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Viewing cable 08NEWDELHI2367, AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MONTEK SINGH AHLUWALIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NEWDELHI2367 2008-09-04 00:59 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO4795
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #2367/01 2480059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040059Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3233
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1623
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6851
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 002367 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2028 
TAGS: EAGR ECON EDU EINV ENRG ETRD ETTC IN KNNP
PARM, PREL, TRGY, TSPL 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MONTEK SINGH AHLUWALIA 
 
 1.  (C) Summary.  Ambassador met with Planning Commission 
Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia on September 2 to 
discuss upcoming high level bilateral meetings, including the 
President-Prime Minister meeting on September 25 and the CEO 
Forum scheduled for October 14.  In addition, the Ambassador 
provided an update to Ahluwalia on the August 22-23 Nuclear 
Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna and his outlook for the 
second meeting scheduled for September 4-5.  End summary. 
 
AMBASSADOR REVIEWS NSG DEVELOPMENTS 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) First, Ambassador Mulford provided Ahluwalia an 
update on events at the August 21-22 Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) Plenary in Vienna.  The Ambassador expressed 
disappointment and shock at the positions that many of the 
NSG members took.  USG officials had engaged with the NSG 
members in the lead-up to the Plenary and the members had 
signaled that they were "supportive" but had "concerns."  The 
Ambassador then noted that NSG members submitted over 60 
amendments in the Vienna meeting to the draft NSG exception 
that the U.S. had submitted.  Ambassador Mulford observed 
that the surprising number of substantial amendments nearly 
amounted to a question of good faith, with key NSG members' 
non-proliferation advocates allowed the upper hand. 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador described to Ahluwalia how the meeting 
in Vienna had 400 people ) minus the Indian delegation that 
had to remain outside ) with all the chairs facing forward 
toward the Chairman's desk, in a configuration that 
discouraged debate and enabled NSG members to offer tough 
amendments semi-anonymously.  Ambassador Mulford also 
explained to Ahluwalia that in the briefing with the Indian 
delegation ) primarily Foreign Secretary Meno and Special 
Envoy Shyan Saran ) during a scheduled break in the NSG 
Plenary, the Indian side solicited questions from the NSG 
members.  None were offered.  US representative John Rood 
also encouraged the participants to utilize the opportunity 
to ask questions of the Indian delegation, but no one did. 
 
Looking Forward 
--------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Ambassador then considered the next steps.  He 
noted that India and the US have negotiated a "clean" text, 
but that he anticipates it will be an extremely hard sell in 
the next NSG meeting in Vienna on September 4-5.  Ambassador 
Mulford assured Ahluwalia that the US goal was to try to keep 
the text "sacrosanct," with NSG member concerns limited to 
comments in the Chairman's Summary.  The Ambassador 
identified several text changes that he thought would be 
unacceptable: the "multilateralization" of the Hyde Act, and 
any language that demanded automatic sanctions in response to 
further nuclear testing.  Whether it would be possible to 
avoid such language, Mulford didn't know. 
 
5.  (C) Secretary Rice had asked the Ambassador to stay in 
Delhi during the September 4-5 Vienna Plenary to engage the 
GoI if needed.  Mulford noted that National Security Advisor 
Narayanan had spoken with him that day and was not happy to 
learn that the Ambassador would not be in Vienna to help move 
the deal through.  Mulford observed that one of the problems 
with the NSG meetings was the representational mode )- that 
NSG members had designated their non-proliferation advocates 
as participants at the Plenary rather than senior political 
representatives who could see the big picture at stake.  The 
big issue for the NSG was whether the international 
nonproliferation system would be stronger with India on the 
inside.  The US delegation on September 4-5 would be led by 
State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs Bill 
Burns, which added weight to the meeting. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Mulford apprised Ahluwalia of his 
discussions with the "Group of Six" like-minded country 
members of the NSG ) Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland ) as well as with Canada 
and Japan.  The Ambassador explained that they needed to 
realize the importance of the NSG exception to India.  The 
Ambassador had pointed out to them that any country that 
blocks the NSG waiver should understand that its relationship 
with India would not be able to meet its maximum potential as 
India was likely to start a blame game, should the NSG 
 
NEW DELHI 00002367  002 OF 005 
 
 
exception not go through.  Ahluwalia agreed that political 
pressure was needed to keep the focus on the big picture.  To 
that end, Ambassador Mulford pointed out, President Bush and 
Secretary Rice were making calls to the leadership of these 
countries; however, the non-proliferation issues were often 
emotive for some countries.  Some of the NSG representatives 
in Vienna had never been to India and had an outdated view of 
the country and the world today. 
 
