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Viewing cable 08AMMAN1744, PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 3: THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AMMAN1744 2008-06-11 07:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
VZCZCXRO6119
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1744/01 1630702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 110702Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2846
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 001744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 
TAGS: ECON PGOV KPAL KREF JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 3: THE 
CYCLE OF POVERTY 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 1466 
     B. AMMAN 391 
     C. UNRWA REPORT - "A SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
        SPECIAL HARDSHIP CASE FAMILIES" (2006) 
     D. AMMAN 670 
     E. AMMAN 815 
     F. AMMAN 1724 
     G. AMMAN 1725 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (SBU) Note: This is the third of a four-part series of 
cables examining the world of Jordan's Palestinian refugee 
camps.  Part one focused on the different categories of 
refugees, and the basic structure of the camp system as it 
exists in Jordan.  Part two examined the isolation of the 
camps - how they are largely separate from Jordanian society, 
politics, and economics.  Part three will look at the 
economic situation of the camps and their inhabitants, 
particularly in light of recent strains on Jordan's economy. 
Part four will examine Islamist politics and extremism in the 
camps.  These cables are the result of focus group meetings 
with diverse residents of nine camps in Jordan.  End Note. 
 
2.  (C) Summary: Poverty is an all-encompassing issue that 
defines Jordan's refugee camps.  Rising prices impact all 
Jordanians, but the residents of the camps feel their effects 
acutely, especially in terms of the cost of land and health 
care.  Lack of opportunity is frequently cited as the main 
reason that the camps remain centers of poverty - a situation 
exacerbated by the lack of education, societal 
discrimination, and exodus of skilled workers.  Poverty is 
the only force that keeps people in the camps.  Some are 
eligible for government or UNRWA assistance, but that help is 
both inflexible and insufficient.  The complicated land 
ownership system in the camps is another damper on economic 
advancement.  Those camp residents who do succeed in life do 
so in spite of their situation, not because of it.  End 
Summary. 
 
The Cycle of Poverty 
-------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In Jordan, there are no official signs or other 
markers that delineate most refugee camps from the urban 
neighborhoods that surround them.  It is poverty that defines 
the borders of Jordan's refugee camps - a recognizable shift 
from the middle class to the lower class.  Contacts in the 
camps use a common set of adjectives to describe their 
economic situation - low, hard, desperate, difficult. 
"Poverty is everywhere in Jordan.  But in the camps, it is 
one hundred percent," says a resident of the Al-Husn camp, 
near Irbid. 
 
4.  (C) Jihad Thaher, UNRWA's area officer for the Zarqa 
district, notes that the people in the camps are by 
definition the poorest of the poor.  Those who have the 
income stream necessary to support their families in the 
outside world will immediately seek a life outside of the 
camp.  Since the camps are already overcrowded, the shelters 
of those who move into the middle class are usually turned 
over to the ever-expanding families who are too poor to break 
the cycle of poverty. 
 
Inflation Takes Its Toll 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) There is plenty of angst across the board in Jordan 
about the rising cost of living, and for the residents of the 
camps, it is an enormous part of their daily struggle.  "Most 
families are sleeping without heaters so they can buy bread," 
says Ibrahim Natour, of Jebel Hussein camp.  Said Ajawi, of 
Irbid camp, cites a recent string of suicides to demonstrate 
the difficulty that people are facing.  Residents of the 
Zarqa camp told us that their neighbors are buying livestock 
and raising them in the streets of the camp - an option, they 
say, that ultimately proves cheaper than buying meat in local 
markets.  Suleyman Abu Taheiner, a resident of the unofficial 
Sukhna camp, says, "I said to the meat in the supermarket: 
'Goodbye, I can't afford you anymore.'" 
 
6.  (C) Facing the rising cost of health care is a 
particularly acute problem in the camps.  Residents of Zarqa 
and Sukhna camps spoke about the increasing reliance of camp 
residents on the basic health system of UNRWA, which provides 
care and pharmaceuticals free of charge to registered 
refugees.  Due to the lack of full access to Jordanian health 
services caused by their citizenship status, the people of 
the camps used to bear the full cost of their treatment at 
government or private hospitals - a bill they can no longer 
afford to pay (Ref A).  "We go to UNRWA's clinics because we 
 
AMMAN 00001744  002 OF 005 
 
 
can't afford any other treatment," says Furejat Um Yazan, a 
resident of the Sukhna camp.  UNRWA's Jihad Thaher sees an 
alarming uptick in the number of patients using the agency's 
health system due to economic conditions, and fears an 
overload.  He says that on average, the staff of UNRWA's 
small Zarqa clinic now see up to 110 patients per day. 
 
