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Viewing cable 08PARTO8, U) Secretary Rice's June 26-27 Participation in

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PARTO8 2008-07-12 12:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL US Delegation, Secretary
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNAI #0008/01 1941210
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121210Z JUL 08
FM USDEL SECRETARY ASIA
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2018 
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PHUM KNNP KWBG
KPAL, G8, BM, PK, AF, NK, IR, IS, ZI, SU, LE, UK, RS, FR, 
CA, IT, JA 
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Rice's June 26-27 Participation in 
the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Kyoto, Japan 
 
1.  (U) Classified by:  Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State, Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
2.  (U) June 27, 2008 at 18:00, and June 28, 2008 at 
09:30; Kyoto, Japan. 
 
3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
U/S Bill Burns 
A/S Christopher R. Hill, EAP 
Lt. Gen. William Fraser 
Evan Reade (Embassy Notetaker) 
Phil Cummings (Embassy Notetaker) 
 
JAPAN 
Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura 
Kenichiro Sasae, Deputy Foreign Minister for Political 
Affairs 
Makita Shimokawa, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister 
Takehiro Funakoshi, Principal Sr. Foreign Policy Advisor 
 
GERMANY 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
Dr. Volker Stanzel, Director General for Political Affairs 
Jens Plogner, Deputy Head of Foreign Office 
Daniel Kriener, Deputy Division Head 
 
FRANCE 
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner 
Gerard Araud, Dep. Sec. General and Political Director 
Philippe Errera, Advisor for G-8 
Philippe Faure, Ambassador to Japan 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Foreign Minister David Miliband 
Mark Lyall-Grant, Director General for Political Affairs 
Paul Williams, Head of Europe Global Group 
David McFarlane, Minister's Private Secretary 
 
ITALY 
Foreign Minister Franco Frattini 
Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata, Political Director 
Alain Maria Ecomomides, Chief of Cabinet 
Mario Boba, Ambassador to Japan 
 
CANADA 
Foreign Minister David Emerson 
Colleen Swords, Assistant Dep. Minister, Political Dir. 
Barrett Bingley, Assistant to Foreign Minister 
Ron Jarson, Director of Foreign Policy Planning Div. 
 
RUSSIA 
First Vice Minister Andrei Denisov 
Sergei Kislyak, Deputy Foreign Minister 
 
 
 
SLOVENIA (EU Presidency) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrij Rupel 
Matjaz Sinkovec, State Secretary 
 
EU COUNCIL 
Robert Cooper, Dir. Gen. for External and Pol-Mil Affairs 
Bruno Scholl, Coordinator of Political and Security 
Committee 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Karel Kovanda, Dep. Dir. General for External Relations 
David Tirr, Head of Unit, European Correspondent 
Stefan Huber, Minister Counselor 
Dominic Al-Badri, Political Analyst 
 
4.  (C) SUMMARY:  The G8 Foreign Ministers met in Kyoto on 
June 26-27.  At a working dinner on June 26 attended by 
Principals plus Political Directors, the topics of Burma, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan were discussed.  The next 
morning the issues of North Korea, Iran, the Middle East 
Peace Process, and Lebanon were taken up.  The meeting 
closed with a working lunch during which Zimbabwe and 
Sudan were covered.  The Chairman's Statement, as well as 
the G8 Foreign Ministers Statement on Zimbabwe and the G8 
Foreign Ministers Statement on Afghanistan, can be found 
on the Japanese MOFA's website at 
mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/f_kyoto08/in dex.html. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
----- 
BURMA 
----- 
 
5.  (C) In the Japanese-led discussion on Burma, G8 
members noted the lackluster cyclone response by the 
Burmese government, which led to an unnecessary loss of 
life, in order for the Burmese regime to preserve the 
illusion that the country did not need international help. 
Several members, including Italy, pushed for a formal UN 
statement on the regime's lack of transparency in 
accounting for its use of international humanitarian aid, 
stating the international community was facing a 
credibility test.  Japan called for incentives to promote 
change by the Burmese regime. 
 