7.  (C) Mulford pointed to the substantial reductions in 
carbon-based emissions that would result from India,s access 
to nuclear energy made possible by the civil nuclear 
initiative.  The Ambassador referenced an estimate that the 
amount of coal substituted with nuclear energy in India over 
the next twenty years was equivalent to half the amount of 
emissions from the state of California and more than all of 
the EU25 emission cuts combined (Note: according to a study 
by David Victor published by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, July 18, 2006.  End note).  Ahluwalia responded 
that India,s lead nuclear scientist, Department of Atomic 
Energy Chairman Dr. Anil Kakodkar, had projected that by 2050 
India's access to uranium through the civil nuclear 
cooperation initiative would treble the amount of uranium 
India could process and use toward nuclear energy, going from 
the equivalent of 200,000 MW of power to 600,000 MW of power. 
 But, Ahluwalia questioned, do the nonproliferation people 
care?  The Ambassador responded that they apparently did not, 
since they went so far as to request that the statements in 
the NSG waiver text referring to the energy benefits of the 
deal be removed. 
 
8.  (C) Ahluwalia opined that keeping the language on energy 
benefits in the text was useful, if not to the NSG members, 
then to a larger audience that would consider the text.  The 
Ambassador concurred, noting that it was important to get the 
text through the NSG quickly so that the bilateral deal could 
move not just to Congress but also to President Bush for 
needed presidential determinations.  These determinations 
were one-time requirements that did not need to be repeated 
in a new administration. 
 
UPCOMING PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER MEETING 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Ambassador Mulford moved to the topic of the 
scheduled September 25 meeting between President Bush and 
Prime Minister Singh in Washington.  He asked Ahluwalia what 
issues he thought the two leaders should discuss, noting that 
the President was interested to know the latest on the 
government's reform impulse that it indicated after winning 
the confidence vote in Parliament in July. Ahluwalia started 
with a longer-term observation: that the government's 
decision to part ways with the Left was decided on the issue 
of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, but that the parting of 
ways was done with the sense of it being a longer, durable 
split.  In the short-term, Ahluwalia continued, there is 
still the question of whether any legislative reforms can be 
done before elections.  He thought the most that could be 
done would be to introduce the insurance amendment 
legislation that raises the cap on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) from 26% to 49% and to pass the pending banking 
amendment act that removes the limit on voting rights of 
shareholders.  Ahluwalia opined that introducing the 
insurance legislation would be the government's signal of its 
commitment to reform.  He thought the banking amendment 
should go through, but it mostly depends on whether the BJP 
signals its support, because otherwise, the government is 
unlikely to be able to amass enough of its new supporters to 
vote for the bill. 
 
10.  (C) The Deputy Chairman also pointed to non-legislative 
reforms as being very possible.  He suggested that Commerce 
Minister Kamal Nath could do more on investment (Note: The 
Commerce Ministry has the lead on the government's FDI policy 
that designates most FDI caps in the country not controlled 
by existing legislation.  End note.)  Ahluwalia also looked 
to the Banking Roadmap which is supposed to be revisited by 
the government and the central bank, the RBI, in 2009.  He 
thought a new roadmap that opened India's banking sector to 
more foreign participation would not be issued until after 
national elections next year.  He noted that the currently 
scheduled October-November parliamentary session was not very 
 
NEW DELHI 00002367  003 OF 005 
 
 
long, and that after that, there was not likely to be a 
substantive session until after elections.  He opined that 
since the deadline for a new Parliament to be in session was 
May 2009, that elections would have to be held by March. 
However, he noted, the election schedule would have to work 
around key school exams during that part of the year. 
 
