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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 UNVIE VIENNA 000343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018 
TAGS: MNUC PARM AORC KNPP IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ONE MIDDLE EAST, TWO RESOLUTIONS 
 
REF: UNVIE 232 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for Reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 Summary and Request for Guidance 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Both Egypt and the Arab League have circulated their 
respective draft IAEA General Conference resolutions (paras 
27-28).  The revised Egyptian text purports to be based on 
consensus UNGA language and incorporates some of the 
French-proposed amendments rejected last year, but is still 
not acceptable to Israel in its current form.  As predicted, 
the Arab League has dropped the reference to the Israeli 
Nuclear "Threat" in favor of the "Israeli Nuclear 
Capabilities."  The Arab Group has gone out of its way to 
portray this as a matter-of-fact resolution that does not 
condemn Israel.  Thus far the U.S., EU and like-minded have 
held strong in insisting on one agenda item/one resolution 
that does not single out Israel.  In an Egyptian hosted lunch 
May 31, Egypt found itself isolated as the EU, including GC 
President Italy, and other like-minded insisted on linkage 
between the Egyptian and Arab League efforts.  Finland urged 
Egypt to return to its former role in brokering consensus. 
Egypt insisted that it was 
not "desperate" for consensus, would call a vote if 
necessary, and would not be "held hostage" to the Arab League 
resolution.  Privately, Egyptian DCM admitted to Ambassador 
Schulte that Egypt was losing influence over the Arab League 
and could not hope to deliver any compromise unless we "offer 
them something." 
 
¶2. (C) The Arab League prefers a softer touch, probably in 
the hopes of cleaving off EU support for their "Israeli 
Nuclear Capabilities" resolution.  In presenting the revised 
text to Ambassador Schulte June 4, Arab Group Chair Morocco 
insisted that the AL sought to avoid controversy or a vote. 
The draft text no longer refers directly to an Israeli 
"threat" though it infers as much.  Israel assesses that 
since the Arab League has taken the lead on this resolution 
away from Syria, the tactics have shifted and the AL may be 
seeking to recreate the UNGA dynamic where the "Israel 
Nuclear Capabilities" resolution is adopted with the U.S. and 
Israel isolated in opposition.  We have indications that the 
Arab League will ask for a new GC agenda item soon. 
 
¶3. (C) Both Egypt and the Arab League have requested a formal 
response to their draft resolutions.  Mission requests 
guidance on responding to their demarches.  We do not yet 
need guidance on strategy or tactics.  When/if a new 
provisional agenda is issued with "Israeli Nuclear 
Capabilities" included, we will consult with our 
EU/Like-minded colleagues on the possibility of removing it 
from the agenda at the Conference.  Portraying the Arabs as 
uncompromising will help keep the EU and others on our side 
as we continue to consult closely with the incoming French EU 
Presidency.  Ultimately, we must be prepared to play hardball 
as well and lay out several options (paras 24-27), including 
a General Committee challenge to a second agenda item, 
amendments from the floor, and risking an up or down vote. 
Mission also cautions, however, that whatever we do on Middle 
East issues could affect other U.S. priorities in the General 
Conference.  End Summary and Request for Guidance. 
 
