an 
opportunity to unambiguously register U.S. support for 
current efforts to re-unify Cyprus.  This is a time of 
extreme crisis for T/C pro-solution forces, of which Talat is 
the undisputed leader.  The slow pace of UN-brokered 
negotiations has left the secular, moderate Talat and his 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) "government" open to attacks 
from anti-solution nationalists, who appear poised to triumph 
in April 19 "parliamentary" elections.  Talat, who would 
still remain the T/C leader and main negotiator until 
"presidential" elections in April 2010, fears a stormy 
cohabitation and hard-line pressure at the negotiating table 
should anti-solution right-wingers take control of the T/C 
"parliament."  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Pushing a Pro-Solution Agenda 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Since coming to power in December 2003, Talat and the 
center-left CTP "government" have been the driving Turkish 
Cypriot force to reunify the island under UN auspices as a 
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.  He has taken forceful 
steps to purge the education system of ethnic (anti-Greek 
Cypriot) bias, improve conditions for the 300-odd Greek 
Cypriots (G/Cs) remaining in the north, and repair endangered 
cultural heritage sites, mostly Greek Orthodox churches. 
Talat even hopes to engage Archbishop of America Demetrios 
and other prominent Hellenic-Americans during this visit.  At 
home, however, he faces growing indifference and even support 
for a two-state solution among his fellow Turkish Cypriots, 
thanks mainly to the 2004 G/C rejection of the Annan Plan and 
rising disappointment with the lack of European Union and 
United States efforts to end T/C "isolation." 
 
¶3. (C) Nevertheless, Talat still has a clear vision of a T/C 
future in a new, reunified federal Cyprus, wherein Turkish 
Cypriots have an effective voice in central decision making 
and control over local affairs in a T/C constituent state. 
He recently announced he would step down as T/C leader in 
2010 if "his mission" to reunite the island failed.  Talat 
believes in a Turkish Cypriot identity unique from Turkey. 
For him and most pro-solution Turkish Cypriots, being 
integrated into Turkey -- either by the in-migration of Turks 
or through de facto or de jure annexation -- is only slightly 
less palatable then being dominated by Greek Cypriots, his 
ultimate fear. 
 
¶4.  (C) Talat largely views his meeting with you as U.S. 
re-affirmation for his pro-solution outlook and efforts. 
Although disappointed that the strong T/C Annan Plan "yes" 
vote (65 percent) in 2004 did not deliver greater USG 
"rewards," such as direct air connections, Talat and the 
Turkish Cypriots consider the United States the only fair 
broker among the P-5.  They were heartened by your recent 
statements in Ankara regarding Turkish Cypriot isolation and 
by your willingness to meet the T/C leader, as Secretaries 
Powell and Rice had done previously.  T/Cs' mistrust many 
other international actors.  They are largely frustrated with 
the EU and UN.  In their eyes, the EU is unduly maniplated by 
the G/Cs, who sit as sole representatives of the Republic of 
Cyprus; Brussels has proven unable to deliver on promises to 
ameliorate T/C isolation -- for example, by extending direct 
trade privileges to Turkish Cypriots -- because Greek 
Cypriots regularly exercise a veto on matters requiring EU 
member-state consensus. 
 
¶5. (C) Talat, who met with both of your immediate 
predecessors (in 2004 and 2005), is likely to raise the 
following during your meeting: 
 
-- the hope that the U.S. appoint a special Cyprus Envoy; 
 
-- the imperative of accelerating the on-going settlement 
effort through greater involvement of the UN and the 
international community; 
 
NICOSIA 00000266  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- the benefits of increased engagement with T/Cs, which 
would cause G/Cs to become less intransigent; 
 
-- the need to end Turkish Cypriot isolation; and 
 
-- a comment from the U.S. to use the Annan Plan or "UN body 
of work" as the basis of future negotiations and as the 
starting point for the proposed U.S. special envoy. 
 
