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DE RUEHUNV #0271/01 1340632
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O 130632Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7917
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0703
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0635
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0548
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0948
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0697
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0532
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0795
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1226
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2018 
TAGS: PARM AORC KNPP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:  ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSES A POSSIBLE 
BOARD RESOLUTION WITH P5+1 AMBASSADORS 
 
REF: UNVIE 240 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for 
reasons 1.4 b and  d 
 
 Summary 
--------- 
 
¶1. (S) Over lunch with P5 1 Ambassadors May 6, Acting U/S 
Rood pressed for a Board resolution on Iran in June.  The 
EU-3 agreed that Board and UNSC actions were complimentary 
and not mutually exclusive; the UK was particularly 
frustrated by the lack of Board action.  EU-3 members joined 
the Acting Undersecretary in seeking to convince Russia and 
China of the value of a Board resolution which would support 
DDG Heinonen's investigation and send a strong signal to Iran 
to cooperate.  Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky saw no need for 
such a resolution, pointing out that much progress has been 
made and counseling patience.  China had no position, though 
it shared Russia's view of positive progress on Iran.  Russia 
insisted that any Board resolution be coordinated at the 
Ministerial level as part of the broader P5 1 strategy. 
Meanwhile, the French are moving forward with plans to host 
P5 1 experts on May 26-27.  Rood encouraged this as a means 
of demonstrating P5 1 unity in Vienna. 
 
¶2. (S) It was clear from the P5 1 discussion that Russia (and 
probably China) would not contemplate any action in the Board 
without explicit instructions.  Russia, in particular, does 
not see the value of doing much of anything in the Board. 
Absent PolDir agreement, prospects of a P5 1-sponsored Board 
resolution are slim.  We could work with the EU-3 and other 
like-minded Missions who may be willing to sponsor a 
resolution, but that would be a more difficult course.   End 
Summary. 
 
 
A/Undersecretary Rood calls for Board Resolution 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (C) P5 1 Ambassadors (China was represented at by DCM 
Minister Counselor) exchanged views over lunch with Acting 
U/S Rood on a June Board resolution on Iran and discussed a 
P5 1 experts meeting in Vienna, now slated for May 26-27. 
Rood noted the May 2 Ministerial agreement on an updated P5 1 
"package" offer to Iran and underlined ongoing concerns about 
the direction of the Iranian nuclear program.  He observed 
that the NIE had expressed greater confidence than before as 
to the existence of a nuclear weapons program until 2003 and 
that other countries had also provided information to the 
IAEA.  These concerns needed to be addressed and accounted 
for so that the Secretariat can conduct its verification 
work.  Along with incentives, the dual track approach 
presumed pressure; UNSC sanctions were one means, but the 
IAEA also had a central role to play.  Just because the issue 
was before the UN Security Council, this did not preclude the 
Board being seized of the matter, he argued, and asked for 
thoughts on a Board resolution in June.  Charge added that 
the P5 1 should consider how to best use the month before the 
upcoming Board to support DDG Heinonen's continuing 
investigation. 
 
Germany:  Time to Send a Message 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald offered that the Iranians 
would "eat their words" concerning "baseless fabrications" if 
the DG reported no engagement on their part.  The mid-May 
timetable for Iran's answers was ambitious and he expected no 
breakthroughs.  Most likely the DG would report that Iran had 
promised answers but that the investigation was not complete, 
he said.  Germany believed it would thus be useful for the 
Board to send a message to the Tehran leadership to cooperate 
with the IAEA investigation.  Gottwald regretted the built-in 
resistance of some groups on the Board to a prospect of a 
resolution. 
 