 
Egypt Rolls Out Revised Draft 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi solicited support for a 
revised draft GC resolution on Middle East Safeguards (para 
28) at an Egyptian-hosted lunch May 30.  A unified EU 
(represented by Slovenia, UK, Germany, Ireland, Finland, 
Italy, Greece) and other like-minded (Norway, New Zealand, 
Japan) supported a "holistic" approach to Middle East issues 
at the late September General Conference and pressed Egypt to 
resume its formerly constructive role to broker a "package" 
with the Arab League.  Italian Ambassador Ghisi will be 
President of the 2008 General Conference.   Also among the 
invitees were Israel, Russia, Turkey and NPT Prepcom Chair 
Ukraine.  (Note: According to Israel, Canada, Australia and 
The Netherlands were intentionally not invited; the first two 
have taken strong principled positions on Middle East GC 
issues.  France, which led the EU charge in the last GC 
against the Egyptian text will preside over the EU in the 
next GC, was also absent. End Note.) 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000343  002 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi circulated the revised text 
in para 28, which he noted was based on agreed UNGA First 
Committee language with some amendments based on last year's 
General Conference deliberations.  The deletions from last 
year may be aimed at placating France, which will hold the EU 
Presidency during this GC.  The current draft deletes two 
references from the 2007 version that had raised French 
objections: OP 4 text which called on states in the region to 
not "permit the stationing on their territories or on 
territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or 
nuclear explosive devices" (Fawzy also suggested this was 
meant to address Turkish concerns, as a NATO member); and OP 
6 text which had urged "the nuclear weapons states and all 
other states," (now just "all states") to assist in 
establishing and not hinder a NWFZ.  The revised Egyptian 
text also deletes a paragraph which noted the importance of 
bilateral Middle East Peace negotiations and the multilateral 
working group on Arms Contro 
l and Regional Security, which has not been active for some 
time. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Schulte welcomed Egypt's effort to consult 
early and to amend the text but underlined the need to treat 
the Middle East as a whole.  He reaffirmed that the U.S. 
seeks consensus on one Middle East item in the GC and will 
not accept a second agenda item singling out Israel while 
other countries in the region violate their obligations. 
Israeli Ambassador Michaeli agreed that without a "package" 
on the Middle East no consensus could be achieved.  If the 
goal of was to isolate Israel, he argued, "then go ahead 
we're used to it."  For Israel "compliance" was the real 
issue and should be reflected in the preamble.  Some of the 
amendments were welcome, Michaeli noted, and the text was a 
step forward, "but only one step after ten steps backward 
last year."  Israel could not accept the revised Egyptian 
text as written.  He further observed that none of the NWFZs 
in the world had been established through the Agency but 
through direct negotiations; Fawzi challenged Israel to start 
them. 
 
¶8. (C) Separately, Michaeli explained to Ambassador Schulte 
on June 10 that the revised Egyptian text deviates from UNGA 
language, with OP 4 particularly problematic. (Note: The UNGA 
text "invites" rather than "calls upon" states in the region 
to develop, test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. End 
note.)  Michaeli also noted the change in OP 5 from "invites" 
to "further calls upon." 
 
EU/Like-minded:  There is Only One Middle East 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald agreed with the U.S. on 
treating the ME as a whole under one agenda item in the GC, 
as "there is only one Middle East."  EU President Slovenia 
also supported consensus and while the Egyptian amendments 
addressed some concerns, the EU supports a single agenda item 
on the Middle East.  Italy, which will hold the GC 
Presidency, sought consensus and to avoid a repeat of last 
year.  Even Ireland, which had broken EU consensus to vote in 
favor of the Egyptian resolution last GC, did not want to 
repeat this "traumatic" experience.  Ireland hoped there 
would be no second resolution and regretted the lack of 
coordination with the Arab group. 
 
¶10. (C) The UK, Norway and New Zealand also supported a 
consensus package.  The UK argued that it was best to address 
the Middle East in a single context, under one GC agenda 
item, and noted that language adopted by consensus in one 
context (i.e. UNGA) does not necessarily translate to another 
context.  Norway cautioned that while the Egyptian effort was 
a positive step, we could not lose sight of overall picture. 
Sweden did not have issues with the Egyptian text but also 
did not want "too many resolutions." 
 
¶11. (C) Picking up on these points, Finland observed that the 
EU was unified but there did not seem to a unified Arab 
position.  Finnish Ambassador Kauppi urged Egypt to resume 
the important role it had played prior to 2006 in brokering 
consensus.  If Egypt wants success on their issue, she 
insisted, it must take responsibility on a related GC issue. 
She also supported one agenda item and one resolution.  The 
Agency has a particular value and controversial issues should 
be minimized as it was all of our responsibility to keep the 
Agency strong, Kaupi concluded.  Significantly, Italy (GC 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000343  003 OF 007 
 
 
President) endorsed the Finnish position. 
 
