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Viewing cable 08RABAT489, SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WARD TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08RABAT489 2008-05-23 18:31 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0489/01 1441831
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231831Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8635
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 4794
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 9632
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T RABAT 000489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TUNIS PLS PASS GENERAL WARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018 
TAGS: OVIP WARD WILLIAM MARR PREL PTER MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WARD TO 
MOROCCO 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  General Ward, we are looking forward to 
your visit to Morocco.  Since your last visit in February 
2007, our governments have become even closer.  Continuing 
close military-to-military cooperation, with a flourishing 
training/exercise program, was highlighted by Morocco,s 
agreement to purchase 24 F-16s and other U.S. equipment, 
which will tie us closely for another generation.  We are 
working on Acquisition and Cross Serving (ACSA) and Status of 
Forces (SOFA) Agreements and would appreciate your mentioning 
them.  Foreign Military Financing (FMF), however, remains 
under threat.  On the economic side, we have doubled 
bilateral trade and signed a Millennium Challenge Account 
Compact--promising almost USD 700 million for development 
projects over the next five years.  Politically, the U.S. 
strongly endorsed the Moroccan autonomy proposal to resolve 
the Western Sahara dispute in the ongoing UN-sponsored talks. 
 This support on their number one international issue was 
much appreciated by the Government of Morocco (GOM), and 
helped embolden them to extend a hand to rival Algeria and to 
propose opening their closed border.  We are now asking them 
to take some concrete measures to build confidence. 
 
2.  (C) The GOM was initially skeptical about AFRICOM.  In 
recent months, it has been coming to terms with AFRICOM,s 
establishment but remains concerned about any physical 
presence in Africa.  It will be useful for you to reassure 
them that there are no plans to move AFRICOM out of Stuttgart 
in the near term, while stressing the advantages the 
increased focus of AFRICOM could bring on the bilateral 
front.  One area of sensitivity is counterterrorism.  The GOM 
has a good handle on both enforcement and efforts to counter 
extremism and, unlike others, keep its own military far from 
the issue.  It would be best to avoid pushing a U.S. military 
role on this in Morocco.  In contrast, there may be scope to 
enhance Morocco,s role in international peacekeeping.  End 
summary. 
 
United States-Moroccan Military Relationship 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) U.S. Military Engagement:  Military cooperation 
between the USG and GOM is improving.  In addition to joint 
training and exercises, such as the annual "African Lion" 
exercise, PHOENIX EXPRESS, and a handful of JCETs, both 
foreign affairs and military officials recently signaled a 
desire for strengthening military relations.  The Royal 
Moroccan Air Force has requested the revival of MAJESTIC 
EAGLE, an annual air exercise that the U.S. suspended due to 
OIF and OEF commitments in 2003.  Morocco has indicated it 
would participate in Operation Active Endeavor--although 
substantial engagement in the operation may take years. 
According to a senior military advisor in the MFA, the GOM 
wants to improve its relations with NATO and pursue a NATO 
Individual Cooperation Program.  In addition to its 
peacekeeping deployments in Africa, Morocco has under NATO 
hats, more than 200 troops deployed in Kosovo with KFOR.  Any 
contribution AFRICOM could make to this effort might be well 
received.  We could also consider how to encourage an 
increase in Moroccan peacekeeping capacity and engagement. 
 
4.  (C) Inspector General of the Armed Forces General Bennani 
(who serves as the CHOD, with the King as formal Commander in 
Chief) recently pledged to sign the Acquisition and Cross 
Service Agreement (ACSA) with the USG on or before the 
Defense Consultative Committee meeting in mid-June in Rabat. 
In addition, the Embassy has tabled a draft Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) but has not yet received any comments.  We 
would appreciate your underscoring our interest: 
 
-- in finalizing the ACSA, which would facilitate their 
pending purchases and 
 
-- in receiving their comments on the draft SOFA.  Washington 
is ready to send a high-level team to review the draft with 
them and hold preliminary discussions.  (We are prepared for 
negotiations, but Washington sees no need to push them far at 
this stage.) 
 
