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Viewing cable 08BUENOSAIRES1205, ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL PETERSON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BUENOSAIRES1205 2008-08-28 15:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1205/01 2411528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281528Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1889
INFO RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001205 
 
FOR REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON FROM AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY 
WAYNE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR H AND RM/F/DFS/FO/AA/CAA 
USDA FOR FAS/OA/OCRA/OFSO 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: OVIP CODEL EAGR ECON PREL BEXP AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL PETERSON 
 
1. (U) This telegram is sensitive but unclassified, and not for 
Internet distribution. 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On behalf of Embassy Buenos Aires, I warmly welcome your 
September 3-6 visit to Argentina.  The agricultural and political 
situation in Argentina has changed significantly since your visit 
here last year.  Previous optimism about the growing potential of 
the agricultural sector and the new administration of President 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) changed after the government 
substantially increased export taxes for soybeans and other products 
on March 11.  Agricultural producers responded to the export tax 
increase by staging a series of farm strikes and protests that 
culminated in July with the Argentine Senate (previously dominated 
by government supporters) narrowly rejecting the tax increase.  In a 
split Senate, the tie-breaking vote against the tax was cast by Vice 
President Cobos.  The popularity of CFK plunged during the dispute 
from close to 50 percent to around 20 percent at the height of the 
dispute.  (It now stands at 29%.)  While repeal of the tax increase 
ended the crisis, the dispute between producers and the government 
continues, with agricultural producers recently threatening to 
resume protests over government restrictions on exports of beef, 
dairy products, wheat, corn and other products. 
 
3.  (SBU) Rising inflation and the government's evident 
under-reporting of it further eroded popular support for the 
government, although the most recent polls indicate the President 
has recovered some of the popularity lost at the height of the 
agricultural conflict.  Her husband, former president Nestor 
Kirchner, has lowered his profile since the July 17 defeat of the 
export tax in the Senate, and the President has made some 
conciliatory gestures, including by holding her first-ever press 
conference on August 2.  The President appointed new Agricultural 
Secretary Carlos Cheppi in July following the defeat in the Senate. 
While Cheppi has made some efforts to improve relations with the 
agricultural sector, he got off to a rocky start when no farm leader 
was invited to his inauguration and Cheppi, along with other 
government leaders, boycotted the traditional Palermo farm show at 
the end of July. 
 
------------------------------ 
A Government Against the Ropes 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU)  On March 11, the GOA unexpectedly issued a decree that 
increased export taxes on soybeans, sunflower, corn, and wheat. 
That precipitated the worst political crisis of either Kirchner 
administration.  Argentina's four principal agricultural 
organizations showed rare unity in organizing production stoppages, 
roadblocks, and public demonstrations to protest the new tax, 
leading to nationwide shortages of such staples as beef, chicken, 
dairy products, and vegetables.  The farm protest also enjoyed 
widespread urban support.  Efforts to negotiate a viable compromise 
failed, in part due to opposition from hard-line members of the 
government, and the GOA increased controls on major exports by 
suspending most beef exports and limiting exports of other products. 
 
 
5.  (SBU)  When the President announced June 17 that she was 
submitting the tax hike to the Congress for its approval, farm 
groups suspended the farm strike and focused on the congressional 
vote.  Former president Nestor Kirchner quickly turned the issue 
into a vote of confidence for the government.  Although it appeared 
that the Kirchners had two-thirds support in both houses of Congress 
after the October 2007 presidential elections, they lost support on 
this issue within the Congress and within their own ruling 
coalition.  In the Chamber of Deputies, the GOA proposal barely 
squeaked by July 5 with a 129-122 vote.  On July 17, after 18 hours 
of debate, the Senate tied early in the morning at 36 to 36, forcing 
Vice President Julio Cobos to break the stalemate with his vote 
against the government proposal.  Senator Urquia, who you will meet 
on Friday, also broke with the government and voted against the 
export tax.  A few days later, the government announced repeal of 
the tax increase, returning the export tax on soybeans to 35 percent 
and ending debate over the export tax regime. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Ongoing Dispute with Agricultural Sector 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Relations between the government and farm sector continue 
to be strained.  While repeal of the increase in the export tax 
resolved a major issue with the farm sector, agricultural producers 
are now pressing for a reduced export tax rate for small and medium 
producers.  Producers are also pressing for removal of export 
restrictions put in place to keep down domestic food prices.  The 
government limits exports of beef and dairy products, and also 
places restrictions on wheat and corn exports to ensure domestic 
supplies.  The government recently announced that it will provide 
additional subsidies for the farm sector, but farm producers tend to 
be skeptical that they will ever receive the promised payments. 
 
