ACTION SCA-00   

INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AID-00   AMAD-00  INL-00   DOEE-00  PERC-00  
      PDI-00   DS-00    DHSE-00  EUR-00   OIGO-00  FBIE-00  VCI-00   
      H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   MOFM-00  MOF-00   
      VCIE-00  NSAE-00  ISN-00   OMB-00   NIMA-00  GIWI-00  SCT-00   
      ISNE-00  DOHS-00  FMPC-00  SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    NCTC-00  
      ASDS-00  CBP-00   R-00     SCRS-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   
      NFAT-00  SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00    /001W
                  ------------------FA445D  131023Z /38    
O 131030Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3818
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL LAHORE

S E C R E T LAHORE 000302 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/13/2018 
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL PK
SUBJECT: (S/NF) EXTREMIST RECRUITMENT ON THE RISE IN SOUTHERN PUNJAB 
 
Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  During recent trips to southern Punjab,  Principal Officer was repeatedly told that a sophisticated  jihadi recruitment network had been developed in the Multan,  Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions.  The network  reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the  province to recruit children into the divisions' growing  Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were  indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional  training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to  terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal  Areas (FATA).  Locals believed that charitable activities being  carried out by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations,  including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, and  Jaish-e-Mohammad were further strengthening reliance on  extremist groups and minimizing the importance of traditionally  moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities. 
Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial  support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making  its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from  "missionary" and "Islamic charitable" organizations in Saudi  Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct  support of those governments.  Locals repeatedly requested USG  support for socio-economic development and the promotion of  moderate religious leaders in the region as a direct counter to  the growing extremist threat.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  During a recent visit to the southern Punjabi cities  of Multan and Bahawalpur, Principal Officer's discussions with  religious, political, and civil society leaders were dominated  by discussions of the perceived growing extremist threat in  Seraiki and Baloch areas in southern and western Punjab. 
Interlocutors repeatedly stressed that recruitment activities by  extremist religious organizations, particularly among young men  between the ages of 8 and 15, had increased dramatically over  the last year.  Locals blamed the trend on a strengthening  network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and madrassas,  which they claimed had grown exponentially since late 2005. 
Such growth was repeatedly attributed to an influx of "Islamic  charity" that originally reached Pakistani pseudo-religious  organizations, such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Al-Khidmat  foundation, as relief for earthquake victims in Kashmir and the  North West Frontier Province.  Locals believe that a portion of  these funds was siphoned to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in  southern and western Punjab in order to expand these sects'  presence in a traditionally hostile, but potentially fruitful,  recruiting ground.  The initial success of establishing  madrassas and mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual  "donations" to these same clerics, originating in Saudi Arabia  and the United Arab Emirates.  The value of such donations was  uncertain, although most interlocutors believed that it was in  the region of $100 million annually. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) According to local interlocutors, current recruitment  activities generally exploit families with multiple children,  particularly those facing severe financial difficulties in light  of inflation, poor crop yields, and growing unemployment in both  urban and rural areas in the southern and western Punjab. 
Oftentimes, these families are identified and initially  approached/assisted by ostensibly "charitable" organizations  including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (a front for designated foreign  terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba), the Al-Khidmat  Foundation (linked to religious political party  Jamaat-e-Islami), or Jaish-e-Mohammad (a charitable front for  the designated foreign terrorist organization of the same name). 
 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The local Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith maulana will  generally be introduced to the family through these  organizations.  He will work to convince the parents that their  poverty is a direct result of their family's deviation from "the  true path of Islam" through "idolatrous" worship at local Sufi  shrines and/or with local Sufi Peers.  The maulana suggests that  the quickest way to return to "favor" would be to devote the  lives of one or two of their sons to Islam.  The maulana will  offer to educate these children at his madrassa and to find them  employment in the service of Islam.  The concept of "martyrdom"  is often discussed and the family is promised that if their sons  are "martyred" both the sons and the family will attain  "salvation" and the family will obtain God's favor in this life,  as well.  An immediate cash payment is finally made to the  parents to compensate the family for its "sacrifice" to Islam. 
Local sources claim that the current average rate is  approximately Rps. 500,000 (approximately USD 6500) per son.  A  small number of Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in Dera Ghazi Khan district  are reportedly recruiting daughters as well. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The path following recruitment depends upon the age of  the child involved.  Younger children (between 8 and 12) seem to  be favored.  These children are sent to a comparatively small,  extremist Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa in southern or  western Punjab generally several hours from their family home. 
Locals were uncertain as to the exact number of madrassas used  for this initial indoctrination purpose, although they believed  that with the recent expansion, they could number up to 200.  These madrassas are generally in isolated areas and are kept  small enough (under 100 students) so as not to draw significant  attention.  At these madrassas, children are denied contact with  the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for  non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government  philosophy.  Contact between students and families is forbidden,  although the recruiting maulana periodically visits the families  with reports full of praise for their sons' progress. 
"Graduates" from these madrassas are either (1) employed as  Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics or madrassa teachers or (2) sent  on to local indoctrination camps for jihad.  Teachers at the  madrassa appear to make the decision based on their read of the  child's willingness to engage in violence and acceptance of  jihadi culture versus his utility as an effective proponent of  Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith ideology/recruiter. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Children recruited at an older age and "graduates"  chosen for jihad proceed to more sophisticated indoctrination  camps focused on the need for violence and terrorism against the  Pakistan government and the West.  Locals identified three  centers reportedly used for this purpose.  The most prominent of  these is a large complex that ostensibly has been built at  Khitarjee (sp?).  Locals placed this site in Bahawalpur District  on the Sutlej River north of the village of Ahmedpur East at the  border of the districts of Multan, Bahawalpur, and Lodhran.  The  second complex is a newly built "madrassa" on the outskirts of  Bahawalpur city headed by a devotee of Jaish-e-Mohammad leader  Maulana Masood Azhar identified only as Maulana Al-Hajii (NFI).  The third complex is an Ahl-e-Hadith site on the outskirts of  Dera Ghazi Khan city about which very limited information was  available.  Locals asserted that these sites were primarily used  for indoctrination and very limited military/terrorist tactic  training.  They claimed that following several months of  indoctrination at these centers youth were generally sent on to  more established training camps in the Federally Administered  Tribal Areas and then on to jihad either in FATA, NWFP, or as  suicide bombers in settled areas.  Many worried that these youth  would eventually return to try and impose their extremist  version of Islam in the southern and western Punjab and/or to  carry out operations in these areas. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly chastised the government for  its failure to act decisively against indoctrination centers,  extremist madrassas, or known prominent leaders such as  Jaish-e-Mohammad's Masood Azhar.  One leading Sufi scholar and a  Member of the Provincial Assembly informed Principal Officer  that he had personally provided large amounts of information on  the location of these centers, madrassas, and personalities to  provincial and national leaders, as well as the local police. 
He was repeatedly told that "plans" to deal with the threat were  being "evolved" but that direct confrontation was considered  "too dangerous."  The Bahawalpur District Nazim told Principal  Officer that he had repeatedly highlighted the growing threat to  the provincial and federal governments but had received no  support in dealing with it.  He blamed politics, stating that  unless he was willing to switch parties -- he is currently with  the Pakistan Muslim League -- neither the Pakistan Muslim League 
- Nawaz provincial nor the Pakistan Peoples Party federal  governments would take his requests seriously.  The brother of  the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, and a noted  Brailvi/Sufi scholar in his own right, Allama Qasmi blamed  government intransigence on a culture that rewarded political  deals with religious extremists.  He stressed that even if  political will could be found, the bureaucracy in the Religious  Affairs, Education, and Defense Ministries remained dominated by  Zia-ul-Haq appointees who favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith  religious philosophies.  This bureaucracy, Qasmi claimed, had  repeatedly blocked his brother's efforts to push policy in a  different direction. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Interlocutors repeatedly requested USG assistance for  the southern and western Punjab, believing that an influx of  western funds could counter the influence of  Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith clerics.  Principal Officer was repeatedly  reminded that these religious philosophies were alien to the  southern and western Punjab -- which is the spiritual heartland  of South Asia's Sufi communities.  Their increasing prominence  was directly attributed to poverty and external funding.  Locals  believed that socio-economic development programs, particularly  in education, agriculture, and employment generation, would have  a direct, long-term impact in minimizing receptivity to  extremist movements.  Similarly, they pressed for immediate  relief efforts -- particularly food distribution and income  support -- to address communities' immediate needs.  Several  interlocutors also encouraged direct USG support to Brailvi/Sufi  religious institutions, arguing that these represented the  logical antithesis to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith philosophy and  that if adequately funded, they could stem the tide of converts  away from their moderate beliefs. 
  Comment 
 