7.  (C) The skyrocketing cost of land and rising consumer 
prices in Jordan are causing young people in the camps to 
postpone marriage.  Buying a house outside of the camp has 
always been a challenge, but now it is almost impossible for 
newlyweds with one or even two entry-level incomes to start a 
life for themselves in the current economic climate.  Abu 
Ra'ed Darash, a resident of Zarqa camp, explained the 
situation of his thirty-six year old son, who has been 
engaged for years, but is unable to seal the deal because he 
does not have the financial wherewithal to find housing or 
provide for a family.  Ayman Al-Burini, a student from Zarqa 
camp, says that many of his friends face a similar situation. 
 
8.  (C) An experienced hand with over twenty-five years as an 
UNRWA staffer, Thaher says that he has never seen the 
economic situation in the camps decline so rapidly and so 
far.  He believes that the true impact of rising prices in 
Jordan has so far been masked by the tight social and 
economic networks of the camps, but fears for the future. 
"People start to rely on their relatives for help.  Then they 
move to the neighbors.  Pretty soon the neighbors who were 
giving ten percent of their income to others can't afford it 
anymore," he says. 
 
The Cost of Opportunity 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Contacts within the camps are unanimous in their 
diagnosis of the reason they remain trapped in a cycle of 
poverty.  They consistently and vocally assert that economic 
opportunities are simply not available in Jordan for 
Palestinians.  Notwithstanding the fact that the private 
sector in Jordan is dominated by Palestinians, many talk 
about the lack of work in the public sector as a function of 
officially sanctioned prejudice against Palestinians.  Jihad, 
a student from Baqa'a camp, posits that "East Bankers can 
find work easily.  Palestinians can't.  We can't join the 
army.  We can't join the civil service.  Palestinians have no 
wasta ('connections')."  Sheikh Qteishat, also of Baqa'a 
camp, complains that "the only job available, even for highly 
qualified Palestinians from the camps, is to sweep the 
streets of Amman." 
 
10.  (C) Residents of the camps speak often about a brain 
drain and how it impacts the economic and social life of the 
camps.  For educated sons and daughters of the camps, the 
lack of employment opportunity in Jordan often means finding 
a job in the gulf or further afield.  Salam Hamdan of Jebel 
Hussein camp says that "people from the camps are very 
successful when they pursue their careers in the gulf 
countries.  But not one of them is a success here in Jordan. 
It's impossible."  As a result, many in the camps are 
dependent on remittance income - a subject that will be 
treated in more detail septel. 
 
11.  (C) Unskilled workers from the camps are most often 
employed in the agricultural or construction sectors.  These 
jobs often require them to commute long distances for 
salaries that are unable to support large families.  The 
recent lifting of fuel subsidies in Jordan has led to a 
corresponding rise in the price of public transportation - a 
system that refugees rely on heavily to get to work. 
Residents of Sukhna camp say that many of their neighbors 
(particularly women) work in the local Qualifying Industrial 
Zone (QIZ) as garment workers.  The minimum wage salaries 
(110 JD, or 154 USD per month) are insufficient, and most of 
the workers tack on as much overtime as they are allowed in 
order to make ends meet. 
 
12.  (C) Some people from the camps also point out that their 
lack of full Jordanian citizenship often prevents them from 
investing in land and property that would serve as a 
financial refuge in times of need.  The convoluted property 
system of the camps (see paragraph 20) exacerbates this 
problem.  Zughd Al-Houli, a resident of the Sukhna camp, drew 
the distinction between East Bankers who, she argued, are 
able to live the "Jordanian dream" of home ownership and the 
residents of the camps who live a hand-to-mouth existence, 
largely without access to credit or other equity-building 
devices. 
 
