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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000561 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM BIC JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: BIC-IX:  BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION, 
SESSION IX, JULY 16, 2008 
 
REF: GENEVA 2579 (BIC-VIII-001) 
 
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Bilateral Implementation Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is BIC-IX-001. 
 
¶2.   (U) Meeting Date:  July 16, 2008 
                 Time:  3:30 - 5:20 P.M. 
                Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (C) U.S. and Russian representatives to the Moscow 
Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) met at the 
U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland, on July 16, 2008, to 
conduct the ninth session of the BIC.  The sides presented 
briefings on the status of, and plans for, reductions in 
their strategic nuclear forces.  The U.S. briefing specified 
that the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads (ODSNW), as of May 31, 2008, was 2647.  The Russian 
briefing specified that the number of Russian strategic 
nuclear warheads (SNW), as of May 1, 2008, was 2032. 
Koshelev also confirmed that the Russian briefing and numbers 
provided were in fact con fidential.  Questions were limited, 
and there were no significant changes in plans to meet the 
Moscow Treaty limits reported by either side since the eighth 
session of the BIC (Reftel).  Of note, however, were 
Koshelev's opening remarks, which included his 
characterization of selective points from a speech Russian 
President Medvedev gave on July 15, 2008 at the Russian 
Foreign Ministry.  Some of the points Koshelev expressed 
concerned the relationship between strategic offensive forces 
and strategic defensive forces, and stated that deployment of 
missile defenses in Europe will affect Russia's strategic 
nuclear forces and existing arrangements for strategic 
stability, including the Moscow Treaty. 
 
--------------- 
OPENING REMARKS 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Taylor and Koshelev exchanged welcomes and introduced 
their delegations.  Koshelev then commented on remarks made 
by President Medvedev on July 15, 2008 concerning Russia's 
foreign policy objectives, noting that elements were relevant 
to the work of the BIC and the implementation of the Moscow 
Treaty.  Specifically, he noted that: 
 
- Russia will maintain its long-standing positions concerning 
matters of disarmament and arms control. 
 
- Cold War institutions for maintaining stability are no 
longer efficient, and new arrangements are necessary.  In 
this regard, Russia has proposed a new Treaty on European 
Security to replace existing treaties. 
 
- 2009 marks the 70th anniversary of the beginning of World 
War II, and it is unacceptable to repeat the events leading 
up to the war as some European capitals are trying.  Russia 
will do its part to resist this type of behavior in order to 
preserve the borders and security of Europe established as a 
result of the War. 
 
 
- Regarding strategic stability between the United States and 
Russia, the deployment in Europe of U.S. missile defense 
assets will affect Russia's strategic forces and, in turn, 
will impact current arrangements concerning strategic 
stability, including implementation of the Moscow Treaty. 
Deployment of missile defenses will destroy elements of 
security upon which strategic stability is based.  There is a 
close relationship between strategic offensive arms and 
strategic defenses; changes in defensive capability will 
affect offensive arms. 
 
(Begin comment:  President Medvedev spoke on July 15, 2008, 
at a meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent 
Representatives to International Organizations at the Russian 
Foreign Ministry.  End comment.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Koshelev concluded his opening comments by stating 
that the need for a reliable exchange of information in the 
context of the Moscow Treaty is increasing as controls 
concerning data exchanges (i.e., under START) will soon 
expire.  To help monitor implementation of the Treaty, Russia 
proposes the sides agree on a common definition for the term 
"strategic nuclear warhead."  Discussions in the BIC have 
brought the sides closer in their understanding of the term, 
and Russia proposes to complete this work by reaching an 
agreement. 
 
¶6.  (C) Taylor expressed appreciation for Koshelev's summary 
of Medvedev's remarks stating that he would report this to 
Washington.  With regard to the BIC and a common definition 
for the term "strategic nuclear warhead," Taylor noted that 
this had been discussed before in the BIC and that this 
discussion had brought the sides very close in terms of their 
understanding of each other.  Therefore, the U.S. position 
remained that it was not necessary to codify a definition for 
the term; the United States had defined the term the same 
since signature of the Treaty. 
 
¶7.  (C) Koshelev agreed that discussions in the BIC had 
brought the sides closer.  He commented that the importance 
of the term extended beyond the Moscow Treaty and was 
relevant in the context of a post-START arrangement, which 
remained a top priority between the United States and Russia. 
 The dialogue on strategic issues would be continued with the 
next U.S. administration and a definition for the term would 
need to be revisited. 
 
