VZCZCXRO7572
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2935/01 2770346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 030346Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0213
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN COE RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WORKING THE EU TO INFLUENCE THE U.S. 
 
REF: A. BRATISLAVA 418 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 2787 
     ¶C. ANKARA 1478 
     ¶D. MOSCOW 2843 
     ¶E. MOSCOW 2670 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On October 1, MFA European Cooperation 
Director Voronkov sketched a Russian strategy to improve 
relations with the U.S. by working through Europe.  Russia's 
"pragmatic cooperation" with German Chancellor Merkel, 
Spanish PM Zapatero, Italian PM Berlusconi, and the French 
leadership - all being hosted in Moscow this October - would 
help create a "healthier dialogue."  Russian experts 
underscore Moscow's success in packing its diplomatic 
calendar with a wide range of European consultations and PCA 
negotiations to undercut the notion of its diplomatic 
isolation.  As part of a Europe-oriented strategy, Russian 
officials continue to call for a new European security 
treaty, not premised on "scape-goating" Russia.  Moscow's 
confidence in its approach was reflected at PACE, where 
Russian officials reaffirmed their willingness to walk away 
from any institution not prepared to engage.  End summary. 
 
The European Route, Path to Normal Relations with the U.S? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In an October 1 meeting, MFA Director for General 
European Cooperation Vladimir Voronkov outlined Russia's 
strategy to re-engage with Europe, indirectly rebuilding 
relations with the U.S.  He considered it a good sign that 
the EU and Russia were able to hammer out an agreement over 
so sensitive a topic as the Georgia war.  Russia would 
continue to seek "pragmatic cooperation" with Europe and 
"because we have a good knowledge of U.S. ties with Europe 
... we hope we can develop a healthier dialogue with the 
U.S." through Europe.  Rejecting the notion that Russia was 
isolated in the wake of its recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, Voronkov pointed to the October 1 visit of Spanish 
PM Zapatero, the October 2 visit of German Chancellor Merkel, 
the upcoming visit of Italian PM Berlusconi, and the 
mid-October French intergovernmental consultations as part of 
an active European agenda. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Russian analysts underscore that Moscow has 
successfully used Europe's instinct to engage to minimize the 
perception of diplomatic isolation.  Not including meetings 
on the sidelines of UNGA, notable visits included: 
 
-9/22 Visit of FM Lavrov to Ireland to meet with FM Martin 
-9/20 Visit of French PM Fillon, including a meeting with PM 
Putin 
-9/15-17 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) meeting (Russia, 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Council of 
European Community) 
-9/15-16 Visit of DFM Titov to Slovakia to meet with FM Kubis 
and MFA State Secretary Strofova (Ref A) 
-9/12 Visit of FM Lavrov to meet FM Sikorskiy in Poland (Ref 
B) 
-9/10 Visit of Deputy Premier Sechin to Slovakia to meet PM 
Fico 
-9/9 Visit of Austrian FM Plassnik to meet with FM Lavrov 
-9/4 Visit of Italian FM Frattini to meet with FM Lavrov 
-9/2 Visit of Belgian FM de Gucht to meet with FM Lavrov 
-9/2 Visit of FM Lavrov to Turkey to meet with FM Babacan 
-9/1 Visit of Bundestag delegation to meet with DFM Karasin 
-8/15 Visit of German Chancellor Merkel to Sochi to meet with 
President Medvedev 
-8/13 Visit of PM Erdogan and FM Babacan to Moscow to meet 
with President Medvedev, PM Putin, and FM Lavrov (Ref C) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Additional upcoming visits include an October 28 
Ministerial meeting of the Northern Dimension Partnership in 
St. Petersburg (participants:  Russia, EU, Iceland, Norway); 
the October 22-23 visit of Latvian FM Riekstin; and a 
tentative visit by Medvedev to Paris.  Some of these visits 
were efforts to reinvigorate languishing bilateral and 
multilateral dialogues: the Northern Dimension Partnership 
has not met since 2006 and the Slovakian-Russian 
intergovernmental dialogue has idled since 2004. 
 
