VZCZCXRO0053
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2069/01 1861425
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041425Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8128
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002069 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018 
TAGS: PRELZ MARR MASS MOPS IR IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND CG DISCUSS SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH 
PM MALIKI 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 b. and d. 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Ambassador Ryan Crocker and MNF-I 
Commanding General (CG) David Petraeus met with Prime 
Minister Maliki June 26 to discuss a "bridge" security 
agreement between the United States and Iraq to facilitate 
continued U.S. support for the GOI while the Status of Forces 
Agreement negotiations continue.  They also discussed ongoing 
security operations in Amarah, Maysan province, upcoming 
operations in Diyala province, Iranian support to Special 
Groups, and reducing firearms in the community.  National 
Security Council Senior Director for Iraq Brett McGurk and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mark Kimmitt joined 
Ambassador, CG, and PolMil Min-Couns at the  meeting.  End 
Summary. 
 
Security Agreement Protocol 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) After initial pleasantries and some discussion of 
current and planned security operations, Ambassador and Prime 
Minister Maliki focused their discussion on the formulation 
of an agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding 
or Protocol attached to the Strategic Framework Agreement 
(SFA) as a bridge agreement to a Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA).  Recalling the conversations that the Prime Minister 
has had with the President and with the Secretary, Ambassador 
proposed a short Protocol attached to the SFA that would 
allow U.S. forces to continue to operate in Iraq in support 
of the GOI.  SOFA negotiations, which historically have 
averaged two years, would continue.  Ambassador noted that 
this protocol would have to be a legally binding agreement to 
allow U.S. forces to remain in Iraq.  It would stipulate full 
consistency with the Iraqi Constitution and law and require 
coordination of forces.  He advised the Prime Minister that 
this form of a security agreement could be accomplished by 
July 31.  Ambassador noted that the form of the agreement was 
flexible as long as it was legally binding. 
 
PM Prefers an MOU 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The Prime Minister acknowledged the efforts being 
made, assuring Ambassador that, as he had told the President, 
he had a genuine desire for an agreement.  He envisioned a 
memorandum to include operational authorities attached to the 
SFA, adding that he would meet with his negotiating team that 
evening.  The PM noted that difficulties of getting the 
requisite two-thirds majority of the Council of 
Representatives (COR) to vote for an agreement, but an MOU 
would not need COR approval.  This form should also help the 
USG with the U.S. Congress he said.  He alluded to success 
overcoming the hurdle of operational authorities, not the 
hurdle of legislative concurrence must be passed.  He 
underlined the need to define obligations and commitments in 
the MOU. 
 
Agreement Must be Legally Binding 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador reiterated that we could be flexible on 
form of an agreement to allow U.S. forces to remain in Iraq 
to support the GOI as long as it was legally binding. 
Responding to the PM's suggestion that the agreement might 
require another month, Ambassador reminded the PM of the 
looming fall election campaigns in both countries - securing 
an agreement sooner would be better.  In further discussion, 
Ambassador noted that this is likely to be an increasingly 
contentious political issue if not concluded soon.  The PM 
took the point. 
 
Need for COR Approval 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The PM expressed concerns about the legally binding 
nature of the agreement, remarking that if the level of legal 
obligation is so high, the COR would insist on taking action. 
 General Petraeus responded that the agreement must be 
legally binding or the U.S. Congress would find it 
unacceptable.  It must enjoy congressional support, he added. 
 Ambassador noted that "legally binding" would not mean a 
permanent agreement - all such agreements have a clause 
allowing cancellation.  PM expressed his view that such a 
cancellation clause would allow a legally binding agreement 
without COR approval, conferring with NSA Rubaie on this 
point. 
 
PM Laments the Limits on His Power 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002069  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6. (S/NF) The PM observed that the U.S. President has far 
more authority in the United States than the PM does in Iraq, 
lamenting constitutional restrictions.  Observing that "We 
wanted a democracy and now we've got one," General Petraeus 
reminded the PM that democracy limits leaders' power.  The PM 
responded further observed that the Iraqi constitution gives 
governors the authority to import weapons.  General Petraeus 
expressed surprise at such power, the PM then further 
complained that the Ministry of Interior does not have 
complete authority over Iraqi Police in the provinces. 
 
Security Agreement Next Steps 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Ambassador suggested that the next course of action 
be that the U.S. and Iraqi negotiating teams work intensively 
on the substance of the texts while the PM determine which 
forum would work best under the Iraqi system for gaining 
concurrence to the agreement.  The PM endorsed the suggestion. 
 
