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DE RUEHLH #0234/01 1991257
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O P 171257Z JUL 08
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3734
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4465
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0260
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0078
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0635
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1872
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1555
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4866

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/17/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON PK
SUBJECT: NAWAZ REMAINS FIXATED ON MUSHARRAF 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, US Consulate 
Lahore, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Boucher met with Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz Chief Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on July 1. 
Nawaz said the judges' restoration issue was a matter of 
principle not subject to political compromise.  Nawaz expressed 
lukewarm support for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
Khyber Agency military operation but was displeased that the 
government did not consult him or other senior party leaders 
about it beforehand.  He equally criticized what he perceived as 
the lack of a government strategy to develop public support for 
the operation.  Boucher pressed the point that polarizing 
political issues such as the judges' restoration and threats to 
impeach Musharraf are distracting the Government of Pakistan 
from effectively tackling more serious threats to Pakistan's 
stability, i.e. the economy and the law and order situation.  He 
expressed U.S. willingness to support the Government in 
addressing these issues.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Richard Boucher met with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Leader 
Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on July 1.  The Assistant Secretary was 
accompanied by National Security Council Senior Director for 
South and Central Asian Affairs Mark Webber, Deputy Chief of 
Mission Peter Bodde, Principal Officer Bryan Hunt, Senior 
Advisor Caitlin Hayden and Political Officer Antone Greubel 
(notetaker).  Joining Nawaz were his brother Punjab Chief 
Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Pakistan Muslim League Parliamentary 
Leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, former Petroleum Minister Khwaja 
Asif and Ambassador Tariq Fatemi. 
 
¶3. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher began the meeting by asking 
about the status of Nawaz's eligibility to run for parliament 
and how long it would take to resolve. Nawaz explained that 
papers were shuttling back and forth, having not been accepted 
in a "political move."  He filed candidacy papers at the urging 
of his party, he explained, despite that fact that he "didn't 
want to," and preferred to "run at a later, appropriate time." 
But, he said, "they want me among them."  Nawaz claimed no 
desire to be Speaker of the Assembly, or Opposition Leader; 
rather, he will support the Government and seek to address the 
"serious constitutional issues" Pakistan faces, including 
restoring the constitution to its 1999 form ("when I was Prime 
Minister") and reinstating the judiciary.  He noted that there 
were no major disagreements with the Pakistan Peoples Party on 
the current proposed package of constitutional amendments. 
 
¶4. (C) There remain disagreements on reinstating the judiciary, 
however. Assistant Secretary Boucher said that the judges' issue 
was one for Pakistanis but pressed Nawaz to consider compromise 
so that it might be swiftly resolved.  Nawaz said that he could 
not compromise on the judges' restoration since it was "morally 
wrong," and a matter of principle.  There must not be any 
Provisional Constitutional Order judges on the courts since they 
abandoned their principles by taking an oath against the 
constitution under the Order.  He acknowledged judicial reforms 
were in order but the time to tackle them was only after the 
judges were restored.  Nawaz criticized Asif Ali Zardari for 
going back on his commitments in the Murree Declaration to 
restore the judges within 30 days through a parliamentary 
resolution.  Boucher stated that many felt Nawaz had also pulled 
out of an earlier commitment to support restoration minus former 
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry -- the so-called "minus one" 
formula.  Nawaz responded emphatically that he had never 
committed to the "minus one" formula and even if he was amenable 
to it "the people would never accept it." 
 
¶5.  (C) After listening to Nawaz's explanations of judicial and 
constitutional issues, Boucher said that we agreed these were 
important issues and the United States wants to see them 
resolved quickly so the Government can get down to the business 
of dealing with the most pressing issues facing the Pakistani 
people. He expressed serious U.S. concern over the state of the 
economy, the rise of militancy and the increase in cross-border 
attacks in the Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province. 
 Nawaz agreed that it was time to get to business, but said that 
the country could only do that once the judiciary was restored 
and Musharraf was out of power.  When asked about the prospect 
for returning his ministers to Cabinet, Nawaz said that the 
party will also not reinstate its ministers until the judges are 
restored.  He conceded, however, that the Pakistan Muslim League 
was getting a free ride in the current scenario because it can 
claim to be a ruling coalition partner but does not have 
ministers to face the media to announce unpopular policy 
decisions. 
 
 
LAHORE 00000234  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (C) Asked if he supported the Prime Minister's multi-pronged 
strategy to combat terrorism, Nawaz said that he supports the 
policy and that it was important that Pakistan coordinate with 
the United States in the War on Terror. He expressed concern 
that terrorists and militants are threatening the social fabric 
of Pakistan, as well.  Nawaz's principal complaint about the 
statement on fighting terrorism and the undertaking of the 
Khyber Agency military operation was that the government and 
military did not consult him or his other senior party leaders 
in advance. The Pakistan Muslim League is a major coalition 
partner, after all, and the policy on fighting terrorism should 
be developed through public debate (in the National Assembly and 
in the press), not by one party.  Nawaz admitted that neither 
Pakistan nor Afghanistan have effective writs of control in the 
tribal areas straddling their borders.  The Assistant Secretary 
agreed on the need for everyone to come together on a 
comprehensive terrorism strategy, including public outreach, but 
pressed for quick, demonstrable progress in curtailing the 
operations of militant groups in the meantime. 
 
¶7. (C) Nisar expressed skepticism on how deeply committed the 
current government is to combating terrorism.  He accused the 
government of launching the Khyber operation immediately before 
Boucher's arrival simply as a facade to demonstrate to the 
United States that Pakistan is still a reliable ally.  He 
asserted that limited combat encounters to date buttress this 
accusation.  Nisar repeatedly claimed that President Musharraf 
was never as committed to effectively combating terrorism as the 
U.S. believed.  The Assistant Secretary noted that Musharraf had 
made genuine and important contributions to the War on Terror 
and reiterated that the current governing coalition needed to 
demonstrate its own credibility on this issue rather than 
rehashing the past. 
 
¶8. (C) After railing against Musharraf as the cause of all of 
the problems in Pakistan, Nawaz and Nisar emphasized to Boucher 
that during Nawaz's two terms as Prime Minister in the 1990s he 
was a reliable ally of the United States.  They cited their 
support for Operation Desert Storm in 1990, reigning in militant 
groups and embarking on policies to improve relations with 
India.  Aside from the judges' restoration issue and the future 
of Musharraf, they claimed the Pakistan Muslim League platform 
and United States foreign policy goals in Pakistan are on the 
same page.  Boucher agreed that there was certainly a 
commonality of interests between the two. 
 
¶9. (C) Nawaz asserted that he also had commonality of cause with 
Zardari when it came to President Musharraf, reporting that 
Zardari told him he was prepared to move forward with impeaching 
President Musharraf.  Boucher stressed that this would be 
another counterproductive diversion and a negative backward 
movement to begin impeachment proceedings against Musharraf. 
Nawaz countered that the "people have expressed that they want 
to get rid of Musharraf." Boucher quickly responded: "They also 
asked you to govern."  Ignoring this comment, Nawaz continued, 
saying "Musharraf is conspiring against us every day...Not me. 
If I am conspiring, I'm conspiring to get the judiciary 
reinstated." 
 
¶10. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable. 
HUNT