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Viewing cable 08PESHAWAR477, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN KURRAM TO FACE PAKISTAN MILITARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PESHAWAR477 2008-09-29 09:24 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Consulate Peshawar
VZCZCXRO3681
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHPW #0477/01 2730924
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290924Z SEP 08
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7672
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4445
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1648
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 1641
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 1276
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0925
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0547
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0595
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0548
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0683
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0637
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/USSOCOM INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 4710
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PESHAWAR 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/29/2018 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PK
SUBJECT: SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN KURRAM TO FACE PAKISTAN MILITARY 
OPERATION? 
 
REF: A) PESHAWAR 409 B) PESHAWAR 396 C) PESHAWAR 384 D) PESHAWAR 36 E) 07 PESHAWAR 739 F) 07 PESHAWAR 248 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) Violence in Kurram Agency has claimed over 700 lives 
since early August when the latest wave of sectarian fighting 
escalated.  Over 1300 have been killed in the last 17 months of 
sporadic clashes.  The Sunni have historically had a slight 
upper hand in fighting, first in the April 2007 violence (Ref. 
F) and again in November (Refs. D, E).  Within the past month, 
however, the Shi'a have launched a series of lethal attacks and 
have won new ground.  Rumors consistently attribute the Shi'a 
momentum to Afghan and Iranian support.  Local taliban from 
North Waziristan, who support the Sunni tribes, carved out a 
transit corridor in lower Kurram in late 2007, linking North 
Waziristan to Khost Province in Afghanistan.  But on August 31, 
the Shi'a captured several Sunni and local taliban strongholds 
in the corridor.  A ceasefire struck on September 9 has slowed 
but not stopped the violence, and over 45 have been killed since 
September 18.  A second ceasefire was concluded on September 27 
whose effect has yet to be seen.  The patchwork of Sunni, Shi'a 
and local taliban control of roads has led to the shutdown of 
most of the main arteries linking the agency to Hangu District 
and Afghanistan, even though on August 20 the Frontier Corps 
deployed four wings (approximately 2,400 men) to intervene along 
the road.  The military authorized an operation of one brigade 
to clear the corridor that the local taliban control on 
September 2.  But with ongoing operations in Bajaur, Swat and 
Darra Adam Khel it is unlikely that military intervention will 
be launched in the immediate future. 
 
Baghzai: A Shi'a Victory 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Ghulam Qadir, the Secretary for Law and Order at the 
FATA Secretariat, confirms that the recent fighting in Kurram 
has resulted in heavy casualties for the local taliban from 
North Waziristan.  Over 700 on both sides have been killed in 
six weeks of fighting, nearly 100 of whom were killed on August 
31 in battles for the Baghzai area and in three alleged suicide 
attacks staged by the Sunni Bangash tribe against the Shi'a Turi 
tribe.  Much of the fighting has taken place in the area between 
Alizai and Sadda in Sunni-dominated Lower Kurram and around the 
Peiwar border crossing, 25 km northwest of Parachinar in Shi'a 
dominated upper Kurram.  The Turi tribemen lead the six Shi'a 
tribes and the Bangash tribesmen lead the six Sunni tribes.  On 
August 31, the Shi'a captured several villages in the Baghzai 
area, a stronghold of the Sunni Bangash tribe and their taliban 
supporters.  A post contact whose staff visited Baghzai soon 
thereafter said that the villages were burnt down and the 
inhabitants had fled. 
 
3.  (C) Sited across the river from Alizai in lower Kurram, 
Baghzai also has strategic significance for the local taliban 
from North Waziristan.  It lies in the heart of the transit 
corridor that these local taliban carved out in lower Kurram in 
late 2007 to link North Waziristan to Khost Province in 
Afghanistan.  A post contact estimates that the taliban from 
North Waziristan receive bribes of between $150,000 and $250,000 
per month to allow safe passage along the dust "kacha" tracks in 
the corridor.  (Note: The corridor consists of all of lower 
Kurram west of the river to Afghanistan, as far north as 
Arawali, which is approximately seven kilometers south of Sadda. 
 End note.) 
 