13.  (C) In addition to the lack of jobs, opportunities for 
camp residents in the Jordanian education system are few and 
far between.  Sheldon Pitterman, who served until recently as 
UNRWA's Jordan Director, notes that only 300 tuition-free 
 
AMMAN 00001744  003 OF 005 
 
 
slots in Jordanian universities are designated for students 
from the camps.  Since many of these students have less than 
full Jordanian citizenship, they are frequently ineligible 
for scholarships and must pay full tuition.  The main 
consequence of this systemic bias against Palestinian 
refugees is that increasingly, the people of the camps are 
without skills and connections necessary to gain employment. 
Residents of Jerash camp, who are mostly former Gazans 
without Jordanian citizenship, relay that work in the 
informal sector or seasonal employment - jobs in construction 
and agriculture - are the only reliable source of employment 
for many in the camps.  "The big problem for us is 
unemployment," says Salam, a resident of Jerash camp.  "With 
nothing else to do, the unemployed are just hanging around on 
the streets of the camp." 
 
Should We Stay Or Should We Go? 
------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) Poverty is the only reason that people remain in the 
camps - there is little to no emotional attachment to the 
land or even the people that keeps refugees inside the camps. 
 Said Ajawi echoes the constant refrain of our contacts when 
he says, "if people in the camps earn enough money, they buy 
land outside the camps and leave."  Land and housing prices 
in Jordan have increased steadily since 2003, making it 
increasingly difficult for camp residents and average 
Jordanians to invest in real estate.  The lack of outflow 
means a corresponding increase in the already crowded 
conditions that prevail in all of Jordan's refugee camps. 
 
15.  (C) Structures in the camps (many of which were designed 
to be temporary) are coming to the end of their natural 
lives.  Walking through the narrow lanes of the camps is a 
study in crumbling facades, piles of rubble, and buildings 
that have seen better days.  Residents of the camps are eager 
to renovate, but are too poor to afford it.  This, along with 
the convoluted property ownership system (see paragraph 20), 
contributes to the feeling of destitution and despair within 
the camps. 
 
16.  (C) Camp residents tell us that one of the effects of 
the unemployment and poverty in the camps is an increased 
focus on the right of return (Ref B).  Said Ajawi warns that 
with increasing prices in Jordan, residents of the camps are 
looking more and more towards Palestine itself as an 
alternative to residence in Jordan - it is becoming more 
politically attractive, but most of all camp residents see it 
as cheaper.  "Palestinians who live outside of the camps are 
thinking long term - they're thinking about building their 
lives.  People here in the camps are thinking about 
Palestine."  A resident of Jerash camp told us that he had no 
choice but to look for alternatives to his current situation: 
 "We don't have jobs, or even national numbers.  What is the 
future for my kids in this country?" 
 
Welfare Sheikhs 
--------------- 
 
17.  (C) Some residents of the camps are eligible to receive 
financial aid from the Jordanian government.  Yet the 
existence of different gradations of Jordanian citizenship 
(Ref A) mean that this assistance is uneven.  People from the 
camps are unanimous in their verdict: aid from the Jordanian 
government is not enough, and its value is constantly 
decreasing as inflation rises.  Afaf Mejdelawi, a housewife 
from the Zarqa camp, points out that the large families of 
the camps who are eligible for government assistance receive 
only a pittance from the government - 36 JD (USD 43) per 
month, per person. 
 
18.  (C) Approximately fourteen percent of refugees who live 
in camps in Jordan are part of UNRWA's "hardship case" 
program, created in 1978 to help the neediest people who fall 
under the agency's care.  These refugees meet strictly 
defined criteria of poverty, and receive additional 
assistance.  The assistance is meager, however - only 7 JD 
(USD 9.80) per month.  With the recent rise in consumer 
prices, refugees are forced to stretch this additional money 
even further.  Note: The hardship case program is currently 
under review, and may eventually include other forms of 
assistance such as employment services and direct food aid in 
the future.  End Note.  UNRWA's Pitterman complains that the 
government always sees monetary support for Palestinian 
refugees as "additional" to that of UNRWA, which it holds 
responsible for the refugees' primary care. 
 
