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Viewing cable 08KUWAIT934, C/NF) RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KUWAIT934 2008-09-01 14:37 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKU #0934/01 2451437
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011437Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2050
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T KUWAIT 000934 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018 
TAGS: PINR PGOV KU
SUBJECT: (C/NF) RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON 
KUWAITI LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS (C-NE8-01319) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 68899 
     B. KUWAIT 0043 
     C. KUWAIT 0799 
 
Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
1. (S/NF)  This message is an initial response to ref A 
request for additional reporting on the ruling Al Sabah 
family's decision-making processes, as well as the 
relationship between Amir Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al 
Sabah and Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Ahmad 
Al Sabah.  Responses are keyed to the questions posed in 
paragraph 1 of ref A. 
 
 
A. (S/NF)  To what extent is Prime Minister (PM) Shaykh 
Nasser independently determining the family's strategy in 
dealing with the National Assembly and other political 
challenges? 
 
General consensus among Kuwaitis close to the Amir, including 
members of the ruling family, is that PM Shaykh Nasser was 
selected by the Amir for this position precisely because he 
represented the least common denominator:  non-controversial, 
diplomatic in his bearing and background, and unlikely to 
rock any political boats.  Our sense is that the Amir remains 
the bottom line of leadership authority in Kuwait, to the 
extent that he chooses to exercise it (which is increasingly 
rare).  For example, although the Amir publicly empowered the 
PM to select new cabinet members following the May 17 
parliamentary elections, the PM's role with the National 
Assembly and the cabinet has been somewhat diffident and 
restricted; his previous two terms as PM have ended with the 
Amir abruptly dissolving the National Assembly when its 
criticisms of government policies and ministers, and the PM 
himself, got out of hand.  More recently there has been an 
attempt to burnish the PM's credentials via highly visible 
travel to a number of Asian nations, including Kuwait,s 
major energy customers Japan and South Korea.  Whether this 
will result in greater policy assertiveness on his part is 
doubtful. 
 
 
B. (S/NF)  Who is advising PM Shaykh Nasser?  To what degree 
are the Amir and the Amir's advisors involved in guiding the 
PM's decisions?  How do the Amir's advisors perceive the PM, 
and how do they work with him? 
 
The PM,s circle of advisors appears to be limited to 3-4 
individuals, including prominent newspaper owner and 
columnist Dr. Mohammed Al-Rumeihi and the Amir,s niece, 
Shaykha Itimad Khaled Al-Ahmed Al Sabah, who serves as Under 
Secretary in the PM,s diwan, and - reportedly not widely 
known - the Amir,s Office Director Ahmad al-Fahd (not to be 
confused with Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahd, President of the National 
Security Bureau, who is seen as the PM,s chief rival). 
These relationships and the decision making process remain 
fairly opaque.  In contrast to most of our interlocutors, who 
consider the PM to be extremely weak and ineffectual, his 
advisors remain extremely loyal, citing the PM,s personal 
qualities of kindness, diplomacy and generosity.  The Amir's 
principal advisors include his son Shaykh Nasser al-Sabah 
al-Ahmad Al Sabah, Economic Advisor Dr. Yousef Al-Ibrahim, 
and Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti.  The Amir also relies heavily on 
his half brother, Shaykh Mish'al al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al Sabah 
and his nephew (and PM rival) Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahad al-Ahmad 
Al Sabah.  There are intrinsic rivalries amongst the Amir,s 
and PM,s advisors and it,s not clear to what extent they 
coordinate or even interact other than socially.   (Note: The 
extended family relationships here lead to intriguing 
arrangements, for example the PM,s very talented son, Shaykh 
Ahmad Nasser Al Sabah, serves as Office Director to FM Dr. 
Mohamed Al Sabah, also seen as a potential rival to the PM, 
although that relationship pre-dates the PM's assumption of 
power and is based on a close personal relationship between 
Dr. Mohamed and Shaykh Ahmad.  Similarly, the CP's office 
director Athbi al-Fahd is the brother of the PM's rival, 
Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahd. End Note). 
 