The Fight to Control the Roads 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Most roads that supply Kurram are closed.  Smuggling 
routes have become the primary ways of supplying the agency and 
sustaining the local economy.  On August 20 the Kurram Militia, 
the Frontier Corps for the agency, deployed four wings -- 
approximately 2,400 men -- to intervene along the Thall-Sadda 
road, much of which is controlled by the Sunni.  Qadir said that 
the Kurram Militia has been successful at checking local 
 
PESHAWAR 00000477  002 OF 005 
 
 
vehicles.  They are afraid to confront vehicles of the local 
taliban, however, because they are outgunned.  The locals 
interpret this as government support for the local taliban, 
creating a credibility problem for the political administration. 
 (Note: The levies in Kurram are predominantly Shi'a and mostly 
police Parachinar.  The Kurram Militia once consisted of mostly 
Shi'a members but recent heavy Sunni recruitment outside of 
Kurram has made it Sunni dominated.  End note.) 
 
5.  (C) Previous government convoys, supply trucks and private 
vehicles attempting to use the road to Parachinar through Hangu 
District and Lower Kurram have been blocked and seized. 
Drivers, particularly those who are Shi'a, have been killed and 
mutilated.  On June 19 the political agent ordered a government 
convoy of 24 trucks to use the road despite the blockage.  When 
the convoy was ambushed, the political agent used pre-positioned 
military air support to drive away the militants.  Even so, 
twelve drivers were killed and their bodies mutilated (Ref. C). 
Post contacts state that roads linking the agency to Afghanistan 
and Hangu District are still controlled by a patchwork of Sunni, 
Shi'a and local taliban groups.  Essential to travel from Kurram 
to Peshawar is the Thall-Hangu road through Hangu District. 
This has again come under the control of Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) despite the military operation in Hangu in July 
(Refs. A, B).  In Lower Kurram, the Thall-Sadda road is 
primarily controlled by the Sunni and local taliban, with some 
pockets of Shi'a control.  In Upper Kurram, the roads are 
predominantly held by Shi'a tribes, though there is ongoing 
fighting at the most heavily used border crossing with 
Afghanistan at Peiwar.  As a result of the fighting in the 
border region, this road has not been a reliable supply route in 
recent months.  Even when the Peiwar crossing is viable, convoys 
must pass through unstable areas in Khost Province in 
Afghanistan and Khyber Agency in Pakistan in order to reach 
Peshawar.  (Note: The Sunni Maqbal tribe spans the 
Pakistan-Afghan border and the Afghan tribesmen sometimes take 
revenge on transiting vehicles for attacks on their kin on the 
Pakistani side of the border.  End note.) 
 
6.  (C) Episodes of sectarianism have hit elsewhere in the 
province in the past six weeks.  On September 18, press sources 
reported that the local taliban evicted 200 Shi'a families from 
Orakzai.  The August 18 suicide bombing near a Dera Ismail Khan 
hospital killed 32 who had gathered to mourn the assassination 
of a Shi'a leader.  A Shi'a leader was killed separately in 
Peshawar on August 16. 
 
What the Shi'a and Sunni Want 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The Shi'a and Sunni of Kurram both want three things: 
the reopening of the roads, the right to return to their homes 
in areas dominated by the other sect, and monetary compensation 
for property damage in the past ten months.  In July, Shi'a 
tribal elders agreed to the resettlement of Sunnis in Upper 
Kurram in principle but refused to give guarantees of their 
safety.  The Sunnis did not return out of fear that the Shi'a 
majority in Upper Kurram would seek retribution against them for 
any action against the Shi'a in Sunni-controlled Lower Kurram. 
(Note: Central Kurram, known as Frontier Region Kurram until 
February 2004, is almost exclusively Sunni.  Although tribes 
from this area are involved in the fighting in Upper and Lower 
Kurram, there have been no reports of fighting in their 
territory.  End Note.) 
 
Outside Support Exacerbates the Violence 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The local taliban from North Waziristan allegedly moved 
into Kurram to maintain a corridor to Afghanistan and to support 
the Sunni in the sectarian unrest.  The Shi'a allegedly receive 
support from former Northern Alliance elements of the Afghan 
military as well as financial and advisory support from Iran. 
On 25 August, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Interior Affairs, 
Rehman Malik, publicly accused foreign elements of involvement 
 
PESHAWAR 00000477  003 OF 005 
 
 
in Kurram.  Post contacts say that if the outside fighters were 
pushed out of Kurram, the local Sunni and Shi'a tribes could 
negotiate a credible truce.  Although it is unclear how many 
outside fighters support the young militants in Kurram, post 
contacts estimate that the numbers on each side are in the 
hundreds. 
 
