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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0181
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2259
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4783

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN GALI 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires A.I. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During the first official USG trip to 
Abkhazia since the August 2008 war, representatives of civil 
society in Gali provided information about several serious 
human rights concerns facing ethnic Georgians in Gali.  They 
face extortion from well-organized criminal gangs; pressure 
to accept Abkhaz or Russians passports, or some level of 
pressure to renounce Georgian citizenship in order to have 
access to basic social benefits and civil rights; and 
limitations on both freedom of movement and Georgian language 
education.  Some expressed great fear at the potential 
security and economic impact of a closure of UNOMIG and were 
considering leaving if it did close.  The IDP issue remains 
contentious, with ethnic Abkhaz admitting only grudgingly 
that ethnic Georgians should someday be given a chance to 
return to Gali, but not the rest of Abkhazia.  End summary. 
 
TROUBLES IN GALI 
 
¶2. (C) EUR/CARC Advisor on the South Caucasus Conflicts 
Michael Carpenter and EmbOff traveled to Abkhazia February 
12-13 and met de facto officials, UN staff, and 
representatives of civil society in both Sukhumi and Gali. 
Two representatives of the Human Rights Centre in Gali made 
the most serious allegations of human rights concerns, 
indicating that the local population faced grave persecution. 
 Most troubling was the allegation that criminal gangs 
control the district, running an almost feudal system of 
extorting a certain percentage of villagers' crops.  They 
said the district is divided into four areas, with each area 
divided into small clusters of three or so villages that are 
controlled by a particular gang.  The gangs are composed of 
former militia members who fought in the past and who would 
likely be called upon again to fight if necessary in the 
future.  They are somehow incorporated into official 
structures, such as the de facto interior or defense 
ministries, but local de facto authorities cannot control 
them, and ethnic Abkhaz residents themselves fear them.  In 
some cases, individual villagers have even been forced to 
work for the gangs essentially as slaves, harvesting produce 
on abandoned land or working on construction projects in 
Sukhumi without pay.  One of the gangs is reportedly 
affiliated with the Krtadze clan in the area around 
Chuburkhinji.  According to these human rights workers, this 
gang, after seeing the Danish Refugee Council's renovation of 
a kindergarten, even tried to force the Council to renovate 
one of the gang's buildings.  The workers asked that this 
example be kept in confidence, lest the Council's staff 
suffer retaliation. 
 
¶3. (C) The Human Rights Center representatives noted other 
human rights concerns as well, such as restrictions on 
freedom of movement across the administrative boundary line 
between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.  They confirmed 
Kishmaria's statements that the boundary is being 
strengthened, and the cost of crossing the boundary is quite 
high for the local population, ranging from 300 to 1,000 
rubles (approximately $9-$30).  They also noted what they 
called the growing Russification of the region.  The 
representatives said that all schools in Gali should 
officially conduct classes in Russian; although the schools 
in lower Gali conduct classes in Georgian, it is in fact 
Qin lower Gali conduct classes in Georgian, it is in fact 
illegal to do so (the UN human rights officer in Gali said 
that he does not believe that teaching in Georgian is 
technically illegal).  Beyond the legal question, however, 
the representatives said the de facto authorities are making 
it more difficult to maintain the Georgian-language system in 
practice by refusing to pay the salaries of Georgian-language 
teachers.  In the past, the Georgian government supported 
these teachers, but now that the boundary is more closed, 
that support cannot get throug.  According to the Human 
Rights Center representatives, parents themselves must 
therefore support the Georgian-language teachers, but that is 
becoming more difficult for the same reason. 
 