6.  (C) Secretary Rice, the Canadians, and the British 
favored adding stronger language to the G8 chair?s 
statement addressing long-term political reforms and the 
regime?s failure to provide an adequate response to the 
cyclone.  The Japanese noted concern with the growing 
influence of China and India, neither of which promoted 
democratic governance in Burma.  Secretary Rice, the 
French, the Russians, and the British proposed reaching 
out to ASEAN and China to apply pressure on the regime. 
The Russians were alone in calling for limited UN actions 
and "balance" in the G8 statement by noting a small but 
 
 
significant trend of improvement in the regime's disaster 
relief response. 
 
-------------------- 
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Participants were united in their concern over the 
rise of extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATAs) along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and 
over increasing political instability in Pakistan.  There 
was general agreement on increasing G8 member state 
assistance in healthcare, education, border security, and 
economic stabilization.  The UK called for action to 
weaken the pervasive role of the military in the Pakistani 
government and to strengthen the role of civil society. 
The Italians were strongly in favor of reviving the 
Potsdam Process, where the leaders of both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan were invited to the G-8 to foster cooperation on 
economic development in the border region.  Participants 
expressed support for greater dialogue between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan in order to diffuse growing political and 
military tensions.  The Canadians proposed more aid and 
training to combat the narcotics trade, and together with 
Russia warned that short-term accommodation of extremists 
in Afghanistan ultimately destabilized both Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. 
 
8.  (C) The British also proposed enlisting Saudi Arabia 
and China, both of which had strengthened business, 
military, and grassroots ties, to jointly promote G-8 
priorities in the region.  The Italians and Canadians 
called for strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan by 
introducing programs to reduce judicial corruption. 
Secretary Rice also noted problems with police corruption. 
Several members expressed frustration with President 
Karzai for slow progress on many reform fronts, and for 
the corruption of members in his inner circle, but 
Secretary Rice and others noted that Afghanistan had come 
a long way in its civil and political development since 
2001.  The EU Council proposed distributing more official 
direct assistance through local institutions rather than 
international NGOs to boost the standing of local 
governments. 
 
----------- 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
 
9.  (C) Japanese FM Koumura led the discussion on North 
Korea by noting the resolution of the North Korea nuclear 
issue was an important challenge for the international 
community and called for continued support for the Six- 
Party Talks process.  He welcomed the North's declaration 
of its nuclear programs but cautioned that a verification 
regime must now be crafted and implemented.  As for Japan- 
North Korea relations, Koumura reported negotiations had 
 
 
resumed on investigating the cases of Japanese citizens 
abducted by the North. 
 
10.  (C) Secretary Rice concurred that while the 
submission of the North's declaration was an important 
step, the creation of a verification protocol was even 
more important.  She predicted that Phase III of the Six- 
Party Talks would be difficult as we must be certain that 
the North accounted for, declared, and disabled its 
nuclear program.  Other important issues also remained, 
she added, noting missile proliferation, the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis, and the abduction issue, which was 
not just an issue between Japan and North Korea, but an 
issue between the United States and the North, as well. 
She reminded the other participants that North Korea 
remained the most closed and dangerous regime on earth and 
that there must be a concerted effort to make it clear to 
the North that we expected them to fulfill their 
obligations and that everyone was watching. 
 
11.  (C) Following the Secretary's remarks, FM Koumura 
invited EAP Assistant Secretary Hill to report on recent 
developments.  A/S Hill stated the process had been a long 
one and that much difficult work remained ahead. 
Verification principles must be established and fashioned 
into a process; the North must grant access to nuclear 
materials, sites, and personnel.  He said we were not 
playing a game of trust with the North.  Rather, we were 
playing a game of serious verification.  He predicted that 
Phase III would see much more multilateral negotiations, 
rather than bilateral talks with the North, and said that 
once the abandonment stage was reached, the other nuclear 
powers would also need to be involved.  The Secretary then 
touched on the recent measures taken by the United States 
to rescind North Korea?s designation as a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism (SST) and lift the application of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act.  She explained that very little had 
been given up and that means of pressure remained. 
 
