VZCZCXRO6314
OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #9280/01 3122334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 072325Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3741
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1034
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5851
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6275
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 9123
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 8408
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 9765

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 119280 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV GG RS SIPDIS
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE NOVEMBER 
10 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC) - DEALING WITH 
RUSSIA 
 
REF:  STATE 115017 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  See paragraph 5. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  The biannual EU-Russia Summit will 
take place on November 14 in Nice, France.  In the wake 
of the crisis in Georgia, the French EU Presidency has 
announced that the discussions will focus on the 
implementation of the provisions of the Sarkozy cease- 
fire agreements of August 12 and September 8, and the 
way forward on the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement.  Background and points on Russia/Georgia for 
use in approaching the EU in advance of the November 10 
GAERC meeting of foreign ministers have been provided 
reftel.  As a supplement to that cable, this message 
contains new points concerning President Medvedev's 
proposal for a new European security dialogue and a 
reiteration of closely-related points on the EU-Russia 
partnership agreement.  Posts should draw from these 
points in discussions as soon as possible at the 
appropriate level in EU member state host governments, 
as well as with the European Commission and Council 
Secretariat.  Other posts should not/not deliver these 
points.  Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS 
caption on their response cables and to reference this 
cable.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Russian President Medvedev first proposed a 
pan-European security treaty in June 2008, then 
elaborated on the proposal at the World Policy 
Conference in Evian, France in October.  In his own 
Evian address, President Sarkozy, whose country now 
serves in the EU Presidency, correctly stated that the 
Medvedev proposal must be assessed in light of existing 
security principles and organizations (e.g., NATO, OSCE) 
and in coordination with the United States.  We consider 
it premature and inappropriate for either the U.S. or 
the EU to enter into discussions of the Medvedev 
proposal with Russia, particularly when Russia has 
failed to honor its commitments under existing framework 
security agreements, has not yet complied with its 
current commitments on security arrangements in Georgia 
under the August 12 and September 8 cease-fire 
agreements, and indeed has not helped us put the Geneva 
process on Georgia on track.  Rather, we should keep the 
focus on Russian actions regarding Georgia and, for 
example, have Russia explain why we should consider 
their proposal on European security given their own 
behavior.  Similarly, as stated in reftel, we believe 
that now is not the time for the EU to resume 
negotiations with Moscow on a new EU-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).  Host country 
interlocutors may assert that the U.S. is inconsistent 
in its position on negotiating with Russia, citing our 
engagement with Moscow on the START Treaty.  Indeed, we 
do believe in dialogue with Russia on key issues of 
strategic interest.  But we believe that these cases are 
not analogous, as the START Treaty itself requires 
interaction among the Treaty partners on a regular 
basis, and the U.S. is thus complying with its 
international treaty requirements.  It should be further 
emphasized that the START Treaty requires, by law, that 
both sides meet by December 5, 2008 to keep open the 
option to extend the treaty beyond December 2009. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On balance, we believe that moving too fast 
with Russia or honoring Russian attempts to divide the 
United States and Europe, even with sound objectives in 
mind, risks sending the wrong message.  Postponement of 
the resumption of the PCA talks until, for example, the 
Russians have helped put the Geneva process on track and 
are helping reduce, not stoke, tensions in Georgia, 
would send the right message.  The next round of Geneva 
discussions will take place November 18-19.  If the EU 
decides to proceed with resumption of the PCA talks with 
Moscow, it is critical they do so in a way that 
minimizes the damage.  They should in no case base a 
decision to resume PCA talks on a false assertion that 
 
STATE 00119280  002 OF 003 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE NOVEMBER 
10 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC) - DEALING WITH 
RUSS 
Russia has fulfilled the requirements of the ceasefire. 
They should not convey that the Russo-Georgia war has 
been set aside as a major international problem.  They 
should not act in a way that undermines the real 
concerns by some European states about pressure from 
Russia. 
 
¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Posts are requested to draw on 
the following points in discussions with appropriate MFA 
official(s) as soon as possible (in advance of the 
November 10 GAERC meeting) and not to leave a non-paper. 
 
-- We have already shared our views on Russia/Georgia in 
the run-up to the November 10 GAERC and appreciate this 
opportunity to follow up with some additional thoughts 
as the EU finalizes it preparations for the November 14 
EU-Russia Summit. 
 
