VZCZCXRO4533
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3296/01 2870734
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130734Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9913
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0039

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EINV ETRD IZ SE
SUBJECT: SWEDISH ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ INCREASING; SWEDISH 
TRADE MINISTER TO VISIT 
 
REF: (A) BAGHDAD 2174 (B) STOCKHOLM 482 (C) BAGHDAD 
     1852 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Sweden has made a large commitment to Iraq 
and intends to do more, particularly as it looks ahead to its 
July 2009 European Union (EU) Presidency.  In an October 8 
meeting, visiting Swedish Ambassador Niclas Trouve and 
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Deputy Director 
General Robert Rydberg told Ambassador Crocker and General 
Odierno that Swedish Trade Minister Bjorling planned to visit 
Iraq in about a month and Foreign Minister Bildt may come 
some time after.  Trouve sought the Ambassador's and 
Commanding General's (CG) assessments of Iraq's current 
political and security situation, and underlined Sweden's 
commitment to contribute to Iraq's future.  On the standing 
up of a permanent Swedish Embassy by spring 2009, Trouve said 
all is still on schedule but expressed concern about the 
imminent removal of immunities for private security 
contractors.  He delivered a letter from the Swedish MFA 
officially requesting and enumerating specific security 
assistance from the U.S., floated the idea that the U.S. 
should pay for alterations to the perimeter walls of the 
Swedish Embassy site as a solution to the issue of Wartsila 
generator convoys, and said that Sweden is still waiting for 
an answer to its July request for information on a Swedish 
detainee at Camp Cropper.  Trouve noted that he will travel 
to Washington and New York in December.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Swedish Engagement Influential and Appreciated 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (C)  Deputy Director General Rydberg began by underlining 
Sweden's significant investment in Iraq.  It hosted the May 
International Compact with Iraq (ICI) review conference and 
has begun construction on its new embassy in Baghdad, the 
biggest Swedish embassy project since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  Ambassador Crocker stressed that Sweden's engagement, 
and particularly that of Foreign Minister Bildt, has been 
enormously important in catalyzing wider European 
involvement.  The May ICI meeting sent a powerful signal 
throughout Europe.  Ambassador Crocker said that Foreign 
Minister Zebari has told him visits by the German, Italian 
and Slovakian Foreign Ministers are in process.  Rydberg 
noted that Swedish Trade Minister Bjorling is planning to 
visit Iraq next month.  Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt will 
come sometime after.  Ambassador Crocker encouraged Sweden to 
use the visit of Trade Minister Bjorling to press home the 
message that Iraq must take steps to improve its business 
climate.  Currently Iraq is rated 152nd in the world as a 
place to do business by the World Bank's 2009 "Doing 
Business" Report.  He recommended Bjorling engage Deputy 
Prime Minister Barham Saleh on this, given his key role both 
in Baghdad and in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on 
business matters. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Turning more broadly to the critical role Sweden can 
play in strengthening Iraq's international relations, 
Ambassador Crocker said that Sweden - as a neutral country 
that represents the values of the West - is in a tremendously 
influential position.  We are at an historic moment: since 
the 1958 revolution, Iraq has been a major source of regional 
and global instability.  Now, for the first time in 50 years, 
it has a government that is oriented toward the West.  The 
West must take advantage of this moment as there are 
countervailing forces that have other designs.  Sweden's 
voice has influence in the EU and at UN Headquarters. 
Ambassador Crocker also stressed the need for the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to step forward, 
a message he told Ambassador Trouve he has delivered in 
Washington.  The International Monetary Fund needs to staff 
an office here and the World Bank needs to expand its 
presence in order to build the lasting relationships that 
will be critical over the longer term. 
 
--------------------- 
Security and the SOFA 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ambassador Trouve then solicited the Ambassador's 
and CG's assessment of the current political and security 
situation as well as prospects for successful conclusion of a 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).  His particular interest 
was on how they would impact Swedish Embassy operations. 
Trouve asked specifically about timetables for a U.S. 
withdrawal and confirmation that immunities for private 
security contractors would no longer exist after the end of 
the year.  On the ongoing SOFA negotiations, Ambassador 
Crocker said we are close, but a few hard issues remain.  The 
 
BAGHDAD 00003296  002 OF 004 
 
 
U.S., he said, is cognizant of the potent effect the British 
colonial legacy still has on the Iraqi psyche and the need 
for any agreement to sanctify Iraq's full sovereignty.  At 
the same time, he stated, we have some core concerns that 
need to be met.  In the end, we must have a legal basis for 
our forces to remain. 
 