7. (SBU) The government has also increased pressure on agricultural 
exporters, including Cargill.  The government is alleging that 
exporters took illegal action to avoid increases in export taxes in 
late 2007 and in March 2008.  Under longstanding regulations, 
exporters were allowed to register exports in advance of actual 
shipment of products and lock in the export tax in place at the time 
of export registration.  In the face of widespread reports that the 
government would increase export taxes after the 2007 elections, 
exporters registered exports for a significant portion of the 2008 
crop.  While legal under the existing legislation, the Congress 
subsequently passed a new law making the export tax increase 
retroactive.  The government is now seeking to collect export taxes 
from the exporters at the higher tax rates.  On the positive side, 
there are some signs of progress on the longstanding dispute between 
the government and Monsanto on the collection of royalties for 
Monsanto's seed varieties.  Monsanto is now in discussions with the 
government on the introduction of new seed varieties and payment for 
the technology, a significant departure from the previous government 
policy of refusing to negotiate over the issue. 
 
------------------------------- 
Background: Political Landscape 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) CFK took office on December 10, 2007, receiving the 
presidential sash from her husband, Nestor Kirchner.  CFK has a 
decades-long history in politics, having served in the Chamber of 
Deputies and most recently in the Senate.  She won the October 28 
election with 45% of the vote over a divided and largely ineffective 
opposition.  Having campaigned on the seemingly contradictory themes 
of change and continuity, she has retained most of her husband's 
cabinet.  Apart from the agricultural dispute, CFK's major policy 
challenges will be to contain inflation, attract and boost 
investment -- particularly in Argentina's energy sector -- and to 
restore a sense of law and order to an electorate increasingly 
concerned about crime and security. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Background: Economic and Commercial Landscape 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly 
literate population, and export-oriented agricultural sector, and a 
diversified industrial base.  Following the 2001-2002 economic 
crisis, 2003-2006 real GDP growth averaged over 8%, and Argentina's 
GDP in 2007 grew at an estimated rate of 8.5% to $255 billion, 
roughly $6,500 per capita.  This impressive economic recovery has 
also led to improvements in key socio-economic indicators, with 
unemployment down from a peak of over 20% in 2002 to 8% during 2008 
and poverty levels down from a post-crisis high of over 50% to a 
(still-worrisome) 20% range (independent estimates put poverty 
levels closer to the 30% range).  The five-year-long economic 
recovery can be attributed to a number of factors, including a 
post-crisis move to a flexible exchange rate regime, sustained 
global and regional growth during this period, the government's 
efforts to boost domestic aggregate demand via monetary, fiscal, and 
income distribution policies, and favorable international commodity 
price trends.  GDP growth in 2008 is expected to slow to around 
6.5%. 
 
10. (SBU) While the accumulation of a substantial foreign exchange 
reserve cushion (roughly $48 billion as of July 2008) and expanded 
tax collections have helped insulate Argentina's economy from 
external shocks, the Central Bank's policy of maintaining an 
undervalued exchange rate and negative real interest rates has 
contributed to substantial inflationary pressures.  Private sector 
analysts estimate that inflation was in the 17-20% range for 2007, 
while the government's official 2007 inflation number was 8.5%. 
Inflation levels in the first four months of 2008 are estimated by 
independent economists in the 25% range but are reported as much 
lower by the government.  There is ongoing public debate about 
measures to control inflation as well as the reliability of the 
government's statistics. 
 
11. (SBU) The government largely froze key public utility tariff 
rates since 2002 and, since 2005, has negotiated price stabilization 
agreements on a sizable basket of essential consumer goods.  The 
combination of Argentina's undervalued currency and high global 
commodity prices have lifted Argentine exports to a record $55.4 
billion in 2007.  Major 2007 Argentine export markets were Mercosur 
(22%), the EU (18%) and NAFTA (11%).  Argentine 2007 imports totaled 
$44.8 billion, with the major suppliers Mercosur (36%), the EU (17%) 
and NAFTA (16%).  Total U.S.-Argentina two-way trade in 2007 totaled 
$9.5 billion.  Imports from the U.S. largely comprise intermediate 
capital goods which have contributed to improvements in domestic 
productive capacity. 
 
