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Viewing cable 08RIYADH708, SAUDIS ON ASSISTING IRAQ

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08RIYADH708 2008-05-01 11:21 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Riyadh
VZCZCXRO3011
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0708/01 1221121
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011121Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8319
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0655
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH IMMEDIATE 0014
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH IMMEDIATE 0014
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL IMMEDIATE 0008
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9516
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 RIYADH 000708 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARMENT PASS TO NEA/I AND NEA/ARP, BAGHDAD FOR 
SATTERFIELD, CETI AND MNF-I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018 
TAGS: CIA ECON EFIN IR IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PHUM PINR
PREL, SA 
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON ASSISTING IRAQ 
 
REF: RIYADH 649 
 
RIYADH 00000708  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY. Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq 
and Economic Minister-Counselor Ambassador Charles Ries and a 
delegation from Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, and NEA-I visited the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 28-30 to discuss channeling 
$500 million of SAG funding for humanitarian assistance 
through the Commanders, Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
and press for progress on debt relief negotiations before the 
President's visit to the Kingdom, and the International 
Compact ministerial on May 29.  The delegation met with 
Deputy FinMin Hamid al-Baz,y on 4/28, Foreign Minister 
Prince Saud al-Faisal on 4/29, and General Intelligence 
Services President Prince Muqrin and FinMin Ibrahim al-Assaf 
on 4/30, accompanied by PolCouns, PolOff, and TreasOff. 
Ambassador Fraker attended the meeting with FinMin al-Assaf, 
and DCM Gfoeller joined the meeting with Prince Muqrin. 
 
2. (S) Each SAG official thanked the USG for offering the SAG 
a proposal detailing a mechanism to quickly and transparently 
deliver assistance to Iraq and noted that helping Iraq's 
people remains of paramount importance to the SAG.  Prince 
Saud and Dr. Baz,y expressed significant interest in the 
CERP proposal and the technical details of the program, while 
FinMin al-Assaf was more circumspect, recommending the 
delegation meet with General Intelligence Service President 
Prince Muqrin.  Prince Muqrin took the idea in stride, 
positively noting that he had also formed a committee of 
Saudis to consider how to provide assistance.  SAG 
interlocutors all delivered the same message regarding debt 
relief - the SAG is committed to provide relief, but the 
total debt amount owed must first be negotiated, and a GOI 
technical team must come prepared with documentation.  The 
SAG would welcome a visit by the GOI technical team for 
negotiations before the International Compact ministerial at 
the end of May.  As for the SAG contributing funds, discussed 
at $500M, for the USG to utilize in Iraq, all the Saudis were 
receptive and willing to discuss implementation of this 
proposal.  END SUMMARY 
 
PROGRESS IN IRAQ, KSA CAN HELP 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (S) Ambassador Ries explained to each SAG interlocutor 
that the purpose of his visit to the KSA was to follow up on 
the earlier visit of Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and 
MNF-I CG GEN David Petraeus (Reftel), whom the President 
instructed to explore how the KSA can serve its national 
interests by doing more for Iraq.  Amb. Ries described how, 
as the areas requiring kinetic operations have receded due to 
the surge, and more importantly, the Sunni Awakening 
Movement, the economic situation in Iraq has improved.  He 
discussed improvements in areas such as economic growth, oil 
production and export, electricity, and agriculture and 
described the transition in USG assistance away from 
reconstruction.  Amb. Ries continued by describing political 
progress, including the unifying impact on Iraq's political 
factions from PM Maliki,s recent operations in Basrah. 
Noting that he would welcome the opening of a Saudi Embassy 
in Iraq, he then stressed that there are two areas where the 
KSA can really be of assistance even before the SAG is ready 
to open an embassy in Baghdad: humanitarian assistance and 
debt relief. 
 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
----------------------- 
 
4. (S) Ambassador Ries noted that Iraq is not an easy place 
 
RIYADH 00000708  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
to do business, especially for NGOs and international 
organizations like the World Bank, but after five years in 
Iraq, the USG has a lot of expertise, and with 160,000 troops 
in country, can securely and effectively deliver assistance 
throughout Iraq.  He noted the positive results the U.S. 
forces have had both militarily and in terms of delivering 
economic assistance.  In recognition of this and its own 
capacity constraints, the GOI has recently transferred $300 
million of its own funds to the U.S. Commanders, Emergency 
Response Program (CERP). 
 