------------------------ 
RUSSIAN BRIEFING ON 
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Ryzhkov presented the following briefing, classified 
con fidential, updating the status of and plans for Russia's 
strategic nuclear forces.  At the beginning of the briefing 
he noted that Russia was open to discussion concerning the 
format of the briefings exchanged in the BIC. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                   Official Translation 
 
Title Page:  Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the 
Russian Federation under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions 
 
Ninth Session of the Bilateral Implementation Commission for 
 
 
the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions 
 
Geneva, July 2008 
 
Page 2 
 
Plans to Reduce and Limit Strategic Nuclear Warheads 
 
     The Russian Federation's plans have not changed since 
the previous session of the Bilateral Implementation 
Commission for the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions: 
 
-- The Russian Federation will reduce and limit its strategic 
nuclear warheads so that by December 31, 2012, the aggregate 
number of such warheads will not exceed 1700-2200; 
 
-- For the purposes of counting nuclear warheads under the 
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the Russian 
Federation considers the following: 
 
      - reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers; 
 
      - reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers on board 
submarines; 
 
      - nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers and those 
stored in weapons storage areas directly at heavy bomber 
bases. 
 
Page 3 
 
The Russian Federation is implementing its plans by: 
 
-- removing from service and subsequently eliminating 
missiles, launchers, submarines, and heavy bombers that have 
reached the end of their warranted service life; 
 
-- converting silo launchers of ICBMs for new armaments and 
modernizing heavy bombers; 
 
-- developing and putting into service land-based and 
sea-based strategic missile systems of a new type: 
 
      - tests of the new RSM-56 SLBM will continue; 
 
      - tests of the prototype of the RS-24 ICBM, which is 
intended to replace obsolete missiles on alert status, will 
continue; 
 
      - work on equipping the Strategic Rocket Forces with 
missile systems with silo-based and mobile-based SS-27 ICBMs 
will continue. 
 
Page 4 
 
Plans for Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions in 2008 
 
In 2008 the Russian Federation plans to eliminate: 
 
      -- 23 road-mobile launchers for SS-25 ICBMs; 
      -- 20 launchers of SS-19 ICBMs; 
      -- 20 launchers of SS-N-20 SLBMs; 
      -- 31 SS-25 ICBMs; 
      -- 17 SS-19 ICBMs; 
      --  3 SS-24 ICBMs; 
      -- 10 SS-N-18 SLBMs; 
      -- 10 SS-N-20 SLBMs; 
 
 
      -- 10 SS-N-23s (sic); 
 
Page 5 
 
Progress in Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions in 2008 
 
By May 1, 2008, the Russian Federation had eliminated: 
 
      --  7 road-mobile launchers for SS-25 ICBMs; 
      -- 18 SS-25 ICBMs; 
      --  2 SS-19 ICBMs; 
      --  1 SS-18 ICBM; 
      --  3 SS-24 ICBMs; 
      --  2 SS-N-20 SLBMs. 
 
(Begin comment:  Ryzhkov emphasized that plans may change 
based on evolving strategic requirements but that, as of May 
1, 2008, Russia was continuing to implement the annual plan 
it had prepared for the year.  Ryzhkov also noted the 
following: 
 
     - One road-mobile SS-25 launcher was converted to be a 
fixed launcher. 
 
     - All SS-24 ICBMs are now eliminated. 
 
     - Since May 1, 2008, Russia eliminated an additional six 
road-mobile launchers for SS-25 ICBMs, ten SS-25 ICBMs, and 
three SS-19 ICBMs, one of which was eliminated by launching. 
 
End comment.) 
 
Page 6 
 
Results of Implementation of the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions in 2008 
 
-- As of May 1, 2008, the Russian Federation had 2032 
strategic nuclear warheads under the Treaty on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions, which is within the framework of the 
quantitative limitations provided for by the Treaty on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions. 
 
Page 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
-- The Russian Federation continues to reduce its strategic 
nuclear warheads under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions. 
 
-- The Russian Federation determines for itself the 
composition and structure of its strategic nuclear forces. 
In this connection, the Russian Federation is guided by 
national security interests and the interests of maintaining 
strategic stability. 
 
End text. 
 
