VZCZCXRO5876
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1125/01 2751010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011010Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8554
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 5174
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HANOI 001125 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PM ASSISTANT SECRETARY KIMMITT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARK KIMMITT AND THE 
U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S.-VIETNAM DEFENSE DIALOGUE 
 
HANOI 00001125  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Hanoi looks forward to welcoming you to Vietnam. 
Your visit for the first-ever U.S.-Vietnam defense dialogue will be 
an important milestone in the growing U.S.-Vietnam relationship and 
will highlight a broad area of bilateral defense and security 
cooperation that has now begun to gather momentum in the wake of 
Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung's June visit to Washington. The 
U.S.-Vietnam bilateral relationship continues to broaden and mature, 
in the process spurring economic, social and technological 
development that has eased the path for a limited expansion of 
personal freedom for the people of Vietnam.  Vietnam's economic 
successes have translated into greater international clout, 
reflected in its current seat as a non-permanent member of the U.N. 
Security Council.  GVN leaders understand that the United States 
plays a direct role in creating the conditions for their nation's 
success and are committed to advancing the bilateral relationship. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Our strengthening relations are also due to Vietnam's 
realization that the United States is an important force in 
maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even "small" 
countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and freedom of 
action.  As such, Vietnam's leaders speak positively and 
optimistically about the future of U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences 
over human rights remain, however, and lingering fears that the 
United States supports the overthrow of the current regime continue 
to complicate the relationship.  China also looms as a factor 
coloring Hanoi's reactions to our proposals in the security realm. 
The Ministry of Defense is one of the ministries most suspicious of 
the United States and of our deepening bilateral ties. 
 
Defense and Security Talks 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The first-ever U.S.-Vietnam Defense and Security Talks (the 
GVN is still hesitating on the official name for the talks) will be 
a milestone in our defense relationship with the GVN.  The GVN side 
will likely be led by Vice Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh.  The GVN 
agreed to the U.S.-proposed agenda items, but we expect them to 
raise additional items the day of the talks.  At the working level, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacts have highlighted the complexity 
of getting interagency agreement on issues and positions between 
themselves, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Public 
Security.  The talks offer an opportunity to emphasize the 
importance of interagency cooperation on a range of defense and 
security issues, as well as to make progress on the specific agenda 
items.  Although not yet confirmed, we expect an opportunity for a 
joint press availability following the close of the talks. 
 
Gradual Progress in Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Defense relations have advanced at a measured pace, but 
reflect the overall positive shift in the relationship.  We conduct 
professional military exchanges with the People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) in a limited but growing range of areas including military 
law, military nursing, public affairs, search and rescue, 
meteorological/ oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster 
preparedness.  PAVN officers have been invited as observers to Cobra 
Gold for the past four years and routinely attend U.S. Pacific 
Command-sponsored multilateral conferences.  Since 1997, over sixty 
GVN officials, including more than thirty PAVN officers, have 
attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS).  PAVN also now sends observers to the 
annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port visits to 
Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18, 2007 visit by two 
mine countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and the USS Patriot, at 
Haiphong port.  In June, Vietnam participated in the Pacific 
Partnership mission of the USNS Mercy.  In 2005, Vietnam agreed to 
participate in the International Military Education and Training 
Program (IMET).  In 2007, we accelerated the pace of IMET and 
provided a language laboratory in Hanoi using IMET funds.  In FY08, 
IMET expanded mil-mil contacts through a U.S. mobile training team 
visit for military medical techniques training.  The GVN also 
continues to send well-qualified candidates to English language 
training and English language instructor training to the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI).  Reaching our full potential for closer 
cooperation in defense activities, including multilateral 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance efforts and attendance at U.S. 
military schools, is attainable, but will require persistence and 
patience. 
 
HANOI 00001125  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) One operational issue affecting our ability to charge ahead 
with mil-mil programs is the GVN's refusal to grant a visa to our 
incoming Defense Attache, Colonel Patrick Reardon.  In June, the GVN 
acknowledged Colonel Reardon's renunciation of his Vietnamese 
citizenship, but ongoing debate between and within the Ministries of 
Defense, Public Security and Foreign Affairs appear to have stymied 
issuance of his visa or accreditation despite multiple high level 
entreaties from the Embassy. 
 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In recent years, the GVN has expressed increasing interest 
in involvement in peacekeeping missions, especially those organized 
under UN auspices.  Vietnam's current seat on the UN Security 
Council has given significant impetus to such increased 
international engagement.  Nonetheless, in order to fully engage in 
future peacekeeping operations the GVN will have to do much more to 
meet significant challenges: the lack of interoperability, the 
paucity of English language speakers in the military, and 
complications due to funding issues.  Their participation in the 
Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) is an important 
step in this direction. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Joint Statement from PM Dung's June visit to Washington 
highlights Vietnam's agreement to participate in GPOI, through 
training courses and other peacekeeping operations activities.  The 
next step is crafting a 'country plan' for Vietnam.  This will 
involve a "Program Design & Development Visit" to Hanoi by a team 
from PACOM and the Center on Civil-Military Relations at the Naval 
Post-Graduate School.  In discussions with MOD and MFA officials and 
the Embassy, the team will craft a GPOI training plan tailored to 
Vietnam's current capabilities and priorities.  PACOM elaborated on 
this at the mil-mil Bilateral Defense Dialogue (BDD) in September, 
but did not secure agreement from the GVN to accept the planning 
team.  Highlighting a visit from the planning team as the next step 
in the GVN's participation in GPOI and securing GVN agreement to 
accept and work with the team would be an important outcome of the 
defense talks. 
 