12.  (C) The EU Presidency commended A/S Hill and said the 
progress achieved to date was a great success for the 
international community.  He stressed this success was the 
result of engagement rather than isolation.  With regard 
to the humanitarian crisis, he noted the need to focus on 
"small items," such as leniency for North Koreans crossing 
into China in search of food, in addition to the "big" 
nuclear issue.  French FM Kouchner focused on the 
humanitarian dimensions of the situation in the North, 
highlighting the lack of food, the resulting starvation, 
malnutrition, and disease, and said that even if hospitals 
existed to treat the sick, there were no means to 
transport the ill to them.  He said that North Korea must 
agree to grant access to international aid organizations, 
particularly those associated with the UN.  In addition, 
efforts must be made to inform the North Korean population 
that our intention was to help them, not to hurt them.  He 
 
 
decried DPRK propaganda that made its people believe that 
international food aid was poisoned.  EC Representative 
Kovanda pointed out that the EU maintained a small 
technical cooperation office in the North but agreed with 
Kouchner that international aid organizations lacked 
access and that there was no information available on crop 
production nor an assessment of the overall situation. 
 
13.  (C) Responding to an inquiry from Germany about 
whether scholarships for North Korean students should be 
offered, Secretary Rice said that none of us would feel 
comfortable as long as the North remained closed as the 
last Stalinist regime in the world.  Efforts to promote 
cultural, educational, and sporting exchanges should be 
promoted, even though it was very doubtful the regime 
would let its citizens participate.  Russia indicated it 
strongly supported Japan's desire to resolve the abduction 
issue and urged the Chair's statement be strengthened to 
include using President Bush's language that this issue 
must be resolved.  VM Denisov also called for stronger 
language on the North's need to fully participate in the 
verification process.  FM Koumura thanked Russia and 
others for their support on the abduction issue and again 
urged the members of the G8 to support the on-going work 
of the Six Parties. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
14.  (C) French FM Kouchner led off the discussion by 
stating all members of the G-8 shared concerns about 
Iran's nuclear program.  The most recent report by IAEA 
Director El Baradei and the outcome of the most recent 
Board of Governors meeting strongly indicated Iran 
continued to work toward the development of a nuclear 
weapons capability.  This, coupled with Iran's continued 
work on ballistic missile technology, could lead to a 
worst-case possibility: a nuclear armed Iran.  The P5- 
plus-one had been trying to make progress with the 
Iranians, but Tehran did not seem to want to hear that we 
were not opposed to the development of a peaceful nuclear 
program.  As a result, the dual-track approach -- 
combining sanctions and incentives -- was the only 
approach open to us.  The recent visit to Tehran by Javier 
Solana and five of the six political directors meant we 
were in a more delicate situation now, said Kouchner, who 
commented that "we'd received Iran's answer to our new 
proposal before we arrived when the Iranians announced 
they planned to bring 6,000 more centrifuges on line." 
Our central objective must continue to be to convince the 
Iranians, both the public and the political elite, that we 
were not opposed to a civil program and that sanctions 
would continue to mount unless they ceased their uranium 
enrichment activities. 
 
 
15.  (C) The Secretary concurred and said she was hopeful 
we had done a better job of getting through to the Iranian 
people with the publication of our latest offer.  However, 
the fact was that the Iranians continued to advance their 
program, and others in the region were becoming more and 
more nervous.  There was a real danger that the Israelis 
would soon become convinced that we could not halt Iran's 
program through diplomatic means.  She stressed that if 
Iran obtained a nuclear weapons capability, a difficult 
region would become a chaotic region.  Iran, she said, is 
the most difficult issue facing the international 
community. 
 
