VZCZCXRO1112
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3479/01 3071100
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021100Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0183
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0267
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 
TAGS: IZ PHUM PREF PREL
SUBJECT: UNHCR DOUBLES PROGRAMMING AND SUPPORTS RETURNS IN 
IRAQ 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Assistant UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
for Operations Judy Cheng-Hopkins briefed the Ambassador 
October 28 on UNHCR,s new strategy to sharply increase 
engagement inside Iraq to support returns.  Ambassador 
Crocker encouraged UNHCR to continue direct engagement with 
the Iraqi Security Forces, as they were the GOI institutions 
responsible for security and property restitution, the most 
critical factors determining returns. On criticism from Iraqi 
officials concerning the resettlement program, the Ambassador 
encouraged UNHCR to emphasize its efforts to return families 
and implement projects to help them.  Regarding Camp Ashraf, 
UNHCR opposes any forced return of the residents to Iran, 
would assist with requests for voluntary return, and is 
prepared to assist and advise the GOI on implementing its 
humane treatment assurances.  On security arrangements for 
the UN once SOFA is implemented, the Ambassador said measures 
would be in place to support UNAMI and the UN agencies and 
that the GOI would gradually take lead responsibility. 
Cheng-Hopkins announced that High Commissioner for Refugees 
Guterres plans to visit Iraq November 25-28.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C)  United Nations Assistant High Commissioner Judy 
Cheng-Hopkins and UNHCR Middle East-North Africa (MENA) 
Director Radhouane Nouicer visited Baghdad October 26-28. 
They met with a range of interlocutors, including Deputy 
Prime Minister Essawi, Vice President Hashemi, Foreign 
Minister Zebari, Deputy Interior Minister Adnan Al-Assadi, 
and Baghdad Operations Commander General Aboud Qanbar. 
Cheng-Hopkins met separately with Ambassador Crocker and 
MNF-I Civil Military Operations Director (CJ-9) Brigadier 
General (Promotable) Perkins October 28.  She was accompanied 
by UNHCR MENA Director Nouicer, and UNHCR Iraq Representative 
Daniel Endres and Deputy Representative Shoko Shimouzawa. 
Senior Refugee/IDP Affairs Coordinator and Refcoord 
participated in the meeting.   They met with the Minister of 
Displacement and Migration in Amman before arriving in 
Baghdad. Cheng-Hopkins and her delegation departed Iraq 
immediately after the meetings at the Embassy.    We will 
report on other meetings septel, as we follow up with UNHCR 
staff. 
 
UNHCR PLANS TO DOUBLE INSIDE IRAQ BUDGET 
 
¶3.  (C)  Assistant High Commissioner Cheng-Hopkins briefed 
Ambassador Crocker on UNHCR,s new strategy to sharply 
increase engagement inside Iraq to support returns, while 
continuing assistance to a large population of needy IDPs. 
While noting that the security situation continues to present 
challenges, Cheng-Hopkins said that UNHCR had concluded from 
its successful shelter rehabilitation work in Sadr City, 
Basra and Mosul this summer that it is indeed possible for 
its national staff and local NGOs to implement projects in 
many parts of central and southern Iraq.  Given the steady 
pace of returns ) over 85 percent IDPs for now ) UNHCR 
plans to play a leadership role in supporting returns.  While 
total returns represent less than 10 percent of post-Samarra 
displacement and refugee returns only a trickle, the only way 
for UNHCR and other agencies to prepare for a larger return 
flow is to get capacity on the ground now.  As such, UNHCR is 
planning in 2009 to double the inside Iraq portion of its 
regional appeal to over $80 million.  It would raise its 
in-country international staff complement from five to nine 
and increase its local staff.   HCR plans to markedly expand 
the reach of its Protection Assistance Centers inside of 
Baghdad to provide legal assistance, help Iraqis access GOI 
services and address special needs cases.  UNHCR would focus 
on key return neighborhoods, such as Hurriya and Doura, and 
apply a "package approach" to address individual needs and 
community services.  UNHCR would carry out its mandate for 
shelter rehabilitation through its implementing partners and 
would coordinate the work of other UN agencies, such as 
UNICEF and WHO to address the particular education and social 
service needs of returnees.  Cheng-Hopkins and Nouicer 
commented that the Ministry of Displacement and Migration 
(MODM) is ineffective.  UNHCR would continue to work with the 
ministry, but they made clear that their expansion plans do 
not depend on MODM. 
 
