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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000735 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, EAP, AND EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE PREL PGOV ECON CB
SUBJECT:   SCENESETTER FOR D'S VISIT: A MATURING CAMBODIA? 
 
REFS:  (A) PHNOM PENH 516; (B) STATE 77799; (C) 07 PHNOM PENH 1500; 
(D) 07 PHNOM PENH 1541 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: In his departure cable, "Seven Significant 
Failures", outgoing Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli framed the 
U.S.-Cambodia relationship as hovering on the brink of a 
transformation: better than it has ever been, but with clearly 
identifiable areas for improvement.  In the weeks since that cable 
was drafted, two events give additional perspective to the question 
of where Cambodia is headed.  Like the U.S.-Cambodian relationship, 
the July 27 National Assembly election was better than any 
previous--but still below international standards.  Meanwhile, 
Cambodia's leadership is displaying a new maturity in its handling 
of an ongoing border dispute with Thailand.  This maturity, so far, 
has been echoed in its muted response to opposition parties' 
election critiques.  Your visit is the highest-level State visit 
here since Secretary Powell's participation in the 2003 ASEAN 
Regional Forum.  It builds on A/S Hill's January 2006 trip, as well 
as DAS Marciel's January 2008 participation in the first 
U.S.-Cambodian dialogue.  Your visit is an opportunity to reassure 
Cambodia's leaderships that we have favorably noted improvements. 
Simultaneously, we want to send the message that their recent 
election victory presents increased opportunities for the new 
government-and for U.S.-Cambodian relations--but also amplifies 
international expectations that Cambodia will move beyond its 
war-torn past and prioritize the development needs of its 
population. End Summary. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The U.S.-Cambodia relationship is better than it has ever 
been.  We enjoy Cambodia's cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, 
law enforcement issues and POW/MIA matters.  Our growing mil-mil 
relationship led to the holding of the first Bilateral Defense 
Dialogue August 26-28 (a proposal first raised when PACOM Admiral 
Keating visited last year.)  The USS Mustin is expected to dock in 
Cambodia in early October.  This will be the third ship visit in 16 
months, after a 30-year hiatus.  The ships, as well as medical, 
dental and engineering outreach, have been warmly received including 
in very remote parts of Cambodia.  USG assistance to Cambodia, 
currently more than $61.6 million annually, is fueling cooperation 
on HIV/AIDS and avian influenza, health care for children and 
expectant mothers, cultural preservation, and humanitarian demining. 
 Cambodia provides temporary haven and a processing site for 
Montagnard refugees, as well as another more politically sensitive 
refugee caseload.  The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has a good 
record of supporting U.S. positions in the UN, contributes deminers 
to the UN in southern Sudan, and recently began participating in the 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).  In a decision which 
significantly increases its multilateral military engagement, 
Cambodia has agreed to host the GPOI capstone exercise in 2010.  As 
Cambodia's impressive economic growth continues, more U.S. 
businesses are exploring opportunities, although they still fall far 
behind investors from South Korea, China, and the region. 
 
THE ELECTION 
------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Cambodia's July 27 National Assembly election was the 
country's third parliamentary exercise following the 1993 poll 
conducted by the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAC) under the 
terms of the Paris Peace Agreement.  The 1998 election was conducted 
in the aftermath of a short, violent CPP-led coup against coalition 
partner FUNCINPEC.  It took more than a year to form a government 
after the next election, in 2003.  The evaluation that this year's 
polling was the best yet could thus be framed by some as damning 
with faint praise.  That said, a significant number of Cambodians 
participated in an election-day process that was conducted in a 
peaceful and open manner with professional conduct by most election 
staff.  International observers, including 47 teams from the 
embassy, traveled freely around the country to observe pre-election 
campaigning and the election itself.  Although some irregularities 
persist, they were relatively low in number and they do not appear 
to have affected the outcome or to have distorted the will of the 
Cambodian people.  Representatives from five different parties have 
been elected to serve in the National Assembly. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) invested massive 
resources to get out to voters in the provinces, capitalizing on 
their positions within government to convey a message that CPP 
delivers (infrastructure, schools, and roads).  The 58 percent of 
the popular vote-translating to 90 seats in the 123-seat National 
Assembly-won by CPP is directly linked to this well-organized, 
well-financed, sustained effort.  A divided and multitudinous 
opposition split the anti-CPP vote and quite probably confused 
voters (for example, two parties competed for Royalist sympathizers 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000735  002 OF 003 
 