EU-Russia PCA Negotiations 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Voronkov painted an equally upbeat picture of 
Russian-EU relations, commenting that PCA negotiations were 
proceeding on pace:  the Permanent Council's meeting on 
energy cooperation will take place in Paris on October 8, a 
meeting on judicial issues will take place on October 15, and 
a ministerial meeting will take place on October 18 in St. 
Petersburg to discuss the PCA framework.  While acknowledging 
 
MOSCOW 00002935  002 OF 002 
 
 
a conflict remained between Russia and newer EU member 
states, he stated that it was the role of the EU to address 
these concerns and present a united position.  Further, "the 
economic crisis may reduce these states' concerns in favor of 
cooperation."  While Voronkov did not discuss the EU's and 
President Sarkozy's threat to end PCA negotiations if Russian 
forces failed to withdraw from Georgia, the expectation - 
reinforced by Medvedev on October 1 - is that Russian forces 
will withdraw from Georgia proper on schedule by October 10. 
 
Locked in the "Legacy of the Cold War" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) As part of its European-oriented strategy, Medvedev, 
Putin, and Lavrov continued to call for a European security 
treaty to redress the balance of Cold war institutions.  When 
asked to explain the Russian concept, Voronkov called it a 
"new philosophy" in relations with the U.S. and Europe.  As 
FM Lavrov had outlined it, "there was a need to look at and 
set a new rules-based organization, based on the Helsinki 
final acts."  Voronkov conceded that Russia did not have a 
concrete proposal, arguing that initial discussions should be 
open-ended to solicit a range of new points on how to reflect 
institutionally the post-Cold War order.  He reiterated that 
the Russian concept was for a transatlantic agreement to 
supplement, but not eliminate NATO, and repeated Lavrov's 
call for a Helsinki-2 process.  He assessed that the present 
systems in Europe provided room for diplomats to talk but 
provided no space for "local peoples" and analysts.  He 
welcomed a Finnish proposal to include points of common 
understanding and points of contradiction in future OSCE 
declarations, as it allowed for a clear understanding of 
implications and problems "from the beginning of the 
negotiating process." 
 
¶7. (C) According to Voronkov, driving this initiative was a 
Russian view that the existing institutions in Europe were a 
legacy of the Cold War, where "Russia was the scapegoat and 
blamed for everything."  The Russian "people will not take it 
anymore."  Comparing the situation to an apartment that had 
not changed in twenty years, he said that the situation 
needed a fresh look that was not held hostage to old 
thinking.  "We cannot slow integration," despite voices in 
Russia and the U.S. that call for isolation. 
 
PACE an Uncomfortable Venue 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Russian confidence in its European approach was 
reflected at PACE.  While positive on long-term cooperation 
with Europe, Voronkov was less sanguine about the PACE 
discussions in Strasbourg.  He expressed Russia's wish that 
the deliberations would be constructive and take into 
consideration Russia's concerns and right to speak, but "the 
only truth in the language (before PACE) is the statement 
that Georgia launched an attack in the middle of the night on 
Tskhinvali."  If Russia's interests were not fairly 
considered, he underlined that the response by the Russian 
leadership would be strong and could include the removal of 
the delegation.  Voronkov said that it was not good for 
either side to not cooperate on this issue, and he noted that 
the PACE was "the only place" continuing to use harsh 
language against Russia.  The task, as he saw it, was for 
Russia to build "a better understanding" within PACE.  In a 
discussion with Ambassador Beyrle September 26, Duma 
International Affairs Committee chair (and PACE 
vice-president) Konstantin Kosachev confidently predicted 
that while some of the interventions would be sharp, PACE 
would not strip Russia of its voting rights. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) As seen from here, Russia has been adept in exploiting 
European fears over estranging Moscow to fill a diplomatic 
dance card with Western partners that seems to undermine the 
portryal of Russian isolation post-Georgia.  Europe has not 
been alone, with Asian partners - including South Korea, 
China, and Vietnam - also weighing in with senior level 
visitors.  That Germany and France have scaled back the scope 
of their annual intergovernmental commissions has been 
obscured by the fact of the sessions themselves. 
BEYRLE