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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA283, IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSIONS WITH DG AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA283 2008-05-19 07:34 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0283/01 1400734
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 190734Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7942
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0707
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0639
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0952
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0704
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0799
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1234
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA, IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2018 
TAGS: PARM AORC KNPP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSIONS WITH DG AND 
HEINONEN 
 
REF: UNVIE 240 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d,h 
 
 Summary 
--------- 
 
1. (S) Acting U/S for Arms Control and International Security 
John Rood discussed the state-of-play on Iran May 6 with IAEA 
Director General ElBaradei and Safeguards DDG Olli Heinonen. 
ElBaradei stressed the need for a face saving measure on 
suspension and said the P5 1, minus the U.S., should deliver 
the updated offer in Tehran, if it is to have any chance of 
success.  He counseled against using Solana as the "mailman" 
because the Iranians do not want to deal with him.  ElBaradei 
made his usual pitch for direct U.S. engagement with Iran as 
the only way to ultimately resolve the Iran issue.  Turning 
to the Safeguards investigation, the DG did not expect Iran 
to be fully transparent on weaponization but the Secretariat 
would continue seeking to "clear the deck" of past issues. 
Acting U/S Rood underscored that Iran's ability to re-start 
weaponization efforts was a present concern and urged the DG 
to push for the AP, points which ElBaradei acknowledged.  The 
DG expressed frustration with the opacity of the Iranian 
leadership and figuring out who was in charge of nuclear 
issues. 
 
2.  (S) Separately, DDG Heinonen recounted his most recent 
trip to Tehran during which the Iranians reviewed the 
"alleged studies" documents.  He also posed questions related 
to procurements and "loose ends" on military involvement. 
Heinonen did not expect Iran would admit weapons-related work 
when it provided its "final assessment" this month. Although 
deployment of the new generation centrifuges was slow, and 
none had been connected to cascades, he acknowledged there 
was also no sign of suspension or readiness to implement the 
AP.  Routine inspections were proceeding unobstructed and he 
did not see much of a practical problem with DIV information 
at Arak, though Iran was not complying with the revised Code 
3.1. 
 
DG's Prognosis 
-------------- 
 
3.(S) Acting U/S Rood solicited the DG's prognosis of recent 
developments on Iran.  ElBaradei acknowledged a difference of 
"perception" on Iran, arguing that the P5 1 strategy should 
have been adjusted three years ago to prevent Iran from 
acquiring industrial-scale enrichment.  Although this was now 
"water under the bridge," he remained of the view that a 
full, robust verification regime was more important than 
suspension.  It was almost impossible for Iran to suspend 
enrichment, he offered, given that Iran sees this as a 
security issue and wants respect from the United States as a 
regional player.  All sides of the Iranian political spectrum 
share this perspective, he added.  ElBaradei remained 
convinced that UNSC sanctions only reinforce hard-liners in 
Iran as this had become an issue of national pride and 
sacrifice.  The DG made his usual pitch for full U.S. 
engagement in direct negotiations with Iran.  Rood pointed to 
Iran's complicated role in the region, and the unhappy 
experience of trilateral talks on Iraq. 
 
4. (S) On the P5 1 package, the DG argued that the question 
was not the content but of offering Iran a "face saving" 
measure on suspension.  As he had told German FM Steinmeier, 
it was a good package but "delivery" would be a problem if 
the P5 1 sent it "by mail" via Solana.  Iran would "return to 
sender" saying they are "not for sale."  The Iranians did not 
want to work with Solana.  He advised that the best way to 
get a fair hearing would be for the "five" (P5 1 minus the 
U.S.) to engage in preliminary talks with Iran.  Rood said 
that he would take this suggestion back to the P5 1.  He 
noted that the Iranian leadership did not appear to be set up 
for making strategic decisions and pressure would be needed. 
ElBaradei agreed that pressure was necessary but so too was 
"an opening valve." 
 
5. (S) Turning to the status of the Safeguards investigation, 
the DG saw the "alleged studies" as the major issue.  He 
referred in passing to the recent agreement by Iran to 
address this issue in May, as a "work plan" or "timeline." 
The DG did not expect Iran would be completely transparent 
and answer all questions, and would only be prepared to do so 
as part of a "package" deal (presumably with the U.S.) in the 
future, at which time unresolved issues could be 
"grandfathered" in.  ElBaradei clearly saw the "alleged 
studies" as a past issue, and referred to the NIE's 
conclusion that Iran had stopped weaponization work in 2003. 
It was now a matter of confidence building, he said, leaving 
future risk assessment to the UN Security Council.  For its 
part, the IAEA would push to "clear the deck," of past 
issues.  Rood underlined the critical importance of the 
weaponization investigation and the need for Iran to proffer 
convincing explanations.  He reminded the DG that the NIE 
could not conclude with confidence that that Iran had not 
re-started weaponization efforts, and that this was a matter 
not just of the past but of the present.  He also noted the 
need to press for more tools, including the Additional 
Protocol.  The DG said that he pushes the AP at every 
opportunity and acknowledged that these issues were past and 
present concerns. 
 