Impacts of Remaining UXO 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) In your meetings, you are likely to hear references to 
"consequences of war" or "legacies of war" issues.  This is the 
catch-all term that the GVN applies to a myriad of problems, 
including Agent Orange(AO)/Dioxin contamination, unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and land mines from the war era, and the incomplete recovery 
of missing Vietnamese military personnel. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Since 1989, USAID, through support from the Patrick J. 
Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF) and other sources, has provided over 
USD 43 million to support NGOs and private voluntary organizations 
to develop comprehensive programs for people with disabilities.  In 
addition, since 1993 the USG has been actively involved in assisting 
the people of Vietnam in overcoming the social and economic impacts 
of remaining UXO from the war.  Vietnam was formally accepted as the 
37th participant in the U.S. Humanitarian De-mining Program in June 
2000, and the USG is now the largest donor of humanitarian 
assistance for mine action programs in Vietnam.  The USG has 
invested over USD 37 million in a broad spectrum of programs not 
only to locate, remove and destroy unexploded ordnance and 
landmines, but also to address the UXO effects on health and 
livelihood of Vietnamese living in affected areas. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Today, various NGOs conduct UXO and land mine clearance, 
risk education and victim rehabilitation. The USG has also donated a 
significant quantity of equipment to the PAVN to assist efforts in 
UXO and landmine clearance and return land to productive use.  In 
2006, the State Department provided USD 3.5 million to support UXO 
action and demining activities in Vietnam, almost a third of which 
went directly to PAVN in the form of donated demining equipment.  In 
FY08, an additional USD 2.5 million will be provided to underwrite 
mine action related activities in Vietnam.  For FY08, Congress 
directed that approximately $2.5 million be spent on demining 
programs, a substantial increase from the $800,000 requested by the 
Administration. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Your visit follows a very successful visit by Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Stephen Ganyard in September to Hanoi and 
several sites in central Vietnam.  Looking ahead, we have encouraged 
Vietnam to work with us to develop a national strategy to address 
the complex and challenging problems associated with Explosive 
Remnants of War (ERW).  A national-level strategic framework is 
essential both to maximize the impact of limited resources on the 
 
HANOI 00001125  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
ground today, and to facilitate the growth of Vietnam's own planning 
and management capacity in the future.  Encouraging Vietnam's 
commitment to a systematic, national approach will ultimately make 
Vietnam's own mine action efforts more effective, a valuable 
achievement that will make Vietnam more competitive in the 
competition for increasingly scarce humanitarian assistance from 
global donors. 
 
Agent Orange/Dioxin 
------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While debate continues over the human impact of AO, recent 
studies reveal that dioxin contamination is concentrated in 
approximately 20 "hotspots," mostly former U.S. bases where AO was 
stored.  Areas subjected to heavy aerial spraying do not currently 
have soil concentrations considered hazardous.  Our engagement on 
this issue has accomplished much, in both transforming the tone of 
the dialogue and capacity building.  Projects have included work at 
the Danang airport as well as a USD 3 million Congressional 
appropriation for "dioxin mitigation and health activities," which 
USAID has begun to implement.  The USG is continuing to work 
together with the GVN, UNDP, Ford Foundation and other NGOs to 
discuss the next steps in the environmental remediation of three 
priority hotspots in Danang, Hoa Binh and Phu Cat airfields.  We 
have made significant progress in addressing constructively what 
remains an emotional issue for many Vietnamese who believe dioxin is 
responsible for most of the birth defects in Vietnam; this was seen 
most recently in the positive press coverage of the September 
meeting of the bilateral Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) on Agent 
Orange/Dioxin in Hanoi. 
 