Local Taliban from North Waziristan 
----------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) According to post contacts, Sunni tribes allowed the 
local taliban from North Waziristan to support them during the 
unrest in November 2007 (Refs. D, F).  The local taliban wanted 
a corridor into Afghanistan due to the pressure on the Afghan 
side of the North Waziristan border.  According to the Liaison 
Officer (LNO) from Combined Joint Taskforce (CJTF) 101, there 
are four navigable passes from the lower Kurram corridor into 
Afghanistan.  Coalition forces have not had significant enemy 
contact on the Afghan side of that border, however, nor have 
they recorded more cross-border attacks from Kurram.  The LNO 
from CJTF 101 reports that cross-border attacks from Lower 
Kurram number about one or two each week.  (Note: Upper Kurram 
attacks are almost non-existent.  End note.) 
 
10.  (C) The local taliban quickly extended their reach within 
Lower Kurram, according to post contacts.  Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) took responsibility for the suicide bombing at a 
PPP rally in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 
February in Shi'a dominated Parachinar, which killed 40.  Post 
contacts suggest that the local taliban motivation to engage 
Shi'a in Kurram has been spurred on by the anti-Shi'a group, 
Lashkar-i-Janghvi, which has links to TTP in North Waziristan. 
When the local taliban entered the agency, they demanded that 
the Sunnis blow up CD shops in Alizai and Sadda, the two main 
cities in lower Kurram.  The damage from ongoing violence to 
economic livelihoods in the area and the ideological bent of the 
local taliban have soured the relationship between the Sunni and 
the Wazirs.  But, according to a post contact, the local taliban 
from North Waziristan are now sufficiently entrenched in Kurram 
that the Sunni do not know how to sideline them.  The local 
taliban in Kurram are mostly from the Utmanzai Wazir and Daur 
tribes.  They are allegedly supplemented by small contingents of 
Chechens and Uzbeks and some local taliban from South 
Waziristan. 
 
Afghan Support for the Shi'a 
---------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Ghulam Qadir claims that some Afghan intelligence 
officers formerly of the Northern Alliance have brought in 
weapons, financing and advice to support the Shi'a against the 
taliban.  Another post contact specifies that Hazara, Tajiks, 
and Uzbeks have been lending support for two months now.  But 
post contacts are unsure whether the Afghan support has been 
officially sanctioned.  They only point out that the Afghan 
government has tried to send convoys of supplies to Shi'a 
dominated Parachinar, the administrative hub of the agency 
located in upper Kurram. 
 
12.  (S) On August 17, the Sunni Bangash tribe claimed to 
capture seven uniformed Afghan National Army personnel.  A post 
press contact who interviewed two of the captured men said that 
they spoke of Shi'a elders from the Turi tribe meeting earlier 
in the year with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to ask for 
support in their fight with the local taliban.  Although the 
political agent publicly dismissed the presence of Afghan 
soldiers in Kurram, post contacts close to him say he was trying 
to prevent a blame game from ramping up.  Post contacts 
attribute part of the success of the recent Shi'a offensive to 
this Afghan support. 
 
The Iran Connection 
-------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Senior Pakistan military officials stated that Iran has 
 
PESHAWAR 00000477  004 OF 005 
 
 
also stepped up its financial and advisory support to the Shi'a 
of Kurram, according to one civilian Pakistani security advisor. 
 They speculate that this support may be channeled through the 
Hazaras of Afghanistan, who also receive Iranian support.  For 
years the Iranian Consulate in Peshawar has allegedly provided 
scholarships to Shi'a students from Kurram.  Although some 
students have gone to the Iranian seminaries in Qom to become 
clerics, others have gone instead to Lebanon and, more recently, 
Iraq to be trained as fighters, according to a post contact. 
The two militias operating in Upper Kurram call themselves the 
"Mehdi Militia" and "Hezbollah."  (Note: Although sectarian 
violence in Kurram began in 1939, the relationship between the 
Shi'a of Pakistan and Iran goes back to 1979.  The era of 
heightened sectarianism after the Iranian revolution under the 
leadership of President Zia ul-Haq ushered in new ties between 
Iran and the Shi'a communities throughout Pakistan.  End note.) 
 
Jirga Brokers an Ineffective Ceasefire 
-------------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) The ceasefire declared on September 9, designed to last 
until December 26, came on the heels of a Shi'a offensive in 
lower Kurram.  The ceasefire has not held.  Hangu District and 
Orakzai Agency jointly sent a peace jirga to Kurram on August 19 
to broker peace.  Eight Sunni members negotiated in Lower 
Kurram, and eight Shi'a members negotiated separately in Upper 
Kurram.  Over the course of two weeks, the Shi'a agreed to 
support the government's efforts to end militancy in the agency, 
but the Sunni were reluctant to submit to a ceasefire.  Several 
post contacts noted that tribal elders from the Kurram tribes 
have lost their influence to the young militants.  On the Shi'a 
side, the elders have also lost ground to pro-Iranian clerics. 
Many are afraid to speak out for fear of being targeted. 
 
