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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SAO PAULO 000542 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE, ELLIOT ABRAMS, NIC RAMCHAND, MEAGHEN 
MCDERMOTT, GREG GATJANIS 
STATE S/P FOR DAVID GORDON 
STATE NEA FOR DAVID WELCH, JEFF FELTMAN 
EMBASSY BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR SISAN, DCM GRANT 
LEBANON DESK FOR CHRISTINE LAWSON, MATT IRWIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2023 
TAGS: PGOV PHALANAGE PARTY PINR PREL KISL LE BR
SUBJECT: LEVERAGING LEBANON,S DIASPORA FOR 
DEMOCRACY/DEEPENING LOCAL CONTACTS 
 
SAO PAULO 00000542  001.4 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Econpol Chief James B. Story for Reasons 1 
.4 B,C 
 
¶1.  (C) This message contains an Action Request.  See 
Paragraph 12. 
 
Summary: 
 
¶2.  (C) Brazil's extensive Lebanese Diaspora, the largest 
such community in the world, contains important, influential 
people who want to work with the USG to help the cause of 
democracy in Lebanon, a position made evident during the 
9/24-26 visit of Jared Cohen (S/P) and Janine Keil (INR) to 
Sao Paulo.  The visit also made clear that an appreciation of 
the local Lebanese Brazilians' ties to their ancestral 
homeland strongly enhances our outreach to this influential 
local ethnic and economic group.  Brazil's Lebanese community 
offers the possibility for a powerful "two-fer," a local 
group that can reinforce Middle Eastern democracy and that is 
influential, in its own right, in Brazil.  Brazil could 
become a model for Diaspora-mobilization for democracy in the 
Middle East and Muslim outreach in WHA, adding important 
transnational aspects to our efforts at Transformational 
Diplomacy.  End Summary. 
 
Cohen and Keil Visit Sao Paulo 
 
¶3.  (C) Jared Cohen (S/P) and Janine Keil (INR) visited Sao 
Paulo, Brazil September 24-26.  They met with a variety of 
representatives -- Christian, Jewish and Muslim -- of 
Brazil's ethnic Lebanese community. Among the Lebanese 
Brazilians who met Cohen and Keil were: Joseph Sayah, 
Lebanon's Consul General; Sheik Jihade Hamade of the World 
Assembly of Islamic Youth (WAMY, Sunni); Berty Tawil and 
Ernesto Chayo (Banco Safra); Alfred Cotait (Secretary of 
International Relations for Sao Paulo City Hall); Guilherme 
Mattar (Cotait's Chief of Staff); Suheil Yammout (Head of the 
Lebanese March 14 Movement and representative of Saad Hariri 
in Brazil); Mohammed Zoghby (President of the Muslim 
Federation of Brazil); Fouad Naime (journalist, editor of the 
magazine "Carta do Libano," representative of Phalangist and 
Lebanese Forces); Salim Schahin (businessman and banker, 
participant in the Abraham Path Project); and Naji Nahas 
(businessman).  The flagship event of the trip was a cocktail 
organized by the Lebanese Consul 
General (CG) at his residence on 9/25, where he invited a 
variety of Lebanese-Brazilian interlocutors to meet with 
Cohen and Keil.  This was supplemented by a visit to a local 
mosque as well as a series of private meetings with Banco 
Safra Officials, leaders of the Future Movement, and 
Lebanese-Brazilian businessman and billionaire Naji Nahas at 
the latter's residence. 
 
The Community: Broad, Deep, Diverse, and Selectively Engaged 
 
¶4.  (C) Brazil's Lebanese Diaspora reflects the diversity of 
its country of origin.  As a rough guide, Brazil's ten 
million persons of Lebanese descent (many of them second and 
third generation) are 90 percent Christian.  The remaining 
ten percent is 9-to-1 Sunni/Shia.  According to those 
interviewed, Brazil's ethnic Lebanese are divided along both 
generational and religious lines into three general groups: 
 
--The Shia (approximately 160,000 according to the Lebanese 
CG).  The Lebanese-Brazilians interviewed (none of whom were 
 
SAO PAULO 00000542  002.3 OF 005 
 
 
Shia) said that the Shia in Brazil are usually 
first-generation immigrants not well-integrated into 
Brazilian society.  They generally speak little Portuguese 
and  sympathize with Hezbollah, likely even those who do not 
publicly voice their support for the group.  The Shia 
maintain a close partisan identification with Lebanese 
politics and many intend to return.  There are anecdotal 
reports, (which have not been verified-NFI), that they 
receive financial help from the Iranian Embassy in Brazil, 
including funds distributed to young Shia to start businesses. 
 