 
C. (S/NF)  Who are PM Shaykh Nasser's allies in the family? 
 
The PM has neither close allies nor deep enmities within the 
ruling family, which was apparently one of the criteria 
considered by the Amir in selecting him.  Having spent much 
of his professional life abroad in Kuwait's diplomatic 
service (including 11 years in Tehran), the PM lacks the 
domestic power base that would enable him to manipulate or 
maneuver his foes in the National Assembly.  He is said to 
 
have a close relationship to Kuwait's Ambassador to the US, 
Shaykh Salem Al Sabah, who is not considered a player in 
internal family politics.  Within the family, broadly 
speaking, alliances are as much about protecting turf as they 
are about personal loyalty.  For example,  Interior Minister 
Shaykh Jaber Al Sabah, protects the PM and by extension his 
own cabinet position against possible encroachment by Shaykh 
Ahmed al-Fahd Al Sabah, president of Kuwait's relatively new 
National Security Bureau, which has overlapping 
responsibilities. 
 
 
D. (S/NF)  What reaction have PM Shaykh Nasser's rivals, 
including director of the Citizens' Services Authority Shaykh 
Mohammad al-Abdullah Al-Mubarak Al Sabah (self-designated) 
and Amiri Diwan minister Nasser al-Sabah al-Ahmed Al Sabah 
had to recent events? 
 
Though no criticism is directly levied at the Amir, his 
government, and particularly the PM, is widely perceived as 
weak.  PM Shaykh Nasser's principal rival is the Amir's 
nephew and "president" of the relatively new "National 
Security Board," Shaykh Ahmed al-Fahd Al Sabah.  Shaykh Ahmed 
al-Fahd is clever and ambitious and is widely seen as being 
the only member of the ruling family having both the will and 
the capacity to rule.  He is also widely perceived as being 
corrupt, together with his close ally the Amir's half-brother 
Misha'al.  Openly contemptuous of the PM, Ahmad al-Fahd 
believes the GoK has not done enough to manage its own 
restive tribal and Salafist populations; at the same time he 
has been accused of manipulating parliamentary elections for 
tribal gains as a means of generating loyalty.  His 
relationship with his uncle the Amir reportedly has been 
rocky of late. 
 
Amiri Diwan minister and son of the Amir Shaykh Nasser 
al-Sabah Al-Ahmed Al Sabah generally has avoided open 
political involvement or discourse, apart from loyally 
articulating his father's vision of Kuwait as a major 
cultural, touristic and economic entrepot for the northern 
Gulf region, and ostensibly focuses on enhancing his 
magnificent private art collection.  However, Al Sabah family 
members have told us he remains a determined rival who 
quietly undermines the PM behind the scenes as he awaits his 
opportunity to ascend to power.  Shaykh Nasser al-Sabah has 
also been entrusted by the Amir with maintaining a discreet 
and confidential liaison relationship with a dual national 
Israeli representative based elsewhere in the Gulf. 
 
Shaykh Mohammed al-Abdullah al-Mubarak Al Sabah, who is 
married to Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahd's sister Bibi, is not himself 
a rival of the PM.  Shaykh Mohammed al-Abdullah enjoys a 
certain access to the Amir by virtue of his pedigree:  he is 
one of two or three surviving grandchildren of the nearly 
mythic Mubarak ibn Sabah Al Sabah (known as "The Great"), who 
is the brother of Kuwait's first Emir Shaykh Jaber bin 
Abdullah Al Sabah and who ruled Kuwait from 1896-1915. 
Shaykh Mohammed's influence remains unclear and by his own 
account he is on the "outs" with the Amir following his 
relatively blunt criticism of the PM,s lack of leadership in 
addressing growing Salafist influence and attendant support 
for extremist ideologies in Kuwait. 
 
 
E. (S/NF)  Has PM Shaykh Nasser increased his chances of 
becoming the next crown prince? 
 
No.  On the contrary, many -- including some within the 
ruling family -- are quietly suggesting that a "correction" 
may be necessary in terms of succession politics.  Although 
well-liked on a personal level, Shaykh Nasser is perceived as 
a politically incompetent, protocol wonk whose record is 
tarnished by his failure to construct and effectively manage 
his cabinet.  The current Crown Prince, Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad 
al-Jaber Al Sabah, is similarly (and correctly) viewed as 
being an extremely decent and nice, weak and ineffectual 
leader, thoroughly disengaged from politics.  That said, the 
Amir will be reluctant to "depose" the PM following the 
public opprobrium generated by his unseemly unseating of the 
Father Amir, Shaykh Saad, and subsequent accession to the 
"throne." 
 
