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Viewing cable 09TBILISI40, GEORGIA: VERBEKE ON WAY FORWARD FOR UN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TBILISI40 2009-01-12 12:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi
VZCZCXRO4648
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0040/01 0121246
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121246Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4756
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0687
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0163
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2236
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: VERBEKE ON WAY FORWARD FOR UN 
 
REF: 08 TBILISI 2123 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary and comment.  UN Special Representative for 
Georgia Johan Verbeke offered the Ambassador initial thoughts 
on the prospects for renewal of the UN Observer Mission in 
Georgia (UNOMIG).  He believes Russia would prefer to see the 
mission closed, but might not want to risk international 
condemnation over its closure; the Abkhaz would prefer to see 
it stay open, but it is not clear how much they can influence 
Russia's decision.  The mission could be salvaged in some 
form, but it will not be easy; Russia will almost surely 
block a technical rollover, and will likely reject a 
strengthened mandate as well.  In Verbeke's view, the most 
feasible approach might be to change the basic structure in a 
way that all sides could accept, such as a main office 
outside Georgia (such as Vienna) and two satellite offices in 
Sukhumi and Tbilisi.  If the substantive issues can be 
resolved, Verbeke thinks the name will not be a dealbreaker. 
Given the serious incidents and humanitarian difficulties 
that continue along the Abkhaz administrative boundary -- 
which UNOMIG has documented as originating almost exclusively 
on the Abkhaz side -- an international presence on both sides 
remains an important stabilizing factor.  Considering the 
remarkable restraint Georgian forces have demonstrated in the 
face of those attacks, Georgia deserves a forceful, 
coordinated effort to find a way to maintain the UN mission. 
End summary and comment. 
 
2. (C) In a meeting on January 8, Verbeke gave an overview of 
the range of possibilities for a renewal of the UN's mandate 
in Georgia.  The most basic would be a technical rollover of 
the existing mandate, as occurred in October 2008; although 
this is currently the most discussed option in New York, he 
thought the Russians would almost surely block a second 
rollover.  Another approach would be to maintain the existing 
basic structure, but revise the monitors' authorities either 
up or down.  He thought the Georgian side would not accept a 
weakened mandate, while the Russian side would not accept a 
stronger one.  A more radical revision would change the 
existing structure.  Establishing a mission in Abkhazia only, 
or two separate missions in Abkhazia and in Georgia, would 
please the Russians and the Abkhaz, but be unacceptable to 
the Georgians.  Another radical reviion would be to take the 
approach proposed by Finland to revise the OSCE mission to 
Georgia: to establish a base office outside Georgia, most 
likely in Geneva, with two satellite offices in Sukhumi and 
Tbilisi.  Although Russia rejected this approach for the OSCE 
mission, Verbeke thought it might ultimately prove 
acceptable, if not palatable, to all sides. 
 
3. (C) On tactics, Verbeke warned against pursuing a 
technical rollover -- toward which, he thought, many western 
friends seem to be drifting -- because Russia would most 
likely oppose a rollover and allow the mission to expire.  He 
explained that Russia went along with the rollover in October 
without a substantive discussion of the mission, but would 
probably demand such a discussion this time around -- and 
would end up rejecting the rationale for the mission in its 
current form.  He also warned against starting with a 
discussion of the mission's name, which could get bogged down 
Qdiscussion of the mission's name, which could get bogged down 
in politicized exchanges and prevent consideration of the 
real issues.  He advised tackling those first -- i.e., the 
basic parameters and structure of the mission -- in order to 
see if there is a deal to be made.  If there proved to be 
enough political will to find a solution to the substantive 
issues, he thought the name issue could ultimately be 
finessed.  One approach on the name might be to use a 
thematic designation, such as "UN Stabilization Mission," 
with no mention of the country. 
 