6. (S) The DG also expressed frustration with the difficulty 
of figuring out who was "in charge" in Iran given the many 
divisions in the Iranian leadership.  He noted that even the 
Supreme Leader had to work to build consensus among factions. 
 In the nuclear field, it was not clear whether the AEOI or 
the Foreign Ministry was in charge at different junctures, 
and the ball seems to have been passed from former nuclear 
negotiator Larijiani to Jalili back to AEOI head Aghazadeh. 
ElBaradei observed that when he met with the Supreme Leader 
in January, only Aghazadeh and Velayati (advisor to Khamenei) 
were present.  They seem to have emerged as significant 
players while nuclear negotiator Jalili is not a player in 
the DG's view.  Although Aghazadeh seemed to be on the 
ascendant, it was still not clear to the DG who had the 
policy lead on nuclear issues. 
 
Olli's Diagnosis 
---------------- 
 
7. (S) In a separate briefing with EXPO, Safeguards DDG 
Heinonen (who was also present in the DG meeting) provided a 
status report of his discussions with Iran on the so-called 
"alleged studies."  He said he presented the "studies" along 
with information from multiple sources in Tehran during his 
last trip.  The Iranians spent two and a half days reading 
the information and offered to provide their "final 
assessment" in May.  In addition to the "studies," there were 
quite a few unanswered questions which Heinonen posed on 
procurement efforts with possible nuclear ties, as well as 
loose ends on military ties to the centrifuge program.  It 
was too early to predict what Iran's "final" answers would 
be, he said.  The mid-May timeframe for assessing the 
military nature of Iran's program was short, he added, not 
sounding optimistic.  Rood inquired whether there was any 
indication of departure from the "baseless fabrications" 
party-line.  Heinonen noted that the Iranians were at least 
studying the information but said he would be surprised if 
they completely changed tune.  The Iranians knew they had to 
provide substantive explanations for these activities. 
However, it was unclear whether they would acknowledge that 
they were nuclear-related or even conducted in Iran.  Asked 
about providing access to people, Heinonen explained that 
requests for interviews would happen in the "next phase," in 
clarifying the answers Iran provided, and observed that there 
were others in the Iranian nuclear establishment equally or 
more important than Fakhrizadeh. 
 
8.(S) Heinonen commented on Iran's April 8 "Nuclear Day" 
announcement of centrifuge expansion and reported that the 
goal of an additional 3,000 or 6,000 centrifuges had not yet 
happened with IR-1 (formerly known as P1) centrifuges.  He 
also said Iran had not provided inspectors with a firm time 
schedule for their deployment.  A few IR-2 and IR-3 
centrifuges had been installed at the pilot facility Natanz, 
mainly he surmised "for demonstration purposes."  (Note:  The 
IR-3, in addition to the IR-2, is one of the four versions of 
the "new generation centrifuges" that were reported in the 
February DG's report. End note)  Heinonen clarified that only 
a small number, maybe one or two, of the IR-2 and IR-3 
centrifuges were running on UF6 gas and that these were all 
single machines not connected to a cascade.  He underlined 
that there was no sign of suspension and Iran had not agreed 
to implement the AP.  Meanwhile, routine inspection 
activities continued unobstructed, including timely 
unannounced inspections, as the Iranians seemed to be doing 
their utmost to appear cooperative on that score.  By his 
estimation, the Uranium Conversion Facility had produced 
roughly 400 tons of UF6.  Construction of the Arak 
heavy-water reactor continued slowly, he noted.  Asked by 
Rood about DIV issues at Arak, Heinonen noted that Iran was 
not adhering to the early DIV requirements of the revised 
Code 3.1 but had reverted to an earlier version.  From a 
practical standpoint, this was not a problem as the IAEA 
already had seals and surveillance measures in place at Arak, 
yet Iran was not complying with the letter of its agreement. 
 
9. (U) Acting U/S Rood did not have an opportunity to clear 
this message. 
SCHULTE