 
F. (S/NF)  What impressions do senior Kuwaiti officials have 
of the Prime Minister?  What events do these officials cite 
as key to shaping the relationship between the Prime Minister 
and the Amir? 
 
Even as his leadership credentials are widely criticized, the 
 
PM generally is personally well-liked, which appears to have 
been one of the most important criteria considered by the 
Amir in selecting him for the position, together with his 
unquestioned loyalty.  Senior officials know that the PM 
wields only such authority as he is granted by the Amir, who 
is generally exempt from open criticism.  Our sources tell us 
that the influential Speaker of Parliament, Jassem 
al-Khorafi, himself close to the Amir, has a uniquely 
conflictual relationship with the PM.  (Note:  In forming his 
government, the Amir for the first time divided what had been 
a combined portfolio into two, CP and PM, which had been a 
longstanding subject of discussion.  This may have been a 
deliberate move to create a separate "lightening rod" for the 
National Assembly in the person of the PM, keeping the CP 
inviolate.  End Note.) 
 
Interestingly, during the July 20 visit of NODEL Reed, in 
which the Amir hosted a meeting and dinner in honor of 
Senator Barack Obama at his private residence, and included 
prominent members of the ruling family such as FM Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed, Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber, Director of the 
National Security Bureau Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahed and his own 
half-brother Shaykh Misha'al, the PM remained largely 
disengaged, did not ask any questions (as did the FM and 
others) and sat through most of the event with a taciturn 
expression. 
 
 
G. (S/NF)  In making the ruling family's political decisions, 
what role is the Amir playing? 
 
By all accounts, the Amir has become increasingly passive - 
some would suggest "passive aggressive," - in dealing with 
the political challenges confronting Kuwait.  Some attribute 
this to ongoing depression following his beloved daughter 
Selwa's death five years ago, others attribute it to health 
concerns and heart surgery several years back, and still 
others say it is simply because he is getting old and tired. 
Whatever the cause, all agree the Amir no longer has the 
passion and energy for ruling that seemed to characterize his 
term as PM/CP, although others suggest he continues to 
micromanage on personnel appointments.  His role may in fact 
be larger but simply not visible to us; his nickname within 
family circles is "the Crocodile" because of his tendency to 
come up quietly smiling and then "whack with his tail" anyone 
who gets out of line. 
 
Our own analysis is that Kuwait's demographics have outpaced 
the state's mechanics of governance.  The 1961 Constitution 
and National Assembly worked very well when political 
participation was limited to the well-entrenched, largely 
urban and self-interested merchant class, a handful of 
"intellectuals," and the ruling Al Sabah.  Nearly 47 years 
later, participation has expanded to include a generally 
unruly and often resentful but demographically dominant 
Bedouin population with tribal and Salafist tendencies. 
Originally courted by the Al Sabah as a counterweight to the 
powerful merchants, this group now wields great disruptive 
power and seems intent on breaking down the old system of 
patronage, alleged corruption and mutual accommodation, 
mostly to ensure that they get more of the spoils. 
Traditional methods of governance based on face-saving 
consensus, or "ijma", and ultimate respect for the ruling 
family no longer achieve the desired results. 
 
For example, the PM's June cabinet reshuffle was an attempt 
to accommodate the various elements of society within the 
newly-elected majority Islamist National Assembly.  His 
cabinet included liberal independents, Salafists and Shia, 
but most importantly, ministers hailing from the four largest 
tribes in Kuwait in an effort to deflect tribal animosities 
away from the leadership and onto their elected and appointed 
members.  This strategy has thus far proven unsuccessful. 
 
 
H. (S/NF) Why has the Amir withdrawn from day-to-day 
politics?  Is the Amir essentially retired from political 
life? 
 
This is a difficult question to answer, in part because the 
Amir,s role is unclear.  While some point to the Amir's 
health (he has a pace maker), age (79 or 82, depending on who 
you ask) or emotional health (his ongoing depression over his 
daughter Selwa's death), he may simply assess that rule by 
fiat is no longer possible with Kuwait,s changing 
demographic.  Lesser members of the ruling family and 
prominent merchants believe he (and the Al Sabah family) 
still wields this authority, but that may be wishful thinking. 
 
That said, he does assert his constitutional authority 
without hesitation, declaring to the June opening session of 
the National Assembly that he would use his constitutional 
powers to dissolve the body again if it engaged in socially 
divisive behaviors. 
 
