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Viewing cable 09TUNIS182, AMERICAN SCHOOL TAX CRISIS DEEPENS: NEXT STEPS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TUNIS182 2009-03-30 15:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tunis
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0182/01 0891525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301525Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6128
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 0037
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR M AND P 
DEPT. ALSO FOR NEA/FO - HUDSON AND NEA/MAG 
DEPT. ALSO FOR A/OPR/OS FOR CAMERON 
TREASURY FOR IA/MDB FOR MORRIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 
TAGS: ASCH PREL AFDB PGOV TS
SUBJECT: AMERICAN SCHOOL TAX CRISIS DEEPENS: NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. TUNIS 0156 
     B. TUNIS 0001 
     C. 08 TUNIS 1135 
     D. 07 TUNIS 1489 
     E. TUNIS-NEA/MAG E-MAILS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec, Reason 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The American Cooperative School of Tunis (ACST) tax 
dispute has reached a critical point and the school faces 
possible closure.  The Ministry of Finance has issued its 
final tax decree, which requires ACST to pay $6.8 million in 
60 days, money it does not have and probably cannot borrow. 
The Ambassador met with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
officials and delivered a clear message that the GOT's 
actions may force the school to close, contravene its 
commitments and have serious consequences for US-Tunisian 
relations.  The Ambassador also met with African Development 
Bank President Kaberuka, who will again approach the Prime 
Minister and other senior GOT officials.  The Ambassador will 
also seek a meeting with Presidential Advisor and Minister of 
State Abdelaziz Ben Dhia.  In the meantime, the school has 
been considering options with its Tunisian lawyers. 
 
2. (C) In this cable, we review developments, and lay out the 
steps the Embassy and school will take.  In brief, we will 
ratchet up the political pressure on the GOT to reverse 
course while making contingency plans if it does not do so. 
We ask for the Department's support and assistance.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Latest Developments: No Good News 
--------------------------------- 
 
     Government Issues Final Tax Decree 
     ---------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) A March 10 meeting between an ACST delegation and the 
Director General of Fiscal Controls of the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) ended without clear result (see ref A).  The 
two sides exchanged views, with ACST noting it was prepared 
to pay a portion of the tax bill, but not the majority of it. 
 The school delegation maintained it has tax exemptions based 
on 50 years of practice, diplomatic exchanges between the 
Tunisian and US Governments, and the 1963 Educational and 
Cultural Agreement (cited by the GOT as recently as 2008 to 
justify VAT exemptions).  The MOF Director General held firm 
to the Ministry's position.  Both sides agreed on the need 
for further guidance on the status of the school, with the 
MOF expressly acknowledging a need for direction from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).  The Director General also 
said the final tax decree would be put on hold until guidance 
could be obtained. 
 
4.  (U) Despite the promise, on March 19, the school received 
the final tax decree, which is the MOF's last word.  There 
are no further administrative appeals and the remaining 
option is to file suit in Tunisia's courts.  In the decree, 
the MOF puts the school in the category of profit-making 
institutions and imposes stiff penalties, particularly in 
regard to withholding taxes for foreign employees and VAT 
exemptions.  The decree maintains the school owes the 
entirety of the original 9.1 million dinar (approximately US 
$6.8 million) finding, and must pay within 60 days unless a 
court case is filed.  The decree also states, however, that a 
large portion of the bill -- 4 million dinar or over US $3 
million -) is not subject to deferment upon appeal to the 
courts, or to payment by installments, and so is due in 60 
days, period.  (NB.  ACST currently has approximately $1 
million in reserve funds.) 
 
     African Development Bank Will Help 
     ---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) On March 24, the Ambassador briefed African 
Development Bank (AfDB) President Donald Kaberuka on the 
latest developments.  Kaberuka was clearly alarmed by the 
potential closure of the school and by the possibility, even 
if the school remains open, of major tuition hikes.  With 200 
students in the school with an 80 percent subsidy from the 
AfDB, the bank would be hard-pressed to pay its share of a 
major tuition increase.  AfDB employees would also find a fee 
hike very difficult.  Kaberuka said he would redouble his 
efforts to pursue the matter with the highest levels of the 
GOT, including the Prime Minister.  He added, however, that 
Tunisia is a sovereign country and there may be no choice but 
to pay or close the school. 
 
