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FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8585
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0321
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0205
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0859
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0198
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0448

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN STREET CLASHES:  THE RULES, AND BREAKING 
THEM 
 
MANAMA 00000191  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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PLEASE  CANCEL THIS CABLE, AS IT IS A DUPLICATE OF 
MANAMA 190. APPOLOGIES OF ANY INCONVENIENCES. 
 
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REF: A. MANAMA 50 
     ¶B. MANAMA 57 
     ¶C. MANAMA 149 
     ¶D. MANAMA 172 
 
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Vandalism and small clashes between Shia 
youths and police are part of a familiar pattern, but recent 
attacks on south Asians are an ugly departure from the 
unwritten rules.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Tensions between Bahrain's ruling Sunni minority and 
its Shia majority continue to simmer as they have for years. 
Much of that tension plays out in parliament, the local 
media, and in private political exchanges between leaders of 
the Shia community and the government.  It also plays out in 
limited street violence, which occasionally grabs 
international headlines. 
 
¶3.  (C) Credible contacts in the Shia community tell us that 
only a small minority supports the bands of Shia youth who 
clash with police most weekend evenings.  These skirmishes 
have been going on for years, and are most frequent during 
the cooler weather.  They have evolved an unwritten protocol 
usually observed by both sides:  a dozen or so young men burn 
trash, then stone responding riot police, who then reply with 
tear gas and rubber batton rounds.  Police then pursue, but 
rarely catch, the rioters.  In most cases no one is hurt. 
 
¶4.  (C) We are now seeing an uptick in these scripted street 
skirmishes, much as we did in early 2008 and last fall. 
Radical youth supporting Haq Movement leader Hassan Musheima 
are reacting to his arrest (refs A and B) by redoubling their 
nighttime efforts to make the police look powerless. Friday, 
March 27 was a typical weekend night:  a half dozen bands of 
youth, each 10- to 20-strong, started garbage fires in Shia 
villages around the island.  Many protesters dispersed when 
police appeared; some drove to other villages to start more 
fires. 
 
¶5.  (C) Several aspects of these protests remain constant: 
First, the numbers of protesters are small, on the order of 
100-200 in the whole country.  (By way of comparison, the 
mainstream Shia Wifaq party put 20,000 orderly demonstrators 
on the street last June.)  Second, the riot police 
(intensively trained by the French national police) seem able 
to cope with these situations in a restrained manner.  Third, 
the clashes are generally confined to a few Shia villages. 
 
Breaking the Rules with Attacks on South Asians 
 
¶6.  (C) However, during the uptick now underway, one 
development may have put stress on the unwritten rules for 
Shia-police encounters:  As we reported in refs C and D, 
young supporters of Musheima have in at least three instances 
turned on south Asian guest workers; one Pakistani man was 
burned to death.  All of Bahrain's religious and political 
leaders have condemned the attacks, with the notable 
exception of the Haq movement and its imprisoned leader 
Hassan Musheima.  Musheima's admirers on the street resent 
south Asians because many street-level policemen are 
Pakistanis. 
 
Comment 
 
¶7.  (C) The attacks on south Asians raise the risk that angry 
or fearful policemen might overreact during a future 
confrontation with Shia youths.  The attacks may also 
reinforce the government's own inclination to alter the rules 
of the game.  In meetings over the past six months with the 
King, Crown Prince, Interior Minister, and chief of police, 
CDA has heard repeated expressions of exasperation with Shia 
youth violence, and a determination to prosecute violent 
demonstrators.  However, pressure from detainees' families 
after past crackdowns has led to pardons for Shia street 
demonstrators; we expect the pressure would be just as strong 
this time round, and the revolving door in Bahrain's jails 
will continue to spin. 
 
¶8.  (C) We will provide via septel an update on the 
government's political engagement with the Shia opposition. 
 
 
MANAMA 00000191  002 OF 002 
 
 
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Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
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HENZEL