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UNCLAS STATE 022067 
 
 
COCOM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF APER CA IO PGOV PHUM PREL UNC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN DEMARCHES ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
ON ICC ACTIONS 
 
¶1.  This is not an action request. 
 
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SUMMARY 
------------------- 
¶2.  A Government of Sudan (GOS) demarche to the United States 
Government(USG) on GOS reactions to the International Criminal 
Court's (ICC) decision to arrest the President of Sudan, Omer 
Al Bashir, on charges that he directed a campaign of mass 
murder, rape and pillage against civilians in Darfur, was 
delivered to Acting Assistant Secretary (A/S) for African Affairs 
on Thursday, March 5 at 1530 hours.  The demarche stated that the 
GOS rejects ICC decision and strongly condemns it on the grounds 
that the Republic of Sudan is not a member of the ICC, does not 
come under ICC jurisdiction and is not subject to ICC rulings. 
The demarche argued that the ICC decision is political and 
could lead to several negative consequences for peace in Darfur 
and in Sudan as a whole.  The GOS stated even though existing 
arrangements might be affected, it intends to abide by its 
obligations under the Geneva convention.  The GOS appealed to 
peace loving nations to assist in suspending the arrest warrants, 
and requested a clear statement of the USG position with regard 
to the ICC actions. 
 
On behalf of the USG, Acting A/S for the African Affairs 
Bureau of the State Department, Phil Carter, stated that the US 
is not a member of the ICC, but sees no need for a deferral of the 
ICC actions at this time.  Carter noted that while the crimes of 
Darfur must be addressed, the USG hopes to look beyond the ICC 
actions to focus on areas of common concern such as the CPA and the 
Darfur peace process.  In this context, Carter demanded that 
the decision to expel 13 NGOs from Darfur be reversed or frozen, 
and informed the emissaries that a political inertia is 
developing, which will constrain the space for bilateral 
negotiations, if the GOS does not immediately reconsider its 
expulsion actions. The A/S remarked that the GOS actions 
negatively impact a current review of US/Sudan relations. 
Carter rejected a GOS request for a Washington visit by 
Foreign Minister (FM) Deng Alor and Presidential Advisor 
(PA) Mustafa Ismael, on the grounds that meaningful dialogue 
will only be possible if the expulsions are withdrawn.  The 
Sudanese agreed to relay the A/S's points to Khartoum and 
provide an immediate response. 
 
 
SUDANESE DEMARCHE POINTS 
 
¶3. The GOS rejects the ICC decision and strongly condemns it. 
Sudan is not a member of the ICC, does not come under its 
jurisdiction and is not subject to its rulings. The GOS 
rejects the ICC decision on the grounds that the decision is 
political. 
 
The decision is political for the following reasons: 
 
a. UNSC, which created the ICC, is a political body; 
 
b. The decision to refer the matter to the ICC was done by the 
UNSC, which is a political organ; c. The Prosecutor, having 
requested an indictment from the ICC, traveled the world to 
convince others to support his request; and d. The ICC is 
focusing on Africa; there are no other continents where 
similar actions with regard to Human Rights are being taken. 
 
¶4. The ICC actions gives rise and will give rise to several 
consequences: 
 
a. It will prolong the conflict and not bring about peace; 
the ICC should be focused on peace; 
 
b. It attempts to deal with accountability but peace 
should be the priority and accountability next - especially 
in view of the Sudanese experiences with the CPA; 
 
c. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) announced 
yesterday that it has declined to continue the peace 
process in Doha/Qatar - the ICC actions sent the wrong 
message. Note: On February 17, the Government of National 
Unity (GNU - which is led by the GOS) and the Darfur rebel group 
JEM  signed an "Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence Building 
for the Settlement of the Problem of Darfur" in Doha, Qatar. 
The agreement is seen as an important step in the renewed 
Darfur peace process. End Note. 
 
¶5. The implementation of existing agreements may be affected 
by the ICC actions, but the GOS is committed to implementing its 
current agreements and protecting all diplomatic and 
International staff in the country as per the obligations 
under the Geneva convention.  The GOS will continue to search for 
peace in Sudan ;the GOS believes that this is in the best 
interest of the people of Darfur and Sudan.  The GOS invites all 
peace-loving countries that have already expressed a desire to 
bring about peace and suspend the indictment of President 
Bashir to continue to seek the withdrawal of the Darfur case 
from the ICC; 
 
¶6.  The GOS desires to know the US official position with 
regard to the ICC decision and a clarification of the various 
statements bade on behalf of the USG.  The GOS requests that 
FM Deng Alor and Presidential Advisor Mustapha Ishmael visit 
the US as soon as possible to discuss the ICC related events and 
the way forward. 
 