¶5.  (C)  General Odierno provided an overall security 
assessment, noting that, with the exception of Ninewa 
province, steady improvements continue countrywide.  While 
these gains are still fragile, the recent spate of 
high-profile bombings in Baghdad notwithstanding, the overall 
number of attacks has not risen in past weeks.  AQI has been 
pushed to the north and its ability to conduct operations 
elsewhere has been greatly diminished.  Similarly, operations 
this year against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups has led 
them to adjust tactics, focusing more on small, well-trained 
teams that target primarily mid-level GOI officials.  General 
Odierno said that Iran is supporting these teams and is also 
using "soft power" tools to influence Iraq's political 
situation.  In response to a question by Ambassador Trouve on 
Sons of Iraq (SOI) integration, General Odierno assessed it 
as going well thus far.  Prime Minister Maliki's directives 
to the Iraqi military indicate he wants it to succeed.  That 
said, the U.S. is monitoring the situation closely. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Iraq's Multidimensional Politics 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  On the political front, Ambassador Crocker and 
General Odierno updated Trouve and Rydberg on dynamics within 
the Sunni and Shia communities, Arab-Kurdish tensions, and 
the impact of PM Maliki's growing assertiveness.  On the 
Sunnis, Ambassador Crocker said that the Sahwa movements do 
constitute a political force.  How that will play out is not 
yet certain.  A number of groups with the Sahwa name have 
registered as political parties in order to take part in the 
upcoming provincial elections.  While this is a positive 
sign, the Ambassador noted, it is also potentially 
problematic as their experience in political organizing is 
nonexistent.  We are looking at how best to keep their 
expectations realistic.  What we don't want, he stressed, is 
for these groups to go into the provincial council elections 
poorly organized and overconfident, then not succeed and 
spend the next several years again in the political 
wilderness.  Hopefully we will see local alliances emerge 
between Sahwas and the established Sunni political parties. 
If handled properly, the upcoming elections should redress 
the imbalances that resulted from the 2005 Sunni boycott. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Turning to the Shia, Ambassador Crocker noted recent 
efforts by Prime Minister Maliki to reach out to the 
Sadrists.  It is still an open question whether he is doing 
this in his capacity as Prime Minister of Iraq or as the Dawa 
Party leader with an eye to elections.  Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI) is also reaching out to the Sadrists 
and the Sadrists themselves have become increasingly vocal in 
their criticism of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.  As 
an example, Ambassador Crocker pointed to this past week's 
incident when Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mashadani's plane was 
denied entry into Iranian airspace enroute to Tehran for 
official meetings.  Sadrist parliamentary member (and chair 
of the parliament's Legal Committee) Baha al-Arraji publicly 
denounced this Iranian action as "an insult to a pillar of 
Iraq's democracy." (Note: Mashadani eventually did go to 
Tehran.  End Note.)  Many Sadrists recognize that the JAM did 
not work out as planned and are now prepared to transform 
their energies into political and social efforts. 
 
¶8.  (C)  On recent Kurdish-Arab tensions on Kirkuk, Khanaqin, 
and Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs), Ambassador Trouve 
asked what role the U.S. is playing to resolve these issues. 
On Khanaqin, General Odierno responded that our commanders in 
the field have emphasized to both sides that the last thing 
they need is for this to result in armed conflict -- we must 
make sure that a tactical mistake does not lead to strategic 
consequences.  In reality, General Odierno observed, the real 
problem has been the inflammatory comments of Barzani and 
Maliki, but it appears now that the situation has now been 
defused and cooler heads have prevailed. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ambassador Crocker noted that this issue offers 
great insight into the multidimensional aspect of Iraqi 
politics.  First, although not in KRG territory, the 
Peshmerga moved into Khanaqin several years ago to provide 
security when the central government was incapable of doing 
so.  At that time, the primarily Kurdish population of 
Khanaqin welcomed their presence.  Now, however, the broader 
context has changed.  The position of the central government 
is much stronger and Maliki wants to redress the situation. 
 
BAGHDAD 00003296  003 OF 004 
 
 
Second, the improved security situation has resulted in both 
Sunnis and Shia increasingly identifying themselves as Arabs 
over their sectarian affiliation.  This strengthened sense of 
"Arabness" has produced a newly emerging Sunni-Shia alliance 
against the Kurds, as was shown in the July parliamentary 
vote on a provincial elections law (which was then vetoed by 
the Presidency Council).  Third, and to some degree a 
countervailing force to the Sunni/Shia versus Kurd dynamic, 
there is the tension between Maliki's efforts to strengthen 
central government authority and resistance to that from 
Kurds, and some Sunnis and Shia in the provinces.  Ambassador 
Crocker underlined that all these currents are the result of 
a demonstrably improved security situation. 
 