5.  (SBU) Recent Military Purchases:  Morocco's thriving 
security relationship with the U.S. has also been reflected 
by Morocco's September decision to purchase 24 F-16 fighters, 
 
over French Rafael aircraft, for USD 2.1 billion--the single 
largest bilateral military purchase by the GOM from the 
United States.  In addition, Morocco has recently agreed to 
purchase 24 T-6 trainer aircraft from the U.S. for an 
additional USD 200 million.  It is also looking at armor and 
other materiel, principally through Excess Defense Articles 
(EDA).  The Moroccans may express their concern at declining 
levels of FMF, which has declined from approximately USD 15 
million in FY05 to a USD 3.6 million request for FY 08.  In 
the past much of the FMF was used to supplement or finance 
EDA transfers. 
 
AFRICOM 
------- 
 
6.  (C) After initial resistance, Morocco has begun to accept 
the formation of a regional command for Africa.  Overall, the 
tone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the 
Ministry of Defense on AFRICOM basing in Africa has been, at 
best, cautious, given strong popular disapproval of the U.S. 
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The current Moroccan 
posture appears to be a reflection of the GOM's desire to 
accommodate U.S. policy--in keeping with Morocco's excellent 
military cooperation in most other areas--and a need to not 
move too far beyond Moroccan public opinion.  Even our 
military interlocutors have recently said that given the 
negative image of the United States because of its policies 
in the region, Morocco will have to wait until after the U.S. 
presidential elections before considering hosting any kind of 
AFRICOM element.  We have also heard criticism from Moroccan 
diplomatic and military leaders of AFRICOM's planned 
sub-regional orientation.  An MFA official who attended the 
African dialogue conference in March of this year opined that 
most African countries believed AFRICOM should remain 
off-continent and emphasize bilateral relations with 
countries, not sub-regional African groups. 
 
On AFRICOM you could productively: 
 
-- reassure Moroccans that the headquarters will remain in 
Germany through at least the next year. 
 
-- focus on concrete efforts AFRICOM could take in the 
bilateral relationship, including enhanced engagement and 
technical assistance, including for their efforts to engage 
with NATO. 
 
7.  (S) Moroccan Relations with Africa:  Morocco has been 
engaged in its foreign relations on the African continent in 
terms of supplying peacekeepers, supporting diplomatic 
initiatives and providing developmental assistance.  Much of 
these efforts are directed at gaining African support on the 
Western Sahara dispute.  Morocco currently has over 1,500 
troops deployed to UN operations in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Cote d,Ivoire and historically has been a 
significant contributor of forces for UN operations on the 
continent.  Morocco has also played a significant role in 
bringing together leaders of the Mano River region, i.e., 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, to discuss 
cooperation and border security.  Recently, the GOM reached 
out to Zimbabwe,s opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. 
Lastly, Morocco touts its support to African countries 
through a range of modest assistance programs. 
 
Regional and International Issues 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Border Troubles with Algeria:  The Moroccan 
relationship with Algeria remains tense and the border 
between the two countries remains closed.  Although 
possessing common languages and some ethno-cultural roots, 
the two countries have evolved in politically divergent 
directions.  Territorial tensions began shortly after 
Algerian independence, when a dispute over the demarcation of 
the border between the two countries in 1963 led to a brief 
period of hostilities known as the Desert (or Sand) War.  For 
the last 30 years, a major bone of contention has been the 
Western Sahara issue and Algerian support for the self 
-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and its 
political and military leadership, the POLISARIO Front.  The 
Moroccan purchase of F-16's was apparently motivated by the 
sense of threat from a previous Algerian purchase of advanced 
aircraft from Russia.  In March, Morocco publicly proposed 
 
opening the border between the two countries, which was 
quickly rebuffed by the Government of Algeria (GOA).  Morocco 
subsequently made a second private, then public proposal to 
upgrade bilateral dialogue, to which there has not yet been a 
public response from Algeria.  In the interim, the two Prime 
Ministers met, in their role as leaders of the parties that 
took the North African states to independence, the highest 
level encounter in years, but with little broader impact. 
 
9.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  Moroccan foreign policy is 
dominated by defending and seeking political recognition of 
its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  The issue 
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria, 
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest 
efforts for independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum. 
 The issue provoked Morocco to leave the African Union and 
helped block regional integration through the Arab Maghreb 
Union.  Approximately one year ago, Morocco proposed a new 
autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of 
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO began in 
Manhasset, New York.  This proposal, deemed "serious and 
credible" by the USG, would provide Sahrawis--indigenous 
people of Western Sahara--autonomy in administering local 
affairs while respecting Moroccan sovereignty over the 
territory.  After the recent renewal of the mandate of the UN 
peacekeeping mission, the U.S. announced we considered the 
independence option for the territory, "not realistic," which 
was appreciated by the GOM. 
 