Possible Military Intervention 
------------------------------ 
 
15.  (C) Despite the weakness of the tribal elders, post 
contacts believe that peace can be negotiated among the tribes 
once the outside elements are pushed out of the agency.  On 
September 2, the military authorized an operation of one brigade 
to clear the corridor that the local taliban of North Waziristan 
control, according to a post contact who proposed the plan. 
With the corridor controlled, he expects negotiations between 
the tribes and Kurram Militia efforts will have vastly better 
prospects of success.  He maintains that it will be insufficient 
to clear Kurram alone, however.  Without extending the operation 
into Hangu District and clearing the Thall-Hangu road of TTP 
militants, the agency will still be blocked off from access to 
the settled areas of Pakistan. 
 
Political Administration Enforces Sanctions 
------------------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) Qadir reports that with approximately $250,000 the 
political agent could buy off everyone in authority to halt 
violence in the agency.  In early September, the political agent 
ordered sanctions against Shi'a and Sunni business interests, in 
a bid to coerce the tribal elders into cooperation.  Section 21 
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) enables the political 
agent to confiscate property belonging to any member of a tribe 
if a fellow tribesman disrupts the peace.  The political agent 
closed transport businesses, shops, and hotels owned by Kurram 
businessmen both locally and throughout the province. 
 
Humanitarian Situation Worst for Minority Pockets 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
17.  (C) The humanitarian situation throughout the agency is 
poor due to the road blockages.  The real humanitarian crisis is 
for the pockets of Shi'a in lower Kurram and of Sunni in upper 
Kurram.  Qadir reported that the FATA Secretariat approached the 
army to do helicopter resupply of these minority pockets but was 
turned down because of the prospect of anti-aircraft fire. 
Although militants on both sides are modifying ground machine 
 
PESHAWAR 00000477  005 OF 005 
 
 
guns and rockets to fire on planes, Qadir is skeptical of the 
effectiveness of such anti-aircraft fire.  Prices of basic 
staples have skyrocketed throughout the agency.  In Lower and 
Central Kurram, schools and banks have been closed, and 
electricity has been shut down for more than a month, which has 
led to a shortage of drinking water.  Post contacts estimate 
that 100,000 of the half million inhabitants have left the 
agency since late 2007.  Army helicopters regularly transport 
medicine, the critically wounded and some civilians between 
Parachinar and Peshawar.  But normal supplies must get into the 
agency by paying off militants at checkposts or transiting via 
smuggling routes.  Kurram is one of the most fertile areas in 
FATA, which has helped to supply the agency with some of its 
food needs.  USAID/OTI has been able to undertake limited 
operations with the Shi'a in Upper Kurram for three months but 
has not been able to undertake sustained programs in Lower 
Kurram. 
 
Post Contacts 
------------- 
 
18.  (C) Post contacts mentioned above include NWFP Governor 
Owais Ghani, Ghulam Qadir (Secretary for Law and Order at the 
FATA Secretariat), a former Additional Chief Secretary of the 
FATA Secretariat (a retired military brigadier general who has 
held senior civilian positions in NWFP and who advises top 
political and military leaders on FATA), the Khyber Political 
Agent and former Kurram PA, the head of the International 
Organization for Migration's (IOM) USAID/OTI sponsored program 
in Kurram, the Peshawar Bureau Chief of Dawn News, a local 
journalist based in Sunni-controlled Sadda, and Peshawar Liaison 
Officer from Combined Joint Taskforce 101. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
19.  (C) The Shi'a may be emboldened but the people of the 
agency are perplexed by what they view as a lack of political 
will to stop the bloodshed.  More people have been killed in the 
past six weeks than were killed in all of 2007.  Even though a 
military operation may occur eventually, the Pakistan security 
forces are unlikely to deploy in the near term given ongoing 
operations in Swat and Bajaur. 
 
20.  (C) The challenge now will be to prevent the spread of 
unrest beyond Kurram given the significant Shi'a populations in 
Orakzai, Hangu, Dera Ismail Khan and Bhakkal. 
VIA