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Viewing cable 09TBILISI321, GEORGIA: ABKHAZ, PROUD BUT NERVOUS -- AND READY TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TBILISI321 2009-02-17 12:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi
VZCZCXRO4111
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0321/01 0481207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171207Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0944
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0178
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2256
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4780
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZ, PROUD BUT NERVOUS -- AND READY TO 
ENGAGE 
 
REF: TBILISI 112 
 
Classified By: Charges d'Affaires A.I. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment.  During the first official USG 
trip to Abkhazia since the August 2008 war, Abkhaz de facto 
officials and civil society representatives showed new 
confidence in their so-called independence, but also unease 
with Russia's increasing influence.  They believe Russia's 
recognition and increased military presence enhance 
Abkhazia's security, but still crave engagement with other 
countries, including the U.S.  All interlocutors expressed 
interest in cross-boundary exchanges, as long as they focused 
on practical issues like health care and avoided status 
questions.  De facto "foreign minister" Shamba, however, said 
diplomats accredited in Tbilisi would no longer be allowed to 
visit; it is not clear how firm this policy is since the EU 
Ambassador from Tbilisi was received by Shamba the same day. 
The December 2009 elections for de facto "president" are 
already encouraging political posturing and possibly limiting 
officials' flexibility, including on the diplomatic access 
issue.  Russia's contribution to the Abkhaz budget has 
increased dramatically; a failure to meet its commitments in 
2009 could cause real political difficulties.  The USG may be 
able to find ways to re-engage with Abkhazia, but will likely 
need to be careful how it articulates the goals of that 
engagement in light of our support for Georgia's territorial 
integrity.  (See septel about serious human rights concerns 
in Gali.)  End summary and comment. 
 
TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE? THE DE FACTO VIEW 
 
2. (C) EUR/CARC Advisor on the South Caucasus Conflicts 
Michael Carpenter and EmbOff traveled to Abkhazia February 
12-13 and met in separate meetings with de facto "foreign 
minister" Sergey Shamba and de facto "presidential" 
representative for the Gali region Ruslan Kishmaria. 
Carpenter met one-on-one with de facto "national security 
council secretary" Stanislav Lakoba, who refused to see a 
diplomat accredited to Tbilisi.  With the media present, 
Shamba began speaking with a confident air about Abkhazia's 
so-called independence as an established fact.  He expressed 
strong disapproval of U.S. policy toward Abkhazia, offering a 
historical justification of Abkhazia's claim to independence 
and suggesting that U.S. recognition of the new reality was 
only a matter of time.  Carpenter made clear that the U.S. 
policy of commitment to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity remained unchanged.  Shamba said that Abkhazia felt 
more secure than before its declared independence and saw 
enormous economic opportunities with its Russian partner.  He 
made clear, however, that Abkhazia was interested in 
engagement with the rest of the world, including the United 
States.  He complained that other countries, in particular 
the U.S., had pushed Abkhazia into a corner "like a wolf" and 
forced it toward its single partner.  Kishmaria said 
half-jokingly that Abkhazia has been free for 15 years, but 
now is independent (i.e., but no longer free).  Shamba 
expressed support for a continued UN presence in Abkhazia, 
although he insisted the name would have to change from a UN 
mission in Georgia.  Carpenter made clear that the U.S. 
valued continued dialogue with Abkhazia, and at the end of 
the meeting, Shamba dropped his adversarial pose and remarked 
Qthe meeting, Shamba dropped his adversarial pose and remarked 
with apparent sincerity on the importance of the U.S. 
speaking with Abkhaz "officials" -- a sentiment he later 
repeated to the Abkhaz press. 
 