Terrorism and Extremism 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (S) Terrorism:  The Moroccan public shares broader Arab 
frustrations, magnified by pan-Arab satellite channels, over 
continued violence in the Israeli-Palestinian theater and 
Iraq.  These frustrations have helped fuel a terrorist threat 
in Morocco, manifested in failed suicide bombings that shook 
Casablanca in May 2003 and targeted the U.S. Consulate in 
Casablanca and the private American Language Center in April 
2007.  Nonetheless, the Moroccans have been relatively 
successful at containing this threat to stability. 
U.S.-Morocco counterterrorism cooperation is robust and has 
led to tangible successes in preempting attacks and shutting 
down cells.  Morocco has been pursuing an interdisciplinary 
approach in confronting the terror threat.  In addition to 
pursuing vigorous law enforcement and intelligence operations 
against known and suspected terrorists, the GOM has worked 
with some success to disrupt radical recruitment by 
encouraging tolerant and moderating precepts of Islam and 
diminishing economic and social marginalization through a 
robust economic development policy.  Existing U.S. engagement 
in cooperative efforts in these areas will continue, and we 
are seeking additional funding to support counter extremism 
and deradicalization programs, including through Section 1210 
and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 
to include a program directed at radicalization in prisons. 
 
11.  (C) It is important to note, however, that partly due to 
the monarchy's longstanding suspicions of the military and 
tight controls on it, the armed forces here have no real 
counterterrorism role.  As a result, U.S. military engagement 
on this issue is not viewed with enthusiasm, whether on 
enforcement or counter extremism.  Moroccan units that have 
trained with U.S. Special Forces during JCETs have indicated 
that there is a proposal to grant the military some role in 
counterterrorism operations.  It would be beneficial if you 
asked General Bennani about the military,s intentions to 
assume this type of mission. 
 
Moroccan Government, Politics, and Economics 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Governance:  King Mohammed VI rules as well as 
reigns.  Morocco's Constitution and reality ascribe to the 
Palace the balance of political power.  The King has made 
significant political reforms, including relative freedom of 
expression, advances on human rights, and enhanced legal 
protections for women, particularly through bold revisions to 
the family law code in 2004, which are controversial with 
conservative Islamists.  Partly as a result of this reform 
record, public support for the King and his reform agenda is 
generally solid. 
 
13.  (SBU) Parliament and Political Reform:  The September 
2007 legislative elections were certified as free and 
transparent by a team of international monitors (funded by 
the USG).  In the elections, the Islamists performed below 
expectations but lead the opposition as the second largest 
bloc in parliament.  The elections were marred by a record 
low turnout, broadly seen as a reflection of low public 
confidence in the Parliament and political parties.  To 
address this, for the past few years, the USG has been 
funding capacity building programs for the Parliament and 
parties. 
 
14.  (SBU) Economics and Trade:  The economy is relatively 
robust with growing foreign investment and remittances, 
increasing tourism and a booming stock market, marred by 
increasing disparities in wealth.  Since implementation of 
our Free Trade Agreement on January 1, 2006, bilateral 
commerce has roughly doubled, Moroccan exports to the U.S. 
have increased 38 percent, and U.S. exports to Morocco have 
increased 155 percent.  However, Morocco still looks 
economically to Europe first.  Agriculture remains the sector 
that determines whether GDP rises or falls.  In  2007, 
drought and a small crop limited economic growth to only 2.3 
percent, but better, if still below average rain and crops 
this year should revive growth.  Rising food prices have 
quickly become a principal domestic issue for Morocco, 
sparking sporadic protests.  The Government will continue to 
subsidize basic goods, remembering the food price riots of 
the 80's and 90's that threatened the stability of the nation. 
 
15.  (SBU) U.S. Assistance:  We are focusing our assistance 
to Morocco on four priorities:  counterterrorism, economic 
growth, democracy and governance, and supporting quality 
education.  One of the many tools to be used will be the 
Millennium Challenge Account Compact with Morocco wherein USD 
697.5 million will be provided over the next five years to 
support economic growth and reduce poverty. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
***************************************** 
 
Riley