UK: Need to Change the Dynamic 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) UK Ambassador Smith also shared doubts about Iran 
providing answers in May.  He noted a broad spectrum of views 
on the Board from those who desperately wanted to believe in 
progress, to those skeptics who believed progress was 
impossible.  He was disappointed by the procedural way in 
which the Board has been handling the Iran issue.  Since his 
arrival in Vienna almost a year ago, it seemed to be always 
the same story: the DG report would come out a few days 
before the Board meeting and there was little time to do 
anything beyond national statements.  As a result the Board 
had not delivered much.  He agreed that it was not a choice 
between action in either New York or Vienna.  Rood concurred 
that the Board had devolved into little more than a venue for 
the DG to report.  There was a basis for agreement, even 
among Board members who took a more optimistic view of the 
Iran file, he believed, on the value of upholding safeguards 
and the AP.  Building from this core, the Board should be 
poised to play its established role.  The Board would not 
displace the UNSC or P5 1 but could play a constructive 
supplementary role, Rood argued. 
 
Russia: Patience Please 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky took exception to any 
argument (though none had been made) that there had not been 
positive progress on the Iran file.  He said he had also been 
in Vienna and had seen remarkable progress on the Iran file. 
He maintained that the dual track approach had yielded 
results.  "Sometimes no action is not bad," he noted, 
especially since New York had already taken action.  The 
Iranians were cooperating, he asserted, and he urged support 
and patience for the Iran-IAEA track.  Zmeyevsky also 
questioned whether Ministers had discussed the prospect of a 
Board resolution and insisted on coordination at the 
Ministerial level in the context of the broader Iran 
strategy.  Vienna could not be the spoiler, he reflected, and 
we must ensure the Board's contribution had a positive impact 
on the general picture.  He counseled that Vienna should wait 
for the strategic moves on the part of the P5 1 with regard 
to the updated package to play out and also noted that Tehran 
was preparing its own proposal.  He had no information on the 
latter proposal but saw it as a good sign that Iran was 
prepared to cooperate with the P5 1. 
 
China: IAEA has a technical mandate 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Unsurprisingly, Chinese Counselor Liu shared the 
Russian view of IAEA-Iran cooperation, noting that all issues 
had been resolved with the exception of the "alleged 
studies," on which Iran's responses were expected before the 
June Board.  He stressed the technical mandate of the IAEA 
and the fact that the issue was now before the UNSC.  China 
had no position on how to deal with the Iran file in the June 
Board. 
 
France: Progress?  What progress? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) French Ambassador Deniau countered that the facts on 
the ground were not encouraging as Iran continued to add 
cascades, develop new generation centrifuges and make rapid 
progress in its ballistic missile program.  Iran had 
addressed next to nothing on weaponization and its 
declarations were not sufficient.  Deniau enjoined the P5 1 
to demonstrate unity including in Vienna.  He argued 
forcefully that a resolution by the Board as the technical 
body in charge of the Iran file would help the broader P5 1 
strategy.  Charge also pointed out that a Board resolution 
would counter Iran's claims that the IAEA had given it a 
clean bill of health when several issues were unresolved and 
more information from governments is prompting more questions 
for Iran.  In the wider context, he argued, a strong signal 
from the Board to Iran that the Vienna file was not closed 
would be useful as the Iranian body politic digests the 
updated P5 1 offer. 
 
¶9. (C) Rood reminded the P5 1 that they should not lose sight 
of the fact that Iran remains out of compliance with its 
Safeguards agreement and weaponization was of the utmost 
concern.  The common denominator, Gottwald noted, was that 
Board members do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Vienna had a role to play on the technical side in helping to 
clean up these issues.  He saw a division of labor with New 
York that did not preclude a Board resolution.  Rood agreed 
that unless there was a significant change in the nature of 
Iran's cooperation on weaponization, it would be useful for 
the Board to weigh in to reinforce the Secretariat's 
investigation.   The DG has said several times he needs 
Iranian cooperation, Rood noted, so the goal is to get Iran 
to cooperate and give the Secretariat credible information. 
Smith added that Iran must provide more than superficial 
cooperation and the next DG report must demonstrate 
cooperation in substance not just form.  Otherwise, the 
Agency could not fulfill its technical mandate, he observed. 
Smith reminded the P5 1 that the Board has required such 
cooperation and compliance of Iran in the past. 
 
