VZCZCXRO3642
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0906/01 1921024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101024Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1623
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000906 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG
SUBJECT: JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT 
ON THREE-PHASE PLAN FOR RESOLVING ABKHAZIA CONFLICT 
 
REF: BERLIN 811 
 
Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  During a June 30 meeting in Berlin, the 
Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia agreed ad ref to 
a three-phase approach for the settlement of the conflict in 
Abkhazia.  The resulting document is far less detailed and 
prescriptive than the original German draft, proposed on June 
12, especially for phases 2 (confidence building) and 3 
(political settlement).  In an unprecedented demonstration of 
interest, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier dropped by the 
meeting to urge the participants to show that the Group of 
Friends is up to the challenge of helping the Georgians and 
Abkhaz get out of their "escalation spiral," and to express 
the German Government's full political support for the 
Friends' effort.  The German chair pressed for concurrence 
from capitals with the ad ref text as soon as possible so 
that the approach can be formally presented to and adopted by 
the Georgians and Abkhaz before the summer break.  The 
Russian representative downplayed the need to act urgently 
and indicated that Moscow may not be prepared to give its 
blessing until after a planned meeting between Medvedev and 
Saakashvili in September.  The German chair countered that 
the Group of Friends was "down to its last bullet" and had to 
show that it was still relevant in helping to resolve the 
Abkhazia conflict.  He warned that if the Friends did not 
act, "other formats" -- such as the New Group of Friends, 
which does not include Russia -- would come to the fore.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Germany hosted a meeting of the Friends of the 
Secretary General on Georgia in Berlin June 30, chaired by 
German Special Envoy for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central 
Asia Hans-Dieter Lucas.  France was represented by Deputy 
Director of the MFA Political Affairs and Security 
Directorate Veronique Bujon-Barre; the UK, by Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus Sir Brian Fall; Russia, 
by Director of the MFA Fourth Department of CIS States Andrey 
Kelin; and the U.S., by EUR DAS Matt Bryza.  Also attending 
was UN SRSG Jean Arnault. 
 
Ad Ref Agreement on German Non-Paper 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) The June 30 meeting was devoted to a line-by-line 
review of a revised version of the German non-paper tabled at 
the June 12 Friends meeting (reftel), which outlines a 
three-phase approach for the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict in Abkhazia.  Although Kelin (Russia) claimed to 
have instructions on only phase 1 on the non-paper, the 
German chair (Lucas) prevailed upon him to allow the group to 
review and reach ad ref agreement on the entire document. 
 
¶4. (C) While the amended non-paper retains the basic 
three-phase structure (phase 1: guaranteeing security and the 
return of Georgian IDPs, phase 2: confidence building, phase 
3: political status), it was significantly shortened during 
extensive editing.  The ad ref document is far less detailed 
and prescriptive than the original German draft, especially 
for phases 2 and 3.  The core element of the non-paper is the 
exchange of declarations on the non-use of force and IDP 
returns and the establishment of a framework for direct 
high-level dialogue between Georgia and the Abkhaz.  SRSG 
Arnault expressed confidence that both parties would see the 
document as suiting their purposes.  The Abkhaz should like 
it because it deals with security and practical cooperation 
first, which they favor, while deferring status.  The 
Georgians should like it because it begins with the return of 
IDPs and slowly, but surely, leads to status. 
 
Personal Appeal by FM Steinmeier 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In an unprecedented demonstration of interest in this 
process, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier dropped by at the 
beginning of the meeting to urge the participants to show 
that the Group of Friends is up to the challenge of helping 
the Georgians and Abkhaz get out of the "escalation spiral" 
in which they find themselves.  He noted that it had taken 
joint high-level efforts just a few weeks before to head off 
a threatened declaration by Georgia to demand the withdrawal 
of CIS peacekeepers.  Stressing that the deadlock between the 
parties had been allowed to drag on dangerously long, 
Steinmeier called on the Friends to agree and present their 
common approach to the Georgians and Abkhaz before the summer 
break.  Steinmeier expressed the German Government's full 
political support for the UN Friends' effort to launch a new 
mediation process for the Abkhazian conflict. 
 
BERLIN 00000906  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶6. (C) At the conclusion of the negotiating session, Lucas 
encouraged all the Friends to seek concurrence from capitals 
with the ad ref text as soon as possible.  He was prepared to 
call another Friends meeting at short notice if necessary to 
finalize the paper, but was hopeful that this could be done 
by e-mail.  He said that once all the Friends were on board, 
the next step would be for SRSG Arnault and German Ambassador 
to Georgia Patricia Flor to brief the two parties on the 
document and secure their agreement.  Finally, there would be 
a Friends meeting with the Georgians and the Abkhaz to 
formally adopt the approach laid out in the paper, hopefully 
before the summer break.  Fall (UK) stressed that it was 
important to get agreement of the parties on the document 
before the final meeting so that the meeting focused on 
implementation rather than on drafting.  SRSG Arnault 
underscored that in planning next steps, it was important to 
keep in mind that only President Saakashvili himself could 
agree to the paper on Georgia's behalf. 
 
Germany Pushes Russia for Quick Agreement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Kelin (Russia) emphasized that he had instructions 
only for phase 1 of the document and that he still needed 
Moscow's views on phases 2 and 3.  He thought there was a 
good chance that there would be no movement on this score 
from the Kremlin until after a planned meeting between 
Medvedev and Saakashvili in early September.  In reaction to 
Lucas's entreaties that time was of the essence, Kelin 
expressed the view that media reports about problems on the 
ground in Abkhazia were exaggerated and that the situation 
was not as urgent as commonly believed.  Lucas countered that 
the Group of Friends was "down to its last bullet" and had to 
show that it was still relevant in helping to resolve the 
Abkhazia conflict.  He said that the Friends had received a 
"clear signal" from the Abkhaz that they were on board with 
the proposed approach.  Therefore, there was no reason for 
delay.  He noted that if the Friends did not act, "other 
formats" -- which do not include Russia -- would come to the 
fore (a clear reference to the ministerial meeting of the 
"New Friends of Georgia" on June 25 in Warsaw).  While SRSG 
Arnault downplayed this possibility, noting that these other 
formats would never find favor with the Abkhaz, he agreed 
that delay threatened to "deepen the crisis." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Germany is clearly feeling pressure to produce as 
coordinator for the Group of Friends (especially given the 
efforts of the "New Friends") and seems prepared to press the 
Russians at a high level to achieve a quick turnaround on the 
ad ref text.  The active involvement of both Chancellor 
Merkel and FM Steinmeier is a very positive sign that the 
Germans are truly committed to achieving a breakthrough after 
years of deadlock.  The Germans also seem to have come around 
to the U.S. view that the most important thing is to get 
direct, high-level dialogue between the parties under way as 
soon as possible and not to be too prescriptive about how 
this is done or what subjects are discussed. 
TIMKEN JR