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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000303 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIA, ERADICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 294 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 176 
 
Classified By: CDA Krishna Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Charge d'Affaires Kris Urs met with Foreign 
Minister David Choquehuanca February 26 to refute President 
Evo Morales' accusations of CIA presence in state oil company 
YPFB, discuss joint counternarcotics eradication efforts, and 
review the newly-released human rights report.  Choquehuanca 
agreed to share Charge's rejection of a CIA presence at YPFB 
with Morales and the cabinet, but said he could not 
contradict Morales and noted "if it were true, you couldn't 
admit it (having spies)."  Choquehuanca seemed confused on 
details of the updated eradication agreement and emphasized 
the government would not wait for USG participation to begin 
eradication efforts. Saying the government had decided to 
seek improved relations, he broached the idea of wide-ranging 
discussions on all aspects of US assistance, but requested 
that some aid be funneled through the "Evo Cumple" program. 
Choquehuanca pledged that the government would not overreact 
to the human rights report, but heavy government criticism 
followed immediately.  Although pleasant, Choquehuanca seems 
unable to affect Morales' behavior where it counts for the 
bilateral relationship.  End summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CIA Accusations Harming Relations 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) Charge opened the meeting by explaining the Department 
had requested he meet with the Foreign Minister to discuss 
President Morales' accusations of CIA involvement in state 
oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos 
(YPFB), the status of eradication efforts, and the annual 
human rights report.  Charge said Assistant Secretary Thomas 
Shannon would discuss the same issues in the near future with 
Ambassador Pablo Solon. 
 
¶3. (C) Charge recalled that the Foreign Minister and 
President Morales had sent letters to Secretary Clinton and 
President Obama, respectively, expressing their government's 
desire for better relations.  Choquehuanca reported that in a 
recent cabinet meeting there had been agreement that Bolivia 
would seek better ties.  Charge underlined that the USG also 
desires better relations but said continued baseless 
accusations -- such as Morales' statement that the CIA 
infiltrated YPFB to trap former company President Santos 
Ramirez and others into a corruption scandal (reftels) -- 
make such improvements very difficult.  Charge emphasized 
that a change in tone by the government was a necessary 
precondition for improving ties.  Noting the oft-mentioned 
desire by the government to exchange Ambassadors again, he 
said it would be difficult to assign a new Ambassador as long 
as there was a likelihood the new Ambassador would be treated 
as Ambassador Goldberg had been.  (Note: Choquehuanca later 
suggested the opposite -- that an exchange of Ambassadors 
would be a necessary measure to avoid further harming 
bilateral relations.  End note.) 
 
¶4. (C) Choquehuanca noted Charge's statement regarding the 
precondition for improved ties, repeated it back, and said he 
would pass it on to President Morales and the cabinet.  He 
responded to Charge's statement regarding the CIA by saying 
somewhat inscrutably "Well, even if it were true, you 
couldn't admit it."  Charge again explained that the charge 
was baseless and ridiculous.  Choquehuanca signaled he was 
not in a position to contradict Morales.  He said if he was 
asked publicly about the allegations he would simply repeat 
that the USG cannot admit it has placed spies (in YPFB or 
anywhere else).  He did not give any assurances that such 
attacks would stop. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Counternarcotics: USG "Unreliable Partner" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5. (C) Charge reported good news regarding recent 
counternarcotics negotiations.  He recapitulated that since 
the last meeting with the Foreign Minister, there had been 
two technical meetings, which had led to an understanding 
that the US would continue to pay all costs other than bonus 
payments ("bonos").  Charge lauded the advances and raised 
the possibility of signing either a new agreement or a face 
sheet amendment to the existing letter of agreement. 
Choquehuanca seemed confused, as though he had not been 
briefed on the latest developments.  Charge explained further 
that the number of eradicators would rise to 1,600 by the end 
of March and that we hoped to continue with our support, 
pending Congressional approval.  Choquehuanca then recalled 
he had been told by Vice Minister Felipe Caceres that the USG 
had indeed agreed to "join up," which he welcomed, but added 
that the government was not going to wait for the USG's 
support.  He said the government was going to spend USD 20 
million of their own funds because it has realized the USG 
was an "unreliable partner," and that if they waited for the 
USG they would not reach their goals. 
 