 
while four parties had Amcits in senior leadership roles). 
Post-election, four parties protested the results, but two-FUNCINPEC 
and the Norodohm Randariddh Party (NRP)-are now seeking a coalition 
with CPP.  This leaves two parties as the serious opposition: the 
Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) which won 26 seats and the Human Rights Party 
(HRP) with three.  They are threatening to boycott the September 24 
opening of the National Assembly, but told us privately that they 
would join, if they could be sworn in by the King in a ceremony 
separate from CPP, FUNCINPEC and NRP.  We have suggested to them 
that the more important thing on which to focus is the role(s) 
opposition parliamentarians can play in Assembly structures and 
committees, ensuring that their significant voter base is fairly 
represented.  Among our medium-term goals will be further efforts to 
address election process shortfalls, strengthen the sense of 
parties' accountability to their voters, and support press freedoms 
and the right to demonstrate peacefully. 
 
PREAH VIHEAR 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The mid-July movement of Thai soldiers into disputed 
territory thrust the temple of Preah Vihear into the international 
spotlight.  Just weeks before, the World Heritage Committee (WHC) 
had agreed to Cambodia's request to register the 9th century, 
cliffside temple as a site of outstanding universal value.  As Ref B 
explains, the unanimous WHC decision was the result of a sustained 
and serious Cambodian lobbying effort.  The fact that Cambodia had 
made (eventually thwarted) efforts to negotiate an MOU with Thailand 
also was perceived favorably by WHC members.  Post continues to be 
concerned by the ongoing stalemate and presence of armed soldiers in 
and around a pagoda near the temple site.  Equally worrying, two 
additional border temples at Ta Moan have become hotspots.  But, we 
believe that the RGC's handling of its quest to register Preah 
Vihear temple (which was awarded to Cambodia by a 1962 ICJ 
decision), its dignified response following the registration, and 
its handling of the Thai incursion merit note, especially against 
the backdrop of a national election during which playing a bellicose 
card predictably would have rallied support to CPP.  In a number of 
areas, we have noted more restrained and more open reactions from 
Cambodia's leaders, most notably Hun Sen.  Whether it is allowing a 
demonstration (Ref C), engaging with critical NGOs such as Freedom 
House (Ref D), or accepting an FBI offer of assistance in a murder 
investigation, the RGC seems to be reacting more maturely. 
 
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The U.S.'s harshest criticisms of Cambodia all spiral back 
to three things: weak systems - in many cases the fruit of the Khmer 
Rouge period; endemic corruption; and a sense that the wealthy or 
powerful can operate with impunity.  These problems are the root of 
Cambodia's continued human rights problems, including those linked 
to unclear land title in a burgeoning real estate market.  They 
still deter U.S. businesses, which worry about investing when 
regulatory frameworks are weak and informal networks abound.  They 
slow our engagement with the military, who face accusations ranging 
from human rights abuses to illegal logging.  And, while a concerted 
government effort has improved Cambodia's trafficking in persons 
standing, mixed messages based on individual judicial decisions make 
some pedophiles and other criminal elements believe Cambodia is safe 
territory for their pursuits. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) A still-outstanding question is whether the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal can strengthen rule of law here.  The U.S. is on the 
threshold of funding, and we hope that you may be able to announce 
an initial tranche during your visit.  Administrative problems, 
directly linked to the corruption endemic in Cambodia, trouble the 
court and are a continued focus of donor and UN attention.  But, the 
first case is set for trial soon and already Cambodian judges 
participating in the mixed tribunal seem to have acquired a greater 
comfort in enforcing politically unpopular positions-and to believe 
that they have the space to do so.  The country as a whole is 
watching the Tribunal, and many believe that finally ending the 
impunity that Tuol Sleng chief Duch, Brother Number Two Nuon Chea 
and others enjoyed for nearly thirty years is the starting point to 
tackle these hardest of challenges.  We are encouraged to move ahead 
for two reasons: first, the long-suffering people of Cambodia 
deserve the best-possible chance; second, all of the progress in the 
other areas described by this cable will stall, if we cannot-working 
with the government and people of Cambodia-address these three root 
challenges. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Your meetings with Prime Minister Hun Sen and Foreign 
Minister Hor Namhong; discussions with opposition parties, economic 
leaders, and civil society; and briefings on the election and the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal will provide key opportunities to note the 
areas of improvement described in this cable.  While discussing how 
their recent election victory presents increased opportunities for 
the new government-and for U.S.-Cambodia relations, you can 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000735  003 OF 003 
 
 
reinforce expectations that Cambodia will move beyond its war-torn 
past and prioritize the development needs of its population.  Eight 
local newspapers have already run stories on your planned visit, and 
press and local interest is high. 
 
CAMPBELL