12. (U) Over 500 U.S. companies are currently operating in Argentina 
and employ over 150,000 Argentine workers.  U.S. investment in 
Argentina is widely diversified, but heavy investment is found in 
the manufacturing, information, and financial sectors.  Other major 
sources of investment include Spain, Chile, Italy, France, Canada, 
Japan, and Brazil.  A range of economic experts have identified 
challenges to sustaining high levels of economic growth in the 
future, including: capacity constraints; the need for substantial 
new investment in primary infrastructure; potential energy shortages 
in the face of high growth and domestic energy prices kept below 
international market levels; increasing scarcity of highly skilled 
labor; inflation and the government's heterodox policies to contain 
it, including price controls.  Continuing Argentine arrears to 
international creditors (including over $20 billion in default 
claims by international bondholders, including U.S. citizens, and 
over $7 billion owed to official creditors, approximately $360 
million of which is owed to the U.S. government) and a large number 
of arbitration claims filed by foreign companies, including U.S. 
companies, are legacies of the 2001/2002 economic crisis that remain 
to be resolved and adversely affect Argentina's investment climate. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Anti-Americanism, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Goals 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
13. (SBU) The greatest overall challenge we face in Argentina is the 
high level of anti-Americanism in the Argentine public.  Argentina 
consistently registers the highest levels of anti-Americanism in the 
hemisphere in public opinion polls.  Working to change these 
perceptions is the Embassy's highest priority.  Argentina maintains 
positive political relations with the United States, but there is 
room for further improvement.  One of the major tasks facing the 
Embassy is forging relationships of trust with a government that has 
been largely inward-focused and intent on maintaining an image as 
independent from our country.  In lobbying the GOA, it can be 
counter-productive to push an issue too aggressively and especially 
in public.  Argentine officials react very negatively to perceived 
affronts their sovereignty, often winning public support for their 
strong reactions.  Shut off from other sources of 
international financing, the GOA has turned to Hugo Chavez to place 
large bond issues. 
 
14. (SBU) Argentina, nevertheless, holds Major Non-NATO Ally status 
and cooperates in regional security, counter-terrorism, drug 
interdiction, nonproliferation and in contributing troops to U.N. 
peacekeeping missions.  The GoA 
has been a strong international voice on arms control and 
nonproliferation issues.  In the IAEA, the GoA has voted to 
refer Iran's noncompliance to the UNSC.  The GoA has also endorsed 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI).  Just this month, Argentina and the 
U.S. co-hosted in Buenos Aires a gathering of all OAS States to look 
for ways to better implement UN resolution 1540, which is aimed at 
keeping WMD from terrorists.  It is under the banner of science that 
the USG and Argentina have realized some of the best examples of 
bilateral cooperation, and we have a long history of aerospace 
cooperation with Argentina. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Promoting U.S. Economic/Commercial Interests 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) In support of U.S. companies operating in 
Argentina, we are encouraging the GoA to support a more 
welcoming investment climate, with greater regulatory, legal, and 
tax regime consistency.  We expend a good deal of effort supporting 
and working with U.S. companies.  We are working closely with the 
GoA and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors to resolve 
longstanding arrears to the USG and are encouraging the GoA to 
resolve claims of U.S. holders of defaulted Argentine bonds. 
Regarding ongoing WTO trade negotiations, Argentina has staked out a 
hard-line position that links acceptance of developed economy 
agricultural sector proposals with more developing nation 
flexibility on industrial tariff cuts.  We have been urging them to 
adopt a more constructive approach. 
 
--------------------------- 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 
--------------------------- 
 
16. (SBU) Argentina is on the USG's Tier-2 Watchlist for lack of 
progress in providing greater assistance to victims and curbing 
official complicity in trafficking at the provincial level. 
However, the legislature recently passed fairly comprehensive 
anti-TIP legislation that makes TIP-related violations a federal 
crime.  Argentina is a source, transit, and destination country for 
men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial 
sexual exploitation and forced labor.  According to the 
International Organization for Migration, 80 percent of trafficking 
victims in Argentina are Argentine, most of whom are trafficked for 
the purpose of sexual exploitation.  Bolivians and Peruvians are 
trafficked into the country for forced labor in sweatshops and 
agriculture.  Argentine efforts to combat trafficking have focused 
on prevention and training of security and government officials. 
One of our key goals this year is to support a vigorous GoA 
implementation of the new federal law and promote the prosecution of 
human traffickers.  However, a number of NGOs have criticized this 
new law as weak on the issue of adult "consent." 
 