There has been no indication otherwise that either health or 
age are constraints, apart from the occasional absence due to 
medical checkups or unspecified illness.  In the past year 
alone, the Amir has maintained an active schedule, traveling 
to Great Britain, the United States, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Turkey, UAE, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Syria.  He 
routinely receives ambassadorial credentials and has received 
senior USG leaders, including the President and the First 
Lady, separately; Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland 
Security, as well as General Petraeus and Admirals Mullen and 
Fallon.  He has hosted foreign dignitaries from all over the 
world, including Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki and U/S Ali 
Redha Shykh Attar, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 
Abbas, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, Spanish King Juan 
Carlos, Iraqi PM Nouri Al-Maliki, Afghanistan President Hamid 
Karzai, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo, Jordan's King 
Abdullah and GCC leaders. 
 
 
 
J. (S/NF) Why has the Amir not removed the Prime Minister, 
and under what circumstances would the Amir remove him? 
 
The Amir appears to use the PM as a sort of political 
lightening rod in his efforts to balance power and manage his 
fractious parliament.  Moreover, and more fundamentally, the 
Amir likes the PM on a personal level and knows that the PM 
is loyal to him; the PM has served with Shaykh Sabah in 
different capacities for the nearly 44 years the Amir served 
as FM.  He will likely retain the PM, barring a catastrophic 
event, because the PM and his cabinet absorb much of the 
criticism of the GOK that might otherwise tar the Amir.  The 
Amir may also fear that a stronger PM (such as a Shaykh Ahmad 
al-Fahad, or Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah 
al-Salem Al Sabah) would usurp some of the authority of the 
Amir, much as the Amir himself did when he was PM.  (Note: 
It is likely that the Amir appointed his younger, weaker half 
brother Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al Sabah as Crown 
Prince (CP) for this reason.  By tradition, it was incumbent 
on the Amir to choose a crown prince from the al-Salem vice 
al-Jaber branch.  The Amir side-stepped this tradition to 
select his brother.  CP Shaykh Nawaf and PM Shaykh Nasser, 
both non-threatening personalities, were appointed by the 
Amir, reportedly without Al Sabah family consultation, on the 
same day in February 2006.  End Note.) 
 
When the Amir was serving as the PM in 2003, Shaykh Nasser 
was then serving as Minister of the Amiri Diwan.  After the 
death of former Amir Shaykh Jaber, Shaykh Sabah was the most 
viable candidate for Amir during the tumultuous two weeks 
that Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah al-Salem Al Sabah was Amir 
(prior to being declared physically and mentally 
incapacitated).  Many Kuwaitis felt that Shaykh Sabah was 
overly ambitious and though he was the heir apparent to the 
throne, handled his ascension to the Amirship with less grace 
and more ambition than appropriate (he actually released 
Shaykh Saad's health records to the National Assembly), and 
it was the well-positioned Shaykh Nasser (who had been in the 
Amiri Diwan since 2003), who smoothed the family feathers 
ruffled by Shaykh Sabah's disruptive path to power.  (Note: 
Shaykh Sabah -- appointed PM in 2003 -- was the first 
non-Crown Prince to hold that position; this anomaly occurred 
as a result of the then-CP's mental incapacitation.  End 
Note.) 
 
 
K. (S/NF)  What impressions do senior Kuwaiti officials, such 
as National Assembly Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi, have of the 
Amir? 
 
No GOK official, and very rarely anyone else outside of the 
family, speaks ill of the Amir openly in this small and 
close-knit society.  His position is imbued with authority 
beyond his person. 
 
Jassem Al-Khorafi, as Speaker of the National Assembly, is 
the third most senior leader in Kuwait after the Amir and 
Crown Prince.  The Al-Khorafi family is one of the two 
richest business families in Kuwait, if not the world, and 
the Speaker's personal wealth represents a key line of 
influence and power.  Al-Khorafi is considered to be very 
close to the Amir.  Al-Khorafi finds himself in the unique 
position of balancing economic and political agendas in his 
 
 
dealings with both the MPs and ruling family members. 
Politically, he does not threaten the Amir or the Al Sabah 
family.  His job involves managing the unruly National 
Assembly from whence he derives his political power.  Thus 
far, the Amir has been content to grant him latitude in 
running the National Assembly knowing that if too many red 
lines are crossed, the Amir retains the constitutional right 
to dissolve the body. 
 
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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
JONES