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Viewing cable 08DILI251, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TIMOR-LESTE (SEPQ)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DILI251 2008-10-01 10:21 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO5886
PP RUEHDT
DE RUEHDT #0251/01 2751021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 011021Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4101
INFO RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3580
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DS/DSS/IP AND DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/1/2018 
TAGS: ASEC TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TIMOR-LESTE (SEPQ) 
FOR FALL 2008 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. 
Embassy Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. 
Embassy Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
------------------- 
 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
------------------- 
 
1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY 
CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS? 
 
No 
 
B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY 
WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
No 
 
C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
Demonstrators at times pass the US embassy en route between 
locations, but no demos have taken place in the areas around 
diplomatic facilities. 
 
D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION? 
 
N/A 
 
E. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC 
ISSUES? 
 
N/A 
 
F. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 
 
Anti-government demonstrations in April 2006 turned into riots. 
Both anti- and pro- government demonstrations that took place in 
June 2006 were basically peaceful, but were accompanied by 
increased security concerns and some incidents throughout the 
city, although not at the site of the demonstrations. In some 
demonstrations in 2007, violence was directed against 
demonstrators. In one incident, a demonstrator traveling to Dili 
from Liquica was struck by a rock thrown at him at the airport 
roundabout. He subsequently fell out of the vehicle he was in 
and was run over by another vehicle.  Demonstrators were also 
been attacked when returning from Dili back to the eastern 
districts. Such events have occurred in both Metinaro and 
Manatuto. 
 
G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG 
PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? 
 
In 2007 several USG vehicles were were damaged by rocks thrown 
by youth during episodes of political violence. There is no 
evidence that USG vehicles or personnel are being targeted.  In 
these cases, the drivers unintentionally found themselves at the 
disturbances in which rival gangs were throwing stones at each 
other and randomly at passing vehicles. 
 
H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR 
PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? 
 
No. 
 
I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY 
WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
Anti-government unrest followed the announcement of the new 
government in August 2007. This was not been in the form of 
demonstrations per se, but hostile groups burning buildings, 
throwing stones at vehicles, etc. 
 
J. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
DILI 00000251  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
No 
 
K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION? 
 
The largest demonstrations against the government in 2006 were 
about 3-4,000.  Average demonstrations are much smaller, wth 500 
or fewer paticipants 
 
L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 
 
Generally peaceful.  In 2008, the few demonstrations that have 
led to and arrests were exceptional. 
 
M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG 
PROPERTY? 
 
See 5 G 
 
2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
 
A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE 
CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND 
VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS). 
 
No interstate conflict, with exception of occasional minor 
cross-border problems involving smuggling and localized 
disputes. The dissident military police commander implicated in 
May 2006 violence as well as seizing weapons from national 
police was killed during an attack on both the President and 
Prime Minister in February 2008.  His followers (numbering fewer 
than 20) are all now in custody. 
 
B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A 
SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? 
 
Issue mentioned in 6.A is generally not an active conflict and 
is localized in western districts. 
 
C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? 
 
No 
 
D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS 
SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION? 
 
No 
 
3. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
 
A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED? 
 
The National Police (PNTL) within the capital city disintegrated 
during the 2006 crisis and under the leadership of the UN is 
being gradually reconstituted. Most PNTL personnel are now back 
on the job, but working under UN Police Command. As a new force 
that has often been politicized they are still very much in 
development and cannot be described as fully trained and 
professionalized. Last year UNPOL granted the PNTL, independent 
authority in Dili. 
 
B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE 
ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. 
 
Training has been provided by ICITAP in the past and was well 
received. PNTL have also participated in FBI training and in 
courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in 
Bangkok.  PNTL have responded well to such training, but much 
more is needed. 
 
C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, 
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES? 
 
Localized and petty corruption is a common problem. There are 
unconfirmed reports of widespread corruption in the immigration 
department. 
 
D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF 
DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? 
 
No. Intelligence services are essentially non-operational.  The 
National Intelligence Service (SNI) is undergoing reorganization 
but faces a lack of qualified personnel. However, the 
occupation-era clandestine network which branches throughout 
society potentially has the ability of providing security and 
political institution leaders with intelligence on opposition 
operations. 
 
E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. 
 
 
DILI 00000251  003 OF 004 
 
 
EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? 
 
N/A 
 
F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN 
RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO 
SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? 
 
N/A - no significant terrorist threats 
 
G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND 
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE 
SECURITY? 
 
Yes 
 
H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR 
AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; 
GOOD/AVERAGE;POOR) 
 
Average, new security requirments imposed by the GOTL and UNPOL 
have been imposed with moderate success. 
 
I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? 
 
(EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE) 
 
Average to ineffective; see 3.C. 
 
J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; 
 
INEFFECTIVE) 
 
Average to ineffective; see 3.C. 
 
-------------------- 
 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
 
-------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN 
COUNTRY? 
 
No 
 
B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
NA 
 
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 
12 MONTHS? 
 
No 
 
D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? 
 
N/A 
 
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? 
 
No 
 
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR 
U.S.-RELATED TARGETS? 
 
No 
 
G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO 
THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE? 
 
N/A 
 
H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. 
 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS? 
 
NA 
 
5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI- 
AMERICAN)IN COUNTRY? 
 
No. 
 
B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS. 
 
N/A 
 
DILI 00000251  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS 
WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? 
 
N/A 
 
D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? 
 
N/A 
 
E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE 
ATTACKS? 
 
No 
 
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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
 
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6. (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS 
 
A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE 
IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES. 
 
No 
 
B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL 
CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL? 
 
N/A 
 
C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 
 
N/A 
 
D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN 
THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS? 
 
No 
 
E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT 
ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 
 
No 
 
F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET. 
AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI- AMERICAN TERRORIST 
ACTS? 
 
N/A.  None of the above countries have diplomatic representation 
in Timor-Leste and we are unaware of the presence of any other 
nationals from these countries. 
 
G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND 
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE 
TERRORIST ELEMENTS? 
 
Loose control of police weapons inventory within the country as 
well as porous borders mean that availability of weapons is 
likely. However, weapons assessed to be in country at this point 
include primarily those purchased for police or military use, 
but not sufficiently controlled, or left over from independence 
conflict. 
RECTOR