------------------------- 
Democracy and Rule of Law 
------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) We work with the GoA, media, and civil society to 
strengthen democratic institutions, fight corruption, and 
reinforce civilian control of the military.  We promote key 
reform efforts such as ending the election of representatives by 
party slate lists, increasing governmental transparency, and 
limiting public corruption and strengthening the political 
independence of the judicial branch.  While we do not succeed on 
every issue, we continue to cultivate the GoA as a cooperative 
partner in multilateral fora, and seek Argentina's cooperation in 
the defense of democracy and the observance of human rights in 
countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, as well as UN 
peacekeeping in Haiti. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
18. (SBU) The Government of Argentina generally respects the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens.  The Kirchner 
government's human rights policy focuses on seeking justice for the 
human rights violations committed during the 1976-83 military 
dictatorship, which resulted in the disappearance of between 
11,000-30,000 leftist guerrillas and political dissidents.  It does 
not, however, focus on bringing to justice armed guerrilla groups 
who also committed human rights abuses during the same period 
(known as "the Dirty War"), albeit on a much smaller scale.  To 
date, the courts have convicted three former officials of the 
military regime, including a military chaplain.  We recently 
returned one person sought here for human rights violations and 
another individual wanted by the GoA remains in Florida.  Argentines 
are also concerned about one particular citizen on death row in 
Texas.  Argentina is a strong international advocate for human 
rights and the USG and GOA generally cooperate on human rights 
issues in international and regional fora. 
 
----------------------------- 
International Crime and Drugs 
----------------------------- 
 
19. (SBU) Argentina is a transshipment and destination point for 
narcotics emanating largely from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay.  With its large chemical and pharmaceutical industries, 
Argentina is also a major source and destination for precursor 
chemicals.  Argentine law enforcement agencies cooperate closely 
with their USG counterparts on drug interdiction efforts, fugitive 
arrests, and information sharing, which has resulted in increased 
enforcement.  This Mission is focused on institutional 
capacity-building and expanding training opportunities for law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges in order to improve 
internal security and decrease international drug and criminal 
activity in Argentina.  Justice Minister Fernandez has repeatedly 
stated that he wants to put top priority on attacking drug 
traffickers and less priority on arresting individual users.  The 
Supreme Court President is working hard to increase judicial 
independence and efficiency. 
 
Terrorism 
--------- 
 
20. (SBU) Former President Nestor Kirchner's administration 
strongly supported counter-terrorism policies during his time in 
office, and his wife and successor CFK has continued the 
cooperation.  Argentina was itself a victim of international 
terrorist attacks in the 1990s and has been a cooperative partner in 
countering terrorism, especially in the Tri-border Area.  On 
November 7, 2007, Argentina succeeded in getting Interpol's General 
Assembly vote to issue international capture notices for five 
current and former Iranian officials and one Lebanese Hizballah 
member (who was reportedly killed in Syria February 13) wanted in 
connection with the 1994 terrorist bombing of the Buenos Aires 
Jewish Community Center (AMIA). 
 
21. (SBU) Argentina cooperates with the United Nations, the 
OAS, its neighbors, and the United States on a number of 
counterterrorism initiatives.  We assist the GoA in 
capacity-building, within the restraints created by Brooke 
Amendment sanctions, to strengthen Argentine law enforcement forces. 
 We also work closely with the Argentine military on modernization, 
increasing interoperability, and training and education focused on 
civilian control, respect for human rights, defense resource 
management, strategic planning, and science and technology. 
Argentina has a leading role in the OAS Inter-American Committee 
Against Terrorism (CICTE), established on Argentina's initiative in 
the 1990s. Argentina has ratified all of the 12 international 
counter-terrorism conventions and has been an active participant in 
the 3 plus 1 tri-border area counterterrorism mechanism, which met 
most recently in Asuncion, Paraguay in January.  The GOA and the USG 
have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 
1993, and an extradition treaty that entered into force in 2000. 
 
Money Laundering, Terrorism Finance, Legal Reform 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
22. (SBU) The Embassy and USG agencies worked with the GoA to pass 
comprehensive antiterrorism, money laundering, and 
terrorism finance legislation to strengthen local enforcement 
efforts.  Since 2005, and largely in response to pressure from the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the GoA and Argentine Central 
Bank have acted to fortify the anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorism finance legal and regulatory regime, passing new 
legislation, amending existing laws, and establishing stricter 
financial sector regulations.  The result is that Argentina 
currently has an adequate legal/regulatory structure that provides 
the legal foundation for the Central Bank and other law enforcement 
and regulatory bodies to investigate and prosecute money laundering 
and terrorism finance.  The challenge now is for Argentine law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies and institutions to enforce 
aggressively the newly strengthened and expanded legal, regulatory, 
and administrative measures available to them to combat financial 
crimes. 
 
WAYNE