¶6. (C) To illustrate his point on our unreliability, 
Choquehuanca said the withholding of Millennium Challenge 
funds had shown the government that even supposedly 
apolitical programs were, in fact, political and that the 
government could not count on USG support.  He said these 
kinds of actions contributed directly to the low state of 
bilateral relations.  Charge patiently explained that while 
the Millennium Challenge program itself is a relatively 
apolitical development program, its funds come from the U.S. 
Congress and that it had been impossible to proceed given the 
poor state of bilateral relations. 
 
¶7. (C) Choquehuanca did respond positively to Charge's 
suggestion of a new counternarcotics agreement, and built on 
this to suggest a larger, overall agreement to regulate 
bilateral relations.  (Note: Choquehuanca seemed to be 
referring to the seven-point agenda proposed by the Bolivian 
government in July 2008.  End note.)  Choquehuanca proposed a 
three-day set of meetings to reach a "framework agreement," 
the first day to share ideas, the second to work through 
questions, with an agreement constructed by the third day. 
He said key representatives with decision-making authority 
would have to be present from both sides for each issue.  He 
offered that the Planning Ministry could lead the effort. 
 
¶8. (C) Choquehuanca then added his hope that such 
negotiations would include discussion of at least some aid 
being funneled through the Venezuelan-supported "Evo Cumple" 
program, saying the government was in similar negotiations 
with the Government of Japan.  Charge demurred, instead 
referring to earlier efforts with the Planning Ministry to 
make our aid more transparent.  Choquehuanca agreed 
transparency was a key point, and said he would discuss the 
negotiations with new Minister of Planning Noel Aguirre. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Human Rights Report 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (C) Charge also passed on a copy of the 2008 Human Rights 
Report for Bolivia, explaining that the report is 
congressionally mandated, that the USG prepares such a report 
for over 170 countries, and that it is factual, balanced, and 
based on multiple sources.  He expressed his hope that the 
report and the forthcoming International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report (INCSR) would not constitute an additional 
friction in our bilateral relationship. 
 
¶10. (C) Choquehuanca said so long as the reports were 
prepared professionally, and were as balanced and fair as 
Charge maintained, the government would not react negatively. 
 He agreed such reports needed to be read in an overall 
context, and not mined for prejudicial comments.  (Note: 
Immediately after the meeting ended, Charge received word 
that Vice Ministers Sacha Llorenti and Wilfredo Chavez had 
already held a press release to label the report "politically 
motivated, poorly informed, immoral, unfair, inaccurate, and 
full of lies," among other terms.  End Note.) 
 
¶11. (C) Choquehuanca suggested a better way to avoid negative 
comments would be for the USG to submit a draft of the report 
to the Foreign Ministry for review and suggestions.  He noted 
the UN had done this with their report, giving them about a 
week to make suggestions.  According to Choquehuanca, "They 
do not have to take the suggestions, of course, but it makes 
discussion possible." 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶12. (C) As usual, the meeting ended cordially, with 
Choquehuanca showing off the large number of mosquito bites 
he had received in the Yungas valley during his recent trip 
for Carnaval.  He expressed his hope that he had not 
contracted dengue.  Choquehuanca seems to dislike delivering 
bad news and prefers his role as a friendly go-between. 
However, by all appearances neither Choquehuanca nor other 
moderate members of the cabinet are able to influence 
Morales' decision-making.  We have no reason to expect a 
diminution in the level of Morales' rhetoric, despite 
simultaneous (and confusing) calls for an improved bilateral 
relationship.  End comment. 
URS