16.  (C) German FM Steinmeier agreed that Iran's nuclear 
program was not just a concern to the G8 but to the 
neighbors as well.  He suggested that Iran was also afraid 
that perhaps its influence in other parts of the region 
would wane if, for example, the Syrians and Israelis 
reached an accord, or if Hamas and Fatah reconciled, or if 
the situations in Lebanon and Iraq became more stable. 
Accordingly, this gave Iran an incentive to continue its 
nuclear program in order to maintain influence.  Germany, 
he said, was skeptical about what Iran's response would be 
to the P5+1 offer; if the response ultimately received was 
not positive, further steps by the Security Council would 
have to be considered. 
 
17.  (C) EU High Representative Solana did not expect a 
breakthrough from Tehran, said EU Council Representative 
Cooper, who pointed out that the Iranian default position 
to any offer was to reject.  "Rejecting offers is easier 
than responding or agreeing in a consensus-based system." 
However, both the government and the media were clearly 
impressed by the presence of the political directors, 
particularly those from China and Russia, and by the fact 
that the Secretary had also signed the letter conveying 
the offer.  Hopefully, a debate within Iran would be 
launched as a result.  Italian FM Frattini agreed that it 
was easier for Iran to simply reject all offers because 
once it accepted, it must negotiate and then fulfill 
commitments.  Italy, he said, supported taking a resolute 
and firm approach and sanctions that were effective and 
achievable.  However, our contacts with Iran must be 
calibrated to avoid conveying the message to a 
nationalistically-sensitive populace that the world was 
somehow out to get them.  Italy understood Israel's 
concerns, but believed an attack on Iran would be 
catastrophic and ultimately ineffective and urged that 
voices be raised against this option. 
 
18.  (C) British FS Miliband said that although we had not 
achieved a breakthrough on Iran, the conveyance of the 
latest offer had at least established a bridgehead.  Two 
things must now be done, he said: increase the 
international consensus against Iran and tighten the 
screws.  The first should involve widening the 
 
 
international consensus against Iran's nuclear ambitions 
by bringing in other countries as well, such as India, 
South Africa, and Brazil.  Our ambassadors in these and 
other countries should be engaged in joint demarchis and 
public diplomacy events to stress the consensus.  We must 
also continue to build consensus in our own countries and 
also within Iran using cultural, diplomatic, and sporting 
events to convince the Iranians that "their other vital 
interests are being harmed by immovable and stubborn 
officials," a phrase he quoted from an interview recently 
given by a former deputy in Iran's nuclear program.  As 
for tightening the screws, increased IAEA involvement was 
called for.  At the September meeting of the Board of 
Governors it must be clear that we were all standing 
together.  In addition, we must build on the actions taken 
already by the UNSC.  Resolution 1803 should be enforced 
and built upon. 
 
19.  (C) The Russian delegation said it had always 
stressed to the Iranians that the P5-plus-one were 
standing firmly together.  Japanese FM Koumura reported 
briefly on Prime Minister Fukuda's recent meeting with 
President Ahmadinejad, at which Fukuda conveyed the will 
of the international community that Iran comply with the 
Security Council resolutions and cease its uranium 
enrichment activities. 
 
--------------------------- 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE - LEBANON 
--------------------------- 
 
20.  (C) The Secretary led this session by confirming that 
the Annapolis conference had launched three important 
tracks.  The first track involved improving the daily 
lives of the Palestinians, particularly those in the West 
Bank.  There had been some progress in Jenin, where 
security responsibilities had passed from the Israelis to 
the Palestinian police.  The Fayyad government was 
dedicated to this process, whereby Palestinian police 
stepped in, the Israelis stepped back, increased economic 
activity followed, and access improved.  She acknowledged 
the process had seen some ups and downs involving Israeli 
incursions and less freedom of movement than we would 
like.  The second track involved intensified efforts to 
implement the Roadmap Agreement.  We were monitoring how 
the parties were meeting their Roadmap obligations.  There 
was a long way to go before the Palestinians could meet 
their security obligations, and perhaps even a longer way 
to go with regard to Israeli settlement activities.  The 
Secretary said she had held several trilateral meetings 
with Prime Ministers Olmert and Fayyad to discuss the 
Roadmap obligations in great detail.  The third track, she 
explained, was the negotiations track.  Abu Alaa and FM 
Livni had agreed these negotiations must be held in 
private as they were discussing the most sensitive of 
issues, including settlements, territory, borders, water, 
 