PASSPORTIZATION 
 
¶4. (C) Carpenter asked Kishmaria about reports of 
passportization in Gali (i.e., compelling ethnic Georgians to 
accept Abkhaz so-called passports and renounce Georgian 
passports and/or citizenship).  Kishmaria said that the 
process of making the document available had begun, with 
7,000 applications already lodged, but only a small number 
issued (a UN political officer estimated the number issued at 
200).  Kishmaria said the process would speed up and possibly 
 
TBILISI 00000322  002 OF 003 
 
 
finish by the end of the year, but no one would be forced to 
accept an Abkhaz so-called passport, with a prospective 
permanent resident card eventually being offered instead. 
The latter would not bestow all the rights of a so-called 
citizen, however, such as voting rights, but Kishmaria said 
individuals would have access to basic services, such as the 
issuance of a driver's license.  He insisted that no one's 
civil rights would be violated because of his or her 
identification document, and that no one would have to 
renounce Georgian citizenship.  Some NGO representatives in 
Gali, however, said that, in fact, applicants had to write 
out by hand a renunciation on a blank line at the bottom of 
the form.  Thus there would be no evidence of the requirement 
on the form itself, but it would not be processed without the 
statement.  The UN political officer in Sukhumi said that no 
one was being forced to give up his or her Georgian passport 
to receive an Abkhaz document, and the interlocutors in Gali 
agreed.  (Note: Were it implemented, such a step would 
greatly inhibit the local population's freedom of movement 
into the rest of Georgia.  End note.)  He also noted, 
however, that those with Abkhaz so-called passports would be 
eligible to receive a Russian pension, which is not generous, 
but nevertheless significant. 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding passportization, Shamba said that no one 
would be compelled to accept an Abkhaz so-called passport, 
because in fact the de facto authorities had no great 
incentive to empower the population of Gali politically.  He 
even stated the authorities did not want the Gali residents 
to vote in large numbers, although he backed off a bit when 
asked why the de facto authorities would not want residents 
of Abkhazia to participate in the political process. 
 
OPTIONS ARE DWINDLING -- AND PEOPLE MAY BEING LEAVING 
 
¶6. (C) An older couple on the street in the city of Gali 
indicated they were seriously considering leaving their 
lifelong home to live with their daughter in Tbilisi.  They 
were concerned with both the economy and the security of the 
region, and for them, the deciding factor would be whether 
the UN mission remains.  If it goes, the wife will lose her 
job, which is their primary means of support; also, they will 
not feel safe.  The husband said that "they" (understood to 
mean the Abkhaz) will be able to do whatever they want if the 
UN leaves, making a slashing motion across his neck.  He said 
that many of their neighbors are also thinking about leaving. 
 He confirmed the story about the unofficial requirement to 
write out a renunciation of Georgian citizenship on the 
application for an Abkhaz so-called passport. 
 
IDPs -- PERHAPS A RETURN TO GALI, BUT NOT BEYOND 
 
¶7. (C) All the ethnic Abkhaz interlocutors showed discomfort 
when asked about the return of ethnic Georgian internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia.  No one rejected the 
idea outright, but no one embraced a comprehensive or swift 
process either.  Shamba agreed that Georgians should 
eventually be allowed to return to Gali, but said returns to 
the rest of Abkhazia would difficult, because old passions 
could result in renewed violence.  The ethnic Abkhaz civil 
society representatives expressed the same concern.  One 
representative of the Center for Humanitarian Programs in 
Sukhumi, which was originally founded to help victims of the 
QSukhumi, which was originally founded to help victims of the 
war in the early 1990s, went farther than the de facto 
officials by suggesting that no one should be allowed to 
return until Abkhazia is recognized as independent.  She 
thought perhaps the right to return could be one element of a 
negotiated final settlement -- a bargaining chip for 
recognition.  Only Khashig Inal, editor of the independent 
newspaper Chegemskaia Pravda, recognized that the IDPs gave 
Georgia the moral high ground to any extent, calling the 
issue Georgia's only "trump card," but even he saw problems 
with any returns outside Gali. 
 
¶8. (C) When asked about a possible process for returning the 
IDPs, Shamba protested that there had been a plan, but that 
the Georgian government had not upheld its part -- i.e., had 
not allowed a census of the IDPs to proceed.  He alleged that 
the number of IDPs was greatly exaggerated, and therefore the 
Georgian government did not want to produce an accurate 
estimate.  The CHP representative also suggested that the 
numbers were inflated because the Georgian government still 
counted those who had already returned as IDPs.  Inal, who 
adopted the most objective attitude toward the IDP issue, 
estimated there to be 180,000 IDPs remaining.  (Note: The 
Georgian government estimates there to be around 230,000. 
End note.) 
 
TBILISI 00000322  003 OF 003 
 
 
LOGSDON