------------------------ 
U.S. BRIEFING ON 
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (U) Yaguchi presented the following unclassified briefing 
updating the status of U.S. ODSNW.  (Begin comment:  What 
follows are the briefing slides and the narrative used for 
 
 
each slide.  Only the briefing slides without notes were 
provided to the Russians.  End comment.) 
 
Begin text. 
 
Title Slide 
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces 
Bilateral Implementation Commission 
 
July 2008 
 
Narrative: 
 
- This briefing will provide you an update on our plans for 
strategic nuclear forces. 
 
- This briefing will summarize actions we have taken and 
long-range plans for these forces. 
 
Slide 2 
 
U.S. Plans for Strategic Nuclear Forces 
 
- Reduce total operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
  warheads to 1700-2200 by 31 December 2012: 
 
  -- Remove some delivery systems from service; and 
  -- For delivery systems retained, remove some warheads from 
operational missiles to reduce the number of operationally 
deployed nuclear warheads 
 
- Completed actions: 
 
  -- Removed 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service 
  -- B-1B conventional role only 
  -- Deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs 
  -- Deactivated Trident I SLBMs 
  -- Converted 4 Trident I SSBNs to carry Trident II SLBMs 
 
- Ongoing actions: 
 
  -- Removing some warheads from operational missiles 
  -- Removing 50 Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers from 
strategic service 
  -- Deactivating all AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles 
 
- Baseline 2012 Strategic Nuclear Force Structure: 
 
  --  14 Trident II SSBNs 
  -- 450 Minuteman III ICBMs 
  --  20 B-2 Bombers 
  --  76 B-52H Bombers 
 
     --- However, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
Report plans to reduce the B-52 force to 56 aircraft. 
 
Narrative: 
 
- Our existing strategic nuclear force structure, with the 
reductions mentioned during 
previous briefings, will remain in service at least through 
¶2020. 
 
  -- Minuteman service life is projected through 2030. 
  -- Ohio class ballistic missile submarines have been 
extended in life and the oldest of 
the remaining 14 is planned to be operational beyond 2025. 
 
 
  -- Our oldest bomber, the B-52, has had numerous upgrades 
and, along with the B-2, should remain operational for 
several decades. 
 
- We have underway, or in the planning stages, life extension 
programs to ensure that these systems remain reliable and 
safe and incorporate modern electronics. 
 
- In addition, we are beginning to examine options to replace 
these weapon systems when each reaches the end of its service 
life. 
 
Slide 3 
 
Update on ICBMs 
 
ICBMs - Minuteman III 
 
- Status:  43 of 50 Minuteman III silo launchers removed from 
strategic service. 
 
Narrative: 
 
- We started deactivating 50 Minuteman III silo launchers. 
 
  -- The first silo was deactivated in early summer 2007. 
  -- As of May 31, 2008, we deactivated 43 silos. 
 
Slide 4 
 
Update on SSBNs 
 
Modification of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs 
 
- Status:  Four Trident I SSBNs have been removed from 
strategic service and have completed their refueling 
overhauls. 
 
  -- All four SSGNs have completed modification. 
  -- There are no plans to return Trident I SSBNs to 
strategic service 
 
Conversion of 4 Trident I SSBNs to Trident II 
 
- Status:  Four submarines have been converted from Trident I 
to Trident II SLBM launchers 
 
  -- Trident I SLBMs are deactivated. 
 
Narrative: 
 
- Our plan to remove 4 Trident I ballistic missile submarines 
from strategic service and to modify them for other roles is 
complete. 
 
- Our plan to convert four Trident I submarines to carry the 
Trident II SLBM is complete. 
 
- There will no longer be any operational Trident I launchers. 
 
Slide 5 
 
Update on Heavy Bombers 
 
Heavy Bombers 
 
- Status:  One less B-2 
 
 
Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missiles 
 
- Status:  Deactivating all AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles 
 
Narrative: 
 
Heavy Bombers 
 
- Total number of B-2 bombers is reduced by one due to an 
aircraft loss. 
 
Nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missiles 
 
- The complete deactivation of the Advanced Cruise Missile 
force will take several years. 
 
Slide 6 
 
Total U.S. Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads 
 
- For purposes of the Moscow Treaty, the United States 
considers Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads 
to be: 
 
  -- Reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles 
in their launchers 
  -- Reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and 
  -- Nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in 
weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases 
 
- A small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads, to 
include spare ICBM warheads, are located at heavy bomber 
bases. 
 