He will also refute Greek Cypriot calls for greater pressure 
on Ankara, claiming (largely correctly, we believe) that 
presently he is "his own man" in the negotiations.  We 
recommend you commend Talat's pro-settlement efforts to date, 
especially his moderate public discourse and efforts to 
achieve ethnic harmony, and then focus the discussion on the 
continued need for flexibility and compromise from both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
US Special Envoy Indispensable, He Thinks 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Talat believes that the appointment of a U.S. Cyprus 
envoy is crucial.  He also knows that the Greek Cypriots 
oppose such a move, as does UN Special Envoy Alexander 
Downer.  Talat nonetheless considers that, absent foreign 
envoys' contributions during the Annan process, the sides 
never would have reached the referendum stage; the same holds 
true today, he argues.  While Talat accepted the G/C push for 
more limited foreign involvement in the present negotiations, 
he is convinced that, given the entrenched positions and 
bitter histories of both sides, it will be impossible to ink 
a deal without a push from outside actors.  Talat reckons the 
most opportune time for a U.S. appointment would be after two 
complete readings of all the negotiating topics, which he 
expects by September.  In his view, the U.S. envoy might then 
contribute to the give-and-take, crucial to reaching a final 
agreement by late 2009 / early 2010. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Need to Speed Up the Process Through Greater UN Involvement 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Talat feels the current negotiations are too slow and 
will push you for a greater UN and international community 
role in facilitating them.  He initially thought the sides 
could conclude a deal by December and then put it to their 
respective populations in simultaneous referenda, but to date 
they have covered only half of the core topics.  Talat 
laments that UN envoy Downer is "just watching" and not 
playing a sufficiently active role, attributing his 
reluctance to G/C pressure.  While Downer is slowly turning 
up the heat, for example by bringing in foreign experts to 
draft "food for thought" papers, the present UN profile is 
far lower than during the 2002-2004 Annan period.  The G/Cs, 
on the other hand, are happy with the current pace and level 
of UN and IC involvement and will actively resist changes. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Greek Cypriots Don't Need a Solution 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Talat believes the Republic of Cyprus's international 
recognition and EU membership insulates the Greek Cypriots 
from any negative results of the possible failure of the 
present negotiations.  While G/C leader (and RoC President) 
Demetris Christofias wants a solution, Talat argues, he has 
no incentive to take risks and reach compromise, given 
Christofias's default position as head of a wealthy, 
recognized state.  Talat fears that his G/C counterpart 
secretly wants to drag things out until Turkey's EU progress 
report comes due in November/December, a period when G/Cs 
believe the T/C and Turkish side will be weaker and other 
more pressure to make concessions.  Conversely, Talat will 
complain he is saddled with the disadvantages of "TRNC" 
non-recognition, which include dependence on Turkey for most 
basic services (telephone/internet, post, and air 
connections, for example) and the inability to trade directly 
with the outside world. 
 
---------------------------------- 
End Turkish Cypriot Isolation Now! 
 
NICOSIA 00000266  003 OF 003 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Talat will argue that the only way to force Greek 
Cypriots to compromise is by positive international 
engagement with Turkish Cypriots that ends their G/C-imposed 
isolation.  He believes that his people should no longer be 
punished for the division of the island, given the G/C "No" 
vote in 2004 and consequent EU and U.S. promises to lift T/C 
isolation.  Talat may ask for increased U.S. investment -- 
including the establishment of branded franchises (which 
would result in those franchises being excluded in the south) 
-- and some mechanism to allow flights into Ercan Airport in 
the north.  He may also ask you to use your good offices with 
the EU to lobby for implementation of the stillborn 2004 
Direct Trade Regulation. 
 
--------------------------------- 
A Word on T/C - Turkish Relations 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Talat rejects Greek Cypriot claims that he is a 
"puppet" of Ankara.  In fact, the T/C leader has deftly 
capitalized on a confluence of interests with Turkish PM 
Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government to bolster pro-solution 
forces on the island and win Turkey's acceptance for his 
"Turkish Cypriot" vision.  At this stage in the talks Talat 
is the dominant player, although he and his team are in 
regular contact with Ankara.  While Turkey's role will 
certainly grow once issues like security guarantees and 
territory are discussed, Talat apparently has succeeded for 
the time being in convincing PM Erdogan not to interfere on 
issues not of existential Turkish concern, such as 
governance, property restitution/compensation, EU matters and 
economics.  Nevertheless, Talat and CTP hint that 
anti-solution groups within AKP and the Turkish bureaucracy 
may not share Erdogan's willingness to trust Talat.  Talat 
worries that these elements might grow bolder if Turkey's EU 
bid is put on hold, AKP is seriously weakened at the ballot 
box, or the nationalist, anti-solution Turkish Cypriot 
opposition comes to power. 
 
------------------------------ 
And on the Need for a Photo Op 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) With "TRNC parliamentary" elections just one week 
away -- and with Talat's CTP trailing nationalist, hard-line 
UBP by a significant margin -- many in the international 
community have been searching for means to buoy pro-solution 
T/C forces.  Talat's visit constitutes just such a tool in 
our kit.  For maximum electoral bounce, however, and to ward 
off attacks from UBP that Talat's status in Washington has 
been downgraded, the T/C leader needs to be received in 
similar fashion to 2004 and 2005.  While there will be no 
press at your meeting, Talat is bringing a 
large-by-Cypriot-standards journalist contingent.  He 
considers at least a shot of a handshake by the official 
photographer essential (the decision not to have photos upset 
Talat when we briefed him on April 13, undoubtedly because he 
surmised the UBP-ers would seek to capitalize on this as a 
"downgrade" of his standing.)  The Embassy fully understands 
the sensitivities involved, especially amongst the Greek- and 
Greek Cypriot-American community.  That said, allowing a 
quick photo shoot would be consistent with past State 
practice and go a long way towards helping Talat electorally. 
Urbancic