5. (S) It was highlighted that the USG is prepared to work 
out procedures to channel SAG funds through either the CERP 
in Iraq or an agreement according to section 607 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act, if the SAG is interested.  Both 
approaches would prevent leakage of funds to other 
intermediaries, and the CERP, in particular, would allow for 
quick implementation of projects with minimum overhead costs. 
 Amb Ries recommended an initial SAG allocation of $500 
million.  In the meeting with Dr. Baz,y, Amb. Ries stressed 
that the USG envisions this assistance would be in addition 
to Saudi Arabia's $1 billion Madrid Conference pledge and 
noted that the USG would still like to see that assistance 
disbursed eventually. 
 
6. (S) Discussion included how the GOI has designated certain 
sectors on which its CERP funds should be used and how the 
SAG would have the same choice.  It was added that SAG funds 
should be used on projects that benefit all segments of the 
Iraqi population and which assist with humanitarian needs. 
Amb. Ries provided each SAG interlocutor with a list of 
sample projects that the SAG could fund through CERP.  At the 
request of Dr. Baz,y, the delegation also provided a paper 
describing CERP to Minister al-Assaf.  On a technical level, 
the delegation explained that a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) would be necessary, the USG would have to disclose the 
funding to Congress, and the USG and SAG will also need to 
discuss how to transfer SAG funds. 
 
7. (S) Dr. Baz,y conveyed that Iraq is important to the SAG, 
and it wants to see a safe, secure, prosperous country. 
However, he noted there are complex political elements that 
must be worked out.  He repeated that Iraq is rich in both 
human and natural resources several times, but said that 
Saudi assistance funding channeled through CERP is an idea 
worthy of study.  He said it was important to first 
understand the program and then present the idea to more 
senior SAG authorities.  In response to Dr. 
Baz'y's inquiry for more details about CERP, including 
whether the delegation had anything written on it, CERP 
contracting mechanisms, who the contractors are, who prepares 
project specifications, and whether there is a limit on the 
size of projects, the delegation described in detail these 
aspects of the program. 
 
8. (S) Prince Saud also expressed a strong interest in this 
Saudi-CERP proposal, repeating Dr. Baz'y,s view that the SAG 
needs to seriously study it.  Prince Saud said that the SAG 
wanted to help Iraqis, but the security situation prevented 
delivery of assistance.  He repeatedly stated that if the 
CERP mechanism is the best way to quickly assist the Iraqi 
people, then the SAG should consider it.  Adding, he 
appreciated the outreach and that it was very kind of the USG 
to think of ways for the SAG,s assistance to reach the Iraqi 
people.  Prince Saud emphasized that the SAG does not seek 
publicity when it gives aid and noted, "We are not trying to 
make Saudi Arabia popular in Iraq; we are trying to make the 
Iraqis popular with each other."  He expressed the belief 
that the proposed humanitarian projects could provide Iraqis 
a small sense of what life could be like with political 
reconciliation. 
 
RIYADH 00000708  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
9. (S) Prince Saud was also interested in the technical 
details of the CERP program and USG reconstruction efforts. 
He inquired about efforts to provide electricity and lure 
back engineers and doctors to Iraq, asking for confirmation 
that the assistance would be delivered by the U.S. military 
and about the sectoral and geographic allocation of projects. 
 Prince Saud also wanted to know about CERP contracting, 
including whether the program uses local contractors, and how 
other donors deliver their humanitarian assistance to Iraq. 
Amb. Ries noted that, based on the present circumstances in 
Iraq, CERP has an advantage over other assistance mechanisms 
because it is managed by local U.S. commanders in Iraq.  In 
addition, Prince Saud wanted assurance that the GOI approved 
of SAG funds being channeled through CERP.  Amb. Ries 
responded that there was agreement among senior GOI officials 
to pursue this proposal. 
 
10. (S) FinMin al-Assaf displayed less overt enthusiasm for 
the proposal.  Although noting that the proposal is 
interesting, he recommended that the delegation discuss the 
idea with Prince Muqrin, as Prince Muqrin would know the most 
about how to provide assistance efficiently.  Nonetheless, 
al-Assaf also thanked the USG for offering this assistance 
channel to the SAG.  He said that Iraq has lost many years of 
development and hoped that it would use its new oil windfall 
to promote economic growth, stressing that the welfare and 
well-being of the Iraqi people is of great interest to the 
KSA.  Al-Assaf stated "Nothing is more important to us than 
having a vibrant, stable country to our north.  Everyone 
knows the problems to the east of Iraq."  He highlighted he 
would be meeting World Bank President Zoellick later the same 
day and would discuss how the World Bank can overcome 
security issues and implement projects in Iraq.  He noted 
that the SAG remains interested in assisting Iraq directly as 
well as opening direct trade links. 
 
