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Viewing cable 09LAHORE9, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE PUNJAB

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09LAHORE9 2009-01-22 07:16 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Consulate Lahore
O P 220716Z JAN 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3881
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMCONSUL LAHORE
S E C R E T LAHORE 000009 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/20/2034 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PK
SUBJECT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE PUNJAB 
 
Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D 
 
1. (S) Summary:  The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan  Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) coalition in the country's  most-populous Punjab province is looking increasingly weak. 
Both parties are openly courting the opposition Pakistan Muslim  League (PML) in an effort to solidify control over the province  and end the current coalition arrangement, although the terms  offered by the PML-N seem highly unrealistic.  The PML has  remained in close contact with both sides, but has, thus far,  refused to be pressured into solidifying a deal with either --  possibly on the advice of allies in the military establishment. 
Uncertainty over the PML's intentions has led PML-N leader Nawaz  Sharif to present a ""final plan"" for salvaging the provincial  coalition and repairing relations at the federal level with the  PPP.  While this plan contains elements that could serve as the  basis for rapprochement between the parties, it appears unlikely  to gain traction as the country moves towards politically  sensitive elections for the federal Senate in March.  While the  political parties snipe at one another, senior politicians who  have found themselves on the wrong side of their respective  parties' current leadership have repeatedly told Principal  Officer of approaches by military officials regarding formation  of ""a national government like Bangladesh.""  While post cannot  verify the veracity of these reports, the Pakistani military's  history of intervention in national politics and its  disagreements with the sitting PPP federal government and the  PML-N make them plausible.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The PML-N/PPP coalition government in the Punjab is  effectively non-functional, with PML-N Chief Minister Shahbaz  Sharif increasingly making most all decisions unilaterally with  no pretext of consultation with PPP ministers or  parliamentarians.  The animosity between the Chief Minister and  his main PPP rival Governor Salman Taseer has grown increasingly  bitter and personal, and neither side seems capable of peaceful  coexistence.  Chief Minister Shahbaz's recent appointment of  ""acting"" PML-N ministers to cover key unfilled government  portfolios -- including the two most prestigious health and  education -- and his steadfast refusal to release development  funds to PPP parliamentarians and cede PPP ministers authority  to engage in bureaucratic transfers and postings appear to have  brought matters to a near political crisis point in the province  and have fueled increasingly vocal PPP demands for an end to any  coalition with the Sharifs. 
 
3. (C) Governor Salman Taseer has been assiduously courting the  leadership of the opposition PML almost since the formation of  the PML-N/PPP coalition government.  If Taseer successfully  negotiates a PPP/PML alliance, he would be in a numerical  position to demand Shahbaz Sharif show his majority in the  parliament and then replace his government.  PML leaders claim  that Taseer engineered such an arrangement with them in October  but then pulled out on the instructions of President Zardari. 
According to Moonis Elahi, son of PML Punjab President Chaudhry  Pervaiz Elahi, Taseer's recent overtures have been rebuffed on  two counts:  (1) the PML has demanded that the PPP first have  the federal judiciary declare Shahbaz Sharif ineligible to  continue as Chief Minister and Nawaz Sharif permanently  ineligible for elected office (cases are pending against both of  them in federal court) and (2) the PML is insisting on being  given the Chief Minister's slot for its appointee (Taseer agreed  to this during the October negotiations, but President Zardari  has reportedly vetoed this idea demanding that the Chief  Minister slot go to the PPP). 
 
4. (C) As the PPP has renewed its efforts to court the PML, the  Sharif brothers have countered with their own offer of a  possible ""reunification"" or ""alliance"" between the Muslim League  factions.  According to Moonis Elahi and senior PML-N officials,  the idea was floated in early January during a face-to-face  meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi in Abu  Dhabi, arranged through ""mutual Saudi friends.""  Moonis claimed  that while the discussions were cordial, Nawaz Sharif's  unwillingness to offer ""appropriately senior"" party and  government positions to the Chaudhry family made the offer less  than sincere.  Following the meeting, numerous emissaries were  reportedly exchanged between the two sides and the PML-N's  current offer (reportedly unveiled by Nawaz Sharif to Ch. 
Shujaat Hussain during a ""chance"" meeting at a friend's farm in  southern Punjab) would give Ch. Pervaiz Elahi, leadership of the  opposition in the National Assembly and presidency of the PML-N  in the Punjab; Moonis Elahi, the title of senior Minister in the  Punjab government; and Ch. Shujaat Hussain, chairmanship of the  PML-N at the federal level (a position currently held by Raja  Zafar-ul-Haq) and a Senate ticket.  Comment:  Post is very  skeptical that the PML-N would actually follow through on making  these appointments even if the PML accepted.  End Comment. 
Moonis claims that his father is still uncertain as to whether  the Sharifs will follow through on their offers and has demanded  that prior to the announcement of any deal that the PML-N  formally sever its coalition government with the PPP in the  Punjab.  Such a move would give the PML considerable leverage  and the ability to extract (or guarantee) concessions from the  PML-N. 
 