11.  (C) Returning to the scope of possible reforms, 
Ahluwalia reiterated that the Finance Minister wants to get 
the banking bill through and that on non-legislative side, 
improving the investment environment through "debugging" the 
"creaking machinery" of the bureaucracy would be an important 
reform.  The Ambassador supported the idea, noting that 
several American companies , most recently Oshkosh and 
Sikorsky, had been disqualified from bids just shortly before 
the bids were to be opened, raising questions of 
transparency.  Ahluwalia admitted that he had not heard of 
these companies' situation.  Ambassador Mulford suggested the 
issue could be an agenda item for the October 14 CEO Forum. 
Addressing the issue of questionable disqualifications would 
help improve the business investment image of India. 
Ahluwalia agreed, stressing that transparency was very 
important.  However, he countered, he has seen instances 
where foreign companies were properly disqualified on a 
technicality that they knew of, yet failed to communicate 
circumstances properly.  Even so, the Ambassador said, it 
would be a good idea not to have disqualifications occur just 
1-2 days before the opening of bids. 
 
EDUCATION FOCUS AT CEO FORUM 
---------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) The Ambassador next suggested that education 
collaboration might be a good agenda focus at the CEO Forum, 
to which Ahluwalia agreed emphatically.  Ambassador Mulford 
asked about the possibility of commercial and military 
offsets being used for investments in India's education 
sector.  Ahluwalia expressed the view that commercial offsets 
-- mostly generated from aviation purchases -- were a more 
likely source of revenue for higher education investments, 
because the Ministry of Defense is likely to use defense 
procurement offsets with its captive, protected state 
interests. 
 
13.  (SBU) Ahluwalia indicated that the Indian side is "keen" 
to step up its educational dialogue with the United States 
and may wish to have it included in the joint statement 
between the President and the Prime Minister at their meeting 
in late September.  He went on to suggest that, at the 
October 14 CEO Forum, the CEOs could "sanctify" a plan to 
move forward on education collaboration.  He explained that 
he has been reaching out to Indian CEOs and to prominent 
Indians in the US, asking for suggestions for cooperation 
between Indian and American universities.  He was trying to 
get the Secretary of Higher Education to the CEO Forum to 
help get acceptance and commitment to moving forward on some 
kind of collaboration.  Under Indian law, Ahluwalia asserted, 
all kinds of foreign investment in education was possible 
short of giving a foreign university degree.  He wanted to 
get the CEO Forum to "sanctify" support for enhanced 
cooperation and to establish a formal framework.  Ahluwalia 
also noted that, in addition to support for the idea, he 
wanted the private sector to help pick up the costs of 
exchanging students or faculty between Indian and American 
universities. 
 
14.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked for clarification that newly 
established programs could be for-profit, but Ahluwalia 
explained that for-profit universities are not currently 
allowed in India, based on a Supreme Court decision.  But, he 
observed, several states were taking the lead in developing 
new education efforts, such as the Indian School of Business 
in Hyderabad or Haryana Chief Minister Hooda's plan to build 
an education city north of Delhi.  India's private 
universities and schools get around the obligation to be 
nonprofit institutions by establishing a trust or society 
that contained hidden fees or very profitable hidden lease 
and other costs passed from the nonprofit educational 
subsidiary to a holding company's real estate subsidiary. 
 
15.  (SBU) Ahluwalia explained that he had proposed to Bill 
Harrison, former CEO of JP Morgan and lead US CEO of the CEO 
 
NEW DELHI 00002367  004 OF 005 
 
 
Forum, that a subgroup be created to identify areas of 
educational collaboration.  He had proposed that Infosys 
co-founder Nandan Nilekani be the Indian side lead, and had 
asked Dan Price for suggestions on a lead from the US side. 
Ahluwalia claimed that some collaborations are already 
underway between US universities and the Indian Institutes of 
Technology (IITs) and of Management (IIMs), India's premier 
universities.  In fact, Ahluwalia asserted, it would not be a 
problem for US universities to identify an Indian university 
partner, where each side would send students for a part of 
the home program to study in the partner university and 
recognize the credits of each other towards the home degree. 
 
16.  (SBU) Embassy Public Affairs Counselor Schwartz asked 
whether Ahluwalia had ideas for specific deliverables that 
could be announced at the CEO Forum or proposed actions for 
the Education Working Group.  Ahluwalia opined that there 
might be a limited deliverable, such as announcing that 
Nandan Nilekani and a US counterpart as co-chairs of a group 
to provide a report to both governments after the Indian 
elections.  Schwartz asked whether a previously discussed 
idea, the creation of a junior faculty development program, 
perhaps funded by commercial offsets, could be kicked off at 
the CEO Forum working group meeting.  Ahluwalia thought that 
was a good idea, adding that there was no doubt that a report 
from the CEO Forum working group to pinpoint the use of 
offsets would find a lot of takers and proposed that the idea 
of offsets be cast as a note of suggestion, along with other 
suggestions, for review by Nilekani's group.  (Comment: 
Ahluwalia's suggestion sidestepped Schwartz's proposal of 
obtaining GOI government approval for the use of offsets by 
simply incorporating it as an area of study for the newly 
formed group.  End comment.) 
 
