VZCZCXRO3756
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLO #2691/01 2981814
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241814Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0200
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 002691 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 
TAGS: KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL IS IA IR LE UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: SAFAVI CLAIMS KHAMENEI WILL HOLD HARD LINE, 
BUT U.S. ELECTION RESULTS MAY GENERATE INTERNAL NUCLEAR 
DEBATE 
 
REF: A. 07 LONDON 3923 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. EMBLONDON (GAYLE) E-MAIL 4/23/08 TO NEA/IR 
        (WOOSTER) 
     ¶C. LONDON 2169 AND 07 LONDON 3700 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Senior Iranian cleric and IRGC figure 
Salman Safavi told a private dinner, attended by Embassy 
London Iran watcher (Poloff), that Supreme Leader Khamenei 
will ease or harden the tone of Iran's nuclear policies based 
on who wins the U.S. presidential election.  Safavi gave no 
specific indication any U.S. election outcome or political 
gesture would prompt Iran to abandon its current nuclear 
program or objectives.  Safavi appeared to suggest the Tehran 
regime is ready to engage in contacts with the United States, 
but provided no details of how such contact might occur or 
what specific outcomes or negotiating objectives might be. 
Nor did Safavi seek any private one-on-one contact with 
Poloff, as he had during previous encounters. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary con't.  In broadly surveying Iran's current 
politics, Safavi argued Iran's key political divide is 
between "reformist conservatives" and "IRGC leadership," and 
that "Khatami reformists," though they may put up candidates 
in national elections, have been marginalized.  Safavi 
claimed that Iran would be open to general outreach by the 
U.S. and would approve a USG request to open a diplomatic 
interests section in Tehran.  Safavi was openly critical of 
Ahmedinejad, though he cited few specifics. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Summary con't.  In three additional meetings 
Poloff had September 17, 25, and 29 with two non-Iranian UK 
intermediaries who see Safavi frequently, the intermediaries 
passed on to Poloff additional comments by Safavi on 
political conditions in both Iran and Israel.   End summary 
 
Venue 
----- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ayatollah Syed Salman Safavi, brother of ex-IRGC 
commander Rahim Safavi, as he had done previously (ref A), 
attended a small private dinner, held in early September and 
hosted by Next Century Foundation, an NGO well known to 
Safavi and to Embassy.  Safavi sketched for a small group of 
London-based diplomats and academics Iran's current internal 
politics, with special emphasis on the nuclear issue.  Unlike 
two earlier NCF events at which he had met privately with 
Poloff, in 2007 and 2008 (ref c), Safavi did not seek 
one-on-one contact with Poloff.  Safavi, however, remained in 
London for some time; Poloff continued until late September 
to receive, via a mutual acquaintance, limited additional 
private comments from Safavi on Iran's politics; Safavi 
returned to Iran in early October. 
 
Claims New Alignment of 
Iranian Factions 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) At the August dinner session Safavi discussed in 
detail his view of the impact the U.S. presidential election 
results will have on Iranian internal politics.  For general 
context, and without labeling key individuals, Safavi said 
the organization of Iran's political factions has shifted, 
from a "reformists versus hard-liners" axis, to a political 
scene dominated by the rivalry of "reformist hard-liners" 
versus "IRGC leadership."  Safavi argued the "reformists," 
who formerly provided the main critique of government 
policies and officials, have, even though they continue to 
receive attention in Iran and abroad, been marginalized as 
leading determinants of Iranian policy and national 
direction.  In addressing the Western group, however, Safavi 
somewhat inconsistently later (para 10 below) reverted in his 
terminology to a discussion of "conservatives" versus 
"reformists." 
 
Interests Section:  Ask Us 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) On the question of a U.S. interests section, Safavi 
said the present regime would approve such a step if there 
were a USG request; he did not appear to qualify his 
statement. 
 
Effect of U.S. Election Results on 
Regime Planning 
---------------------------------- 
 
LONDON 00002691  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Safavi, in response to an audience question he 
appeared to have been waiting for, said that the results of 
the U.S. presidential election November 4 would impact 
Iranian regime election planning: he claimed that, in the 
event of a Republican Party win, regime planners would become 
"more conservative .... everything for us will be 
simplified."   He stated that a Democratic Party win would 
"create difficulties," as "different parts of the system will 
debate (their) roles and responsibilities." 
 
Ahmedinejad's Nuclear Role: 
Bully Pulpit Matters 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Safavi said the Supreme Leader had in early 2008 
"given (Ahmedinejad) the nuclear issue," to the extent that 
the President now has, according to Safavi, the rhetorical 
lead on nuclear issues, but no authority over Iran's nuclear 
strategies.  Safavi commented, however, that even mere 
rhetorical leadership, in Ahmedinejad's hands, "in practice 
affects the power structure" on nuclear matters. 
 
Claims Iran Ready to Engage 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) As evidence of what he called Iran's broad 
willingness to engage the United States Safavi pointed to the 
appointment of an American university professor as an advisor 
to Ahmedinejad, to the travel of "some" visitors to the 
United States, to Iran's "readiness to talk to the United 
States" in the P5 1 context, and to Iran's readiness to 
receive U.S. Congressional visitors .  He also argued the 
existence of sanctions "discredit" those (within Iran) who 
advocate openings to the West. 
 
