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FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8326
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CASABLANCA 000047 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (ADDED IRAN COLLECTIVE) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL KTER MO AG IR
SUBJECT: MOROCCO/IRAN: THE PHANTOM SHIA MENACE 
 
REF: A. RABAT 200 
     ¶B. 08 RABAT 171 
     ¶C. 08 RABAT 178 
 
CASABLANCA 00000047  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General Millard for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: One of Morocco's top experts on 
Islam discounted the government of Morocco's (GOM) 
explanation that the Iranian Shia menace was a 
proximate cause of the breakdown in relations 
between the two countries.  Whatever Iran's alleged 
proselytizing activities may have borne, the 
penetration of Shia Islam in Morocco is still very 
limited, he maintained.  GOM sensitivities may be 
linked to the Shia community's basing their loyalty 
to the throne on the quasi-Shia blood links between 
Morocco's kings and the Prophet Mohammed.  Leading 
Moroccan Shia deny links to Hizbullah or Iran, 
however.  In contrast to the few Shia here, mostly 
immigrants or their descendents, he thought there 
might be as many as 20,000 Moroccans in Europe who 
have converted to Shia Islam.  The expert saw the 
Iranian Shia "menace" as an invention of the GOM and 
claimed the rupture in relations was more related to 
Iran's warming relations with Algeria and its 
perceived shift to support the Polisario's claim on 
the Western Sahara.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Background: The government of Morocco (GOM) 
has officially blamed the recent rupture of 
diplomatic relations with Iran on two factors; 
Iran's unfair treatment of Morocco following a 
dispute over Bahrain's sovereignty and Iran's 
alleged Shia proselytizing activities in Morocco 
(Ref A).  Shortly after the expulsion of the Iranian 
Ambassador to Rabat, the Ministry of Interior 
announced the creation of a commission to collect 
and confiscate Shia publications from bookstores 
throughout Morocco and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs has reportedly ordered Imams to deliver 
Friday sermons against the dangers of Shia Islam. 
 
----------------------- 
Morocco's Imported Shia 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Mohammed Darif, an expert on Islamic groups 
in Morocco, described the historical development of 
Shia Islam to poloff in a March 18th meeting. 
According to Darif, Shia Islam has existed in 
Morocco since the early 1960s when it was brought by 
the Iraqi and Syrian schoolteachers who helped fill 
the dearth of educational positions in post- 
independence Morocco (many of them for classical 
Arabic).  These teachers made their life in Morocco, 
married local women, and in a limited and informal 
fashion taught friends and students about their 
beliefs.  There were a very small number of converts 
and most grouped themselves in northern towns such 
as Oujda and Tangiers. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Darif recalled that the Iranian revolution 
generated considerable interest among Islamists in 
Morocco.  Abdessalam Yassine, the charismatic leader 
of the banned Adl wa Ihsan (Justice and Good Works 
Organization - JCO) dedicated the first five 
editions of his magazine Al Jamaa (the Group) in 
1980 to explaining and expanding upon the ideas 
expressed in Ayatollah Khomeini's book, the Islamic 
Government.  Yassine, like many others at the time, 
was fascinated by the strategy of Khomeini in 
bringing about Islamic governance.  Yassine and 
subsequent Moroccan Islamic groups looked to Iran as 
a political example to be emulated rather than as a 
theological or doctrinal inspiration. 
 
¶5. (S) Darif specified that in 1983 a group of 
Islamic militant students formed the group Jundi 
Allah (the Soldiers of God) which allegedly had ties 
to Iran.  The founders included Mustafa Mouatassim, 
who later went on to form other Islamic 
organizations including, Al Ikhtiyar Al Islami (the 
Islamic Choice) and eventually in 1996 Hizb Al Badil 
Al Hadari (The Party of Civilizational Alternative). 
Another young Islamist activist who worked with 
Mouatassim to found Jundi Allah was Mohammed El 
Marouani who went on to form Harakat Min Ajil Al 
Oumma (Movement for the Nation) which applied for 
political party status around 2007.  In February of 
2008, the GOM banned the party and the movement 
following the arrest of Mouatassim and Marouani for 
 
CASABLANCA 00000047  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
their alleged involvement in the Belliraj terrorist 
cell (Ref B).  All told some thirty eight people 
were arrested including Abdelhafid Sriti, a 
correspondent for Hezbollah's satellite channel, Al 
Manar. The GOM has accused Moutassim of ties to 
Hizbollah and, privately to the USG, of knowledge of 
a link between Belliraj and Iran (Ref C). 
 
--------------- 
Shia in Morocco 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C) While there is an Iranian association with 
these groups, Darif insisted that the connection is 
best understood as a convergence of political goals 
rather than any affinity for Shiism.  The main 
contingent of Shia followers in Morocco belongs to 
the doctrinal school that follows the Lebanese 
Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, which he 
described as largely disinterested in political 
affairs. 
 
¶7. (C) In 2007 the Islamic Education Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (ISESCO) held a conference in 
Rabat to promote Sunni-Shia understanding. 
According to Darif, Mohammed Fadlallah's son Ali 
attended the conference and later traveled to 
Tangiers and Oujda to meet with the Moroccan Shia 
community.  In Tangiers he visited the Jamaat Anwar 
Al Mawaddah (the Luminous (prophet's) Family) 
association and in Oujda the Jamaat Al Liqaa Al 
Insani (the Human Meeting) association.  Both of 
these Shia organizations have applied for government 
recognition from the Ministry of Interior and have 
been denied an association license. 
 
