VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0836/01 2971405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231405Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9255
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5302
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4085
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1377
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1247
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: T/C NEGOTIATOR URGES GREATER U.S. ROLE 
 
Classified By: By Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 
1.4 (d) 
 
1.(C) Summary:  Repeating a common Turkish Cypriot (T/C) view 
on internationalizing the quest for a CYPROB solution, T/C 
negotiator Ozdil Nami urged the USG to play a more activist 
role in the effort. In an October 20 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Nami said his October 16 meeting with G/C 
negotiator George Iacovou was inconclusive and charged that a 
Greek Cypriot proposal for weighted voting was "a direct 
attack on political equality." The T/C negotiator said that 
the talks were disorganized and aimless due to Christofias, 
refusal to use the Annan Plan as the main frame of reference 
for the talks. Regarding the opening of the 
Limnitis-Yesilirmak crossing, he said the "ball was in the 
G/C court" and reiterated the T/C proposal to ship non-lethal 
supplies to T/C troops in the Kokkina enclave, presumably 
under UN-escort, in return for the opening. He refused to 
engage on reaching out to pro-solution forces in the Greek 
Cypriot Orthodox Church, arguing that Talat and his 
administration were already working to improve conditions for 
Orthodox worshipers in the north. The Church, he said flatly, 
should use established channels (the UN or G/C negotiator 
Iacovou). He rejected a May 2008 proposal by the RoC Minister 
of Education to craft a mechanism to accredit universities in 
the north, arguing that education*even under the 1960 
constitution*was a communal, not federal, matter.  He also 
complained that the G/Cs were using the "Straw Rule" to limit 
foreign meetings with Talat, most recently with the 
Australian FM. Overall, Nami had a much darker view of 
things, even since our last meeting with him on October 14. 
His boss continues to engage with the G/Cs, however, and 
appears willing to work directly with Christofias within the 
UN-framework. End Summary 
 
---------------------------------- 
"US not showing a lot of Interest" 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Responding to the Ambassador,s question about a press 
statement by Talat, Nami said that the T/C leader was correct 
in that the "US was not showing a lot of interest" in the 
process. He charged international recognition as President of 
the RoC gave Christofias unwarranted "credit" without 
affording Talat the ability to counter with a reality check. 
Consequently, things were moving far too slowly, and 
Christofias, views more and more appeared to be merely a 
more "diplomatic version" of former hard-line RoC President 
Papadopoulos. He urged the US to level the international 
playing field afforded Christofias by giving Talat equal 
access and consideration(without going into detail as to 
modalities). The Ambassador said he would report Nami,s 
comments but reminded him that the Embassy and the USG as a 
whole were seriously engaged, not just watching. For the 
moment, however, the two leaders had taken the direct 
responsibility on themselves to produce results. 
 
--------------------------------- 
"G/Cs want to reinvent the wheel" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Nami complained that Christofias was trying to 
"reinvent the wheel" with his total rejection of the Annan 
Plan, even as a point of reference. AKEL agreed with nearly 
eighty percent of its content, but &Christofias is 
pretending it does not even exist,8 he griped. This lack of 
structure in the talks was causing serious delay and even, he 
claimed, violating the UNSG,s call to use the entire UN Body 
of Work, which clearly included the Annan Plan. Nami said the 
T/Cs were willing to address G/C concerns regarding Annan 
Plan shortcomings, for example the need to strengthen the 
executive or improve the property regime. They would even 
respect domestic G/C sensitivities. They were not ready, 
however, to "start from scratch," as this would drag out the 
process and imperil the &ruling8 CTP,s election chances 
(Note: "Parliamentary" elections are scheduled for February 
2010 but may be called sooner. End Note). 
 
------------------------------------- 
"Direct Attack on Political Equality" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Nami said that there was no "movement" in his October 
16 meeting with Iacovou. Moreover, Nami characterized 
Iacovou,s presentation of "weighted voting," part of a 
G/C-proposed presidential system, as a &direct attack on 
political equality." Under the G/C plan, a Greek Cypriot 
presidential candidate would be paired with a Turkish Cypriot 
vice-presidential candidate on a single ticket, with the two 
swapping positions at some point. This, with weighted voting, 
might result either in a G/C presidential candidate coming to 
power without majority Turkish Cypriot support, or lead to 
exclusion of nationalist, right-wing forces on both sides, as 
they would be less inclined to pair with former enemies. In 
response to the Ambassador,s question, Nami said that the 
G/Cs understood these concerns, but were unclear as to 
whether they could effectively address them. Nami complained 
that the G/Cs were fixated on the 80/20 population split, 
rather than on the need to give the Turkish Cypriots an 
effective voice. While he agreed, in line with UN 
resolutions, that political equality did not mean numerical 
equality, ratios, he argued, would have to differ depending 
on the institution if the T/C equities were to be protected 
in the long term. 
 