3. (C) Shamba also said, however, that diplomats accredited 
in Tbilisi would no longer be welcome in Abkhazia.  EmbOff 
suggested such a policy would make engagement difficult, 
arguing that using this particular issue to make a political 
point about Abkhazia's status would hurt its own stated 
interest in engagement in return for little, if any, gain. 
Shamba did seem to leave the door open for future visits, 
saying that meetings might be possible on a case-by-case 
basis for specific purposes.  (Note: An internal debate among 
de facto officials on the wisdom of accepting 
Tbilisi-accredited diplomats recently came out in the open in 
the Abkhaz press, with Shamba arguing for more flexibility 
and Lakoba -- who refused to see EmbOff -- taking a hard 
line.  Current official policy is apparently not to receive 
them; although no one has yet been denied permission to 
travel, some Tbilisi-based ambassadors told us that they have 
been informally asked not to ask.  EmbOff received permission 
to travel, however, and EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund 
also traveled to Abkhazia February 12, and was received by de 
 
TBILISI 00000321  002 OF 003 
 
 
facto "officials" so this issue is probably not fully 
settled.  See also reftel.  End note.) 
 
4. (C) A UN political officer in Sukhumi explained some of 
the political crcumstances shaping the de factos' attitudes 
at the moment.  He said the upcoming December 2009 election 
of a new de facto president was the foremost issue on 
everyone's mind, with the competition already "severe," and 
de facto officials were already toughening their stances with 
the elections in mind.  He also noted, however, that Russia's 
support for Abkhazia's budget was planned to increase 
dramatically.  The budget would rise from the equivalent of 
$59 million in 2008 to $144 million in 2009, with Russia 
providing the lion's share of the money.  A large chunk of 
this increase has reportedly been allotted to salaries of 
civil servants, including one third of the entire budget 
going to law enforcement salaries -- a useful step in an 
election year, as the UN officer noted, but not a helpful 
investment in Abkhazia's long-term development.  He also 
questioned whether Russia could maintain this level of 
support this year, considering its own financial 
difficulties, or into the future, and suggested any default 
on these promises would have major repercussions on internal 
Abkhaz politics. 
 
CROSS-BOUNDARY OPPORTUNITIES 
 
5. (C)  Carpenter asked if Shamba saw opportunities for 
engagement across the boundary.  Shamba said he saw value in 
practical projects, such as those on the human level that 
would improve the lives of Gali residents, but warned that 
the specifics were important.  The goal must not be the 
re-establishment of Georgia's territorial integrity, and he 
could not accept contacts with organizations affiliated with 
the Georgian government.  He approved of contacts between 
NGOs, adding that some connections already exist.  He said a 
good first step would be to allow Abkhaz students who are 
offered U.S. scholarships, such as Fulbrights, to travel on 
their existing (i.e., Russian) passports.  According to him, 
past cases in which students earned a scholarship, but were 
then asked to travel on a Georgian passport, sowed resentment 
toward the U.S. among the Abkhaz people.   He added the 
public attitude toward the government's actions would be 
especially important this year, as Abkhazia moves towards 
so-called presidential elections in December.  Shamba also 
expressed acceptance of the dispute resolution mechanism 
currently under negotiation in the Geneva talks. 
 
6. (C) Kishmaria likewise expressed approval of 
cross-boundary engagement, noting that some contacts have 
been maintained all along.  He was particularly receptive to 
cooperation in health care.  He objected to Georgian official 
involvement, as well as that of the Abkhaz 
government-in-exile.  Kishmaria said that local residents 
fear Georgian provocations and the only solution was a 
tightly controlled boundary, with barbed wire and six 
official crossing points.  When asked about sniper and other 
attacks on Georgian police officers, Kishmaria did not deny 
that they had happened, but again said a strong boundary was 
the answer.  He expressed willingness to cooperate with a 
dispute resolution mechanism, although he questioned whether 
such institutions, such as the previous quadripartite 
meetings in Chuburkhinji, added much value. 
 
TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE? CIVIL SOCIETY'S VIEW 
QTO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE? CIVIL SOCIETY'S VIEW 
 
7. (C) Representatives of non-governmental organizations also 
expressed genuine pride in Russia's recognition; one said 
that "by the way, we are separated, not separatists anymore." 
 Although they generally recognized that Russia's influence 
was growing in ways that were not necessarily in Abkhazia's 
best interest, and in some cases could be a catastrophe for 
Abkhazia, they also felt that the August war had made 
cooperation with Georgian organizations more complicated. 
Representatives of the Center for Humanitarian Programs 
(CHP), which has been quite active in bringing Georgians and 
Abkhaz (and Ossetians) together for reconciliation 
activities, said that some in Abkhazia were now questioning 
the appropriateness of such activities as confidence 
building, peacebuilding, or even dialogue.  Some in fact 
wanted to turn away from Georgia and Georgians completely, 
believing that Georgia's so-called aggression against South 
Ossetia could just as easily have been directed against 
Abkhazia.  Nevertheless, the CHP representatives did still 
see engagement as important, focusing on such concrete 
possibilities for cooperation as AIDS prevention.  They 
 
TBILISI 00000321  003 OF 003 
 
 
objected to calls for projects that included a provision that 
the project promote the reintegration of Georgia, however. 
 
8. (C) Khashig Inal, editor of the independent newspaper 
Chegemskaia Pravda, welcomed Abkhazia's recognition by Russia 
and noted that many were still "dizzy" in their excitement. 
He added, however, that it was easy to sit back and think 
that nothing more needs to be done, allowing Russia to take 
responsibility for such specific elements of Abkhazia's 
so-called independence as security and the budget -- and 
thereby render newly "independent" Abkhazia dependent. 
Echoing the UN political officer, he noted that 60% of 
Abkhazia's budget is currently paid by Russia, but that only 
the intellectuals currently understood the implications of 
that fiscal dependence.  He pointed to InterRAO's deal with 
the Georgian government to manage the Enguri Hydropower 
Station as an example of how Russia tends to make decisions 
about Abkhazia without consulting Abkhazia.  Inal also blamed 
the U.S. for encouraging this dependence on Russia, 
suggesting the obligatory "territorial integrity" language in 
projects alienated the Abkhaz and pushed them toward Russia 
in the social, economic and military spheres.  Hesaid that, 
unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia has never wanted to be part of 
Russia -- but if Abkhazia's economic dependence on Russia 
continues, it will probably join Russia in ten years or so. 
He encouraged increased U.S. and European investment in 
Abkhazia, but said that, no matter how much money was 
offered, Abkhazia would never re-enter Georgia. 
 
9. (C) Ethnically Georgian members of the Human Rights Center 
in Gali expressed their interest in economic connections 
across the boundary.  They said other areas that needed 
attention from outside Abkhazia were human rights issues and 
legal assistance.  They proposed information centers that 
would help inform people about their human rights and how to 
protect them.  Likewise, a small business center, perhaps 
that issued grants, would be helpful.  They suggested that 
joint Abkhaz and Georgian businesses could work together to 
strengthen the local economy and protect themselves against 
criminal activity (see septel on human rights concerns in 
Gali). 
 
COMMENT: THE TIME IS RIPE, BUT GO EASY 
 
10. (C) It is clear that representatives of all different 
groups and levels of Abkhaz society are sincerely interested 
in renewed engagement with the United States.  Although 
Russia's recognition has given them a new level of 
confidence, even arrogance, about their political future, it 
has also driven home the reality of their current isolation 
in the shadow of their northern neighbor.  Thus, while they 
will be even less willing to make compromises on questions of 
status (hence their ill-conceived policy of not accepting 
Tbilisi-accredited diplomats), they will be perhaps even more 
willing to establish relationships with various partners 
(hence their unwillingness to commit fully to the 
"no-Tbilisi-diplomats" policy).  If Russia does not deliver 
the promised huge increases in fiscal support, there will 
likely be a significant political backlash against both the 
current de facto authorities and their Russian backers -- and 
therefore even more opportunity for greater engagement with 
others.  The task for the USG is to identify programs and 
projects that address specific needs and start to rebuild 
Qprojects that address specific needs and start to rebuild 
connections across the boundary, while avoiding too blatant a 
discussion of any underlying goals of promoting Georgia's 
territorial integrity.  Recent conversations with Georgian 
officials suggest they will support renewed engagement as 
well, although not at the cost of recognition -- or anything 
that might imply recognition. 
LOGSDON