R 031145Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRAIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1674
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LISBON 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
OSD WASHINGTON DC
COGARD HQSUPRTCOM WASHINGTON DC
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
DEA HQ WASHDC
AMEMBASSY PRAIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAIA 000039 
 
 
EUCOM PLEASE PASS ALSO AFRICOM FOR MBAKER AND FOR CNT RSTRAYER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/3/2019 
TAGS: MARR MASS SNAR PREL ETRD KJUS CV
SUBJECT: (C) HELPING CAPE VERDE MOVE FROM DATA TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE 
WAR ON DRUGS AND TERROR 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Marianne Myles, Ambassador, AMEMBASSY PRAIA, 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
Corrected Copy.  Please discard Praia 038. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Post has engaged the GOCV in a sweeping dialogue 
on the future of GOCV interagency collaboration in interdicting 
drug smuggling, combating illegal fishing, and countering arms 
smuggling and related terrorist activities.  At the heart of 
this dialogue is a two phase USG proposal to (1) install a 
robust maritime domain awareness, communications, and 
intelligence sharing platform in Cape Verde, and (2) encourage 
the GOCV to expand access to this capability to an interagency 
group, establishing a shared platform for intelligence 
collection, analysis, and dissemination.  This cable details the 
history and status of Phase One projects, and assesses the 
prospects for Phase Two implementation.  Success in this effort 
would give us more than just an ally with a useful geo-strategic 
location astride some of the world's principal smuggling routes; 
it would give us a willing and capable partner in the fight 
against smuggling of all kinds. Counter-narcotics is our number 
one mission strategic priority, and we assess that GOCV 
implementation of this two phase program is the most important 
single medium-term contribution Cape Verde could make to that 
fight. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Post continues to aggressively pursue -- jointly with the 
United States Africa Command, Office of Counter Narco-Terrorism 
(AFRICOM/CNT) -- the installation of a robust maritime domain 
awareness, communications, and intelligence sharing platform in 
Cape Verde.  The concept, dubbed the Counter Narcotics and 
Maritime Security Information Center (CMIC), involves two 
distinct phases:  In Phase One, technical capability will be 
installed to permit the Cape Verde Coast Guard (CVCG) to 
exercise improved Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and command 
and control functions.  Phase One began in earnest in February 
2009 and completion is expected in Summer 2009.  Phase Two will 
seek to expand this capability to an interagency group within 
the GOCV, establishing a shared platform for intelligence 
collection, analysis, and dissemination.  Phase Two is 
contingent upon GOCV political will and leadership in 
establishing the appropriate interagency climate and regulatory 
frameworks.  Post has already begun fruitful engagement with the 
GOCV on this theme (see para 6). 
 
¶3. (C) Evolution of the CMIC Concept:  In June 2008, the U.S. 
Coast Guard collaborated with the CVCG in an unprecedented joint 
live operation in which the CVCG placed a Law Enforcement 
Detachment (LEDET) aboard the USCGC Dallas and conducted live 
patrols, boardings, and consensual searches of suspect vessels 
for over one week.  This was the first such LEDET live joint 
operation conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, and built on a solid 
record of joint training between the two services, notably 
including the GOCV's hosting of the 2006 NATO exercise Steadfast 
Jaguar (the first NATO exercise in sub-Saharan Africa).  In 
preparation for the Dallas LEDET, the USG (through AFRICOM/CNT) 
provided laptop computers and software to permit effective shore 
to ship communications, linking all participants in real time 
and dramatically facilitating intelligence sharing and 
decision-making. 
 
¶4. (C) In discussions with CVCG leadership, EmbOffs and AFRICOM 
officials identified broader CVCG communications and information 
sharing needs.  Using creativity and energy, officers of CNT 
adapted the Information Fusion Center concept (successfully used 
in over two dozen applications in the Asian AOR) to the Cape 
Verde context.  The Fusion Center would establish a server-based 
information backbone for the CVCG, permitting interoperability 
of a wide array of communications equipment, secure handling of 
sensitive intelligence, and both physical and virtual meeting 
spaces to conduct training exercises and live operations.  The 
concept was vetted via INL and AF in July 2008, and planning of 
the facility begun.  During the vetting process, INL 
successfully lobbied for increased funding for training, 
sustainment, and technical assistance with future integration of 
other GOCV platforms into the Fusion Center concept.  The 
project budget was accordingly more than doubled from $150,000 
to approximately $320,000. 
 
¶5. (C) Powerful Synergies Discovered:  As this concept continued 
to evolve, synergies with other ongoing bilateral and 
multilateral counter-narcotics and MDA efforts were revealed.  A 
joint U.S.-Spanish effort to provide MDA through improved 
land-based sensors led early on to asking key questions about 
how best to integrate allied GOCV agencies including the 
Judiciary Police, the Customs police, and the Maritime Police. 
A U.S. European Command (EUCOM) funded initiative to expand 
maritime Automated Identification System (AIS) technology to 
Cape Verde similarly touched on core Maritime and Fisheries 
Institute equities.  GOCV enthusiasm for standing-up its new 
intelligence service (SIR) led to scrutiny of intelligence 
sharing protocols, privacy laws, and regulation and protection 
of state secrets.  A U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation funded 
effort to develop a digitized fingerprint database, and 
Judiciary Police efforts to develop a similar in-house database 
on criminal suspects contributed to the momentum.  It quickly 
became clear to all that Cape Verde was potentially at a tipping 
point, in which a series of overlapping projects, if properly 
aligned, could be mutually reinforcing and result in a quantum 
leap forward in GOCV capabilities. 
 