Provincial Elections 
-------------------- 
¶8. (S/NF) Ambassador pressed the PM to pass the elections law 
as soon as possible, encouraging him to use his position as 
Prime Minister to lead all the parties together to reach 
consensus.  PM remarked that he was planning to bring 
together the various political blocs to address the issue. 
He noted that there were concerns about the sectarian 
implications of the elections law and some counseled delay. 
A two-month delay was possible.  General Petraeus agreed that 
bringing together the leaders of the political party blocs 
was a good plan, but advised against delay.  Ambassador 
repeated the need to pass the elections law as soon as 
possible, later reminding the PM that Iraq's friends in the 
international community would not understand failure to 
complete the elections law. 
 
Tawafuq in the Government 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Ambassador queried PM on status of negotiations to 
bring the Tawaffuq party back into the Government.  The PM 
replied, after conferring with NSA Rubaie, that there were 
some strains, but that all parties must step up to their 
responsibilities.  Joking, he suggested that he might 
threaten them with arrest by MNF-I.  General Petraeus 
responded that MNF-I would only have physical custody, but 
the GOI would be the arresting authority.  PM noted that the 
people of Iraq deserve better leaders - the people seek 
solutions, the leaders create difficulties, he added. 
Ambassador expressed appreciation for the PM's efforts and 
encouraged him to continue for the sake of the country even 
though Tawaffuq made it difficult.  PM lamented the constant 
shifting of decision-makers and demands of Tawaffuq, 
indicating that now it looked as if Tawaffuq would receive 
the Ministry of Higher Education and two new ministerial 
posts.  He encouraged Ambassador to talk with Tawaffuq 
leadership; Ambassador noted that the Embassy is engaged and 
will keep at it. 
 
Iranian support for Special Groups 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Ambassador asked the PM about the status of the 
Jaysh al Mahdi and Special Groups in Basra and Sadr City.  PM 
remarked that Moqtada al-Sadr was not re-forming Special 
Groups (SG).  General Petraeus noted that Iran supports and 
trains SG criminals.  The PM expressed surprise at this, 
suggesting that this is a question of the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship.  General Petraeus pushed back hard, underlining 
the importance of Iraq taking a stand against Iranian malign 
influence and pointing out that the SG were the vanguard of 
Iran's efforts for Hezbollah-ization of Iraq.  PM responded 
that Iraq must act against all groups regardless of their 
affiliation, Iranian or Arab, eventually insisting that the 
GOI would fight ruthlessly against foreign malign actors. 
 
U.S. relations with Iran 
------------------------ 
 
  ¶11. (S/NF) The PM asked if there was any truth to press 
reports of the U.S. re-establishing a diplomatic presence in 
Iran.  Ambassador responded that the U.S. believes it best to 
resolve issues with Iran through diplomatic and political 
means and that the press reports were just that, press 
reports.  The PM subsequently added that the U.S. must not 
attack Iran from Iraq. 
 
One AK per Family 
----------------- 
 
BAGHDAD 00002069  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12. (S/NF) General Petraeus suggested that the GOI re-examine 
its law allowing each family to keep an assault rifle in the 
home - this makes the work of Iraqi Security Forces very 
difficult.  He also noted that General Abud, Baghdad 
Operations Commander, was confiscating assault weapons in 
parts of Baghdad to improve the security situation.  The PM 
indicated that while eventually some limits might be imposed, 
the current allowance of one assault rifle per family in the 
home, not on the street, would remain for the near future. 
He agreed that a gradual introduction of greater limits would 
be useful, suggesting Najaf might be the place to introduce 
such limits. 
 
MNF-I Support 
------------- 
 
¶13. (S/NF) General Petraeus informed the PM that MNF-I troops 
had killed the AQI Emir of Mosul and detained the Emir of 
east Mosul.  These operations underscored the need to keep up 
the efforts in Mosul.  Noting that the Emir of Mosul had been 
released from GOI custody, General Petraeus underlined the 
need to thoroughly screen candidates for release, adding that 
MNF-I has released thousands after educational and 
rehabilitational programs.  He also noted that today MNF-I 
had delivered the 1,000th up-armored Humvee to Iraqi Security 
Forces.  These were free of charge, the CG added.  PM Maliki 
opined that Iraq had done MNF-I a favor by accepting the 
Humvees - think of the cost of transporting them to Kuwait, 
he joked. 
CROCKER