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FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RHMFISS/SOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFDNTC/HQUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9074
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCBACM/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO 1//

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000139 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
CG SOCEUR FROM DATT/ARMA 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO MOPS MARR NATO HR DEFENSE
REFORM 
 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MG KISNER, CG SOCEUR, VISIT TO 
CROATIA 
 
Classified By: COL Brendan McAloon, DATT, for reasons 1.4 
(b) & (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Sir, your visit is very important for the 
dedication ceremony in honor of MSG Ivica Jerak (YER-ak). 
You will meet Ambassador Bradtke at the ceremony and will 
be hosted later by the Chief of the General Staff, GEN 
Josip Lucic (LOOTS-itch). 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  Atmospherics.  Your trip comes at a time when 
the excellent security relationship between Croatia and 
the United States continues to strengthen.  Croatia 
appreciated the United States being one of the earliest 
countries to ratify Croatia's NATO accession protocol and 
the signal of support for Croatia that it sent. Recently, 
a small group of Slovenian nationalists has unexpectedly 
delayed ratification of Croatia's accession to NATO by 
requesting a national referendum, tying it to a border 
dispute dating to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. 
The Croatians want the ratification process in Slovenia 
to come to a timely conclusion so Croatia can become a 
full member of the Alliance before the NATO Summit in 
April, a goal which the United States shares.   GEN Lucic 
was unexpectedly reappointed as CHOD last year for a 
second five-year term, though many doubt that he will 
serve past 2011 when the current Croatian President 
reaches the end of his second mandate.  Lucic is an 
affable man but he is close to being burned out after 
almost 7 years as CHOD.  I don't expect him to offer much 
in substance to the conversation.  The Croatian Special 
Forces, however, are his favorites as is the commander, 
Colonel Zupanic (ZHU-paan-itz), and he has lent his 
presence to this event for that purpose. 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) Atmospherics continued.  I don't expect that 
the Croatians will have a laundry list of requests for 
support for you.  Croatian pride normally keeps them from 
requesting financial assistance but if it is offered they 
won't refuse.  If on the other hand we have support 
requirements that Croatia is well-suited to fulfill, it 
would be best to couch them as requests for help to a 
friend and future ally. 
 
¶4.  (C) JACKAL STONE.  JS09 is scheduled to take place 
here in Croatia in September 2009.  The Croatians are 
proud that they have been chosen to host the event and 
see this as proof that they are taken seriously by the 
U.S. military in general and our SOF in particular.  We 
finished the Main Planning Conference in Split, Croatia 
this week. 
 
¶5.  (C) OMLTs.  Croatia has the only non-NATO OMLT in 
Afghanistan as part of its approximately 277 troop 
contribution to ISAF.  The OMLT is deployed with the 3rd 
Kandak of the 209th ANA Corps.  Croatia pays all expenses 
for the OMLT with the exception of U.S.-provided 
stratlift.  They have no operational limitations on 
deployment or ROE, but do have two caveats: no CT and no 
Counter-narcotics operations.  Croatia and its partner 
the Minnesota National Guard will deploy a combined 
Combat Support OMLT next month.  Later this month Croatia 
will deploy a garrison level OMLT.  Croatia has expressed 
a desire to deploy a PRT in the future but we assess that 
the current focus on OMLTs is the best use of its 
capabilities in the near to mid term.  Regarding 
communications within Afghanistan, the Croatian OMLT is 
caught in a Catch-22 in that as a non-NATO force 
contributor, Croatia is not allowed to have the required 
NATO COMSEC systems.  Last year we were able to develop a 
work-around by deploying a U.S. commo team with the OMLT. 
The U.S. team has redeployed, however, and the Croatian 
OMLT is currently without secure NATO comms.  This issue 
has been raised in Brussels but as of yet no NATO nation 
has volunteered a communications team for the Croatian 
OMLT.  Although Croatia's NATO accession will probably be 
finalized in April making the COMSEC problem moot, we 
will still have to contend with the acquisition backlog 
 
for the required radios for some time. 
 
¶6. (C) KFOR:  The Croatian Parliament has authorized the 
deployment of two helicopters and 20 airmen to Kosovo in 
¶2009.  We expect that the Croatians will deploy two of 
their new MI-171Sh lift helicopters.  This will be the 
first deployment outside of Croatia for the Air Force. 
Croatia has expressed a willingness to deploy two more 
helicopters to KFOR next year.  SOCEUR finished an 
evaluation of Croatia's ability to provide lift support 
last week and from all accounts the results were very 
positive. 
 
¶7.  (C) Peacekeeping: Croatia prides itself on its 
transition from a security consumer with UN Peacekeepers 
on its territory to a security provider with Croatian 
Armed Forces (CAF) elements involved in UN peacekeeping 
operations around the globe, to include 98 CAF personnel 
on the UN mission in the Golan Heights.  Croatia has 
deployed 15 of its Special Forces soldiers to the EU-led 
mission in Chad where they are serving within the Polish 
sector.  With these deployments Croatia is in the process 
of implementing its plans to increase and sustain its PKO 
contributions from around 250 soldiers in 2007 to 600 
soldiers by 2010. 
 
¶8. (C) ASPA: The U.S. FMF and IMET programs were 
suspended in July 2003 due to American Serviceman 
Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions.  As a result, in the 
past few years the CAF depended entirely upon national 
resources to accomplish its NATO partnership goals and to 
equip its forces for ISAF.  Croatia is the only ISAF 
partner and new NATO invitee that accomplished its 
transformation and financed its ISAF commitments without 
FMF or Coalition Support Funding.  The suspension of IMET 
during this time has had a telling impact throughout the 
CAF.  Most notably is the lack of U.S.-educated staff 
officers at the senior and mid-grade officer level to 
fill critical billets on the MOD, CAF, and NATO Staffs. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) FMF/IMET levels.  Croatia did not receive any 
FMF in FY08, and will receive only 1.8 million dollars in 
FMF in 2009.  IMET is similarly under-funded for a NATO 
invitee with only 309K in FY08 (including the 9K in end- 
of-year fallout) and is projected to receive 500K in 
FY09.  The proposed budget numbers trend better in FYs 10 
and 11. 
 
BRADTKE