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USG RESPONSE 
-------------------------- 
¶7. Acting A/S Carter responded that: 
 
a. The ICC arrest warrant has been on the forefront of 
USG/GOS bilateral relations for some time, and the USG has 
consistently stated that both governments need to look beyond 
the ICC actions to focus on the areas of common concern such as 
the CPA and the Darfur peace process; 
 
b. The issues of crimes/impunities in Darfur need to be 
addressed, but we must look beyond this to continue to engage. 
For those involved in these crimes justice must be done. 
The USG hopes that the GOS responds positively to the ICC 
concerns; 
 
c. The US is not a member of the ICC.  The USG sees no 
need for a deferral at this time. 
 
d. The Doha peace process must be made more inclusive; 
the USG seeks to engage the GOS on Darfur regardless of ICC 
issues.  In this context, this has been a very bad day for our 
relationship and efforts to maintain flexibility on the areas 
of concern between the USG and the GOS; 
 
e. The USG has contacted the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) and expressed its concern about JEM comments on 
March 4; JEM states that they cannot return to the negotiating 
table unless genuine progress is made in the release of 
prisoners, which was agreed to in Doha. The USG told JEM 
in no uncertain terms to eschew violence, sit at the 
negotiating table and not sit behind a Kalashnikov;  JEM agreed 
to return to Doha after the release of prisoners. 
 
f. The USG is trying to get maximum leverage to make the 
peace process work, but the actions of the GOS in expelling 
13 NGOs from Darfur is perplexing, contradictory to its own 
interests and seriously constrains the space for us to work 
in going forward on Darfur.  These NGOs, such as CARE, 
OXFAM, IRC, with sterling reputations in the field of 
humanitarian assistance and the alleviation of suffering were 
delivering critically needed services to the people of Darfur, 
and the consequences of this action, if not immediately 
reversed, will be difficult for both the USG and the GOS; 
 
g. The expulsion of the NGOs is being seen around the world 
as a punitive act, in retaliation for the ICC actions. 
This response by the GOS is frustrating, as it will  limit the 
Darfur resolution, negatively impact the Doha peace process 
and bring acute suffering to the people of Darfur.  Beyond 
Dafur this action will negatively impact the ability of the NGOs 
to operate elsewhere in the Sudan, and the delivery 
of services will be irrevocably diminished.  The humanitarian 
organizations must remain in place in Darfur. This action 
neither helps the GOS and the USG to find common ground 
to solve the suffering in Darfur nor does it stabilize the 
situation between Sudan and Chad. It is a perplexing, disturbing 
action which is difficult to understand. The USG urges the 
GOS to reconsider this action immediately, as there is a 
political inertia developing for a harsh response, and the 
consequences will be irrevocable if the expulsion orders 
are not withdrawn; 
 
h. The GOS responses to the ICC actions are not the 
restrained responses the USG thought it had negotiated 
with the GOS.  It is important to note that the USG is in 
the process of a policy review with regard to the Sudan, 
and these actions negatively impact that review. 
 
 
GOS ACCUSES NGOs OF FAILED MANDATES 
 
¶8.  Ambassador Khoc informed the A/S that all 
Sudanese are concerned about the 
displaced persons who are helped by the NGOs, but the 
GOS is constrained to act this way because the NGOs 
have admitted to passing information to the ICC and were 
clearly not sticking to their mandate, thus abrogating 
the arrangements under which they were allowed to operate. 
Ambassador Salah, DCM,  elaborated that there are 
19 American NGOs in the Sudan and only four were being 
expelled, because their mandates should not include 
communications with the ICC as this 
is political work. 
 
¶9.  Acting A/S Carter explained that there is no 
evidence that the NGOs admitted to anything, but an 
argument that they were not fulfilling their mandate is 
unacceptable, as the organizations were not hiding 
anything, were not involved in any new political activity, 
and any reporting on humanitarian conditions cannot 
be considered as politics.  He reminded the Ambassador 
that to argue now -- 5-6 years later -- that the NGOs 
were talking to the ICC and expel them on these 
grounds is specious, punitive and unacceptable. 
 
 
FINAL REMARKS AND ARRANGEMENTS 
 
¶10.  Acting A/S Carter made the following concluding 
remarks: 
 
a. If the expulsions are implemented it will have 
definite implications for the character and content 
of our bilateral relations with the GOS and the processes 
related to Darfur; 
 
b. The Sudanese request for a visit by Foreign Minister 
Deng Alor and Special Advisor to the President of 
Sudan Mustapha Ishmael is only meaningful and possible 
if the expulsions are withdrawn or frozen in place 
until direct dialogue can be achieved. 
 
c. We cannot press JEM to move forward on the next 
round of Doha talks until the prisoner exchange is 
conducted as agreed.  Once this exchange occurs the 
USG can help bring JEM back to the negotiating table 
in Doha. 
 
¶10.  The Sudanese agreed to relay these points back 
to Khartoum and to provide an immediate response. 
 
¶11.  Acting A/S Carter will call Presidential Adviser 
Nafie on March 6 for further discussions. 
 
 
CLINTON