Nuclear File: Some Say Not Closed 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  At a later point in his remarks, Safavi said the 
regime's official line is that the nuclear file is closed, 
but he then very pointedly stated that "other parts of the 
government think the issue is still open," and stated there 
is "very strong debate" internally over Iran's current 
nuclear posture.  At yet another point referring to P5 1 
requirement that Iran suspend enrichment preliminary to 
general political engagement, Safavi stated that if an 
"American" offer is made of "unconditional" engagement, the 
"taboo on talking with America" will be broken and "anything 
is possible." 
 
¶11. (C) Safavi claimed he had a "good understanding" of the 
American political system and of how a U.S. President can be 
constrained by the system and by circumstance.  He argued, 
however, that "a black man as President" would represent 
(according to Safavi) a new and important "capacity to 
change" by the U.S. political system and that am Obama 
administration "opening" to Iran would in itself create 
change.  He then went on, smiling briefly, to state 
"diplomacy is business; you give something, you get 
something." 
 
Khatami, Qalibaf, and Ahmedinejad 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Asked about "reformist" political plans, Safavi 
opined that if Khatami stands for president Qalibaf will not 
stand, due to what Safavi said was the likelihood the two, if 
they both ran, would split the reformist vote.  (Comment: it 
is interesting Safavi argues that the political appeal of 
IRGC veteran Qalibaf, whom some western analysts classify as 
practical but conservative, lies with reformist-oriented 
voters.  End comment).  Safavi, using the terminology he had 
previously disparaged, predicted that if Khatami does not 
stand there will be multiple "conservative" and "reformist" 
candidates, resulting in a fractured vote and an Ahmedinejad 
win. 
 
June 2009 Election: No Changes to 
Iran's International Hard Line 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Safavi stated that regardless of the result of Iran's 
June 2009 presidential election, there will be "no big 
changes" in "Iran's international policies."  Safavi stated 
"all the alternatives (candidates for 2009) have a "security 
background" and therefore "have security as a priority -- we 
will apply our historical experience of (the last) 30 years" 
 
LONDON 00002691  003 OF 004 
 
 
in setting Iran's national priorities.  He stated that the 
sixth Majles (the so-called "reform Majles" of Khatami's 
presidency) "neglected the security of the country," and 
intimated its "errors" would not be repeated.  He later 
referred to Iran's electoral practices of intensive screening 
of candidates (for Islamic and political orthodoxy) and 
characterized the current Majles as an "appointed" body, 
rather than an elected one. 
 
Relations with U.S.for Khamenei 
Overshadow Nuclear Differences 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Responding to Poloff's question on sanctions, Safavi 
said the Supreme Leader's 2007 blessing of bilateral talks 
with the U.S. on Iraq security had been a major signal but 
that the talks "did not go well;" this purported "failure" 
plus the further "extension of sanctions" discredited  in 
Khamenei's eyes, according to Safavi, the idea of opening to 
the U.S. to some extent.  Safavi said that for the Supreme 
Leader the "America file is more important than the nuclear 
file." 
 
Hezbollah: Hard to Control 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) In response to an audience question on Hezbollah, 
Safavi claimed "we have tried to persuade (Hezbollah)" not to 
attack civilians inside Israel. 
 
U.S. Visit, Israeli hostages 
---------------------------- 
 
¶16. (S/NF) In follow-up meetings Poloff held separately, in 
September and October with two regular UK citizen contacts 
(ref b) already known to both Safavi and Poloff, these mutual 
acquaintances separately passed on to Poloff additional 
fragmentary comments from Safavi: 
 
-- Safavi feels "beleaguered" by internal political rivalries 
and tension in Tehran.  The UK intermediary commented that 
Safavi is now far more reluctant than he has been in the past 
to discuss with the intermediary specific current cases of 
hostage-taking by Iranian clients of Israeli citizens.  He 
said Safavi had said Livni's coming to power in Tel Aviv 
could create a "new opening" to discuss such cases. 
 
-- Safavi reportedly said there is an over-arching 
uncertainty in Tehran about the future and a "high level of 
fear" over what the international scene may hold in store for 
Iran.  Safavi was reportedly non-specific, but the source 
commented that in his decade-plus friendship with Safavi he 
had never seen Safavi so obviously worried and tense. 
 
-- Safavi reportedly would like at some point to visit the 
United States and brief key, non-official Washington figures 
(preferably think-tanks) on "who is who" in Tehran, as Safavi 
feels there is a poor understanding within the USG of 
Tehran's internal dynamics. 
 
¶17. (S/NF) One intermediary told Poloff he is confident 
Safavi had within the last several years had contact with 
Israeli diplomats in London, but that such contacts may have 
been discontinued due to the possible risks (from Tehran 
authorities) to  Safavi and his family (part of which is 
UK-based). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶18.  (C/NF) Safavi, although he has a commanding presence, 
appeared to be working very hard at the NCF event to maintain 
his composure and affability and to make himself understood. 
He seemed very tired, perhaps as the result of workload 
and/or sustained tension.  His English, while accurate, was 
noticeably more labored than in the past -- at the time of 
the NCF dinner it had probably been many months since Safavi 
had been in an English-speaking environment. 
 
¶19.  (C) Whether or not Safavi's version of events and trends 
in Tehran is accurate, Safavi is unlikely to have appeared at 
the London NGO event without authorization from his brother 
(ex-IRGC Commander Rehman Safavi, now military advisor to the 
Supreme Leader) and perhaps from other senior IRI figures as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
LONDON 00002691  004 OF 004 
 
 
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