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Viewing cable 08PARIS2016, S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PARIS2016 2008-11-04 13:06 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #2016/01 3091306
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041306Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4739
S E C R E T PARIS 002016 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PTER PHUM KAWK KISL KPAO FR
SUBJECT: S/WCI AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES GUANTANAMO 
BAY DETAINEES, SUDAN AND GEORGIA WITH FRANCE 
 
Classified By: POL Deputy Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 (B & D) 
 
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Williamson met with 
French MFA officials on October 27 to discuss possible 
resettlement of Guantanamo Bay detainees in France. 
Williamson noted there are approximately 25 detainees 
considered low-threat whom the U.S. wants to release but 
cannot return to their countries of origin because of U.S. 
concerns for the detainees, well-being.  French advisors to 
the foreign minister, Eric Chevallier and Sylvie Pantz, said 
that while the GOF could not confirm it would accept any of 
the detainees, the GOF would be willing to consider the 
request as well as participate in talks on the issue led by 
European Union partner, Germany.  Chevallier and Pantz 
expressed concern over assimilation of detainees who did not 
have Francophone ties, but Williamson referenced the 
successful recent assimilation of five Uiger detainees in 
Albania who did not have ties to that country.  Regarding 
Sudanese efforts to gain an Article 16 suspension in the UN 
Security Council on the possible indictment of President 
Bashir in the International Criminal Court, Chevallier said 
the GOF position was "clear and firm": There would have to be 
a marked and demonstrable change in Sudan for the French to 
even consider the issue.  On Georgia, Chevallier emphasized 
that the EU observer mission there was strong and competent, 
contrary to what Russian President Medvedev had publicly 
claimed.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson met with French MFA 
advisors to the foreign minister Eric Chevallier and Sylvie 
Pantz, as well as with MFA officers Christian Bernier and 
Gurvan Le Bras in Paris on October 27. 
 
 
GITMO DETAINEES: FRENCH OPEN TO DETAINEE ISSUE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3.  (S/NF) S/WCI Ambassador Williamson began by stating that 
as the legal process in U.S. courts for detainees held in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba progressed, flexibility on options about 
what to do with them decreased.  Thus, there was some urgency 
to resolving some of the more problematic cases.  He said the 
USG is particularly concerned about the status of around 25 
detainees who could not be sent back to their countries of 
origin.  This group includes 17 Uighurs, as well as Uzbek, 
Palestinian and Egyptian detainees, who cannot be repatriated 
because of concerns about humane treatment.  Williamson said 
that the 25 detainees in question had not been prosecuted, 
were low threat, and would require little in the way of 
security measures.  In response to a question from Pantz, he 
emphasized that the USG was not seeking any sort of judicial 
process against them nor their detention.  Williamson noted 
there were currently around 250 detainees left in GITMO, but 
efforts were ongoing to reduce this number. He stated that 
approximately 100 are from Yemen alone, and while we have 
been working to see many of them repatriated, the government 
there simply doesn,t have the capacity to absorb them. 
Williamson said that anywhere from 50 to 100 detainees posed 
a high threat and the U.S. would almost certainly have to 
deal with these detainees for years into the future. He 
explained that the USG was asking allies to help by accepting 
other detainees who posed less of a risk. This relatively 
small, low-threat group for whom the U.S. was seeking 
relocation could be accepted for re-settlement as a 
humanitarian gesture. He pointed out that Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and 
the Special Rapporteur for Torture all were supportive of 
these efforts to see detainees re-settled in Europe and would 
be willing to publicly commend countries that accepted them. 
 
4.  (S/NF) Williamson said he has spoken to a number of 
European governments about this issue over the past two years 
and had heard that while certain countries were willing to 
accept some of these low-threat detainees, they have 
consistently sought an arrangement where several governments 
would act simultaneously to admit them.  Williamson noted 
that the effort to pull such a group together had been 
hampered by the fact that the decision making process in 
different governments was progressing at different paces and 
that governments had placed constraints on the USG as to what 
could be said about their willingness to be part of a group. 
Williamson said that recently, German National Security 
Adviser Christophe Heusgen had stated that he would be 
willing to act as a facilitator for this process and wanted 
to reach out to his counterparts in other European 
governments to discuss the issue. Williamson encouraged 
France to consider accepting some detainees, noting that 
France,s stature within Europe, and its position as EU 
President, would automatically add credence to the effort. 
He urged Chevallier to accept a call from Heusgen on this 
matter. 
 
5.  (S/NF) Pantz said the GOF would need certain guarantees 
that the detainees would "not return to fight."  France is 
concerned that accepting a detainee who did not speak French, 
for example, might make assimilation complicated, marking 
them as potential recruiting targets for Islamic extremist 
elements, she said.  Chevallier asked if there were any 
Francophone detainees among the 25 low-threat group, as it 
would be easier to sell the idea within the GOF.  Williamson 
said he was not sure if there were any French-speaking 
detainees, but noted that of the five Uighur detainees and 
three others that were already relocated to Albania, none of 
them spoke the language but that their assimilation had been 
going well.  Representatives from the Uighur Diaspora, he 
noted, had expressed a willingness to help with the 
assimilation of the any Uighur detainees re-settled in 
Europe. 
 