GOI NEEDS UNHCR,S HELP 
 
¶4.  (C) Recalling High Commissioner for Refugees Guterres, 
commitment to strengthen UNHCR's involvement inside Iraq 
expressed during his February 2008 visit to Baghdad, the 
Ambassador welcomed UNHCR's expansion plan, especially the 
focus on returns.  The Ambassador underscored that in 
addition to implementing assistance, UNHCR has a critical 
role to play in helping prepare the Iraqi Government to 
address returns and shape Iraq's approach to the 
 
BAGHDAD 00003479  002 OF 003 
 
 
international community.  Noting that today,s Iraq was far 
different from Iraq of the Baathist era (1958-2003), he said 
that the GOI needs much help in building relationships and 
capacity.   To do so, we must understand what Iraq's 
transition means, both psychologically and physically. 
While the new GOI holds power, it is navigating amidst the 
persistent political culture of the past.  One practical 
reality of this is that Iraqis are very sensitive about being 
told what to do by outsiders.  Noting that Cheng-Hopkins had 
come directly from a meeting with the Baghdad Operations 
Commander General Abud Qanbar (whom UNHCR had urged not to 
evict squatters on public property unless the GOI had a 
definite need for the property), the Ambassador encouraged 
UNHCR to continue direct engagement with the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF), as they are the GOI institutions responsible 
for security and property restitution, the two conditions 
that are most critical to returns.  The Ambassador commented 
that this engagement presents an important opportunity within 
an opportunity.  The ISF does not have a depth of experience 
in protecting the people.  This had not been how the previous 
regime had used the security forces.   UNHCR and the other UN 
actors have an opportunity to help orient the ISF in this 
positive direction and empower it without creating enmity 
among the population.    At present, ISF are supporting 
returns well in some areas, such as northwest Baghdad, and 
less well in others, as in Abu-Ghraib.  UNHCR had witnessed 
positive ISF role in visits to northwest Baghdad, organized 
by the Second Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne. 
 
ADDRESS GOI CRITICISM OF RESETTLEMENT WITH FOCUS ON RETURN 
 
¶5.  (C) Cheng-Hopkins said she received sharp criticism from 
some Iraqi officials that UNHCR's third country resettlement 
program is exacerbating the brain drain from Iraq. (Note: We 
learned subsequently that it was Vice President Tariq 
al-Hashemi. End Note.)  Cheng-Hopkins said UNHCR's standard 
response to such concerns is that third country resettlement 
is available to only a small number of Iraqi refugees and 
that UNHCR prioritizes resettlement for the most vulnerable 
and needy of the refugees.  She asked the Ambassador for his 
advice on how to manage this issue with the GOI.   The 
Ambassador replied that UNHCR should emphasize that return is 
the principal durable solution UNHCR is working to achieve. 
This is the case almost everywhere in the world and it is 
true for Iraq.  Ambassador reminded Cheng-Hopkins that the 
refugee experience Iraqis and others in the region have first 
and foremost in their minds is that of the Palestinians and 
UNRWA, which has no return component.  He said the equation 
in the Iraqi consciousness is simple:  refugees plus UN 
equals UNRWA.  To counter this, Iraqis need to see UNHCR's 
positive role.  He encouraged UNHCR to emphasize its efforts 
to return families and implement projects to help them and 
work with the Iraqi media to publicize this.  (Note:  In a 
related development, last week UNHCR Assistant High 
Commissioner Erica Feller told PRM that UNHCR is conducting a 
comprehensive review of protection considerations for Iraqis 
in neighboring countries and that it will soon issue a new 
advisory on returns.  The new advisory would still be 
"cautionary;" but it would reflect UNHCR's assessment that 
parts of Iraq are more conducive for safe and voluntary 
returns than others and would therefore be more nuanced and 
forward leaning than the current advisory.  End note.) 
 