¶9. (S/NF)  A jihadi recruiting network relying on Deobandi and  Ahl-e-Hadith religious, charitable, and educational institutions  is increasing its work in impoverished districts of southern and  western Punjab.  Local economic conditions coupled with foreign  financing appear to be transforming a traditionally moderate  area of the country into a fertile recruiting ground for  terrorist organizations.  The provincial and federal  governments, while fully aware of the problem, appear to fear  direct confrontation with these extremist groups.  Local  governments lack the resources and federal/provincial support to  deal with these organizations on their own.  The moderate  Brailvi/Sufi community is internally divided into followers of  competing spiritual leaders and lacks the financial resources to  act as an effective counterweight to well-funded and  well-organized extremists. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Post believes that this growing recruitment network  poses a direct threat to USG counter-terrorism and  counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan.  Intervention at this  stage in the southern and western Punjab could still be useful  to counter the prevailing trends favoring extremist  organizations.  USAID development resources in agriculture,  economic growth, education, and infrastructure development are  useful and necessary and will address some of the immediate  needs.  In post's view short-term, quick impact programs are  required which focus on: (1) immediate relief in the form of  food aid and microcredit, (2) cash for work and community-based,  quick-impact infrastructure development programs focusing on  irrigation systems, schools, and other critical infrastructure,  and (3) strategic communication programs designed to educate on  the dangers of the terrorist recruiting networks and to support  counter-terrorist, counter-extremist messages. 
HUNT