  -- The U.S. does not consider these warheads to be 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
- As of May 31, 2008, the aggregate number of U.S. 
Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads was 2647. 
 
Narrative: 
 
- As we stated previously, this is the U.S. definition of 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
- The U.S. does not consider spare warheads to be 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. 
 
- During BIC VIII, the U.S. reported that, as of September 
30, 2007, the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW was 3079. 
 
- As of May 31, 2008, the aggregate number of U.S. ODSNW was 
¶2647. 
 
Slide 7 
 
Summary 
 
- Current and planned strategic nuclear force structure and 
activities are consistent with the current strategic 
environment. 
 
Narrative: 
 
In summary, 
 
 
- Our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
continue to be reduced consistent with the terms of the 
Moscow Treaty. 
 
- The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended reducing 
the MM-III ICBMs to 450 and the B-52 fleet to 56. 
 
- However, Congress expressed its view that only 18 of 94 
B-52 bombers could be retired, so the B-52 fleet may number 
¶76. 
 
- We are deactivating all AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles. 
 
- We have a number of activities in progress related to 
sustainment of our strategic forces and implementation of our 
defense strategy. 
 
- These activities, and our strategic nuclear forces, are 
consistent with the new strategic environment. 
 
- Our intention is to continue to provide transparency and 
predictability on our activities and forces through actions 
such as this briefing. 
 
End text. 
 
---------------- 
QUESTIONS RAISED 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Koshelev sought clarification concerning the 
classification of the U.S. presentation, asking whether it 
could be used publicly.  Taylor confirmed that the U.S. 
presentation was unclassified, and asked whether Russia could 
provide an unclassified briefing.  Koshelev responded that 
Russia approached the work of the BIC in the same manner as 
that of the JCIC, and that the information exchanged was con 
fidential.  The only treaty for which Russia provides 
information in a public forum is the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty.  Taylor assured Koshelev that the United States would 
continue to handle as con fidential the information provided 
by Russia through the BIC. 
 
¶11.  (C) The only additional question raised came from 
Novikov, who asked when the deactivation of the AGM-129 
Advanced Cruise Missile will be completed.  Yaguchi explained 
that it will take several years to deactivate all missiles as 
there is a technical process that must be completed within a 
set of control procedures to ensure safety.  When asked 
whether deactivation would be completed by the expiration of 
the Moscow Treaty on December 31, 2012, Yaguchi said he did 
not know, but would ask whether Washington could provide a 
more definitive answer.  After querying Washington, 
Delegation was provided with the following response:  "The 
United States plans to complete the deactivation of the 
AGM-129 by December 31, 2012."  That response was provided to 
Novikov in the form of a Delegation paper. 
 
¶12.  (C) The U.S. delegation had no questions concerning the 
Russian presentation. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Taylor expressed appreciation for the information 
 
 
provided by the Russian Federation, and noted that Russia was 
within the limits set by the Moscow Treaty and the United 
States was well on its way.  He concluded by stating that 
meetings of the BIC are useful and demonstrate the ability of 
the United States and Russia to work cooperatively within the 
strategic relationship they have developed, and that each 
side can take lessons from the examples set by the U.S. and 
Russian presidents in their ability to work together in a 
cooperative manner. 
 
¶14.  (C) Koshelev agreed, and noted that the working 
relationship between Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak and 
Under Secretary Rood, particularly within the framework of 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, provides 
another example of the ability of Russia and the United 
States to work constructively on issues of importance.  This 
is true also within the BIC, which contributes to Moscow 
Treaty implementation.  Regarding the next meeting, Koshelev 
suggested that Russia and the United States consider a 
regularization of the information exchanged, as this was 
important considering the upcoming expiration of the START 
Treaty.  Deferring any specific proposals, Koshelev suggested 
that this issue simply be considered. 
 
¶15.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Presentation, dated July 
2008, (briefing only); and 
 
    -- U.S. Delegation paper "U.S. plans to deactivate the 
AGM-129," dated July 21, 2008. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian Presentation on Reductions of Strategic 
Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation under the SOR 
Treaty, dated July 2008. 
 
¶16.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Fortier 
Maj Gondol 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Tessier 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Belyayev 
Mr. Kashirin 
CAPT (1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Mr. Lapshin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
 
 
Mr. Serov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶17.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text