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DE RUEHKV #0430/01 0651832
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD3B7708 MSI7874-632)
P 061832Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7437
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000430 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 
TAGS: EFIN EREL ETRD PGOV PREL XH UP
SUBJECT: IMF UKRAINE PROGRAM IN JEOPARDY 
 
REF: A. KYIV 419 
     ¶B. KYIV 406 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  In the presence of G7 ambassadors and the 
World Bank, the Kyiv-based IMF resident representative told 
PM Yulia Tymoshenko on March 5 that there would be "little 
benefit" in the mission team returning to Ukraine without 
greater progress on the Fund's conditionalities.  Despite a 
recent declaration of political unity by President 
Yushchenko, the PM, and other senior officials, the IMF cited 
a lack of political will to implement necessary measures, 
calling on Ukraine to "help itself first."  The PM appealed 
for understanding, asking the assembled group to take into 
account Ukraine's "special (political) circumstances" that 
"will not change."  Appearing unusually haggard and short 
tempered, the PM admitted that it would be a "tragedy" if 
Ukraine failed to renew its cooperation with the IMF.  The PM 
focused on solutions for bringing Ukraine into compliance 
with its IMF commitments, though her ideas were well-worn and 
materially at cross-purposes with the Fund's overall goals. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In the face of what may be a larger than projected 
fiscal deficit, increased deposit withdrawals from already 
teetering banks, and rising unemployment and corporate 
defaults, Ukraine's leaders cobbled together a "joint 
declaration" on March 3 in order to placate the IMF's calls 
for greater political unity.  Max Alier, the IMF's 
residential representative in Kyiv, told the PM in front of 
G7 ambassadors and the World Bank that the Fund had been 
encouraged by "signs of renewed political cooperation" by the 
newly constituted Anti-Crisis Working Group.  The joint 
declaration, a one page document forwarded to us by 
Presidential aide Oleksander Shlapak before it was signed, 
pledged that the group would take three actions: 1) develop a 
tax and fiscal policy to match available external financing; 
2) gradually introduce a flexible exchange rate to soften the 
impact of external shocks; and 3) engage in the comprehensive 
reconstruction of the banking sector, aimed at renewing 
financial stability. 
 
¶3.  (C) While Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and other principals 
made good on their promise to put forward a declaration of 
their willingness to adhere to IMF conditionalities, Alier 
was downcast about the lack of political will to implement 
the full IMF program.  In particular, he cited the Working 
Group's other compromise pact, a draft Letter of Intent (LOI) 
to the IMF.  Alier said that the LOI "falls short" on key 
steps needed to bring the mission team back to complete its 
review, necessary for the disbursement of the IMF's next $1.8 
billion loan tranche.  The lack of specific dates and prior 
actions referenced by the LOI has provided "little assurance" 
that Ukraine had fully committed to IMF program 
conditionalities, according to Alier. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ukraine must "help itself first," said Alier, an 
opinion that was also apparently expressed to President 
Yushchenko in a letter from IMF Managing Director 
Strauss-Kahn this week.  Alier reiterated that in order to 
bring the Fund back, the country's leaders must take urgent 
"fiscal corrective action" to generate savings of at least 2 
percent of GDP.  Alier affirmed that progress on a bank 
resolution strategy had been slow, even though the diagnostic 
studies of the first two groups of Ukraine's banking sector 
had been completed.  It remains essential, according to 
Alier, to put together a sound framework to address the 
banking sector, as loan quality had rapidly deteriorated and 
an average of $3.75 billion (UAH 30 billion) per month had 
been withdrawn from banking deposits since the crisis began. 
It would not take long for the banking system to succumb, 
projected the IMF representative. 
 
