VZCZCXRO6657
PP RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNK #0167/01 0611139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021139Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8167
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0497
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0480
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2023
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0827
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0062
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0934

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN JUNTA ASKS ISRAELIS TO LEAVE 
 
REF: A. A. HANKINS/OPS CENTER TELCON 3/1/2009 
     ¶B. B. STATE 14163 
     ¶C. C. NOUAKCHOTT 138 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Israeli Ambassador Miki Arbel called Charge evening 
of March 1 advising that he had been convoked that afternoon 
by the MFA Secretary General and asked to reciprocate actions 
taken by the Mauritanian authorities by closing his embassy 
and leaving.  The Secretary General said Mauritania had told 
its Arab partners that it would take actions in response to 
the Israeli actions in Gaza but that those actions were seen 
as being incomplete.  Arbel told the Secretary General that 
he was shocked by the Mauritanian actions and would have to 
seek instructions from his capital.  The Secretary General 
told the Ambassador that the Mauritanians had expected the 
Israeli's to take these actions weeks ago when they had 
advised them of their decision to freeze relations and asking 
the Israeli's to take "appropriate measures" by which they 
meant to say "reciprocal" actions.  Arbel indicated that he 
had taken "appropriate measures" by maintaining a low 
profile.  Arbel told Charge that Tel Aviv had asked him to 
immediately brief the U.S. Embassy and indicated that Israel 
would be demarching European capitals on Monday seeking 
assistance to reverse the regime's decision.  Arbel noted 
that Foreign Minister Livni intends to raise Mauritania with 
Secretary Clinton during their scheduled meeting March 3. 
 
¶2.  (C) Given the continued unavailability of the MFA 
Director for North American Affairs Ahmed Deya who has put 
off meetings, requested in response to ref B, with A/DCM for 
over a week (Deya has been working out of the Interior 
Minister trying to implement a new directive to allow voting 
by expatriate Mauritanians during the regime's intended June 
elections), Charge secured a meeting with the Secretary 
General Mohameden Ould Sidi dit Bedena on March 2 to deliver 
REF B demarche.  In addition to the points made in reftel, 
Charge stressed the negative repercussions of any decision to 
sever ties with Israel including (a) publicly aligning 
Mauritania with the extremist Middle Eastern view expressed 
by Hamas, Syria and Iran thereby undermining the regime's 
claim that it provides the best long-term option for security 
and stability in the region, which would (b) undermine U.S. 
relations in the long term and likely force the regime's less 
severe European critics (Spain and Germany) to take a tougher 
line in regards to the coup.  Charge noted that soon after 
the coup, the regime's Foreign Minister had cited President 
Abdallahi's diplomatic contacts with Libya and Iran as a 
dangerous trend that justified the coup.  The actions taken 
by the regime since the coup demonstrate a stronger leaning 
towards extremist regimes. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Secretary General did not raise his discussion 
with Ambassador Arbel but quickly defended Mauritanian policy 
regarding Israel saying, "At the time of Taya, the government 
took a courageous decision -- against the will of most 
Mauritanians -- to establish relations with Israel because we 
thought that was the best contribution that we could make at 
the time for long term peace in the region.  At the Doha 
Summit, General Aziz determined that the best contribution 
the current government could make was to freeze -- not cut -- 
relations with Israel."  He added that, "Whatever you may 
think, we base our policy towards Israel on our own 
interests.  Our relations were not established to please 
America nor will they be cut to retaliate against the U.S. 
now or to please Iran, Syria, or anyone else."  Charge noted 
that Mauritania had chosen the extremist line in relation to 
the Palestinian issue -- one that important partners like 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia (in addition to the legitimate 
representatives of the Palestinian people) reject in favor of 
dialogue.  The Secretary General stressed that "Mauritania 
continues to be committed to a long term relationship with 
Israel" and had clearly decided to "freeze" rather than "cut" 
ties.  Charge noted that "freezing relations" is not part of 
the standard diplomatic vocabulary and asked for a 
definition.  The Secretary General said, "We have closed our 
embassy, shipped our furnishings back home, and brought back 
our Ambassador and we expect Israel to act in a reciprocal 
fashion.  We have not, however, changed the legal status of 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000167  002 OF 002 
 
 
our relations with Israel.  We still have those relations and 
our Ambassador remains the Ambassador to Israel.  If and when 
the situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
suggests a durable peace, there is nothing to preclude us 
renting a new chancery and sending our Ambassador back." 
Charge noted it was unusual that Mauritania would take a 
unilateral action and then expect Israel to respond in kind. 
The Secretary General only responded, "that is how we view 
reciprocity." 
 
¶4.  (C) Charge will be briefing Ambassador Arbel on this 
demarche this afternoon.  The Secretary General took 
particular note of the arguments that a rupture of relations 
with Israel would tend to undermine U.S. -- particularly 
Congressional -- support for any future Mauritanian 
government -- legitimate or otherwise.  He also noted the 
argument that aligning Mauritania with the 
Hamas/Syrian/Iranian hard-line would alienate Mauritania 
politically and potentially lead to a hardened European 
response to the regime.  Our sense is that the timing of the 
Mauritanian action is driven by Qaddafi's emerging mediation 
initiative on Mauritania.  With Tripoli already seen as 
biased towards the military regime, the Mauritanians are 
likely trying to curry favor with Tripoli hoping Qaddafi, as 
AU President, will act contrary to the AU's hard line policy. 
 Qaddafi is expected to arrive in Mauritania this week 
installing his tent-palace in the middle of the national 
stadium to initiate talks between Aziz, Abdallahi and Ould 
Daddah.  The junta may want to be able to tell the Guide 
they've kicked out the Israelis before the process begins. 
WALSH