Fullest Possible Accounting 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Predating the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and 
normal defense contacts, U.S. military and DoD elements continue 
their efforts toward the fullest possible accounting of Americans 
missing from the Vietnam Conflict.  Since 1988, the Joint POW/MIA 
Accounting Command (JPAC), a USPACOM subordinate element, has 
evolved to include forward Detachments in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Thailand/Cambodia.  With its Vietnam Detachment (Det 2), it has 
completed 90 92 Joint Field Activities (JFA), which incorporated 
extensive research, interviews, analysis, and excavations in order 
to accomplish its mission.  Ultimately, JPAC's efforts in Southeast 
Asia have resulted in accounting for 880 899 Americans previously 
listed as MIA; 1766 1757 remain missing throughout Southeast Asia. 
 
¶15. (SBU) From its inception, Det 2 forged good relations with its 
GVN counterparts.  In December 2006, the GVN gave approval for the 
use of U.S. naval vessels to operate within their territorial waters 
in order to enhance JPAC's underwater investigations towards the 
identification of potential recovery sites.  Coordination to 
complete the regulatory procedures for the use of such a vessel is 
in progress, and JPAC hopes to implement this new search platform in 
the coming fiscal year.  However, JPAC continues to seek GVN 
permission to conduct JFAs unrestricted search operations in the 
Central Highlands - a politically sensitive region of the country. 
While understanding the GVN's hesitancy regarding such access, 
reinforcing the message that JPAC's mission is not political and 
that such access is critical to putting this legacy issue behind us 
would be useful for the GVN to hear from you. 
 
Counterterrorism 
---------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Vietnam says the right things about the threat of global 
terrorism and has participated with us in modest cooperative 
activities.  During President Bush's visit in 2006, the President 
and his Vietnamese counterpart pledged to increase cooperation to 
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
technology and materials in accordance with international and 
national laws and each country's capacities.  The United States 
provides counterterrorism assistance to Vietnam by funding 
Vietnamese participation in counterterrorism-related training at the 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and through 
military-to-military exchanges with an emphasis on counterterrorism 
themes.  Vietnam has signed eight out of thirteen UN terrorism 
conventions.  Approval of the remaining five is winding its way 
through the cumbersome GVN bureaucracy, the delay explained in part 
by GVN concern with its capacity to carry out obligations under the 
conventions.  Two of the remaining conventions are reportedly in the 
final stages of GVN approval, while the status of the other three 
remains unclear. 
 
Expanding U.S. Naval Ship Visits 
-------------------------------- 
 
HANOI 00001125  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) While we have regularized our SOP for regular ship visits 
over recent years, the GVN has remained firm in limiting the 
frequency of port visits by U.S. Navy vessels to one a year.  This 
restriction is frequently cited as being consistent with GVN laws 
that regulate visits by foreign warships; however, some other 
nations conduct more frequent port visits.  While it may be 
unproductive to demand more frequent port calls, we still seek to 
persuade the GVN to permit more frequent access for limited, 
technical calls (i.e., for refueling and replenishment).  This would 
support our overall goal of increasing routine access for U.S. naval 
vessels at Vietnam's ports, while not escalating the pace of 
military contacts beyond a level that is comfortable for the GVN. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Similarly, we hope to reverse the PAVN leadership's 
reluctance to participate in distinguished visitor fly-outs to U.S. 
Navy vessels transiting the South China Sea.  To date, these have 
been rebuffed due to concerns over the "appearance of Vietnam's 
participation in joint exercises with the United States."  This, 
clearly, is code for limiting advances in the relationship to a pace 
that does not discomfort the Chinese. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Since 1995, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) programs have provided aid in legal reform, governance, 
economic growth, HIV/AIDS, environmental protection and disaster 
prevention.  For FY 2007, total U.S. assistance from all agencies 
was about USD 86.6 million, most of which has gone towards providing 
health-related assistance, notably in the area of HIV/AIDS treatment 
and prevention.  Vietnam is one of fifteen countries in the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), with USD 65 
million provided in 2007 to expand integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, 
care and treatment programs.  This figure includes approximately USD 
3.1 million dollars for the Department of Defense (DOD)-managed 
portion of PEPFAR HIV/AIDS programs with Vietnam's Ministry of 
Defense. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Since 2000, DOD has supported a wide variety of Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDCA) projects in Vietnam. 
Through USPACOM, the U.S. Government has sponsored the construction 
of eight medical clinics in Thua Thien-Hue Province, a primary 
school in Quang Binh Province, and two centers for disabled children 
in Quang Binh Province.  Two additional humanitarian assistance 
construction projects were completed in the summer of 2007 and 
turned over to local authorities in Central Vietnam: a medical 
clinic in Quang Binh Province, and a 10-room primary school in Quang 
Tri Province.  Additionally, USPACOM has facilitated multiple 
donations of excess medical property to various medical facilities 
throughout Vietnam. 
 