--The second, third, and fourth generation immigrants, 
majority March 14-oriented Christians, but also a significant 
number of Sunni Muslims.  (Note: The March 14 Movement or 
March 14 Alliance refers to Lebanon's 2005 Cedar Revolution, 
when Lebanese citizens opposed to Syria's occupation of their 
country rose up in protest against the occupiers following 
the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri on 2/14/05.  End Note.)   This group makes up the vast 
majority of the Diaspora.  Beyond a shared hope for a 
peaceful and unified Lebanon, they are not deeply involved in 
the particulars of Lebanese politics.  Those interviewed 
stressed the Diaspora's spirit of integration, insisting the 
Lebanese conflict's ethnic divisions for the most part do not 
exist among Lebanese-Brazilians.  Their presence in Brazil's 
business and political life is extensive.  Some of Brazil's 
most successful business and banking leaders hail from the 
Lebanese community (Safra Bank) as well as the country's 
political lead 
ers (Sao Paulo Mayor Gilberto Kasssab is Lebanese; there are 
35 members of the Brazil-Lebanon Parliamentary Friendship 
Group).  Interlocutors told us that "there is not a province 
in Brazil" that does not have an ethnic Lebanese elected to 
some office.  This group, which includes descendants of 
original Lebanese immigrants, may number into the millions 
and is the largest Lebanese community in the world. 
 
--The third group is a subset -- really a leadership set -- 
of the broader Lebanese community described above.  It 
consists of very successful and well-connected business 
persons who are intimately familiar with Lebanese politics. 
They are often emotionally stricken by the turmoil they see 
in their ancestral homeland, but have trouble identifying 
worthy projects to support Lebanese democracy.  Members of 
this leadership group reject Hezbollah's extremism and Syrian 
and Iranian interference in Lebanon, but are also 
disappointed in the corruption that they say permeates all 
sides of Lebanese politics.  They also fear that the U.S. 
will give up all hope for Lebanese democracy and "abandon" 
the country.  This last group proved most responsive to the 
Cohen/Keil visit and expressed keen interest in learning more 
about U.S. initiatives to support Lebanese democracy and in 
how they could support such efforts. 
 
Engagement Not Across-the-Board, But Intense 
 
¶5.  (C) While most Lebanese Brazilians keep Lebanon's 
divisions at arms-length, the leaders described above can be 
intensively engaged in the country.  Several of our 
interlocutors communicate with Lebanese political leaders 
regularly.  President Suheil Yamout of the Future Institute 
provided perhaps the most concrete example of intense 
selective engagement when he described his organizations "get 
out the vote" drive for Lebanon's March parliamentary 
elections to Cohen and Keil.  The Future Institute aims to 
fly some ten thousand Brazilian citizens who also hold 
Lebanese passports back to Lebanon to vote this March, 
 
SAO PAULO 00000542  003 OF 005 
 
 
providing up to USD 10,000 in financial support to each one 
to make the trip.  The Future Institute also mentioned that a 
likely 50,000 Lebanese will self-finance trips back to 
Lebanon in the spring to participate in the March elections. 
They are coordinating with Saad Hariri (son of the Prime 
Minister assassinated in 2005, leader of the Lebanese Future 
Movement) to ensure that they maximize thes 
e votes in the right districts.  Meeting participants 
estimated that there are up to one half-million Lebanese in 
Brazil who are eligible to hold Lebanese passports and who 
could conceivably vote in that country's elections.  When 
asked, Lebanese stakeholders explained that the vast majority 
of these are March 14 supporters. 
 
Pre-Polarization Lebanon Meets Brazil 
 
¶6.  (C) The bulk of the Lebanese community in Brazil 
contrasts with Lebanon itself in the critical area of 
polarization.  Where Lebanon has become a synonym for 
religious/ethnic division and state breakdown, the older, 
second/third/fourth generation Lebanese Brazilians are a 
community noted for their openness, internal diversity, and 
tolerance.  (The more recently-arrived Shia do not fall under 
this umbrella.)  This became evident throughout a series of 
meetings that featured local Lebanese Christians, Jews and 
Sunni Muslims all conversing easily in fluent Lebanese 
Arabic.  Interlocutors attributed this to several factors: 
the basic tolerance that older Lebanese, products of the 
pre-1970s Beirut, have for one another; the "melting pot" 
quality of Brazilian culture, which emphasizes mixing and 
moderation, the reality that they all want to do business 
with one another; and finally the conscious desire of the 
Lebanese Brazilian community not to import Lebanon's troubles 
into their community.  Participants in our 
 meetings were eager to tell the story of the successful 
Lebanese Brazilian "melting pot"  back in the Middle East and 
particularly in Lebanon.  The Diaspora may have lessons for 
the homeland when it comes to teamwork and tolerance. 
 