4. (C) Regarding Russia's attitude to the discussion, Verbeke 
expressed more pessimism than optimism.  He thought Russia 
might end up going along, because it would be awkward for 
Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to be 
seen as removing a UN mission from Georgia at this sensitive 
time.  He acknowledged, however, that Russia already showed 
itself willing to weather criticism for such a stance at the 
OSCE.  He even thought Russia might make the calculation that 
any damage sustained for obstructionism at the UN might not 
compound the damage from the OSCE stance very much; perhaps 
the international community would mark down Russia's 
decisions as one black mark, not two.  Another important 
lesson Verbeke drew from the OSCE decision was that Russia 
was willing to play harder ball than most observers expected; 
it did not want an international presence in the territories, 
 
TBILISI 00000040  002 OF 002 
 
 
and its actions in Vienna may well be the first step in a 
long-term plan to remove all international monitors (the 
"slice-by-slice" approach described in reftel).  Verbeke 
noted that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin recently 
asked him why monitors were needed on both sides of the 
administrative boundary, since the EU Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM) covers the south side and Russia provides security on 
the north.  Verbeke suggested this question indicated that 
Russia perceives the EUMM as serving its interest of keeping 
the spotlight on the Georgian government and its actions, 
instead of Russia and the de facto Abkhaz authorities.  In 
other words, Russia would be content to have no monitors in 
Abkhazia and only the EUMM outside it. 
 
5. (C) Verbeke also pointed out that the EU faced its own 
internal difficulties on the EUMM, because there is no 
unanimity on the importance, or even the need, for a 
continued presence in Georgia.  Ironically, both the 
"softies" and the "hardies" -- i.e., those who are wary of 
supporting Georgia and those who want to do as much as 
possible for Georgia -- have reasons to question the EUMM's 
continuing presence.  The "softies" never understood why the 
EU should play a role in Georgia in the first place.  The 
"hardies" perceive that under its current limitations of not 
being able to enter the territories, the EUMM actually hurts 
Georgia and helps Russia.  He suggested the EU faced some 
tough discussions in the near future.  (He also noted this 
internal dissent within the EU was very sensitive and asked 
not to be quoted in this regard.) 
 
6. (C) Unlike the Russians, the Abkhaz want to see a 
continued UN presence, according to Verbeke.  He said they 
see the UN as a counterweight to Russia.  Although they would 
prefer a mission to Abkhazia alone, Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" 
Sergey Shamba told Verbeke in a December 24, 2008 phone call 
that he understood the UN's position that any mission would 
have to be on both sides of the boundary.  (Abkhaz de facto 
"President" Bagapsh recently told British Ambassador Denis 
Keefe, however, that Abkhazia would never agree to a UN 
mission under the current name.)  More generally, Verbeke 
said his recent conversations with the de facto authorities 
indicated that the initial euphoria after Russia's 
recognition of Abkhazia had died down, that they were now 
experiencing more than a little buyer's remorse.  He said 
this was also true among representatives of Abkhaz civil 
society, who, without spelling it out, have been suggesting 
that they will not accept independence at any price.  They 
have expressed specific concerns about Russia's economic 
influence, for example, and the potential environmental 
impact of the Russian presence.  A week after Verbeke met 
with Shamba in mid-December, Karasin called Verbeke for a 
readout of the meeting -- suggesting to Verbeke that Russia 
is trying to keep close tabs on its client's actions 
regarding the UN. 
 
COMMENT: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY 
 
7. (C) While UNOMIG patrolling efforts have been hampered in 
recent months, post continues to consider the UN mission in 
Georgia a vital deterrent to increased violence or renewed 
hostilities in western Georga.  Post likewise sees the UN as 
an important source of information about such topics as 
living conditions and human rights in Abkhazia, which is now 
more isolated than ever.  In recent months, UNOMIG has 
Qmore isolated than ever.  In recent months, UNOMIG has 
documented the persistence of the attacks against the 
Georgians from the Abkhaz side of the boundary -- and the 
Georgians' remarkable restraint in not responding in kind. 
We believe it is, therefore, worth making strenuous and 
creative efforts to secure a continued UN mandate -- as long 
as it does not lend any legitimacy to the separatist Abkhaz 
regime.  President Saakashvili has consistently insisted that 
Georgia will not agree to any long-term arrangement that 
could come back to haunt it in future negotiations or lend 
any legitimacy to the Abkhaz, and the potential benefits of a 
renewed UN mandate are not worth any further weakening of 
Georgia's already difficult position.  If Abkhaz statements 
to Verbeke are sincere, it is possible the Abkhaz themselves 
might be the biggest proponent of a continued UN mission, as 
long as we can find a formulation they and the Georgians can 
deal with.  Post believes that Verbeke's formulation -- or 
another creative approach -- that would keep UNOMIG in 
business is worth the effort.  The big question is whether 
the Russians are ready to discuss the issue, or are committed 
to closing down UNOMIG. 
TEFFT