VZCZCXRO2683
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1226/01 3360657
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010657Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0686
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001226 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
USDOC FOR 4232/ITA/MAC/EUR/OEERIS/SSAVICH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD EFIN SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: STILL NO GRAND ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
 
REF: A) Belgrade 1175  B) Belgrade 864 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Serbia has so far escaped the worst of the initial effects 
of the global financial crisis.  The economy is slowing and the 
government faces a difficult 2009 with declining revenues, a sharp 
slowdown in economic growth, increasing spending demands from the 
diverse government coalition and a bleak outlook for investment 
inflows.  The Serbian government does not have a unified policy or 
set of priorities to guide its economic path and to soften the blow. 
 The 2009 budget process highlights the government's ad hoc approach 
and parochial/party interests that are driving internal debate.  The 
government continues to muddle through the necessary choices on 
pensions, public sector wages and infrastructure investment.  End 
Summary. 
 
Financial Crisis Begins to Bite 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Some members of the Serbian government recognize that the 
global financial crisis has already begun to affect Serbia's economy 
and the government has taken some steps, including an IMF stand-by 
arrangement (ref A), to respond.  However, the government as a whole 
does not have a comprehensive economic strategy and or a clear 
economic policy leader, so to date government initiatives have been 
poorly coordinated and have taken a more shotgun approach to 
economic reform and stimulus.  The many political parties in the 
coalition have not yet unified under a strategy or goal and are 
pursuing parochial interests of their own ministries and parties. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a November 21 meeting with the Ambassador, Finance 
Minister Dragutinovic (DS) outlined the economic challenge.  October 
government revenues were much lower than projected, which made the 
2008 budget rebalance that was passed in September even more costly, 
as the government could not cover some of the planned expenditure 
increases.  Dragutinovic said the IMF deal was important, and that 
it would be challenging to get agreement on a 2009 budget that met 
the IMF-agreed 1.5% of GDP deficit target for the consolidated 
budget deficit.  She admitted that the national-level budget deficit 
would actually be 1.9% of GDP and that the difference would be made 
up with "surpluses" in other areas.  The government revised the 
official 2009 GDP growth estimate further down to 3-3.5% from 4% 
just a few weeks ago.  Vlada Cupic, the Chairman of Hypo Bank, told 
us on November 14 that he predicted GDP growth in 2009 of between 
0.5% and 1.5%. 
 
Budget - Every Ministry/Party for Itself 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The back room negotiations on the 2009 Serbian budget 
highlight the lack of clear economic priorities and the difficulty 
of building consensus among the diverse parties and interests in the 
governing coalition.   The only economic message that every 
government official in Belgrade uses is the need to invest in 
infrastructure, specifically the Corridor 10 (ref B) highway project 
linking Serbia to Hungary and Macedonia.  Beyond Corridor 10 the 
ministries and ministers fall back to protecting their turf and 
their party interests.  Janko Guzian, the Finance Ministry State 
Secretary with the unenviable task of preparing the budget, told us 
on October 28 that he had faced difficult battles with Ministers 
within President Tadic's Democratic Party (DS), Deputy PM Dinkic's 
G-17, the Pensioners Party (PUPS) and others.  Interestingly, he 
commented that the only party in the coalition that was not making 
heavy spending demands was Deputy PM Dacic's Socialist Party (SPS). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Dragutinovic complained that the government had not 
prioritized spending, which was especially important since resources 
next year would be scarce.  As a technocrat with no previous 
political experience, Dragutinovic is poorly equipped to fight the 
bureaucratic and inter-ministerial political battles over spending. 
Ana Firtel, executive director of the Foreign Investors Council, 
expressed frustration to us on November 25 that the government had 
not set out its priorities and had not articulated an economic 
vision for Serbia. 
 
Pensions and Wages - The Grand Compromise 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to Dragutinovic, the 2009 budget froze pensions 
nominally next year, but public sector wages would increase in line 
with the cost of living.  This was the compromise necessary to bring 
PUPS on board with the IMF restrictions on budget spending.  This 
formula meant that the government would not have to rescind the 10% 
extraordinary pension increase passed in September.  The details of 
this compromise have not been fully absorbed by the Serbian public 
and it is unclear how unions and labor will react after two years 
with wage increases well above inflation.  Dragutinovic said that 
 
BELGRADE 00001226  002 OF 002 
 
 
she had a positive meeting with leaders from the teachers union to 
reach out and explain the economic situation, but much more work 
with labor will be necessary. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Serbian government lacks a clear economic vision to 
carry them through the financial crisis.  Prime Minister Cvetkovic, 
an economist, has excellent economic credentials, but President 
Tadic chose him to lead this government because of his managerial 
skills and his ability to identify issues where government consensus 
is possible and move ahead with those items.  He has respect inside 
the government for his management, but he is not the public face of 
the government, nor is his style to impose discipline on the diverse 
government leadership.   As a result, the four Deputy Prime 
Ministers -- Dacic (responsible for justice and police), Djelic 
(responsible for EU integration), Dinkic (responsible for domestic 
economic development), and Krkobabic (pensions) -- are more active 
in public pressing their individual economic agendas, leaving the 
public without a coherent vision for Serbia's economic future.  The 
Serbian economic situation will be difficult in 2009 and the 
government must pass the test of agreeing to a responsible budget in 
the coming weeks.  The budget will pass, likely with some 
difficulty, but Serbia's real challenge will be to move from 
reacting to each economic hurdle individually and prioritize the 
economic agenda to minimize the effects of the financial crisis 
while advancing the European vision that got this government 
elected.  End Comment. 
 
BRUSH