11. (S) In a later meeting with Prince Muqrin, he stressed 
that the SAG wants money to go to the Iraqi people and wants 
them to know it is from the KSA.  He said that he had formed 
a committee of Saudis, led by the former head of the Red 
Crescent, to determine how to most effectively deliver a 
large sum of money to needy Iraqis.  He gave the committee a 
month to prepare a report, which he expects soon.  He said 
that the SAG wants assistance to reach all Iraqi groups, with 
a particular concern for refugees, both inside and outside 
the country.  Other priorities would be orphans, widows, 
displaced persons, and "unemployed, qualified persons." 
 
12. (S) Prince Muqrin explained that Saudi King Abdullah 
al-Aziz (who he referred to as "my boss") was reluctant to 
engage Iraq and refers to it as the "Iraqi swamp."  However, 
that view has begun to change, as the SAG has become 
concerned that in the future, Iraqis will ask what their 
large, rich neighbor did for them during the period of crisis 
and the answer will be nothing.  Prince Muqrin said he was 
instructed not to use the Red Crescent Society as a 
distribution channel for Saudi assistance, and that he should 
coordinate closely with the Americans.  The SAG is also 
willing to coordinate with the GOI as necessary.  Prince 
Muqrin insisted that any assistance be transparent and free 
of fraud and repeated that Iraqis must know it is from the 
KSA, though not through flags and propaganda.  He stressed 
that he would like to see the assistance come back in the 
form of business opportunities for Saudi companies in Iraq. 
 
13. (S) Amb. Ries responded that the delegation was aware of 
the conversations Prince Muqrin has already had with other 
senior USG officials regarding assistance and wanted to offer 
this as one channel for the SAG to consider.  He asked Prince 
Muqrin how he wanted to proceed.  Prince Muqrin said he would 
 
RIYADH 00000708  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
share the draft MOU and CERP description provided by the 
delegation with his committee for consideration.  He will 
then share his committee's findings and proposals with the 
USG.  Prince Muqrin said he was meeting King Abdullah 
immediately following the meeting and would discuss the ideas 
with the King. 
 
DEBT RELIEF 
----------- 
 
14. (S) Amb. Ries summarized the SAG,s previously stated 
commitments to provide debt relief for Iraq on Paris 
Club-comparable terms.  He emphasized that it is important to 
clean up Iraq's balance sheet so that it can participate 
fully in the global financial system.  Amb. Ries mentioned 
that the USG wants to see a reinvigorated dialogue on debt 
relief, including possible technical negotiations, prior to 
the International Compact ministerial in Stockholm on May 29. 
 He added that an early conclusion to a debt relief agreement 
would be mutually beneficial to Iraq and the KSA, and the USG 
would like to wrap up the debt issue before the end of the 
year. 
 
15. (S) Dr. Baz,y noted that the SAG and GOI technical teams 
have held four meetings to discuss the amount of the debt, 
which remains the critical outstanding issue.  In contrast to 
the readouts from the Iraqi technical team, Baz,y described 
the most recent meeting in September 2007 as "constructive." 
He said that the SAG technical team is always ready to meet 
and expressed hope that a technical meeting could happen 
before May 29.  He asked whether the GOI team has specific 
dates in mind for the visit.  Amb. Ries replied that the 
delegation from Baghdad could work with the GOI to propose 
dates.  In response to Amb. Ries, suggestion to meet in a 
third country to avoid visa problems for the Iraqis, Baz,y 
claimed that coming to Riyadh is not that difficult.  Baz,y 
also said documentation about the debt amount is in the hands 
of the Iraqis when Amb. Ries raised the possibility of 
providing the USG the documents in order to assist with the 
negotiations. 
 
16. (S) Prince Saud repeated many of Dr. Baz'y,s assertions 
regarding debt relief.  He noted that the discussion about 
debt relief has "gone on and on," but the most recent 
negotiations had been positive.  He said the two sides would 
set up a time to finalize negotiations on the interest, which 
should finish quickly, adding that the Iraqis now have the 
documents.  Prince Saud highlighted that he had given a 
public commitment to provide Paris Club-comparable debt 
relief to Iraq; the parties just need to get down to business 
and finalize it. 
 