¶6. (C) Post launched a series of discussions with the Chief of 
Staff of Defense, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy Commander 
of the Judiciary Police, the Commandant of the CVCG, and others, 
seeking to assess and ultimately encourage the alignment of 
those interests.  All GOCV officials recognized the value of a 
shared interagency platform of the kind that CMIC could become. 
No single GOCV agency has the critical mass or expertise to 
create such an intelligence clearing house independently of the 
others, but the creation of a joint platform would clearly 
benefit all.  The capacity to collate police and intelligence 
data, track suspect persons and suspect vessels, communicate 
with interdiction assets in the field, and integrate these 
efforts in real time with those of partner states would allow 
the GOCV to simultaneously improve and operationalize its MDA, 
as well as contribute meaningfully to international 
counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts. 
 
¶7. (C) Sharing Turf and Setting Limits:  For this vision to be 
realized would require the settlement of certain turf disputes 
(such as conflicting claims to jurisdiction over drug seizures 
on the high seas by both the CVCG and the CVPJ).  It would also 
require sufficient dedicated funding by the GOCV (the 2008 AIS 
program mentioned above was successfully installed but 
operations have been hamstrung by the lack of line-item funding 
in the relevant GOCV ministry budget for the required 
bandwidth).  Most importantly, it would require establishing key 
norms and procedures to ensure protection of sources and 
methods, efficient but secure distribution of intelligence 
products, and a vigorous defense of civil rights that still 
permits bona-fide intelligence collection and analysis. 
Squaring these circles would require powerful political 
leadership from within the GOCV itself by someone with the 
influence and dedication to overcome these obstacles and impose 
a resolution.  One of the few actors who fits this description 
is Minister of Defense Fontes Lima. 
 
¶8. (C) Current Status of CMIC Project:  On January 28, 2008, 
Ambassador and DCM met with Minister Fontes Lima to seek her 
agreement to lead the charge on GOCV interagency information 
sharing and analysis.  Though the CMIC is a key component and 
the technological backbone of the proposed interagency effort, 
it had by this time become the action forcing event more than 
the deliverable -- a means more than an end in itself.  We 
encouraged the MOD to use the CMIC project to leverage movement 
on the broader interagency issue. Fontes Lima grasped 
immediately both the practical and political subtleties of our 
message.  She green-lighted CMIC Phase One, and pledged prompt 
personal action on convoking discussion regarding the longer 
term interagency integration both the USG and GOCV seek to 
enable Phase Two.  The MOD lost no time in following through on 
her word. In a separate meeting with CVCG Commandant Fernando 
Perreira, DCM was told the MOD had called a senior level meeting 
for the week of February 9 to begin discussion of this issue. 
In the meantime AFRICOM/CNT has consolidated its programs to 
provide a clear focus on procurement and installation of the 
CMIC equipment, and has invited three CVCG officers to extended 
training on database administration and security.  These classes 
begin in March and will conclude concurrently with the 
procurement and importation of the required equipment, allowing 
the three officers to participate actively in the assembly and 
activation of the network. 
 
¶9. (C) Next Steps in Information Fusion:  Once the identified 
site is prepared (improved HVAC, security, and related upgrades 
to support an information fusion center), actual installation 
should proceed fairly smoothly.  The real challenges will be the 
political and organizational ones: determining who owns the 
intelligence products that will be produced by this fusion of 
data streams; who can access it; if/how it can be used in 
law-enforcement or other operations; how it will be protected; 
what mechanisms will be put in place for oversight; and many 
other non-trivial concerns.  The GOCV is receiving assistance 
and advice from a wide variety of partners, including the UNODC, 
partner state intelligence agencies, partner state police 
agencies, and partner state militaries.  These organizations 
have distinct mandates, so the nascent GOCV information fusion 
center will feel itself pulled in several (at times 
inconsistent) directions at once. 
 
¶10. (C) The most likely outcome is, in Post's view, that the 
principal beneficiary of this system early-on will be the CVCG. 
With a defined mission and integrated command structure, the 
CVCG can most quickly make use of actionable intelligence.  For 
this concept to succeed, however, it is vital that other 
agencies, particularly police agencies, also have input into and 
access to the analysis produced.  Post and AFRICOM/CNT are aware 
of this dynamic and continue to stress the need for CVPJ and 
other agency involvement.  CVPJ participation in recent LEDET 
operations with the U.S. Navy and UK Navy are positive signs, 
but we must continue to press for genuine interagency 
collaboration.  Given its distinct mission, consumer base, and 
(necessary) separation from law enforcement, the SIR is most 
likely to remain only a consumer of the CMIC product, perhaps 
without even an overt acknowledgment that it is reading those 
reports.  However, maximizing the benefit of the link between 
CMIC and foreign intelligence services -- a link which is 
currently envisioned to pass through SIR -- will require some 
creative thinking about how to ensure urgent actionable 
information reaches the operational agencies (whether military 
or police) in time to be acted upon. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment:  The GOCV has repeatedly demonstrated, through 
LEDETs and other activities, its readiness and political will to 
join the U.S. and its allies in the fight against transnational 
crime, especially maritime narco-trafficking.  The scope and 
vision of their proposed transformation in intelligence 
capabilities is little short of astonishing, and offers the U.S. 
and the EU an unparalleled opportunity to help them get it 
right.  Success in this effort would give us more than just an 
ally with a useful geo-strategic location astride some of the 
world's principal smuggling routes; it would give us a genuine 
partner, willing and capable to assist meaningfully in 
monitoring and (in due course) actively interdicting illicit 
traffic in people, drugs, weapons, and worse.  Counter-narcotics 
is our number one mission strategic priority, and we assess that 
GOCV implementation of this two phase program is the most 
important single medium-term contribution Cape Verde could make 
to that fight. 
 
 
MYLES