¶8. (C) One of the leaders of this Fadlallah-oriented 
northern community is Issam Hamidan, who also was 
involved in the formation of an Islamist student 
organization in the early 1990s called Talabaat Al 
Mithaaq (Students of the Pact.)  In May of 2008, 
Hamidan along with a young editor named Younnes 
Sifri published a Shia magazine called Ruhyat 
Muassarat (Contemporary Vision).  The magazine, 
which published just two issues before being closed 
down by the authorities, spoke for the first time 
openly about the Shia community in Morocco.  It 
argued that Morocco is in fact a Shia country since 
was once ruled by the Shia Idrisid Dynasty and 
celebrates Shia traditions.  The publication also 
affirmed the community's allegiance to the "Shia" 
Alaouite family of the king which claims descent 
from the prophet's daughter Fatima and the Caliph 
Ali. 
 
------------------- 
The Hoja of Morocco 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Moroccan press has periodically done 
pieces on the threat of Shiism and most have 
featured interviews with or portrayals of Driss 
Hani, the so-called Hoja, or leader of the Shia in 
Morocco.  Hani, born in Meknes, converted to Shiism 
and traveled to Syria at the age of eighteen where 
he studied in a hawza (Shia seminary) that followed 
the teachings of Ayatollah Shirazi.  After his 
eventual return to Morocco, he has unsuccessfully 
tried to register Shia organizations with the 
government including al Ghadir in Meknes headed by 
Hani's brother Mouhssine, Attawasol in Al Hoceim, 
and Al Inbiaat in Tangiers.  In a 2002 interview 
with a Moroccan daily paper, Hani disavowed any 
connection between the Shia community in Morocco and 
Hizbollah or Iran.  While Hani has been the face of 
Shiism in the Moroccan media, Darif claimed that he 
has only a handful of followers and that the media's 
focus on him is the result of his own self-promotion. 
 
----------------------- 
The True Iranian Threat 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Darif expressed skepticism that Iran is 
actually involved in, or capable of, undertaking any 
effective campaign to convert or spread Shia 
doctrine in Morocco.  Considering the effectiveness 
and vigilance of the Moroccan security services and 
the largely political nature of Iran's Shia message, 
it seems unlikely that Iran would have much 
opportunity to for such activities, he argued. 
 
CASABLANCA 00000047  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) The number of Moroccan Shia is unknown. 
While there are probably no more than two dozen 
Moroccan students studying at hawzas in Lebanon, 
Syria, and Iraq, the Moroccan expatriate community 
in Europe, especially Belgium and Germany, is 
sizable.  Darif believes that there are at least 
twenty thousand Moroccan converts to Shiism residing 
in Europe.  He also noted that King Mohammed VI's 
speech during Ramadan of 2008 in the city of Tetouan 
called for the formation of a council of Moroccan 
religious leaders who would work to ensure that 
Moroccans resident in Europe are not swayed by 
radical or heretical ideas.  Darif reported that 
these reforms were aimed at countering Iran's Shia 
proselytizing activities. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Behind the Curtain: Western Sahara 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Although Morocco perceives a threat from the 
extended influence of Iran amongst its expatriate 
population in Europe, it seems unlikely that the 
breakdown of relations was truly related to Iran's 
proselytizing.  Rather, Darif claimed, Morocco is 
upset about the warming relationship between Iran, 
Algeria, and Venezuela and the implications for its 
claims on the Western Sahara.  Darif reported that 
last month the deputy chief of mission at Iranian 
Embassy in Algiers (NFI) travelled to the town of 
Tifariti in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara and 
gave a speech comparing the berm in Western Sahara 
to the security wall between Israel and Palestine. 
Darif believes that Iran has been playing both sides 
and may be considering changing its position towards 
the Polisario. 
 
----------------------- 
The Phantom Shia Menace 
----------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Shortly after the announcement to end 
relations with Iran, the press reported that the 
Ministry of Interior has begun to set up committees 
in the governorates and provinces to confiscate and 
ban all Shia publications.  Darif claimed that the 
authorities had already confiscated books in the 
Habbous neighborhood of Casablanca and had targeted 
stores in Tangiers.  The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs has likewise directed Imams to deliver 
sermons at Friday prayers speaking out against the 
Shia threat. The latest press reports alleged that 
the police have begun a campaign to arrest 
individuals suspected of links to Shiism. 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT:  While the real reason behind the 
break in diplomatic relations remains opaque, we do 
not believe that the small population of indigenous 
Shia represents the existential threat portrayed by 
the GOM.  Over the past week the Moroccan press has 
been beating the drum about the prevalence and 
seriousness of the Shia threat, portraying the 
community as an Iranian fifth column.  We are unable 
to confirm the Western Sahara/Algeria link, which 
the MFA has specifically denied to Embassy Rabat but 
we remain skeptical that this was the principal 
reason for a break down in relations.  Nevertheless, 
we share Darif's implied concern that the GOM may be 
engaged in a dangerous course of action by 
conflating politics and religion and inciting people 
against a religious minority. 
 
¶15.  This message was coordinated with Embassy 
Rabat. 
MILLARD