¶12. (C) Russia, Japan and Turkey likewise supported a 
consensus approach. (Note:  Russia and Japan had voted in 
favor of the Egyptian resolution last year, while Turkey 
joined the EU in abstaining).  Russia said it was willing to 
consider any text and Japan expressed strong support for a 
NWFZ.  Turkey said it would study the text and asked if Egypt 
was open to changes.  Fawzi noted that this draft text was 
based on consensus language and worried about opening it up 
to too many changes. 
 
 
Egypt Isolated 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Completely isolated at his own dining room table, 
Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi warned that Cairo had wanted 
tougher resolution language.  He underscored that Egypt was 
not "desperate" for consensus and would call a vote if 
necessary and put the onus on those who oppose a Middle East 
NWFZ to explain their position.  The Egyptian effort would 
"not be held hostage" to another resolution, he claimed. 
Ambassador Schulte noted that everyone at the table wanted 
consensus but others, not present, do not and Egypt needed to 
help moderate them. 
 
¶14. (C) Egyptian DCM took note of U.S. and EU positions, and 
said he would report "both" back to Cairo.  Ambassador 
Schulte advised that he had not heard separate US and EU 
positions.  He expressed hope that the Egyptian mission would 
report that the U.S., the EU, Norway, Japan (New Zealand 
chimed in as well) all supported a single Middle East agenda 
item.  After the lunch, the Egyptians reiterated privately 
their readiness to call for a vote.  The Egyptian DCM also 
noted that Egypt was losing influence over the Arab League 
and asked that we "give them something"; Egypt could urge the 
Arab Group to be more moderate if they knew that a deal would 
be accepted.  Ambassador Schulte recalled that the Arab group 
could have had a deal last year. 
 
Arab Group Rolls Out Its Text 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Following up on Ambassador Schulte's meeting with AL 
SYG Moussa in April (reftel), Moroccan Ambassador Zniber, the 
new Arab Group in Vienna Chair, AL Ambassador Wehbe and the 
Saudi Ambassador shared the revised resolution on "Israeli 
Nuclear Capabilities" (para 29) with the U.S. on the margins 
of Board session June 4. Zniber had been mandated by the AL 
to present the text to the U.S., EU, NAM and other regional 
groups.  In furtherance of the AL Summit and Ministerial 
level decisions, Zniber cast this as an effort to deal with 
the issue under the NPT umbrella, for the good of the NPT 
regime and within the competence of the IAEA General 
Conference.  He underlined that it was not linked to the 
Middle East conflict.  The objective, Zniber explained, was 
not to create "controversy or confrontation" nor to "blame, 
denounce or condemn" Israel but to stick to facts and to call 
upon Israel as the unique country in the region that has not 
adhered to the NPT.  To this end, the word "threat" was 
dropped.  He also 
 noted that the Arab Group wanted to avoid a vote.  Through 
this resolution, the AL hoped to start a "dialogue" with the 
aim of convincing Israel to join the NPT.  Arab countries 
recognized U.S. efforts in the region, and the AL asked that 
the U.S. understand their position on this issue. 
 
¶16. (C) Ambassador Schulte reaffirmed U.S. support for a 
Middle East WMD-free zone, universal adherence to the NPT as 
well as universalization of the AP and highlighted 
"compliance" with the NPT as the major issue facing the 
region.  He cited German Ambassador Gottwald's statement at 
the Egyptian lunch that "there is only one Middle East" and 
recounted EU and like-minded support for a single agenda 
item.  Ambassador Schulte previewed the U.S. statement to the 
Board on the Provisional GC Agenda, which at this point 
includes only the Middle East Safeguards item.  The U.S. 
statement supported a holistic and consensus based approach 
to the Middle East and opposed a second resolution that 
singled out any one country.  Doing so, he argued, would 
raise questions as to why we were not citing two other 
countries in the region that were out of compliance. Nuclear 
Counselor further observed that the omnibus GC Safeguards 
resolution already calls on all countries to conclude a 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000343  004 OF 007 
 
 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and, the 
refore, to adhere to the NPT. 
 