6.  (S/NF) Chevallier said he would have Pantz and her team 
review documentation provided by the USG regarding the 25 
low-threat detainees and assess whether there were any 
security or other concerns.  He noted that the MFA legal 
advisors would "hate" the idea, but that the decision, if a 
positive one were made, would be via political means. 
Williamson said that if the GOF could identify specific 
potential detainees for relocation, the USG could arrange for 
personal interviews with the detainees, if required, and 
provide any additional information that might be needed. 
Chevallier asked how many detainees the U.S. was asking 
France, or other countries, to take. Williamson said that 
obviously we would like to see all of them transferred so the 
more any one country would take, the closer it moved us to 
that objective.  He recognized, though, that one of the 
reasons governments were looking for a group to act together 
was that this then reduced the burden on each country. He 
suggested that Chevallier discuss this further with Heusgen. 
Williamson confirmed to Chevallier that the USG had already 
spoken to Switzerland, Portugal, Germany, Ireland, and 
Lithuania about the issue.  When Chevallier asked whether the 
UK would be accepting detainees, Williamson replied that the 
UK had already taken three individuals who had had residency 
in Britain, but who were not citizens, and that it was 
unlikely that they would accept more at the present time 
Chevalier said the GOF would look into the matter and get 
back to Williamson soon.  The GOF would also be willing to 
speak with Heusgen as he attempted to put a group together, 
Chevallier said. 
 
 
SUDAN: FRENCH POSITION FIRM AND CLEAR 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Williamson asked about the GOF position regarding 
Darfur and Sudan, noting that he had discussed this matter 
with MFA officials at a P-3 meeting in London in August and 
in Paris last month with Presidential Adviser Bruno Joubert. 
Chevallier said the French were "clear and firm": The GOF 
publicly and officially said there would have to be an 
"immediate and radical" change in Sudanese policy for the 
French to consider an Article 16 deferral  in the UN Security 
Council 
(UNSC) on the possible indictment of President Bashir by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).  Such a change in policy 
would have to include a ceasefire agreement per UNAMID, 
political change, acknowledgement of regional issues (such as 
Chad), and implementation of judicial arrangements acceptable 
to the ICC.  Chevallier said 10 days earlier he and other 
French officials, including Foreign Minister Bernard 
Kouchner, told visiting Sudanese officials that, contrary to 
GOS requests, the GOF would not act as a mediator between 
Sudan and the ICC.  In the meantime, the Sudanese had made 
some effort at reforms, but they were "far from sufficient," 
Chevallier said. 
 
8.  (C) Williamson noted that the Sudanese had seemed 
confident earlier that because of backing from African Union 
(AU) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) states, 
they would be able to garner enough support  within the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) to halt the ICC process.  Williamson 
asked if the GOS officials still appeared as confident when 
he and Kouchner met with them recently. Chevallier said he 
believed the GOS was disappointed by events at this year,s 
UNGA, especially after clear demonstrations of P-3 unity and 
lack of cohesive support from AU colleagues.  Williamson 
stated that the GOS had previously sought to have the UNSC 
vote on an Article 16 deferral quickly, but he wanted 
Chevallier,s thoughts on how the Sudanese might want to 
approach the matter now, in light of their experience at 
UNGA.  Chevallier replied that he believed the GOS did not 
believe there would be any change for the better in U.S. 
policy with the incoming administration, so he thought they 
still wanted to see some resolution in the near future  In 
fact, he added, the Sudanese seemed more pessimistic about 
 
their chances after January, especially with the election of 
new non-permanent members to the UN Security Council who do 
not appear sympathetic to Sudan,s position on Darfur. 
Williamson concluded by stressing again the USG,s concern 
that any discussions with the Sudanese not lead them into 
believing that a deal can be worked out and that it is only a 
matter of agreeing to the terms.  Chevallier assured him that 
France also felt strongly that the Sudanese not interpret 
discussions in that light. 
 
 
GEORGIA: FRENCH PLEASED WITH EU OBSERVER MISSION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9.  (C) Williamson indicated that during his September visit 
to Paris, he had had detailed discussions with MFA officials 
about the deployment of the EU Observer Mission in Georgia, 
and of the importance of a human rights component. While 
there had been skepticism then that human rights and civilian 
protection capabilities could be incorporated, Williamson 
noted that some progress seemed to have been made in this 
regard when he subsequently spoke to EU officials in 
Brussels. Chevallier said that there had been progress and 
that he had been very involved in the process to enhance this 
component of the mission. He acknowledged that it still was 
not nearly as robust as they would like, but the GOF believed 
the current group of EU observers was "strong and good," 
contrary to Russian President Medvedev,s statements claiming 
the observer mission was incompetent.  Chevallier noted the 
EU needed to have the right kind of observers in Georgia in 
order to track events on the ground and to adequately address 
these concerns.  Although getting approval for the observer 
mission was difficult, he believed that over time it would 
become incrementally more effective and play more of a 
protection role. Ultimately, though, the EU would need to 
have a presence in Akhalgori, the Kodori Gorge, and other 
contentious locations, Chevallier said. 
 
10.  (U) SWCI Williamson has cleared this message. 
 
 
STAPLETON