17. (S) FinMin al-Assaf made the same remarks about debt 
relief.  He said that the Iraqis have the documentation, and 
the important issue to resolve is the actual principal.  He 
said he was ready to welcome the GOI technical team but 
wanted the GOI to come prepared to discuss details.  He added 
that the SAG has announced its commitment to debt relief, but 
the debt amount is larger and more complicated than for other 
creditors.  He said he was not sure that the issues could be 
resolved before the International Compact Ministerial, but 
that a technical meeting could take place.  Al-Assaf claimed 
that during a bilateral meeting in Washington on April 11, 
Treasury Deputy Secretary Kimmitt told him that the GOI would 
provide a proposal on debt relief soon.  He said he looked 
forward to seeing the proposal.  Ambassador Ries replied that 
he would convey the SAG,s willingness to move forward to 
Iraqi Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr and that the SAG wants 
the GOI to provide a proposal and come to a technical meeting 
with supporting documentation. 
 
 
RIYADH 00000708  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND SAUDI EMBASSY IN IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
18. (S) Prince Saud lamented that so much suffering could 
befall Iraq, adding, "Everything seems to go askew in Iraq. 
Good intentions do not achieve their objective, while bad 
intentions do."  He said that reconciliation is not possible 
without the Marja,iya, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali 
al-Sistani, joining the fray.  He implored the USG to "be 
good imperialists" by forcing Sistani to condemn the militias 
and violence, arguing that Sistani can affect reconciliation 
more than anyone.  Prince Saud said that the Shiites in Iraq 
should "return some of the favor you have done them."  He 
concluded that he hoped to see a repeat of the Emperor of 
Japan's call on General MacArthur in his office with a visit 
by Sistani to General Petraeus, office. 
 
19. (S) Prince Saud also stressed that even if the SAG opened 
an embassy in Baghdad, it would not be able to help Iraqis. 
While the SAG will have more contact with the Iraqis, 
including through visits and more Arab League meetings, 
opening an embassy would be very difficult.  He said that the 
risk of losing diplomats was too high, and the SAG would be 
"sending young people to their death."  Prince Saud expressed 
that the USG no doubt understands how unpalatable this is. 
Amb. Ries replied that while security in Baghdad remains a 
difficult challenge, he and other members of the USG 
delegation felt safe enough to live and work there.  Prince 
Saud remarked that they are "brave people" and thanked them 
for their service in behalf of the Iraqi people. 
 
20. (S) Prince Muqrin also emphasized the risks to a Saudi 
ambassador in Baghdad.  He rhetorically asked what good an 
ambassador would be if he were locked in the International 
Zone all day.  Amb. Ries explained that the USG has a lot of 
experience providing security to its ambassadors in Iraq and 
could speak with the Saudis regarding the problem of 
organizing a robust security system.  He noted that Coalition 
Forces provide helicopter support to help many countries, 
ambassadors move around the country.  He also noted that the 
presence of many senior GOI officials in the International 
Zone allows diplomats to accomplish significant amounts of 
work. 
 
SECURITY PROGRESS 
----------------- 
 
21. (S) The delegation updated Prince Muqrin on many of the 
improvements in security and recent kinetic operations, 
reviewing the progress expelling al-Qaeda in Iraq from Anbar 
Province and other areas, formation of Sons of Iraq in many 
communities, reduction in military and civilian deaths, the 
decline in attacks, decreases in ethno-sectarian violence, 
Iraqi Security Force improvements and continuing challenges, 
and operations against the Special Groups of the Jaysh 
al-Mahdi that are committing criminal acts, particularly in 
Basra and Baghdad's Sadr City.  Prince Muqrin welcomed the 
briefing.  Regarding ethno-sectarian violence, he cautioned 
the USG not to underestimate the role of revenge in Arab 
society.  He claimed, "The revenge business is still going as 
strong as ever." 
 
COMMENT - SAUDIS MOVING WITH US ON IRAQ 
--------------------------------------- 
 
22. (S) After over a year of not wanting to even discuss Iraq 
with us, the Saudis are certainly moving forward with us in 
this regard.  That this working level delegation was so 
well-received and that these extremely senior SAG officials 
were so receptive to our proposals for Iraqi debt relief and 
providing Saudi funds to be utilized through U.S. CERP was 
 
RIYADH 00000708  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
telling.  The Saudis now recognize that Iraq's situation is 
improving, although they remain reluctant to actually open 
their Embassy in Baghdad.  While they retain their suspicions 
of Iraqi Prime Minister of Nuri al-Maliki, they see our 
proposals as effective steps forward in stabilizing their 
Iraqi neighbor while also countering Iran. 
FRAKER