¶17. (C) Zniber acknowledged that the AL draft resolution may 
be singling it out Israel, "bearing in mind the context," but 
continued to deny any linkage to the Middle East conflict. 
Ambassador Schulte noted that we share the common aim of a 
WMD-free zone but support different tactics; without progress 
on Middle East peace, establishment of a WMD-free zone would 
be difficult.  Furthermore, Iran and Syria's non-compliance 
raise two immediate threats that are not addressed by the GC. 
 As he did later in the Board meeting, Zniber assured that 
Syria would cooperate with the upcoming Safeguards visit.  If 
a GC resolution were presented on Iran, the Arab Group would 
study it and would not be opposed in principle.  Morocco 
believed that Iran must also fully respect its NPT 
obligations and answer UNSC and Board requests. 
 
¶18. (C) Ambassador Schulte urged Zniber to coordinate with 
Egypt, which was after all also an Arab Group member.  He 
welcomed the early dialogue with the Arab Group, and noted 
that we were studying the Egyptian draft.  The U.S. sees 
Middle East issues as a totality, and both efforts must be 
dealt with in tandem, he insisted.  Wehbe agreed that there 
was one Middle East but many questions and asked Ambassador 
Schulte to relay final reaction from Washington. Ambassador 
Schulte promised to do so and reiterated that the U.S. and EU 
support one agenda item and one approach.  Ambassador Schulte 
also encouraged Zniber to consult with Israel Zniber was open 
to dialogue with Israel in a personal capacity, if it would 
help, though doing so officially on behalf of the Arab Group 
would be difficult.  (Note: USDEL passed the text to Israeli 
Ambassador after the meeting.  End note.) 
 
¶19. (C) During the June 5 Board session, Algeria and Morocco 
responded to the U.S. intervention in support of a single 
agenda item on the GC Provisional Agenda.  Algeria was open 
to consultation and compromise but noted that 
"conditionality" would be difficult to accept.  Morocco 
underlined that substantive discussion of the total 
denuclearization of the Middle East would be a priority 
objective for the General Conference.  Notably, neither 
insisted on a second agenda item. (Note: We have indications 
that the Arab Group will soon ask for a second agenda item. 
End Note).  The second resolution could also be considered 
under the existing Middle East Safeguards agenda item. 
 
¶20. (C) Ambassador Schulte met June 11 with last year's GC 
President Moin Hamze, who will represent Lebanon at this 
year's GC.  Noting that he saw no improvement in the 
situation in the run-up to this September's BOG and GC, Hamze 
confirmed that the Arab League will soon request a separate 
agenda item on "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities," and that Egypt 
has not accepted the merging of the two resolutions.  He 
noted also that AL SecGen Moussa will be in Vienna for a 
donor conference on Lebanon June 23 and will use the 
opportunity to seek meetings on the issue. 
 
Comment / Tactics / Analysis 
---------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) The "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities" draft resolution 
is not as anodyne as the Arab Group/AL would have us believe, 
and appears to have been the subject of negotiation with 
hard-liners in the group.  Wehbe noted that the AL had tried 
to take account of U.S. and EU concerns, which "was not easy 
to do."  It took two months for the AL to circulate the draft 
text Moussa had promised in April.  Israeli Ambassador 
Michaeli agrees that Moussa seems to have taken ownership of 
this effort away from Syria. 
 
