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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, DRL, DRL/AWH; 
G/TIP 
NSC FOR EPHU 
DOJ FOR AGO MUKASEY; DAAG SWARTZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MAAR ID
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING -- MISSION REQUESTS REVIEW OF 
PROPOSED CHANGES 
 
JAKARTA 00001240  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, for reasons 1.4 (b+d). 
 
¶1.  (C) This is an Action Request.  Please see Para 10. 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY:  Recently proposed changes to the Leahy 
human rights vetting process risk undermining U.S.-Indonesia 
security cooperation and, ironically, contradict the law's 
intent to promote human rights.  The Secretary's 2005 
decision to resume security assistance to Indonesia has 
generated valuable cooperation, including in peacekeeping 
(Lebanon and Darfur), counterterrorism and regional security. 
 President Bush told President Yudhoyono in June 2007 in 
Sydney that he wanted to enhance our security relationship 
and increase mil-mil cooperation. 
 
¶3.  (C) SUMMARY (CON'D):  The Department's new vetting 
requirements would, if finalized, undermine both the 
Secretary's policy decision and the President's intention. 
Embassy Jakarta intends to continue to seek opportunities to 
expand mil-mil and police cooperation to implement these 
policy directives, but is seriously constrained by these 
vetting changes.  We request high-level inter-agency review 
of this expansion of vetting requirements before any new 
policy is instituted.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES 
 
¶4.  (C) The two proposed changes to the vetting process 
would: 
 
-- prohibit training of any member of a security force unit 
with past human rights violations, even if the unit's 
violations pre-dated (by many years) the arrival of the 
individual in the unit; and 
 
-- require, for the first time, the vetting of every 
individual in a composite unit, rather than vetting the unit 
commander only; this change would overload the vetting 
process and effectively block much police and military 
training. 
 
¶5.  (C) For years, Mission has practiced a diligent and 
intrusive vetting process that has kept human rights abusers 
from receiving USG assistance, thereby accomplishing Leahy 
vetting goals.  Prior to these recent changes, the Department 
had never, to the best of our knowledge, 'vetted out' any 
Indonesian that the Mission had recommended for training. 
These recent changes to the Department's vetting policy are 
creeping in without wide clearances in the Department or 
front-channel notification to posts.  Such sweeping changes 
would affect security assistance programs in many parts of 
the world and, Mission believes, require high level 
inter-agency discussion. 
 
¶6.  (C) Not once has an Indonesian security official trained 
by the USG and vetted by the Embassy using long-standing 
Leahy criteria later been credibly alleged to have committed 
gross human rights violations, which is the Leahy vetting 
standard.  The system here has worked, both to honor the 
human rights intent of the vetting requirement and to allow 
our security cooperation to proceed. If we cannot fully 
engage with Indonesian security forces, we cannot fully train 
the police and military units who would respond to terrorist 
attacks in Indonesia and protect our Embassy.  The Indonesian 
contribution to the UNIFIL peacekeeping operation would not 
have been possible; Indonesian police participation in Darfur 
PKO would also be jeopardized. 
 
 
JAKARTA 00001240  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
THE VALUE OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
¶7.  (C) With Indonesia's democratic and security sector 
reforms since 1999, there is no longer a trade off between 
our security interests and human rights values in our 
security assistance program here.  Our assistance advances 
both goals simultaneously.  Our engagement and security 
cooperation with security forces here since 2005 have 
produced results, both in terms of operational improvements 
and professionalization, as well as human rights practices. 
Training has resulted in increased anti-trafficking efforts, 
fewer abuses by police in controlling crowds, a four-fold 
increase in disciplinary actions taken by police for ethics 
and other violations, and senior military officers being 
denied promotion into key positions because of their past 
human rights records.  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission 
both advocate human rights training for security forces and 
provide such training themselves, including for the Army 
Special Forces (Kopassus) and 
the police Mobile Brigade.  These security forces advance 
vital U.S. interests by assisting in peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs), protecting U.S. facilities and citizens in Indonesia, 
and fighting terrorism and human trafficking. 
 
¶8.  (C) Institution of these two changes to the vetting 
process would seriously damage our police and military 
training programs.  Our INL-funded and, to a lesser extent, 
DS/ATA-funded training of the Indonesian police would be 
paralyzed.  For INL programs in 2008, we have trained 1,172 
police officers using composite units.  Requiring each 
individual to be vetted for a composite unit training 
exercise would have increased the number of individuals 
submitted for vetting by over 1,000 in the last six months, 
overloading the vetting system here and in Washington and 
bringing this crucial training to a virtual halt.  These INL 
programs include not only human rights training, e.g., an 
international standard 'use of force' policy, but also 
capacity-building programs in anti-human trafficking, 
anti-illegal logging and other areas critical to U.S. 
interests here. 
 
¶9.  (C) On the military side, the story is similar.  Our IMET 
and other training programs are designed to build 
professionalism within the Indonesian military.  There are 
explicit human rights training programs, as well as training 
for peacekeeping operations and disaster relief/emergency 
response that would be damaged by the new vetting 
requirements.  Indonesian participation in UNIFIL--for which 
we transported 850 Indonesian soldiers in a composite 
unit--would not have been possible if we had been required to 
vet each and every soldier.  The Indonesian troops would 
simply have not been able to participate, despite the fact 
that Washington weighed in actively with all capitals 
concerned to get the Indonesians there.  On disaster relief 
as well, our assistance is used to train first responders, 
emergency management officials and civil affairs officers, 
all essential for the GOI's response to a natural or man-made 
disaster here--and there are many.  Mission recently received 
instructions to deny vetting to a m 
ilitary officer who literally was not even born when his unit 
was reportedly involved in human rights violations.  How can 
we explain to him and others like him that we value Indonesia 
as a strategic partner and support Indonesia's desire for a 
more active international role?  U.S. action, such as this, 
undermines our stated and actual policy toward Indonesia in 
fundamental ways.  These vetting changes need serious 
high-level, inter-agency attention. 
 
JAKARTA 00001240  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
ACTION REQUEST 
 
¶10.   (C) We request a high-level inter-agency review of this 
proposed expansion of vetting requirements before any new 
policy is instituted.  Meanwhile, we request that the two new 
interpretations of vetting proceedings cited above be 
suspended until this matter can be fully discussed and the 
results of this policy discussion shared with posts via 
official channels.  Specifically and most urgently, we ask 
that the vetting request for composite units of police slated 
for training in the immediate future in the fields of 
anti-trafficking, management systems, and public relations 
(per Jakarta 1073, 1075 and 1077) be acted on immediately 
based on vetting of the unit commanders, so that we are not 
forced to cancel these important opportunities. 
 
HUME 
 
HUME