     Pressing the MFA 
     ---------------- 
 
6. (C) During a meeting March 26 with MFA Chief of Staff 
Mahmoud Khemiri and the Minister's Special Assistant Mehrez 
Ben Rhouma, the Ambassador spoke at length about the tax bill 
and the school's situation.  He stressed that the United 
States and Tunisia are close to a crisis over this matter and 
the GOT's refusal to grant a tax exemption for equipment and 
work being done at the North Africa American Cemetery and 
Memorial.  (Note: We report on the cemetery tax issue by 
septel.)  The Ambassador made clear the school does not have 
the funds to pay the tax bill and probably cannot borrow the 
money.  If the GOT does not change course, there may be no 
choice but to close the school.  The Ambassador said such a 
development would have a serious effect on our bilateral 
relationship at the beginning of the new US Administration. 
He stressed that the school has been associated with the 
American Embassy for 50 years and been subject to diplomatic 
correspondence throughout that time.  It was inappropriate 
for the GOT to take unilateral action without negotiating 
with the US Government.  The Ambassador urged, again, that 
the GOT immediately begin negotiations with the Mission on a 
bilateral agreement to settle the school's status. 
 
7.  (C) Khemiri suggested that the Embassy could guarantee a 
loan for the school and noted that the Ministry of Finance is 
very powerful.  The Ambassador said the Embassy could not 
guarantee a loan, although it was possible the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) might do so.  (NB. OPIC 
has since declined to do so.  See below.)  When the 
Ambassador asked if there was a political message in the 
GOT's actions, Khemiri jumped in to flatly deny there was any 
such motivation, saying this is a technical issue.  The 
Ambassador noted the publicity that the closure of the school 
in Syria received, adding if the Tunis school closed it too 
would receive international media attention.  The Ambassador 
added that the GOT should not underestimate the potential 
reaction in Congress, in addition to that of the 
Administration.  He informed them of his intention to seek a 
meeting with Presidential Advisor and Minister of State Ben 
Dhia and said AfDB President Kaberuka would raise the matter 
with the Prime Minister again. 
 
--------- 
What Now? 
--------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The Ministry of Finance's action leaves the school 
and Embassy confronting an urgent situation.  We are now 
taking steps to ratchet up the pressure on the GOT and to 
plan for the possibility we may have to close the school. 
The visit March 25-27 of Beatrice Cameron of the Office of 
Overseas Schools was a valuable opportunity to review our 
plans and consult on strategy.  As we move forward, we will 
need significant support from the Department.  Below, we 
outline what we are doing and suggest possible steps by the 
Department. 
 
     Steps by the School 
     ------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Here is what ACST is doing, in close consultation 
with the Mission: 
 
A) Financial situation.  The school is assessing the 
financial impact of the tax bill.  ACST has explored the 
option of a loan, but private banks have made clear a 
guarantee would be necessary.  On March 27, OPIC, which backs 
an existing ACST loan of $2.5 million, declined the request 
for a new guarantee.  The remaining options are an AFDB loan 
(unlikely) or an agreement by the GOT to stretch out 
payments.  Even if a loan or payment arrangement is possible, 
however, we estimate tuition would have to be raised by US 
$10,000 per student (to approximately $28,000 annually) for a 
high school student.  In addition to hiking tuition, the 
school would have to cut operations and activities. 
Moreover, such a tuition increase would be beyond the means 
of many families whose children are now in the school and the 
resulting drop in enrollment would only exacerbate the 
financial situation. 
 
B) Briefing the parents.  The ACST school board is fully 
apprised of the tax situation, and knowledge of it is 
gradually spreading.  ACST has a general meeting with all 
parents scheduled for April 15, and the board and Embassy 
officials will have to brief all parents at that session. 
Immediately prior to the general meeting, if the tax issue 
has not been resolved, the board will send a letter to all 
parents to apprise them of the situation. 
 
C) Legal case.  ACST, together with its lawyers, is preparing 
to file suit in Tunisia's courts.  Given that the judicial 
system is not independent, we believe this is a last resort 
and have advised ACST to proceed only if all political 
options have been exhausted.  ACST will not file unless and 
until the Embassy gives a green light to do so. 
 
D) Contingency plans: ACST and the Mission will begin to 
discuss contingency plans for the closure of the school. 
Regardless of the outcome, however, we expect all students to 
be able to complete this academic year. 
 
     Steps by the Mission 
     -------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Here is what the Mission is doing: 
 
A. Ben Dhia meeting.  The Ambassador will seek a meeting with 
Minister of State Ben Dhia on the school and hand him a 
non-paper (draft provided to the Department by e-mail). 
Comment.  We believe this meeting will be a key test of 
whether the GOT will stand down and commence negotiations on 
a bilateral agreement.  End comment. 
 