---------- 
Turkey/PKK 
---------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  The discussion touched briefly on the recent 
Kurdistan Workers, Party (PKK) attack on Turkish soldiers 
very close to Turkey-Iraq border.  Ambassador Crocker told 
Ambassador Trouve that it is critical for Iraqi Kurds to 
understand how explosive this issue is with the Turkish 
population.  He noted that both Talabani and Barzani 
immediately condemned the attack.  General Odierno added that 
this is a complex issue that does not have a military 
solution.  The GOT, he noted, understands this but is under 
tremendous public pressure to do something.  In reality, the 
steps the GOI will need to take are both multifaceted in 
nature and will take perhaps five to seven years, which does 
not mesh up well with the Turks desire to see the PKK 
eliminated now. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Swedish Embassy Update, Future of Private Security 
Contractors, and Wartsila Generator Convoys 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Ambassador Trouve then turned to concrete issues 
related to progress on Sweden's embassy project.  The plan to 
open the embassy in April 2009 is on track, he said.  The 
architects in charge have told him all is going well.  The 
security perimeter is in place and a security force is 
present.  The Swedes continue to use the security services of 
the UK-based Control Risks Group (including Gurkha stationary 
guards at the embassy building site).  Ambassador Trouve said 
he proposed to Foreign Minister Zebari that security 
personnel on Swedish Embassy grounds, and those protecting 
him when he travels, should be covered under the Vienna 
Convention.  He expressed concern, however, about what would 
happen should a Swedish security officer shoot someone.  He 
also noted that providing diplomatic passports for these 
individuals would be problematic, given that most are not 
Swedish.  Ambassador Crocker noted that the U.S. Embassy has 
already initiated a dialogue with the Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior about training special Iraqi protection units that 
eventually will provide protection for U.S. diplomatic 
personnel.  Ambassador Crocker emphasized that as we move 
forward, security responsibilities have to be "Iraqi-ized." 
 
¶12.  (C)  Ambassador Trouve then raised the ongoing issue 
(refs B and C) of the convoys of huge Wartsila generators 
that must pass by the Swedish Embassy site and have 
necessitated temporary movement of exterior T-walls.  (Note: 
The moving of the T-walls takes place entirely on the public 
road that passes directly in front of the Swedish Embassy and 
which the GOI has never acknowledged to be part of the 
Swedish compound.   The Swedes are using this public road as 
their construction laydown area and are doing so 
unilaterally, according to the Iraqi MFA.  End Note.)  Trouve 
confirmed that the last two convoys went smoothly but also 
said "we're not happy about this."  The situation has created 
the impression that the Swedes are allowing military convoys 
to pass through their premises.  Additionally, the moving of 
T-walls reduces the setback from the street and makes the 
embassy site more vulnerable to VBIEDs.  Trouve asked how 
many more Wartsila convoys were expected and General Odierno 
responded that two more are scheduled.  Ambassador Crocker 
noted that whether there will be future convoys beyond this 
is a GOI decision and urged the Swedes to engage the Ministry 
of Electricity regarding its future intentions.  Ambassador 
Trouve then informally conveyed that the architects of the 
project say that an alteration in the positioning of the 
T-walls can be accommodated into their design.  However, it 
would cost $75,000 to $100,000.  Trouve floated the idea that 
"maybe this is something we can discuss."  Ambassador Crocker 
again recommended that Trouve raise this with the GOI. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Formal Request for Security Assistance 
-------------------------------------- 
 
BAGHDAD 00003296  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C)  Following up on conversations earlier this year 
with both Ambassador Crocker and DCM Butenis (refs A and C), 
Ambassador Trouve presented a formal letter from the Swedish 
MFA requesting U.S. Embassy assistance for Swedish embassy 
personnel in the event of emergency situations.  The letter 
requests assistance in four specific areas: Quick Reaction 
Force (QRF); emergency communications and 
intelligence/information exchange; MEDEVAC and access to the 
Combat Support Hospital (CSH); and hostage assistance. 
Trouve said that once the U.S. formally responds to this 
request it will designate a point of contact with whom we 
should liaise. 
 
------------------------------ 
Swedish Camp Cropper Detainee; Information Again Requested 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C)  In a brief aside, Ambassador Trouve noted that the 
U.S. had not yet responded to an official letter Sweden had 
delivered in July regarding the situation of a Swedish 
detainee at Camp Cropper.  "We need an answer," he said. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Trouve to Washington and New York in December 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  As the meeting concluded, Ambassador Trouve said he 
will be traveling to Washington and New York in December. 
Ambassador Crocker asked that he provide us his specific 
dates when he knows them, as there would be a number of USG 
officials who would be very interested in meeting with him. 
CROCKER