 
¶5. (C) For his part, Nami said he preferred the Presidential 
Council of the Annan Plan, which would be elected by an equal 
number of senators from both communities, ensuring from the 
onset that it would enjoy a bicommunal majority. Nami said 
that he hoped Christofias would not insist on the idea of a 
"weighted vote" as it fundamentally undermined political 
equality, and could not be accepted by the T/Cs. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
"Ball in G/C court on Limnitis-Yesilirmak Opening" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (C) Nami said that the "ball was in the G/C court" 
regarding the opening of Limnitis-Yesilirmak crossing, which 
both leaders have committed to open. He said, however, that 
it was "unthinkable" to spend the 6-7 million Euros needed to 
upgrade the road on the T/C side and then deny the T/Cs the 
right to resupply their forces in the Kokkina pocket with 
non-lethal civilian goods.  Nami claimed that UNFICYP Chief 
Zerihoun said the UN "would find a way", if both sides 
agreed, to facilitate a resupply deal, which, according to 
Nami, would include UNFICYP escort of T/C resupply vehicles. 
Nami said that his G/C counterpart said such a deal "would be 
difficult" and did not necessarily agree with the approach. 
UNFICYP COS Hughes told us separately it would be impossible 
for the UN to escort a military resupply mission, even if it 
only involved non-lethal goods. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Taking another tack, the Ambassador tried to ask for 
Nami's view on the failed, September ad hoc opening for Greek 
Cypriot worshipers of the Limnitis-Yesilirmak crossing point 
as a CBM.  The T/C refusal weakened pro-solution forces in 
the Greek Orthodox Church. Nami said it had been a "last 
minute request," which the T/Cs, despite their best 
intentions, could not implement. Emphasizing what Talat had 
told the Ambassador previously, Nami was adamant that the 
T/Cs never made any promises. When the Ambassador tried to 
raise with Nami allegations of harassment of pro-solution 
Greek Cypriot clergy and worshipers in the north, Nami said 
that those involved should address their concerns to UNFICYP 
or to the Greek Cypriot authorities and refused to accept a 
document regarding these allegations that a G/C bishop had 
asked the Ambassador to pass on. Nami said that Talat had a 
"good record" on dealing with the Church. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
"Education is a Communal matter, period" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Nami rejected out of hand a G/C proposal to craft a 
bicommunal mechanism to accredit T/C universities that the 
RoC Minister of Education had asked the Ambassador to forward 
(the proposal had apparently been made to the Turks in May 
2008). Nami said that education was a "communal matter" and, 
consequently, the G/C approach was "totally unhelpful." If 
the Greek Cypriots really wanted to show goodwill, Nami said 
he would support a proposal to create a bicommunal committee 
to accredit all universities on the island, not just Turkish 
Cypriot institutions. He also said that the Greek Cypriots 
should find a mechanism under which Turkish Cypriot 
universities could participate in the Bologna process*"not a 
legal impossibility", he argued. 
 
----------------- 
"Straw Rule Back" 
------------------ 
¶9. (C) Nami claimed that the "Straw Rule," a holdover 
Papadopoulos-era G/C practice that forbid high-level foreign 
guests (senior ministers) from meeting with senior RoC 
leaders should they also call on Talat at his "Presidential 
Palace," was back in force. He alleged that the Australian FM 
was being threatened with no high-level G/C meetings should 
he see Talat.  Consequently, instead of the T/C leader, the 
Australians had invited Nami to a dinner with their visiting 
minister.  Nami was affronted by such behavior and would 
discuss his participation with Talat.  (Note: The Straw Rule, 
as applied under Papadopoulos, prevented foreign visitors 
from meeting the RoC president only, not other cabinet-level 
officials.  If what Nami said was true, the rule not only has 
re-appeared, but may be more restrictive.) 
 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  Nami,s tenacious insistence on political 
equality underscores a sine qua non for T/C participation in 
the entire process.  The T/Cs use the term political equality 
as shorthand for confirmation of their right to a continued 
long-term presence on the island as a distinct community with 
its own viable constituent state.  They cling to the hope 
that the G/Cs will be willing to enshrine such a distinction 
into a final agreement, but Nami indicated the T/Cs are now 
worried that the G/Cs may have reneged on this fundamental 
principle.  Meanwhile, talks resumed October 22 in a 
still-hopeful atmosphere, with Special Adviser Alexander 
Downer having left this round to be chaired by Special 
Representative Taye-Brook Zerihoun.  On October 21, 
Christofias rebuffed calls from his own hard-liners to pull 
out of the talks, insisting he would not bow to such 
pressure.  Hours after the October 22 meeting, Christofias 
flew to China for a multilateral meeting.  End comment 
Urbancic