19.  (C) The Gazan residents of Jerash camp are in a 
particularly tight spot economically.  Refugees from the West 
Bank, who are often Jordanian citizens, have access to 
government health care and other vital services.  The people 
of Jerash camp, on the other hand, are entirely dependent on 
 
AMMAN 00001744  004 OF 005 
 
 
UNRWA.  The only aid they receive from the government of 
Jordan is a quarterly donation of 200 packets of groceries 
from the King.  The packets, which contain around 100 JD (140 
USD) of food, reach only a small minority of the 28,000 
people who live in the camp.  Jihad Thaher, UNRWA area 
officer for Zarqa, says that the agency has a preferred 
hiring program for refugees from Gaza in recognition of their 
inability to access the services of the Jordanian government. 
 As a result, Jordan's UNRWA employees are disproportionately 
of Gazan origin. 
 
Land Ownership:  Down the Rabbit Hole 
------------------------------------- 
 
20.  (C) A major factor that impacts the financial security 
of camp residents is the convoluted property ownership 
system.  When the camps were founded in the early 1950s and 
late 1960s, the Jordanian government leased the land for the 
camps rather than buying or expropriating it.  Over the 
years, Jordan has maintained lease payments to these 
landowners for the camps, some of which now occupy urban land 
that is worth millions of dollars.  Note:  The high cost of 
maintaining these leases over the years is one of the main 
factors in Jordan's quest for governmental compensation as 
part of any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
End Note.  The primary consequence of this system for the 
residents of the camps is that they cannot buy the land on 
which they live and work.  While they wait for a solution, 
residents of the camps are trapped in a financial gray area. 
 
21.  (C) Residents of the camps cannot buy the property they 
live on, but they do technically own the structures they 
inhabit.  Yet there is a further complication that derives 
from the system of registering deeds and ownership changes in 
these structures.  UNRWA, not the Jordanian government, holds 
the documents that register ownership of the structures in 
the camps.  These pseudo-deeds have not been updated since 
the founding of the camps - the original owners of the 
structures from the camp's founding are listed on all of the 
deeds.  Yet the structures in the camps have changed hands 
many times since then; nearly all of the houses and 
businesses in the camps are occupied by people who are not 
the original owners listed on the registration documents. 
 
22.  (C) In the absence of an official registration process, 
an informal system of ownership change has blossomed in the 
camps.  Residents of several camps told us that larger 
families are often unable to find sufficient housing, and are 
forced to swap with people in other camps, creating a de 
facto property exchange market between the different camps. 
When camp residents want to buy, lease, or trade a structure 
in the camp, they come to an agreement with the owner, and 
exchange what amounts to a promissory note.  Each structure 
in the camps has a chain of promissory notes that traces back 
to the original "ownership" document on file with UNRWA. 
 
23.  (C) The legality of this system is unclear, and as a 
consequence Jordanian courts are inundated with property 
disputes from the camps.  The director of Al-Husn camp told 
us that in the end, "we have many problems determining the 
ownership of buildings," and that many of the buildings are 
tied up in endless legal battles over the validity of 
promissory notes.  There is a project in the works to create 
an electronic record system for property in the camps, but 
UNRWA officials say that the system is in its infancy.  Note: 
 During our visit to Souf camp, an official from the 
Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) who sat in on our 
meeting was accosted by a man engaged in a complicated 
property dispute.  End Note.  As a consequence of this 
situation, refugees in Jordan are the least likely of all 
UNRWA areas of operation to own their own homes (Ref C). 
 
Against the Odds 
---------------- 
 
24.  (C) Many of our contacts in the camps assert that 
Palestinians will succeed despite their difficult economic 
situation.  They point to the many professionals and 
businessmen who are still considered "sons of the camps" - 
people who have broken the cycle of poverty and made their 
communities proud.  Yet this sentiment is often qualified by 
the notion that success will only come if the social and 
political structure of Jordan allows people of the camps room 
to flourish.  A resident of Baqa'a camp told us, "you will 
only extend your legs as far as the blanket will cover them." 
 Ibrahim Natour, of Jebel Hussein camp, is proud of the 
successful businessmen who have emerged from the camps over 
the years.  "We are self-made people," he says.  "Can the 
children of (the wealthy Amman district of) Abdoun study by 
candlelight?"  Comment:  While the socio-political situation 
in the camps exacerbates the cycle of poverty, the rising 
cost of living in Jordan impacts East Bankers as well. 
 
AMMAN 00001744  005 OF 005 
 
 
Residents of the camps often view their situation though a 
narrow lens, but fail to grasp the rural poverty in Jordan 
that reflects their own plight.  End Comment. 
Hale