P5 1 Experts Meeting in Vienna 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Deniau reported that PolDirs had agreed to the idea 
of a French-hosted P5 1 experts meeting in Vienna, and 
suggested May 26-27, which would coincide with the expected 
release of the DG's report on May 23.  (Note: The French 
Mission has since sent invitations.  End Note.)  Rood 
observed that expert consultations in Vienna would reinforce 
the perception that the P5 1 were working together.  Experts 
should focus in particular on weaponization, which goes to 
the heart of the matter, and support the Secretariat. 
 
¶11. (C) China flagged practical issues with getting Austrian 
visas in time for the meeting.  More constructively, Liu 
suggested that calling the expert consultations the "Second 
Experts Meeting on the Iran Nuclear Issue," following up on a 
similar meeting in June 2007, would help Beijing grasp the 
format and expectations of the meeting.  Deniau clarified 
that the purpose of the meeting would be to take stock of 
developments since last year.  Charge suggested that the 
Secretariat could also be brought into the discussion on the 
sidelines of the experts' meeting.   Deniau further advised 
P5 1 counterparts to not discount Iran's technical capacity 
and the sense of urgency associated with the Iran file.  Rood 
agreed that we should not take this for granted and allow 
Iran time to master enrichment. 
 
Comment: Prospects for a Resolution 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) The Russian position has not changed since the P5 1 
meeting in Vienna (reftel).  Absent agreement at the PolDir 
level, we see little prospect for a P5 1-sponsored Board 
resolution in June.  We also have seen no enthusiasm on the 
part of the EU3 to sponsor a resolution on their own. 
 
¶13. (S) A P5 1 sponsored resolution would have the best 
prospect for passage on the Board, and may command consensus. 
 NAM and Arab resistance could be overcome given the current 
composition of the Board, particularly if we can bring South 
Africa and the Arab states along.  South Africa is the only 
NAM standard bearer on the Board and could call for a vote. 
South Africa shares our concerns on weaponization (and said 
so in the March Board), but in a recent discussion, Governor 
Minty was unenthusiastic about a resolution, telling Charge 
that calls for cooperation from the likes of South Africa and 
Egypt are a better way to maintain pressure on Iran. 
 
¶14. (S) A non-P5 1-sponsored resolution would clearly have a 
tougher road.  It could take the form of an EU-3 sponsored 
(as in the past) or other like-minded-sponsored resolution, 
in the hopes of eventually dragging along Russia and China. 
Abstentions by Russia and China, however, would open the 
spigot for other Board members to follow suit.  If we are 
concerned about P5 1 unity, a like-minded country such as 
Canada could front a resolution in lieu of the EU-3. 
Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire is willing to do so, 
if the EU-3 raise no objections.  Australia would also likely 
be disposed to take a leadership role. 
 
¶20. (S) Absent consensus, a Board resolution would have to 
garner a majority of those present and voting (abstentions 
don't count) in the 35-member Board to secure passage.  Of 
 
course, much will depend on the content of the resolution; 
the closer it hews to the DG report and supports the 
Secretariat, the more support it will get on the Board.  In 
the "yes" column, we can count the EU-3 and like-minded and 
the EU members/associated states:  Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, U.S., UK, Austria, Croatia, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania and Albania, totaling 14 votes.  Among those 
who could be readily persuaded, we would include most of 
GRULAC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador) along 
with Thailand, the Philippines, and less engaged African 
states: Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria (assuming they show up for a 
vote), for a total of another 10 votes.  We could include 
Switzerland in this column but they may well abstain.  The 
hardest sells will be: Russia, China, South Africa, India, 
Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and possibly Iraq, 
totaling 9 votes.  Bolivia must pay arrears to regain its 
voting rights and is hardly engaged on the Board. 
PYATT