 
security, and ultimately, Jerusalem.  They had held 
serious discussions and serious expert-level work was 
taking place.  The Secretary said she still held out hope 
that a peace agreement could be achieved by December.  The 
difficulty was to convince others, and particularly the 
Arabs, that real progress was being made. 
 
21.  (C) With regard to Gaza, the Secretary acknowledged 
that the Palestinian Authority was not in control, and 
this presented a problem.  However, the Egyptian- 
negotiated "calm" showed promise and could be built upon. 
The Syrian-Israeli track, which was being moderated by the 
Turks, at the very least gave a more comprehensive view of 
the process.  The most important thing to do at this time, 
said the Secretary, was to maintain momentum.  The 
Annapolis conference, followed by meetings in Paris, 
Bethlehem, Berlin, and a coming meeting in Moscow, would 
keep the international community focused on the goal.  The 
parties remained committed to making progress, and despite 
the difficult internal political situations faced by both, 
continued to push ahead toward an agreement that would be 
popular with both Palestinians and Israelis. 
 
22.  (C) Italian FM Frattini reported that the recent 
Lebanese presidential election was a turn for the better 
and it was necessary to take advantage of this as we 
concentrate on the future.  Prime Minister Siniora had yet 
to form a government, but he was committed to the process 
despite the difficulty in selecting ministers.  The Doha 
Agreement would be difficult to implement, but needed the 
support of the international community, which must see it 
as a package.  We could not talk about disarming the 
militias without concurrently strengthening the Lebanese 
armed forces.  Daily living conditions must be improved, 
particularly in the Palestinian camps.  The UNIFIL mission 
was important and should be continued, but its 
effectiveness on the ground could be improved with better 
understanding on the rules of engagement and other issues. 
Frattini urged the G8 to encourage Israel to show 
readiness to discuss the Sheba Farms issue.  Their 
continued presence in this area gives Hezbollah a pretext 
for its existence as a force to resist Israeli occupation, 
adding that it seemed all agreed this small area was not 
Israeli territory and that UN supervision of this issue 
was called for. 
 
23.  (C) Russian Deputy FM Denisov said he agreed with the 
above assessments and stressed that Russia was working 
with its Quartet partners to overcome the negative trends 
in the peace process.  He noted an upcoming ministerial in 
Tokyo between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians as a 
positive development.  The Slovenian minister said the EU 
had been encouraged by the Annapolis process, the 
activities of the Quartet, the Israel-Syria talks, and the 
election in Lebanon, but not by the situation in the 
Palestinian territories.  He said the G8 must encourage 
 
 
the Israelis to take a better attitude toward the building 
of a viable Palestinian state; settlement activities and 
roadblocks must stop.  The Palestinians must be permitted 
to develop the institutions of a state, including 
healthcare institutions.  German FM Steinmeier said his 
country recognized the positive developments mentioned but 
was not overly optimistic about the situation in Lebanon. 
 
