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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2803/01 2451510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011510Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9161
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002803 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRA GOV WAELI MAKES CASE FOR ONE-PROVINCE REGION 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2474 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 2448 
 
Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
 ------- 
 
¶1. (C) Basra Governor Wa'eli (Fadhilah) confidently outlined 
for Senior Advisor Gordon Gray on August 30 the progress made 
toward forming a regional government in Basra.  The Governor 
emphasized that Basra would pursue a referendum on a 
one-province region in early 2009, with the possibility of a 
three-province region (including Dhi Qar and Maysan) in the 
near future.  Wa'eli noted that opposition from ISCI/Badr and 
the Prime Minister could lead to potential intimidation of 
Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) officials, but felt 
confident that he would attain approved signatures from ten 
percent of Basra voters and hold a referendum.  Wa'eli 
attempted to maintain a modicum of distance from the movement 
-- organized by his cousin -- but he clearly sees regional 
formation as the ticket to both provincial and personal 
advancement.  The Governor was particularly interested in 
gauging U.S. response to a potential Basra Regional 
Government.  End summary. 
 
Mechanics of Region Formation 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  The Governor explained with considerable enthusiasm 
that his cousin Abd al-Latif (an independent COR member from 
Basra) had gathered signatures from two percent (24,000) of 
Basra's 1,200,000 registered voters, enabling him to petition 
IHEC to call a referendum on Region Formation in Basra. 
After filing the petition -- which is imminent, he assured, 
but not yet done -- petition organizers will have 60 days to 
gather additional signatures (96,000-plus) to reach ten 
percent of all registered voters and therefore hold the 
referendum.  Upon receiving the ten percent petition, the 
director of the IHEC office in Basra  must submit the list to 
the Council of Ministers, who, in turn, must submit the 
petition to the  Baghdad IHEC office within 15 days, Wa,eli 
asserted.  Once names are certified, the Baghdad IHEC office 
must schedule a referendum within 90 days.  For the 
referendum to be approved, over 50 percent of the voters in 
the province must participate, and over 50 percent of those 
participating must vote in favor.  Under the scenario 
described, Wa'eli estimated that elections could be held as 
early as February.  The Governor seemed confident that 
signatures would be gathered, that the referendum would be 
held without great delay, and that the referendum would 
succeed. 
 
Every Province a Region 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Describing Basrawi enthusiasm for Region Formation, 
the Governor noted that his province has particular 
grievances, with tremendous oil wealth, a dysfunctional power 
generation and distribution system that is now providing 
electricity only four hours per day, and the largest net 
transfer of wealth to the central government.  Therefore, he 
noted, Basra residents want to pursue a one-province region, 
not the three-province or nine-province ideas that have been 
floated by other Shi'a political leaders.  (Note: The 
Governor's assertions about the popularity of Region 
Formation and the desire for a one-region formation are 
supported from other contacts in reftels. End note.)  He 
conceded that it might be politically feasible to integrate 
Dhi Qar and Maysan into the region at a later date.  The 
Governor said that these provinces would not need a 
referendum to join a Basra-led region; in his estimation, 
each province could join based on a two-thirds majority vote 
of a new Basra Regional Government and the Provincial Council 
of the province wishing to join.  (Note: This is incorrect, 
according to our Iraqi constitutional experts. After the 
first two steps described by the Governor, a referendum to 
the voters in each petitioning province must take place. End 
Note) Wa'eli was less than enthusiastic about a 
three-province region, saying "Region Formation is the future 
in Iraq.  Every province will want to be its own region." 
 
What Basra Has to Gain 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) In the Governor's view, Region Formation would bring 
about huge fiscal benefits.  The central government allocated 
Basra a 160 million USD budget in 2006 and 176 million USD in 
2007, he said.  According to Wa'eli the Director General of 
the Public Works department told him he could only finish 4 
percent of his ministry's core projects in Basra with the 
entire provincial budget.  The Governor estimated that as an 
independent region his province could collect 1.5 billion USD 
 
BAGHDAD 00002803  002 OF 002 
 
 
in taxes, tolls, and fees.  He also claimed that his province 
turns over 2.5 billion USD annually to the Ministry of 
Finance, 75 percent of which it would get back as a region. 
Needless to say, the Governor believes that retaining these 
funds will be the key to controlling budgets, generating 
electricity, and spurring economic development. 
 
Overcoming Shi'a Opposition 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Wa'eli admitted that opposition from the central 
government and ISCI/Badr must be managed -- he was careful to 
cast his cousin, not himself, as organizer of the 
one-province region movement.  Nevertheless, the Governor 
dismissed concerns that the Basra GEO office, which has seen 
staff members murdered in recent weeks, could be intimidated 
by petition opponents or overwhelmed by the need to 
subsequently register voters for provincial elections and 
handle the referendum process.  He conceded that the major 
parties (ISCI, Da'wa, Fadhilah) in Basra have been loathe to 
declare formal support for the referendum for fear of 
repercussions from the Prime Minister's office or Badr Corps. 
 As a result, minor parties such as the Gathering for 
Democracy, the Nationalist Trend, al-Qassimi, and others with 
little to lose have played more of a leading role in the 
movement, with the Governor's consent. 
 
Seeking Approval 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Governor was curious to know what the U.S. thought 
about Region Formation in Basra.  He related a recent 
conversation with the British Ambassador in which he was 
advised to tell his allies to back off from the Region 
Formation campaign.  Gray responded that we were primarily 
concerned with making sure that Iraq maintains its 
territorial integrity and that any referenda are carried out 
in a transparent manner consistent with the Iraqi 
Constitution.  He also cautioned that Region Formation may 
not be the silver bullet needed to address electricity 
production and other Basrawi concerns.  The Governor argued 
against the final point, but appeared otherwise satisfied 
that the U.S. would not try to oppose the process. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) With each subsequent meeting -- four with us in August 
alone -- Governor Wa'eli appears increasingly committed to 
the process of Region Formation in Basra.  With the 
Governor's own low popularity in an election season, and with 
continued Basrawi frustration toward the central government, 
the timing appears right for the Governor to take the risk 
associated with attempting to carry a Region Formation 
campaign to its conclusion.  Several factors will make the 
campaign more difficult than the Governor suggests -- there 
is no guarantee that signatures will be gathered and approved 
by IHEC easily, and his idea of a referendum by February 
seems overly optimistic.  In the end, the campaign may still 
be no more than a bargaining chip against the central 
government to leverage higher budget allocations.  But the 
Governor realizes that Basrawi frustration gives him a 
serious chance to succeed in creating a one-province Basra 
Regional Government, and he knows it.  End comment. 
BUTENIS