Response Highly Positive, But.... 
 
¶7.  (C) The majority of Lebanese Brazilian interlocutors 
eagerly embraced the idea of coordinating engagement with 
Lebanon with USG efforts.  The community manages large 
financial resources and appears more than willing to engage. 
That said, conversations revealed two intriguing elements 
that indicated frustration with the U.S. and a possible need 
for more Muslim outreach here in Brazil. 
 
-At the 9/25 cocktail, Lebanese Brazilian interlocutors 
worriedly asked Cohen whether or not the U.S. had "given up" 
on Lebanese democracy?  Would the country be abandoned? 
Cohen replied emphatically that this was not the case, that 
the President and the Secretary remained firmly engaged. 
Nonetheless, the participants' disquiet was evident along 
with their enthusiasm for engagement. 
 
-Our 9/25 visit to a local mosque was highly cordial.  Sheik 
Jihad Hassan presented his group as non-political and eager 
for outreach.  Nonetheless, during the visit, Cohen noted 
that the mosque uses the Salafist (or more radical) of two 
translations of the Koran available.  In addition, when asked 
about outside support for the mosque, the Sheik said that all 
financial help came "from the community," an answer that 
appeared to point to the local communitym, but that seemed 
ambiguous in the face of the mosque's ample resources for 
teaching and outreach. 
 
SAO PAULO 00000542  004.3 OF 005 
 
 
 
What Is To Be Done? 
 
¶8.  (C) Cohen discussed several concrete project ideas for 
Lebanon with our interlocutors, who responded 
enthusiastically.  Among the ideas put forward: 
 
-Filming a documentary about teamwork and tolerance among 
Christians, Muslims and Jews in Brazil's Lebanese community 
as a tolerance model that could be broadcast in Lebanon and 
in the Middle East, possibly by Al-Jazeera Network. 
 
-Creating a Brazilian-Lebanese Business Council that could 
undertake high profile efforts to provide youth employment 
and internships back in Lebanon.  Cohen specifically 
mentioned the "Teach for Lebanon" initiative as an example 
that could maybe benefit from this. 
 
-Developing a version of the "Birthright" Program (under a 
different name) that reinforces the connections American Jews 
feel for Israel by funding travel to Israel.  Lebanese youth 
overseas could be encouraged to travel and even work in 
Lebanon. 
 
-Translating interviews with USG Officials on Lebanon into 
Portuguese for the Brazilian Lebanese community.  Likewise, 
USG officials who work on Lebanon could give interviews in 
Brazilian media. 
 
-Arranging for the Lebanon-Brazil Parliamentary Friendship 
Group to visit Washington DC and meet U.S. officials 
overseeing our policy toward Lebanon. 
 
-Setting up meetings for the Lebanese CG in Sao Paulo, Joseph 
Sayah, to discuss our policies with Washington officials when 
he next travels to the United States. 
 
-The vast majority of interlocutors suggested that Cohen make 
a follow up visit to Brazil at some point in the near future. 
 
Comment: The Multiple Benefits in Diaspora-Engagement 
 
¶9.  (C) The most important opportunity to emerge from 
Cohen/Keil's visit was the possibility that Brazil's Lebanese 
community could support USG efforts to build a democratic and 
independent Lebanon.  Community members expressed enthusiasm 
for a range of cultural and economic initiatives and appeared 
ready to self-finance efforts which would work in 
coordination with the USG. 
 
¶10.  (C) As potentially important as the Lebanese Diaspora 
might be for Lebanon, its members remain a strong and 
influential group here in Brazil.  Engaging them, 
particularly some of their most influential leaders, on an 
ancestral homeland issue near and dear to their hearts only 
deepened our already good contacts with this critically 
important local group and some of its most prominent members. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Lebanese Diaspora provides a bridge to more 
moderate Muslim groups that would be excellent targets for 
outreach. 
 
¶12.  (C) Lastly, Brazil's diversity and the strong 
home-country connections of some of its Lebanese Diaspora 
could make it a testing ground for both Diaspora-engagement 
strategies and Muslim outreach in Latin America. 
 
 
SAO PAULO 00000542  005.3 OF 005 
 
 
Action Request: 
 
¶13.  (C) As a point of departure for efforts to engage Middle 
Eastern communities in Brazil, Post would be interested in 
models that other posts -- particularly the UK, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, and Germany -- have employed 
successfully for Muslim outreach.  These would be good points 
of departure for our own efforts to engage Middle Eastern 
communities in Brazil. 
 
¶14. (C) This message was coordinated with and cleared by the 
U.S. Embassy, Brasilia. 
WHITE