5. (C) PML leaders report that the party is, at present,  undecided as to which, if either, offer to pursue or what course  of action to take should either the PPP or PML-N fulfill the  prerequisites that the Chaudhries have laid down.  While forward  blocks favoring both the PPP and the PML-N exist in the party,  these blocks appear to be unable to muster sufficient numbers to  force the PML leadership towards one side or the other.  There  is also genuine concern at senior levels of the PML that should  the party declare its open support for either the PPP or the  PML-N at this stage, no more than half the party's sitting  members would follow, making the party's ability to influence  the ultimate composition of the federal or provincial  governments questionable.  In addition, several leaders have  pointed out that allowing either the PPP or the PML-N to believe  that a deal with the PML is no longer possible could open senior  PML leaders to corruption (or other criminal charges) at either  the provincial or federal level.  These leaders, who seem to be  in the majority in the new 50-member committee established to  determine the ""future of the PML"", favor keeping prolonged  negotiations open with both sides and sitting in opposition  until much closer to the next national election. 
 
6. (S) Sharif relative Sohail Zia Butt and senior PML-N  politician Khawaja Saad Rafique recently told Principal Officer  in separate meetings that the uncertainty of the PML's  intentions have led the Sharifs to reconsider rapprochement with  the PPP, provided that an equitable deal can be found.  They  claimed that the broad outlines of such a deal had been  presented by party leader Nawaz Sharif to President Zardari.  In  their view, the minimum PML-N conditions for any deal were: (1) 
dismissal of Governor Salman Taseer, (2) removal of the  President's ability to dissolve the National Assembly, (3) full  retirement of Chief Justice Hameed Dogar and appointment of  Justice Sardar Raza in his place, and (4) agreement to appoint  judges in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of  Democracy.  In exchange, the PML-N was prepared to offer a  unified slate of candidates in the upcoming Senate elections,  end its support of the lawyer's movement, appoint a full Punjab  provincial cabinet with equitable PPP representation, cede  governing authority to provincial ministers, release development  funds to the PPP members of the Provincial Assembly, and  reinitiate discussions on a federal coalition government. 
Neither Butt nor Rafique was aware of Zardari's response to the  proposal, but both were skeptical about whether the initiative  would succeed. 
 
7. (S) PML leader Humayun Akhtar Khan recently told Principal  Officer that the party was under significant pressure from ""the  establishment"" -- the local euphemism for the military and  intelligence services -- not to become embroiled in the  PPP/PML-N conflict at this stage.  ""The establishment"" preferred  that the party remained neutral and in opposition for the time  being as ""additional alternatives might emerge.""  At the same  time, several senior politicians from both PPP and PML-N have  confided to Principal Officer that ""the establishment"" is once  again active in attempting to ""undermine the civilian  government.""  They reported that they had been approached by  senior military officers, who requested that they consider  supporting a ""national government"" similar to the Bangladesh  model.  While all the politicians were quick to claim that they  rejected the overture, each took pains to point out that similar  approaches were doubtless made to others who might be more  amenable to the suggestion.  Some even admitted that they might  be tempted to support such an idea in the future if the current  government proved unable to deliver. 
 
8. (S) Comment:  While the local press is full of rumors of both  a PPP/PML deal and a Muslim League reunification, post does not  believe that either is likely to happen in the immediate future. 
 Nawaz Sharif is unlikely to follow through on the appointments  allegedly offered to the Chaudhry family, as they would require  him to dump longstanding allies from key senior leadership  positions.  In addition, the PML's self-interests are best  served by remaining neutral at the moment, continuing  negotiations with both sides, and joining with the presumptive  winner of the next election at a future date.  Nor are we  optimistic that the PML-N and PPP will be able to bury their  differences and form either a workable coalition at the  provincial level or a new national coalition.  Powerful,  competing self-interests probably prevent a sensible deal from  being struck.  As the two parties bicker, increasing frustration  may well fuel outside moves by both disgruntled politicians and  ""the establishment"" to try and build the PML and major party  dissenters into a ""national government,"" but this is a long-term  project with unknown prospects for success.  In the  short-to-medium term, the unwieldy and fractious Punjab  coalition government appears likely to limp forward with both  coalition partners attempting to score political points from one  another and little actual governance taking place.  End Comment. 
 
  HUNT