A Word on the Economy 
--------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) After a decade of isolation and failed economic policies, 
Vietnam is determined to catch up with the Asian tigers.  Vietnam's 
"doi moi" (renovation) program of economic reform, begun in 1986, 
has set the country on a successful market economy path, with an 
average growth rate of 7.5 percent over the past decade.  The GVN 
focuses on exports and foreign direct investment in its drive to 
achieve middle-income status by 2010.  The United States is 
currently Vietnam's largest export market and third largest overall 
trade partner.  U.S. investors tell us the key challenges they face 
in Vietnam are underdeveloped infrastructure, a shortage of skilled 
workers and managers, and the considerable level of state 
participation in the economy.  For its part, the GVN is grappling 
with issues of corruption, improving the legal environment, and 
implementing its WTO commitments.  Vietnam's current turmoil is 
rooted in high inflation (27.9 percent year-on-year September), the 
large current account deficit, and inefficient allocation of 
resources, which is particularly obvious in the disproportionate 
amount of state resources devoted to powerful State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). 
 
Human Rights Challenges 
----------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Serious deficiencies related to human rights in Vietnam 
include lack of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of the press.  One of our key objectives is to end the use of 
catch-all "national security" provisions for the prosecution of 
peaceful dissent.  We continue to call for the release of all 
prisoners of conscience, but where we see individuals expressing 
their political opinions, many of our government interlocutors see 
"lawbreakers" trying to destabilize the regime.  The recent arrests 
 
HANOI 00001125  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
and sackings of Vietnamese reporters and editors in the wake of a 
corruption scandal reveal the on-going battle within the GVN over 
the role of freedom of the press.  The continued existence of groups 
in the United States that advocate regime change complicates human 
rights engagement by providing ammunition to hard-liners who want to 
stoke the fading paranoia that we are indeed still "the enemy." 
Reassuring the GVN that the USG does not support separatist groups 
can assist in building a better human rights dialogue based on 
mutual trust. 
 
The China Factor 
---------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) While Vietnam's engagement with the United States will 
continue to broaden, China necessarily constitutes Vietnam's most 
important strategic preoccupation.  This is not to say that Vietnam 
is "choosing" China over the United States; Vietnam's leadership is 
sophisticated enough to realize that relations with China and the 
United States do not represent a zero sum game; it is possible to 
have good relations with both.  Each relationship also creates 
challenges, however.  While China constitutes a vital and necessary 
commercial partner and former ally, it is also perceived as a 
significant and frustrating constraint to Vietnam's freedom on 
action. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Chinese bullying of foreign companies in an attempt to 
compel them to cease oil and gas exploration efforts in the South 
China Sea serves to remind Vietnamese officials that while the 
Vietnamese may not approve of all U.S. policies, the same is 
certainly true of Chinese actions.  While progress has been made in 
settling the land border, there is no commonality of views on 
sovereignty issues regarding the South China Sea, known as the "East 
Sea" to the Vietnamese.  Hanoi is also "riding the tiger" with 
regard to managing the deep negative views toward China of many 
Vietnamese.  China is widely disliked and distrusted as a former 
colonial master, and Beijing's actions in the Spratlys and Paracels 
threaten to inflame those passions.  Should Hanoi allow 
unconstrained protests against the Chinese, however, it would appear 
weak in the face of calls to action that it could not satisfy, as 
well as risking Beijing's anger. 
 
Future Prospects 
---------------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) The GVN recognizes the strategic importance of the United 
States in the region and the world, but is not shy about criticizing 
U.S. actions it perceives as outside the multilateral system.  The 
GVN routinely chafes over U.S. criticism of Vietnam's record of 
human rights and religious freedom.  Nonetheless, Vietnam's leaders 
are also pragmatic and recognize that Vietnam's own continued 
economic well-being, growth and security are, in large measure, 
inexorably tied to its relationship with the United States. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Vietnam has begun to explore opportunities within regional 
organizations to increase joint efforts against terrorism, 
narcotics, maritime piracy and other issues of shared concern. 
Vietnam has also recently begun joint sea patrols with other 
neighbors in the Gulf of Thailand and has established hotlines to 
help facilitate coordination along sea boundaries.  Nevertheless, 
for historic and foreign policy reasons, the GVN is generally 
reluctant to speak out against its "traditional friends" such as 
North Korea and Iran when they engage in behavior that the rest of 
the international community condemns. 
 
What You Can Expect 
-------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) You can expect your interlocutors not only to be 
articulate and well informed, but also to speak in terms generally 
supportive of growth in the bilateral relationship.  As noted above, 
lingering suspicions still exist among conservatives in leadership 
about the development of closer ties with the United States, but the 
overall tenor is one of support and interest at a measured pace that 
will not upset the GVN's calibrated attempts to maintain balance 
among its other regional partners.  The defense talks will continue 
to help translate those good feelings into measurable 
accomplishments in the defense and security relationship. 
 
¶28. (SBU) We look forward to your visit and stand ready to do 
everything we can to make your time in Vietnam as productive as 
possible. 
 
MICHALAK