¶22. (C) Aside from dropping any reference to the Israeli 
nuclear "threat," some of the language has been toughened, 
probably to compensate.  OP 1 refers to the "threat" posed by 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. 
Taken in conjunction with OP 2 calling on Israel to accede to 
the NPT, the inference is clear.  The language in OP 1 was in 
the preamble of last year's text.  Other changes include 
specific mention of UNSCR 487 in the preamble; OP2 "expresses 
concern" rather than "serious concern" and OP3 "Urges" rather 
than "Requests" the Director General to work with concerned 
states. 
 
¶23. (C) For the Arab Group, dropping "threat" is a major 
concession, in the hopes of wooing the EU, but clearly 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000343  005 OF 007 
 
 
doesn't make the resolution any more palatable to Israel. 
For the time being, the EU seems to be holding strong, 
insisting on one agenda item and not singling out Israel. 
 
¶24. (C) One way of dealing with the AL resolution could be to 
insist on deletion of any reference to Israel.  Privately, 
Michaeli was open to considering this as a resolution on 
nuclear capabilities in the region which could apply to Iran. 
 Michaeli hoped that the two resolutions could be considered 
under the Middle East Safeguards agenda item.  Michaeli 
assessed that the AL may be seeking to recreate the UNGA 
First Committee dynamic whereby the Middle East Safeguards 
resolution is adopted by consensus and the "Israeli Nuclear 
Capabilities" resolution is voted upon with the U.S. and 
Israel isolated in opposition.  He attributed this shift to 
the AL taking the lead away from Syria and believed the draft 
text was "testing the waters." 
 
¶25. (C) If there is any hope for a consensus "package" 
linkage to the Egyptian text remains a key consideration.  We 
will need to consider what such a package may look like.  For 
two years now, the Arab Group has rejected the old package 
(resolution plus Presidential Statement).  Both we and the EU 
have signaled clearly that we may challenge a second agenda 
item.  The success of such a challenge would depend on the 
final composition of the General Committee, which includes 
the GC Vice-Presidents, yet to be chosen.  Even if 
successful, the General Committee's recommendation could lead 
to a floor fight in the Plenary.  Israel is also signaling 
that it may introduce floor amendments to both resolutions 
which could get majority support, but would effectively 
nullify the intent of the resolutions.  In order to have any 
hope of pushing the Arabs back into compromise, the prospect 
of another disastrous (to the Arabs) vote on their issues 
must remain real. 
 
¶26. (C) Ultimately our success in once again defeating the 
Arab League initiative will hinge on the EU.  While we will 
be in good hands under the French Presidency, which can be 
expected to take a leadership role, we cannot afford to be 
complacent.  Michaeli will meet with the French in the near 
future and we will also include this issue in our US-EU 
Presidency consultations.  As EU President, the French may 
have to be more even-handed than in their national capacity. 
 
Middle East Safeguards (Egyptian Draft) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) Begin text of "Application of IAEA safeguards in 
the Middle East" draft resolution: 
 
The General Conference, 
 
(a) Recognizing the importance of the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons - both globally and regionally - in enhancing 
international peace and security, 
 
(b) Mindful of the usefulness of the Agency's safeguards 
system as a reliable means of verification of the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, 
 
(c) Concerned by the grave consequences, endangering peace 
and security, of the presence in the Middle East region of 
nuclear activities not wholly devoted to peaceful purposes, 
 
(d) Welcoming the initiatives regarding the establishment of 
a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including 
nuclear weapons, in the Middle East and earlier initiatives 
regarding arms control in the region, 
 
(e) Recognizing that full realization of these objectives 
would be promoted by the participation of all States of the 
region, 
 
(f) Commending the efforts of the Agency concerning the 
application of safeguards in the 
Middle East and the positive response of most States in 
concluding a full-scope safeguards agreement, and 
 
(g) Recalling its resolution GC(51)/RES/17. 
 