24.  (C) The French view was that no one should be lulled 
into forgetting the fact that "progress" was made in 
Lebanon because Hezbollah took Beirut by force and over 60 
people died.  It was important to support the Siniora 
government and to try to extend the agreement between 
factions that led to the presidential elections.  But the 
facts that an "over-armed and dangerous" Hezbollah 
remained a force to be reckoned with and that the 
Christian camp was divided portended difficult times 
ahead.  Likewise, we should not get too carried away by 
the fact that Israelis seemed to be willing to discuss 
easing access to Gaza.  Kouchner reported that President 
Sarkozy had been very tough with the Israelis on the issue 
of settlements during his recent visit, but was encouraged 
that it was now at least possible to speak of Jerusalem as 
the capital of two states without having members of the 
Knesset walk out on him.  Kouchner also expressed concern 
that current Israeli decisions were being taken against 
the backdrop of internal political uncertainties.  He was 
afraid that if the Israeli government fell, we would be 
back to square one.  He noted with some optimism the 
existence of a bill in the Knesset to give financial 
incentives to Israeli settlers to leave their homes and 
said he believed a significant number of settlers would be 
willing to do so. 
 
25.  (C) British FS Miliband touched upon three points. 
First, the Palestinian financial crisis was an urgent 
issue.  Steps must be taken to ensure the government could 
continue to function beyond July.  Second, while the Jenin 
model was key to furthering development in the West Bank, 
continued steps to reform and strengthen the Palestinian 
security sector were essential.  Third, the process of 
opening the crossings into Gaza must continue and the G8 
must provide support for this. 
 
26.  (C) FM Koumura wrapped up the discussion by 
explaining Japan's "Corridor for Peace and Prosperity" 
initiative and confirmed that Tokyo planned to host a 
ministerial between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians 
on July 2-3. 
 
------------------ 
CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE 
------------------ 
 
27.  (C) On the day of contested by-elections, 
participants made impassioned statements of dismay over 
 
 
the escalating political and economic collapse of 
Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket of southern Africa. 
Secretary Rice, the British, and others forcefully spoke 
of the threats to regional stability posed by President 
Mugabe?s increased harassment, torture, and killing of the 
political opposition.  Several delegates expressed anger 
at recent UN and EU violations of the travel ban imposed 
on the Zimbabwean regime, even while UK and U.S. diplomats 
were being detained in Zimbabwe. 
 
28.  (C) The foreign ministers broadly supported 
publishing a separate statement on Zimbabwe with strong 
language on imposing sanctions on the country should 
Mugabe conduct a fraudulent by-election.  Secretary Rice 
stated that Harare?s behavior would not be tolerated 
elsewhere in the world, and that the time had come to stop 
thinking of Zimbabwe as a problem of backwards Africans 
incapable of democracy.  The Secretary said the United 
States had run out of patience with South Africa?s "quiet 
talks" and insisted on language in the G8 statement 
referring to the GOZ as "illegitimate." 
 
29.  (C) The Russians were the only delegation to oppose 
the mention of UN sanctions in a separate G8 document on 
Zimbabwe.  They argued for a sober, "balanced approach" to 
language about Zimbabwe.  Although they did not object to 
a separate statement by the G8, the Russians preferred 
using the UN for action on Zimbabwe.  In response, 
Secretary Rice said she would consider bringing the matter 
up in the UNSC on Tuesday. 
 
----- 
SUDAN 
----- 
 
30.  (C) Participants underscored the difficulty in 
finding solutions to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, as 
well as the potential for regional spillover.  Canada 
requested G8 support in the UN for a renewal of the UNAMID 
hybrid Africa Union/UN peace keeping operation mandate, 
which is  up for review in July, and for more member 
states to participate in the mission.  The Japanese added 
their support to UNAMID and the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).  The UK called for an improvement in the 
quality, not just the quantity, of UNAMID support. 
Secretary Rice underlined our support for the economic 
reconstruction in southern Sudan, and our backing of the 
SPLM, which has made the government of Sudan more 
efficient.  Secretary Rice and FS Miliband warned that the 
unraveling of the CPA could lead to civil war and 
emphasized the importance of Chinese cooperation on Sudan. 
France drew attention to the 400,000 IDPs in Sudan, adding 
to the general criticism of Khartoum.  Japan said it was 
considering a dispatch to UMAMID if Sudan neglected to 
comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. 
RICE