¶5.  (C) Commenting to Alier that she "got the message," the 
PM told the group that she saw two options: early 
parliamentary elections or a higher budget deficit -- perhaps 
10 percent of GDP.  Early elections would take 5-6 months. 
(Comment:  We think that a budget deficit of 10 percent of 
GDP would be extraordinary, given that Ukraine cannot finance 
its current deficit equivalent to at least 5 percent of GDP. 
End comment.)  The PM pointed to other countries worldwide 
that had resorted to large budget deficits in order to 
stimulate their economies.  To garner financing, the PM 
expected that she could borrow externally or raise gas prices 
for industrial consumers.  She was also actively courting 
partners for the privatization of Ukrtelecom, Odessa Portside 
Plant, and regional electricity generation plants (so-called 
oblenergos).  Privatization would not require any 
legislation, though President Yushchenko continues to oppose 
the idea, said Tymoshenko.  The PM projected that privatizing 
these assets would yield at least $1.5 billion (UAH 12 
billion), and she said that the French Ministry of Finance 
had confirmed its interest in a partnership for the purchase 
of Ukrtelecom during her recent visit to Paris.  (Note: 
President Yushchenko and others have opposed privatization 
efforts, citing market deterioration and concerns that an 
asset "fire sale" would run counter to Ukraine's medium to 
long-term interests.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Based on recent revenue projections for the current 
2009 budget, Alier stated that Ukraine's fiscal deficit would 
likely exceed the 5 percent of GDP originally estimated by 
the IMF.  In turn, the PM commented that she was disheartened 
that measures to cut the deficit had not passed in the Rada. 
Tymoshenko acknowledged that the March 3 defeat of a bill 
that would have brought substantial savings to the Pension 
Fund had raised concerns for the IMF, though she blamed 
OU/PSD -- a faction formerly controlled by the President and 
his allies -- for its weak support, with only 7 deputies 
voting in favor. 
 
¶7.  (C) Proxy disputes between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko now 
dominate the local media, as the unraveling "political truce" 
appears to further threaten the IMF program.  The pension 
bill met its demise on March 3, hours after a group of BYuT 
deputies joined the opposition parties to vote for the ouster 
of Foreign Minister Ohryzko, an ally of the President, 
allegedly for Ohryzko's anti-Tymoshenko letter circulated to 
Ukraine's key embassies abroad (Ref B).  On March 4, Naftohaz 
headquarters were raided by the state security service (SBU), 
which is under the control of the President, allegedly to 
seize documents related to controversial elements of the 
Tymoshenko-brokered gas deal with Russia (Ref A).  On March 
5, after receiving an order from the Presidential 
Secretariat, the Ukraine NATO mission refused to credential 
DPM Grigoriy Nemyria, Tymoshenko's key foreign policy 
advisor, as he sought access to the compound to participate 
in the NATO-Ukraine Council Ministerial with Acting Foreign 
Minister Khandogiy in Brussels.  Nemyria had traveled to 
represent Tymoshenko, thus the "gate incident" has been 
interpreted as a slap in the government's face. 
 
¶8.  (C) Note: Rada Speaker Lytvyn saw the disintegration of 
Yushchenko/Tymoshenko cooperation coming, when he spoke to 
the Ambassador on March 4.  He worried that Ukraine would "go 
down in chaos," with each faction leader looking to 
capitalize on the mistakes of others.  He had predicted that 
the Ohryzko dismissal would lead to more destabilization of 
an already fragile "pretense" of unity.  End note. 
 
¶9.   (C) The IMF, World Bank, and G7 ambassadors told PM 
Tymoshenko -- repeating what they had stated to the President 
on February 26 -- that an "on track" IMF program remains a 
pre-condition to any external budget support.  The PM asked 
the assembled group to take into account Ukraine's "special 
(political) circumstances" that "will not change."  The PM 
admitted that it would be a "tragedy" if Ukraine failed to 
renew its cooperation with the IMF, and she said that she 
would continue to reach out to the U.S. and the E.U. for 
financial assistance, knowing that such support was 
conditioned on a prior agreement with the IMF.  She admitted 
that Ukraine was in ongoing negotiations with the Russians 
for a bilateral loan.  Yet, the PM suggested that Russia was 
in a worse economic condition than Ukraine, and she predicted 
that Russia would face an avalanche of financing obligations 
in the months to come. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment.  That the IMF program is in trouble is no 
surprise, especially since the second tranche of a $16.4 
billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) has been on hold for 
several weeks due to the lack of GOU action on the IMF's 
conditionalities.   Nonetheless, to our knowledge, the IMF 
had not previously told the President or the PM that the Fund 
would indefinitely withhold the return of its Ukraine mission 
team.  The longer the IMF mission team is delayed, the 
greater the threat of a Ukrainian financial disaster. 
 
¶11.  (C) The ball is now firmly in Kyiv's court.  On the one 
hand, the Anti-Crisis Working Group, a roundtable process 
that had made some progress and generated some hope, has been 
unable to contain the animosity and scope of personal 
ambitions driving Ukraine's senior leaders.  On the other 
hand, some sort of joint process remains essential, given the 
gravity of the situation and the seeming inability of 
Ukraine's leadership to put aside politicking for more than a 
few days in order to rescue the country from further decline. 
 We are concerned that while the G7 ambassadors plus 
IMF/World Bank process has helped, it no longer can 
substitute for higher level engagement.  End comment. 
 
TAYLOR