B.  Other GOT meetings.  If the Ben Dhia meeting does not 
produce results, the Ambassador will request a meeting with 
the Prime Minister.  If the meeting with the Prime Minister, 
and subsequent interventions by the Department (see para 11), 
produce less than satisfactory results, we would seek 
instructions from the Department for the Ambassador to seek a 
meeting with President Ben Ali.  The Ambassador is also 
reaching out to other influential Tunisians who are close to 
the GOT to apprise them of the situation and seek support. 
 
C.  COM meeting.  The Ambassador will update key Ambassadors 
in Tunis (e.g., the German, French and British Ambassadors) 
on the latest developments and ask them again to approach the 
GOT.  Several have previously agreed to do so. 
 
D.  Contingency planning:  While we will continue to do 
everything possible to avoid closure, we now believe the 
situation demands prudent planning.  Obviously, there are a 
variety of short and long term implications for the Mission. 
We will lay these out in future cables and e-mails to the 
Department. 
 
     Requested Steps by the Department 
     --------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) We ask the Department to consider the following 
actions.  In each case, we recommend that the Department 
raise the school and cemetery tax issues together. 
 
A.  Tunisian Ambassador appointments.  As NEA has agreed to 
do, we ask that tax issues be a top point in all meetings 
between USG officials and new Tunisian Ambassador Mansour. 
 
B.  Under Secretary intervention: If we do not receive a 
clear indication from Minister Ben Dhia that he will help 
resolve the problem, we will need to seek direct intervention 
by the Department with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  As a 
first step, we suggest a telephone call by the Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs to Minister Abdallah. 
 
C.  Secretary intervention:  If the tax matters continue to 
remain unresolved, we believe a letter from the Secretary to 
President Ben Ali (or possibly Minister Abdallah) would be 
another useful step.  We may ask that the Ambassador be 
instructed to deliver the letter in person to Ben Ali. 
 
     Media Plan 
     ---------- 
 
12.  (SBU) The Mission is drafting possible media guidance on 
the school (and cemetery) tax matters.  We will forward the 
drafts to NEA for review.  In addition, if it becomes 
apparent that private communications with the GOT are not 
producing action, we believe we should consider the 
possibility of a public statement.  Such a statement, 
however, should be a last resort as it may well make it more 
difficult for the GOT to reverse course. 
 
------------------------------ 
Comment: Consequences and Why? 
------------------------------ 
 
13.  (C) The closure of ACST, or even a drastic increase in 
tuition, would be serious blow to the English-speaking 
international community in Tunis.  It would leave 537 
children of 69 nationalities (including 44 US Government 
dependents in September 2009) with no alternative 
English-language education options in Tunisia.  AfDB 
President Kaberuka has said the school situation might well 
force the bank to speed up its departure from Tunis.  Several 
international businesses (e.g., British Gas, Tunisia's 
largest foreign investor) would also be compelled to reassess 
their operations here.  And, of course, no ACST would also 
mean a major change in US Mission operations, and have an 
impact (for example) on the viability of the FSI advanced 
Arabic school. 
 
14.  (C) So why is the GOT pursuing its tax action against 
the school?  Despite the denial by MFA officials (who are 
unlikely to be informed about intentions in Carthage), the 
action may be related to GOT pique over US democracy and 
human rights policies.  Or, it may be simpler.  The 
President's wife, Leila Trabelsi, was reportedly a founding 
investor in the relatively new International School of 
Carthage.  Mrs. Ben Ali was subsequently reported to have 
sold her share, but her reputation is still linked to the 
success of the school, which benefited from direct GOT 
financial help.  The school may now be seeking more paying 
students.  Finally, perhaps, this really is no more than the 
Ministry of Finance seeking revenue.  Whatever the GOT's 
reasons, we do not believe the government fully understands 
the implications of its actions.  An early departure of the 
AfDB and the down-sizing of foreign Missions and 
international businesses would have serious consequences for 
Tunisia, including a financial impact that would far outweigh 
any potential tax revenue from the school. 
 
15.  (C) Regardless of the GOT's motivations, our response to 
its actions must be political and immediate.  The GOT is 
acting unilaterally in contravention of its commitments to us 
and its actions are about to harm US interests.  We must push 
back, and push back hard. 
Godec