¶1. Takes note of the Director General's report in document 
GC(52)/XX (to be updated); 
 
¶2. Affirms the urgent need for all States in the Middle East 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000343  006 OF 007 
 
 
to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency 
safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important 
confidence-building measure among all States in the region 
and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context 
of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone (NWFZ); 
 
¶3. Calls upon all parties directly concerned to consider 
seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required 
for the implementation of the proposal to establish a 
mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region, and 
invites the countries concerned which have not yet done so to 
adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, including 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a 
means of complementing participation in a zone free of all 
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and of 
strengthening peace and security in the region; 
 
¶4. Further calls upon all States of the region, pending the 
establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons (Delete: or permit the 
stationing on their territories or on territories under their 
control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices), or 
to pursue actions that would undermine the goal of 
establishing the zone; 
 
¶5. (Delete: Invites) Further calls upon all States in the 
region to take measures, including confidence-building and 
verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the 
Middle East; 
 
¶6. Urges (Delete: the nuclear weapon States and all other 
States) all States to render assistance in the establishment 
of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action 
that would hinder efforts aiming at its establishment; 
 
¶7. (Delete para: Takes note of the importance of the 
bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the multilateral 
working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in 
promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, 
including the establishment of a NWFZ;) 
 
¶8. Requests the Director General to continue consultations 
with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early 
application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear 
activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of 
model agreements, as a necessary step towards the 
establishment of a NWFZ in the region, referred to in 
resolution GC(XXXVll)/RES/627; 
 
¶9. Calls upon all States in the region to extend their 
fullest cooperation to the Director General in the 
fulfillment of the tasks entrusted to him in the preceding 
paragraph; 
 
¶10. Calls upon all other States, especially those with a 
special responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, to render all assistance to the Director 
General by facilitating the implementation of this 
resolution; and 
 
¶11. Requests the Director Genera1 to submit to the Board of 
Governors and the General Conference at its fifty-third 
(2009) regular session a report on the implementation of this 
resolution and to include in the provisional agenda for that 
session an item entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in 
the Middle East". 
 
End Text 
 
Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (Arab Group Draft) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶28. (SBU) Begin text of Arab League draft resolution on 
"Israeli Nuclear Capabilities": 
 
a) Recal1ing the relevant resolutions of the General 
Conference and the Presidential Statements endorsed by tile 
General Conference on this issue. 
 
b) Recalling also UN Security Council Resolution 487 (1981), 
which inter alia, requested Israel to submit all its nuclear 
installations to the agency's safeguards system. 
 
(c) Bearing in mind the resolution on the Middle East adopted 
by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000343  007 OF 007 
 
 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
in which the Conference noted with concern the continued 
existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the Middle 
East. 
 
d) Recalling the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which welcomed 
the fact that all states in Middle East, with the exception 
of Israel, are states parties to the NPT, and reaffirmed the 
importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement 
of all its nuclear facilities under Comprehensive IAEA 
Safeguards for realizing the universality of the Treaty in 
the Middle East. 
 
(e) Convinced of the significant contribution of the NPT to 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament and to regional and 
international 
peace and security. 
 
f) Recognizing that joining the NPT Treaty and submitting al1 
nuclear facilities in the region to the IAEA Comprehensive 
Safeguards is a prerequisite for establishing a Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZME): 
 
¶1. Expresses concern about the threat posed by the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and 
stability of the Middle East, 
 
¶2. Expresses concern about the Israeli nuclear capabilities, 
and calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all 
its nuclear facilities" under Comprehensive IAEA Safeguards. 
 
¶3. Urges the Director General to work with the concernstates, 
in particular States with the special responsibility 
regarding nonproliferation as stated in article VI of the NPT 
towards achieving that end 
 
¶4. Decides to remain seized of this matter and requests the 
Director General  report on the implementation of this 
resolution to the Board of Governors and the General 
Conference at its fifty-third regular session under an agenda 
item entitled "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities". 
SCHULTE