GOI NEEEDS UNHCR HELP TO MANAGE MEK 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for UNHCR's 
past work in according refugee status to defectors from Camp 
Ashraf and in protecting and attempting to facilitate third 
country resettlement of the former Mujahedin e-Khalq (MeK) 
refugees.   He said that the transition from MNF-I to GOI 
security control of Ashraf is proceeding somewhat more slowly 
than expected because the GOI was not ready.  He said the GOI 
needs the help of international organizations such as UNHCR 
to implement and uphold its humane treatment assurances.  Its 
presence and attention would remind the GOI that the 
international community is watching.   Middle East Director 
Nouicer laid out UNHCR's longstanding approach to the MeK to 
General Perkins.   There would be no blanket refugee status 
for the Camp Ashraf residents.   UNHCR would consider 
individual requests for refugee status from individuals as 
long as they are outside the camp and have renounced the MeK. 
  Nouicer encouraged the re-establishment of a camp where 
defectors could go, but he deflected an inquiry about UNHCR's 
readiness to run it.   Nouicer said UNHCR would oppose any 
forced return of the residents to Iran.  However, UNHCR would 
assist with requests for voluntary return.  UNHCR is prepared 
to assist and advise the GOI on implementing its humane 
treatment assurances. 
 
UNHCR CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN 2009 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003479  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Cheng-Hopkins said that UNHCR had taken the strategic 
decision to expand in Iraq.  The Government of Sweden had 
funded ($1.5 million) and is supervising the construction of 
a 35 room office building in the current UN compound.  This 
would provide space for UNHCR and other agencies to expand. 
However, she was concerned about security arrangements for 
the UN once the SOFA is implemented.  The Ambassador replied 
that measures would be in place to support UNAMI and the UN 
agencies.  He said that the international presence benefits 
the GOI and that the GOI is keen to take on the role of 
ensuring effective protection.  At present there is a 
transition to Iraqi control and the U.S. is heavily engaged 
in training and building up ISF capacity.  He cited the PRTs 
in Najaf and Karbala, as models for the future.  Since the 
withdrawal of coalition combat forces from those provinces, 
both PRTs are located on Iraqi Army bases.  U.S. military 
units provide perimeter security for the PRT and movement 
support.  UNHCR Representative Endres expressed the concern 
that UNDSS remains a problem and hoped that they would not be 
locked down once CF ceased providing protection. 
 
HIGH COMMISSIONER TO VISIT IRAQ NOVEMBER 25-28 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Cheng-Hopkins announced that High Commissioner 
Guterres plans to visit Iraq November 25-28 and that he is 
keen to travel around the country, possibly to Najaf, Ramadi, 
Basra and Mosul.  She said that the HC would need support 
from MNF-I.   Both the Ambassador and General Perkins pledged 
support.   Perkins urged UNHCR to get their requirements to 
MNF-I as soon as possible. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶9.  (C)  We have been nudging UNHCR to expand programming 
inside Iraq and focus on supporting returns for months and we 
are pleased to see them commit to this.  UNHCR's readiness to 
engage with the military and MNF-I's strong support have been 
critical factors in enabling UNHCR to circulate and assess 
conditions.  UNHCR has a realistic view of MODM's limited 
capacity and is structuring its programming independently of 
the ministry.  As U.S. forces draw down and the GOI 
increasingly assumes its responsibility for security, there 
will be need for continued dialogue with UNDSS to ensure that 
UNAMI and the UN agencies can move. 
CROCKER