-- In particular, we are deeply concerned about 
President Medvedev's proposal for a new pan-European 
security treaty. 
 
-- It is difficult to conceive giving Russia an audience 
to discuss proposals for improving Europe's security 
architecture -- based on principles including respect 
for territorial integrity -- not long after Russia 
invaded its neighbor, recognized the "independence" of 
two separatist regions on that neighbor's sovereign 
territory, and while it maintains a significant military 
force presence on the territory of a neighboring 
sovereign state. 
-- Such actions are inconsistent with existing security 
cooperative frameworks, such as the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act and the Helsinki accords. 
-- Russia has not yet complied with the August 12 and 
September 8 cease-fire agreements, specifically by 
failing to withdraw to pre-August 7 numbers and 
positions of troops and refusing to allow humanitarian 
access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  It is critical 
that the EU not suggest that Russia is in full 
compliance with the ceasefire, which would raise 
problems of credibility. 
-- We hope and expect that the EU will continue to 
express concerns about the unfulfilled elements of the 
ceasefire and other issues that raise tensions in 
Georgia, such as  the presence of Russian troops in 
Akhalgori and the Upper Kodori Valley and continued 
failure to allow international monitors (e.g., from the 
OSCE) into South Ossetia. 
-- Under these circumstances, particularly when Russia 
has failed to honor its commitments under existing 
security agreements, formal discussion of President 
Medvedev's security architecture proposal is premature 
and inappropriate. 
-- We are also concerned about Russian efforts to divide 
Europe and North America. 
-- For our part, we welcomed President Sarkozy's Evian 
comments in response to President Medvedev which 
stressed that the Medvedev proposal must be assessed in 
light of existing European security principles and 
organizations, including NATO and the OSCE, and that 
this assessment must be carried out in coordination with 
the United States and Canada. 
 
-- Rather, we should keep the focus on these commitments 
regarding Georgia and insist that the Russians explain 
why we should consider their proposal on European 
security given their own behavior in Georgia and other 
aspects of Russian behavior, e.g., their unilateral 
suspension of CFE. 
 
-- The U.S. and EU need to continue to exercise caution, 
and ensure U.S.-European coordination to minimize 
opportunities for Russia to try to divide us, as we 
proceed with our review of this latest security 
architecture proposal from Moscow.  We look forward to 
consulting with you further on these important issues, 
and we welcome your suggestions on how to strengthen our 
coordination. 
 
-- This is also the context in which we have considered 
the European debate about when and how to move forward 
with the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA).  With all respect for the EU's internal 
deliberations, we question the basis for resuming PCA 
 
STATE 00119280  003 OF 003 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE NOVEMBER 
10 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC) - DEALING WITH 
RUSS 
negotiations with Russia before Moscow has met all of 
its commitments under the cease-fire agreement. 
 
-- We understand that continued engagement with Russia 
remains a priority for many within the EU, despite 
Moscow's failure to comply with its cease-fire 
commitments. 
 
-- Indeed, we do not believe that EU or U.S. dialogue 
with Moscow should be halted. 
 
-- That said, we hope that the EU will look carefully at 
issues of timing.  We do not want the Russians to 
misinterpret EU interest in PCA talks as absolving them 
of responsibility to fulfill their commitments under the 
Sarkozy-negotiated ceasefire. 
 
-- However the EU proceeds, we place great importance in 
maintaining our unified public position that Russia 
still has not met its commitments under the cease-fire 
agreements. 
 
-- It will be critical to convey to Russia that Europe 
has not simply "swept Georgia aside" as an inconvenience 
in an effort to resume business as usual at all costs. 
 
-- Conveying a sense of solid European (and solid 
Transatlantic) concern over Georgia and, indeed, over 
the more problematic aspects of Russian foreign policy 
is even more important in light of the harsh language 
from President Medvedev's "state of the federation" 
speech, which included threats to install offensive 
missiles in Kaliningrad.  We also do not want to see 
Russia emerge with a sense that European concerns about 
Russian behavior in Georgia and beyond have been brushed 
aside. 
 
-- The context and underpinnings of the EU decision 
about the PCA talks can be critical in shaping the way 
that decision is received. 
 
-- Thank you for this opportunity to exchange views on 
these matters of central importance to Euro-Atlantic 
security. 
RICE