17.  (SBU) Schwartz suggested that another deliverable might 
be the establishment of a US - India Higher Education 
Council, which ECA Assistant Secretary Goli Ameri had agreed 
to fund during her recent trip to India.  The Council would 
be housed for simplicity at the Fulbright Commission which 
has a bilateral Board of Directors and serve as a regular 
consultative body for educators, along with their supporters 
in government and industry.  Ahluwalia thought that made "a 
lot of sense," and suggested that in advance of the CEO Forum 
meeting, it would be good to discuss the idea with MEA Joint 
Secretary Gaitri Kumar and CII leader Tarun Das. 
 
DE-CONSTRUCTING DOHA 
-------------------- 
 
18.  (C) Ambassador Mulford lastly noted to Ahluwalia that 
President Bush might wish to discuss with Prime Minister 
Singh the recent failed mini-Ministerial in Geneva on the 
Doha Round.  Mulford asked Ahluwalia if he thought it worth 
raising, to which Ahluwalia replied that anything that the 
President felt should be raised would be fine and in fact the 
two had often exchanged views on Doha before.  Further, 
Ahluwulia felt that if the US judged there was the 
possibility of movement, then a discussion at the Bush-Singh 
level would be especially useful.  Ahluwalia noted that he 
had not yet received a full briefing from the Indian 
delegation, but that Joint Secretary Gopal Krisha was 
scheduled to come over during the week to discuss with him. 
However, Ahluwalia said that he had heard from the US 
National Security Council's Dan Price on the August meeting. 
Ahluwalia understood that the breaking point had been over 
the special safeguard mechanism (SSM).  The Indian view, 
Ahluwalia believed, was that the 40% increase in imports as 
the threshold trigger for raising tariff rates was too high. 
As an economist, Ahluwalia opined, he didn't understand why 
the percentage of imports had been used.  More relevant, he 
asserted, was the size of imports to the economy.  The larger 
the importance of imports to the economy, the more important 
a small increase in imports was. 
 
19.  (C) Ahluwalia further offered that his limited 
understanding from the Indian side was that U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab had hardened the US 
position on SSM and would not consider a compromise proposal 
that would have phased in an increase in the import increase 
trigger.  The Ambassador quickly countered that the US 
perceived that India had hardened its stance on SSM after 
Commerce Minister Nath had returned to Geneva from the July 
 
NEW DELHI 00002367  005 OF 005 
 
 
21 Confidence Vote in the Indian Parliament, and that the 
change was unexpected.  Ahluwalia replied indirectly, noting 
that India's view of the SSM was that since the main proposal 
for the Doha bound rates was so similar to the rates from the 
Uruguay Round that the SSM only applied to Uruguay products 
with no margins.  The key question was what should be the 
trigger for raising tariffs under the SSM?  Economic 
Counselor Davison explained that SSM was very important to US 
agricultural interests.  Many of them felt that without the 
SSM, the US concessions on agriculture were too much.  They 
felt the overall package would not have resulted in increased 
and predictable access to Indian markets. 
 
20.  (C) As the meeting drew to a close, Ahluwalia reiterated 
that he agreed with the Ambassador that the President and 
Prime Minister should discuss Doha at their meeting. 
Ahluwalia thought there was maybe a communication issue that 
could be addressed.  The Indian government, he assured the 
Ambassador, was not taking the view that there was nothing 
there at Doha for India.  If there are small points where 
re-thinking and clarification could be made, and USTR Schwab 
and Minister Nath were to meet again before the President-PM 
meeting, then it would be useful to know what the US needs 
are.  If it is just this "SSM thing" of choosing between 
either no SSM until 40% or creating a lower, graduating 
trigger, Ahluwalia concluded, then it did not seem to be a 
major difference. 
 
MULFORD 
MULFORD